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Abstract
This dissertation begins with Lefebvre’s theoretical framework that space is a
social product and provides a brief account of the plans and road networks
established with John Graves Simcoe’s founding of York (now Toronto).
Foucault’s arguments about gridded street systems and early forms of policing
are then introduced to explain the intentions and desires associated with the
gridded street pattern of Toronto. Foucault’s theory of governmentality is argued
to be the marking of a limit rather than a strict prohibition, and is a specifically
urban practice. Lacan’s graph of desire and Lacanian concepts such as
jouissance, enjoyment, transference, and love are then introduced to continue
this discussion of the problem of limits in contemporary urban everyday life. The
overriding questions addressed here are, “What do we desire from the city?” and,
“What do we think the city wants from us?” The historical formation of cities and
the central writers and movements in urban planning are then interpreted through
Lacan’s ‘four discourses.’ Generally, early ‘organic’ urban spaces are understood
through the master’s discourse, Frederick Law Olmsted, Ebenezer Howard, and
Le Corbusier represent the shift to the university’s discourse, while Jane Jacobs
is presented as within the analyst’s discourse. The reading of Jacobs also shows
her to be primarily concerned with the economic aspects of cities. A deeper
analysis of Lefebvre’s theories, along with Manuel Castells’ theory of the ‘space
of flows’ and ‘timeless time,’ are then used to tie together the problem of desire
and spatial arrangement through a discussion of the implications of mobile
communication, ‘Big Data,’ and the ‘internet of things’ on urban life with
theoretical support from Simmel.
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INTRODUCTION
The last ten or fifteen years have seen an increasing rise of interest in cities.
Throughout this period, nearly every publication on cities begins with the statistic
that the majority of the world’s populations now live in urban areas, and that this
trend is expected to continue. In 2000, Manuel Castells suggested there have
only been two stages of urban sociology, three if you count the latest: “a deep
silence.”1 The first wave of the Chicago School (Robert Park, Louis Wirth, and
others) employed an early version of what is now known as ‘quantitative’ analysis
to understand and support social ‘integration’ within cities.2 In the 1960s and 70s,
a new framework of ‘conflict’ was introduced to understand the competing
interests of various groups within cities.3 This new ‘school’ of thought was not
particularly unified, but from their shared Marxist perspective, two main themes
arose: the right to the city 4 and the production of space.5 Since then, Castells
insists that urban sociology has only been a rehashing of these old debates and
largely silent on new forms of urban life.6 However, cities themselves have grown
and become more complex, and it has been other disciplines and interests that
have taken the city as an object of study. Beyond the Marxist ‘everyday life’
tradition, one is more likely to find accounts of urban life by those who study

1

Manuel Castells, “Conclusion” in The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory, ed. Ida
Susser (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 393.
2

Notable publications include: Robert E. Park, “The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of
Behavior in the City Environment,” American Journal of Sociology 20 (1915): 579–83; Robert E.
Park, Ernest Burgess, Roderick McKenzie, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1925); Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life: The City and Contemporary Civilization,”
American Journal of Sociology 44 (1938): 1–24.
3

These thinkers are well-documented in Andy Merrifield, Metromarxism: A Marxist Tale of the City
(New York: Routledge, 2002).
4

Henri Lefebvre, Le droit à la ville (Paris: Anthropos, 1968). English translation: Henri Lefebvre,
“The Right to the City” in Writings on Cities, ed. and trans. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 147–159. This work has been taken up by David Harvey. See David
Harvey, “The Right to the City,” New Left Review 53 (Sept–Oct 2008): 23–40.
5

Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991).
6

Castells, “Conclusion,” 393.

!

Introduction!

2

contemporary culture (much of which is within the Marxist, ‘conflict’ tradition),7
contemporary economy (such as Castells, Edward Glaeser,8

and Richard

Florida,9), or in the eviscerations of American suburbia.10 Though more than half
the population lives in urban areas, for the most part, cities are not currently
considered an important object of analysis in academia.11 While urban sociology
is no longer suffering the “deep silence” that Castells diagnoses, but is still
largely quiet, much of the contemporary discourse around cities is largely defined
by those seeking to ‘boost the local economy’ or ‘attract talent.’ This dissertation
seeks to be another voice out of this “deep silence” with a critique the economic
discourse, an interrogation of the traditional history of urbanism, and provide an
alternative methodology to theorize everyday urban life.
!

Coincidentally, also during this period in which Castells argues there was a

“deep silence” in urban sociology, multiple disciplines have endured a rising
interest in (and perhaps an annoyance with) Lacanian psychoanalysis. Since
1990, much of this is due to Slavoj Žižek’s work, which presents arguments and
7

For example: Henri Lefebvre, The Critique of Everyday Life (3 vols.), trans. John Moore and
Gregory Elliot (London: Verso, 2008); Henri Lefebvre Everyday Life in the Modern World, trans.
Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Transaction, 1984); Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday
Life, trans. Steven Rendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
8

Edward Glaeser, Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter,
Greener, Healthier, and Happier (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).
9

Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure,
Community, and Everyday Life (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
10

By far, the most influential of these is James Howard Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere:
The Rise and Decline of America’s Man-Made Landscape (New York: Touchstone, 1993). For
similarly themed books on Toronto, see: John Sewell, The Shape of the City: Toronto Struggles
with Modern Planning (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); John Sewell, The Shape of
the Suburbs: Understanding Toronto’s Sprawl (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); and
Lawrence Solomon, Toronto Sprawls: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).
11

I realize this is a contentious claim and it may have been more true at the end of the twentieth
century than now, which speaks to my opening argument about the increasing interest in cities.
However, consider that few, if any Political Science or Sociology undergraduate student is
required to take a course on cities. Canadian Political Science students are required to take at
least one course on Federal politics, and usually one on international relations – but not local
governance. Similarly, Sociology departments require students to take a variety of courses, but
not on cities even though they are the primary location of social relations. My point, and what
should be a concern, is that the discourse around cities has become largely dominated by
economists often ‘selling’ their prescriptions to, for example, local governments and Business
Improvement Areas.
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assertions that are, at first, counter-intuitive but linger with the reader, confronting
him or her with the possibility that he or she has had it all wrong. Lacanian
analysis is not without its detractors, and nor is it exempt from critique. To accept
insights from Lacanian psychoanalysis is to accept the existence of the
unconscious, which is an ‘object’ that cannot be measured, counted, or
quantified. And, even if one does accept the existence of the unconscious,
Lacanian analysis structures and defines its functions differently from other, more
traditional psychoanalytic and psychology frameworks. While Lacanian
psychoanalysis is, of course, concerned with individual subjects, it does not seek
to ‘develop the ego,’ but rather to demonstrate how the subject is a ‘barred
subject’ – always-already alienated from itself. Further, and this will become clear
why this important by the end of this dissertation, Lacanian psychoanalysis does
not seek to ‘cure’ the subject, but rather find ways to allow the subject to ‘traverse
the fantasy’ and even ‘enjoy’ their symptoms.
!

Adding to the confusion and frustration with Lacanian psychoanalysis is

the way in which Lacan presented his work. Lacan never wrote a ‘book’ in which
he sought to clearly explain his ideas and theories. There is a collection of
essays, published as Écrits, but these do little to satisfy the seemingly
reasonable question, “What is Lacan arguing?” Lacan’s work comes to us
primarily through a series of ‘seminars,’ which are in fact transcriptions of courses
he taught from 1953–1980, and not all of these have been published. Throughout
these seminars, we do find some of his main concepts and arguments clearly
articulated, but we also find an unrelenting series of puns, jokes, asides, and
provocations. After reading some of his work – how much depends on the
particular reader – one should inevitably encounter this frustration with his
apparent lack of clarity as one’s problem, not Lacan’s. From where does this
demand for ‘clarity’ come? Much like the analyst-analysand relationship, it is not
up to the analyst (Lacan) to provide all the answers. It is the analysand (the
reader) who, through transference, insists the analyst is the ‘subject supposed to
know.’

!
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In Žižek’s various applications of Lacanian theory we, again, find concepts

deployed to understand a wide range of issues and objects and, depending on
the issue or the object, come to have different meanings. Thus, in this
dissertation, I take care to explain my interpretations of Lacanian concepts and
themes. It is my hope that a reader unfamiliar with Lacanian theory will perhaps
learn something about Lacan and, more importantly, understand my Lacanianinfused arguments. As well, I hope that readers familiar with Lacan’s work will
find something of value in my interpretations and applications of his concepts and
theories.
!

Michael Gunder and Jean Hillier are two urban planners who have taken

up Lacan’s work to theorize the contemporary profession of urban planning.
Gunder and Hillier have published a series of articles beginning in 2003 12 and
more recently a book in 2009.13 Gunder and Hillier focus on contemporary
planning as a profession and the relationships between the planner, the space of
the plan, and the ‘stakeholders’ (i.e. affected residents and businesses).14 While
their articles and the book are interesting and ought to be required reading for
contemporary planning professionals, there is little overlap between their work
and what is presented here. They focus on the current profession of urban
planning and urban policy makers whereas this dissertation takes up Lacan’s
work to theorize central historical movements that sought to solve the problem of
the urban, as well as the social and political relations between contemporary
urban dwellers, and their interactions with the built environment – planned or not.
12

Michael Gunder, “Planning Policy Formation from a Lacanian Perspective,” International
Planning Studies 8, no. 4 (Nov 2003): 279–294.
13

Michael Gunder and Jean Hillier, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement
with Spatial Planning (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2009). Much of this book is drawn from their
previously published work, as noted in the book’s “Acknowledgements,” which lists twenty articles
and book chapters the authors had previously published.
14

For example: Michael Gunder, “Lacan, Planning and Urban Policy Formation,” Urban Policy
Research 23, no. 1 (March 2005): 87–107; Michael Gunder, “Shaping the Planner’s Ego-Ideal: A
Lacanian Interpretation of Planning Education,” Journal of Planning Education and Research 23:
299–311; Jean Hillier and Michael Gunder, “Not Over Your Dead Bodies! A Lacanian
Interpretation of Urban Planning Discourse and Practice,” Environment and Planning A 37 (2005):
1049–1066.
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Furthermore, Gunder and Hillier are writing for professional urban planners and
policy makers, not theorists or academics, and thus present a rather scaleddown, digestible interpretation of Lacan’s work. This is not to say their
interpretation of Lacan is incorrect or too simplified, but rather that they have a
different focus and a different imagined reader than I. For example, their book
Planning in Ten Words or Less takes up Lacan’s and Jacques Derrida’s theory of
language to argue that the central terms of contemporary urban planning (such
as sustainability, Smart Growth, risk, rationality, and planning) are “empty
signifiers,”15 whereas this dissertation makes only a few references to theories of
language.
!

This dissertation seeks to demonstrate how cities and urban space

become invested with the the Lacanian notion of the Other’s desire. That is, the
thoughts, plans, and behaviours of urbanists, urban planners, and urban dwellers
often take the city as an object that has its own desires and lacks. In other words,
we ask “What does the city want?” and “What does the city want from us?”16 In
many of Lacan’s writings and seminars, he uses the concept of the ‘Other’ (either
A or ) to indicate not simply another subject but a familial, juridical, mythical, or
religious order. In Žižek’s Lacanian theory, we are also presented with ‘the Big
Other,’ a ‘transcendental’ and unknown force that appears to structure and
control the coordinates of a subject’s ‘reality’ (the Symbolic).17 Thus, I argue ‘the
city’ is frequently and continually taken as the Other – a particular physical and
social structure with what appear to be its own demands and desires. Taking the
city as the Other’s desire is not in any way a normative prescription, nor a
15

Gunder and Hillier, Planning in Ten Words or Less. The argument and structure of the book is
clearly outlined on pages 1 and 2.
16

These questions are inspired by Lacan’s “Chè vuoi?” (What do you want?) which will be
discussed fully in Chapter 2. See: Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the
Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English,
trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
17

‘The Big Other’ is the phase Žižek uses to distinguish Lacan’s ‘Other’ from ‘the little
other’ (objet a). The Big Other often surfaces in everyday discourse as ‘they,’ as in, “Well, you
know what they say…” or, “They just do this so we have to pay more…” It should be clear that the
Other gains this status only because the subject or subjects invest it with this status, and so Žižek
repeatedly states there really is no Big Other.
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‘problem’ that needs to be ‘solved,’ but rather a diagnosis that this dissertation
will make clear. And I should be clear that I am not arguing that all discussions of
cities or urban planning must take this, or any, Lacanian methodology.
!

This dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach to discuss this theme

of the city as the Other’s desire. Thus, this work is more of a bricolage than the
presentation of a central thesis with a series of supporting arguments.18
However, that we take the city as the Other’s desire is, in fact, an argument and
the reader will find a whole series of sub-arguments and interpretations
throughout this work, which I will now outline.
!

Chapter 1 introduces Toronto as the primary city of analysis in this

dissertation by problematizing what we mean by ‘Toronto.’ The focus of this
chapter is the grid – the common street pattern of many cities, including the one
laid out by John Graves Simcoe when he ‘founded’ York (now Toronto). This
basic grid structure remains as the ‘backbone’ of Toronto: not just as the main
circulation routes but what gives Toronto its “texture” and largely underwrites the
way in which people give Toronto its “soul” or “personality.” 19 While many urban
writers recognize the importance of gridded street networks, few provide a theory
of the grid or discuss its implications. Michel Foucault, however, provides a
thorough and compelling account of gridded street systems of the eighteenth
century, the time of York’s founding. Foucault makes a strong connection
between the practice of urbanizing with the grid network and the role of police.
Foucault’s theory of grids, urbanization, and policing are presented to support a
deeper discussion of how this gridded network relates to governmentality, which I

18

I am using the term ‘bricolage’ as I interpret it from Derrida’s discussion of Claude Lévi-Stauss’
work: to use, in this case, theories, which “had not been especially conceived with an eye to the
operation for which they are to be used … even if their form and their origin are heterogenous.”
Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences,” in Writing and
Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978): 285.
19

Gerald Suttles, “The Cumulative Texture of Local Urban Culture,” American Journal of
Sociology 90 (1984): 283–304. Suttles (and others) use the term “texture” to refer to the “soul” or
“personality” of a city or local urban area.
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argue is a specifically urban phenomenon. This culminates in a critique of
Jacques Rancière’s distinction between politics and the ‘police order.’
!

But what is the political? How is it different than social relations? Social

and political theorists largely agree that, while governance is part of it, ‘the
political’ extends to other relationships as well. Contemporary political and social
thought is largely influenced by Foucault’s theories of power which has led many
to equate power relations with politics. We are familiar with the various strategies
to ‘politicize’ a variety of established arrangements, which essentially means to
point out that ‘power relations’ are at work. Rancière has published a new theory
of the political in which he argues that “politics is not the exercise of power.”20
Rather, he distinguishes much of what we normally understand as ‘politics’ is part
of what he calls the ‘police order’ (a system of the arrangement and distribution
of the sensible where we find power relations).21 ‘Politics’ is whatever ruptures
the police order. While Rancière’s arguments are compelling, he confines politics
to unique and rare instances which implies that everyday life (the opposite of
unique and rare) is ‘non-political.’22 Further, I argue that whatever ruptures the
police order (i.e. politics proper) is ‘resolved’ by being incorporated into the police
order and thus loses its political significance. It appears that Rancière conceives
of these ruptures as coming from outside the police order, but I will suggest that
these ruptures can and do come from within the police order. Something which
we tolerate or accept within the police order (such as poverty or an inequality)
can become too much to tolerate and thus erupts from within the police order and
exposes its contingency.

20

Jacques Rancière, “Ten Theses of Politics” Theory and Event 5, no. 3 (2001), Thesis 1.

21

See: Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1998), 28.
22

I say “unique and rare” here because I interpret this as the central and most compelling aspect
of Rancière’s theory of the political. His arguments in Disagreement clearly seek to wrest the term
‘political’ from what he finds to be its overuse. My arguments about this and the veiled critique of
Foucault will be further developed in chapter 1.

!
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My definition (perhaps a theory) of the political is the judgment and

declaration of a limit. In chapter 1, I respond to Foucault’s theory of power,
previous definitions of the political, including Rancière’s, to untangle the politics
of everyday urban life. This is only a secondary concern of this dissertation, but
throughout a common theme of ‘limits’ arises. In chapter 1, I argue the production
of urban space (be it from plans, actions, or behaviours) are the result of
declaring ‘too much’ or ‘too little.’ We will see how British colonizers declared a
limit to the territory that was, perhaps, named ‘tkaronto’ by dropping a box on it
and naming it York. John Graves Simcoe, who ‘founded’ York, similarly marked
limits on this territory by parcelling the land in a grid. Foucault’s theory of
urbanization and governmentality accounts for the limit of ‘too much’ or ‘too little’
insofar as early practices of urbanization comprised the circulation of people and
goods and criminals and disease and gave rise to a new form of governance as
“the right disposition of things.”23
!

As already hinted, chapter 2 takes up Lacanian concepts to demonstrate

how we take the city as Other, instilling it with its own desires and lacks. To this
end, Lacan’s graph of desire, along with his theories of enjoyment, jouissance,
transference, and love are used to understand a number of different
arrangements and behaviours associated with everyday urban life. Much of this
chapter is devoted to close reading of Lacan’s graph of desire (which is, in fact,
four graphs) and the numerous concepts and relations it contains. Of particular
importance is the question posed in “graph 3” (Figure 7): “Chè vuoi?” (“what do
you want?”), which I argue is asked by both the city dweller to the city, and by the
city itself to the city dweller. Thus, this chapter most clearly examines the central
questions of this dissertation: “What does the city want?” and “What does the city
want from us?” The answers to these questions, I argue, are bound up with
enjoyment, jouissance, and, especially, transference. The purpose of this chapter

23

Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978,
ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009), 96.
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is to contribute to the sociology of everyday urban life from a non-Marxist
perspective.
!

The various ‘applications’ of Lacan’s theories (such as by Gunder, Hillier,

and especially Žižek) demonstrate that Lacanian psychoanalysis is essentially a
social theory. Gunder and Hillier use Lacanian insights to theorize the
relationships between planners and between planners and the various
“stakeholders.” Much of Žižek’s use of Lacanian theory is used to explain a wide
variety of social and political relationships (from parenting, to popular culture, to
war and violence). This is because Lacanian analysis is nothing without the
essential relationships between self and others, be it the ‘little other’ or the ‘Big
Other.’ In other words, the subject in Lacanian analysis is only understood in
relation to other people, other people’s desires (often literally as the other’s
desire), and within the cultural setting. And these relationships are caught up in
various struggles and contestations, which can be understood in the realm of the
political.
!

It is my Freudian24 and Lacanian25 inspired argument that we accept the

annoyances and like the pleasures of urban life, but we lose our acceptance and
favour when it reaches a limit of ‘too much.’ For example, we like the city for its
density and intensity of life but it reaches a limit of ‘too much’ density and
intensity. The Law is often unable to find a balance or compromise and responds
to ‘too much’ of anything with ‘none at all.’ We also find this response of ‘none at
all’ in short-sighted fantasies of total efficiency, which deny the contingencies and
externalities of social and political life.26

24

Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII (1920–1922), trans. James Strachey
(London: Vintage Books, 2001).
25

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits
of Love and Knowledge, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).
26

In the conclusion to this dissertation, I will argue that, by taking some liberties with Lacan’s
notion of the ‘symptom,’ we can theorize the way in which an urban object or phenomenon shifts
from something we enjoy to something we find to be a problem.
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Lacan’s four discourses are introduced in chapter 3, where I argue that the

history of cities and early urban planning can be understood through these
discourses. This chapter shows the slow rotation from the master’s discourse to
the university discourse in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Toronto, along with
the parks movement and the Garden City movement. Le Corbusier is then
presented as the completion of this rotation to the university discourse, and his
overidentification with this discourse unwittingly exposes its failures. I argue that
the parks movement, the Garden City movement, and Le Corbusier all begin as a
response to the master’s discourse from the hysteric’s position but then seek to
situate themselves in the university discourse. My presentation of these
movements and Le Corbusier all seek to remain ‘close to the text’ and highlight
aspects of their ideas and theories that are often overlooked and misrepresented.
The theme of ‘limit’ introduced in chapter 1 reappears in this chapter. We will see
how, in response to ‘too much’ urbanism of the industrial era, early urban
planners responded with the parks movement,27

then the Garden City

movement.28 Le Corbusier responds to his perception of crumbling cities and
pushes the limits of urbanism,29 so that planners and builders of the twentieth
century would only take some of his ideas.
!

The history of urbanism presented here through Lacan’s four discourses is

a new interpretation of this history.30 More than simply novel, it also reveals
different implications of the various writers and movements, and allows us to see

27

Frederick Law Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns” (NP: American Social
Science Association, 1870). Reprinted in Early Town Planning: Volume One, Selected Essays,
ed. Richard LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: Routledge, 1998).
28

Ebenezer Howard, To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with
Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy and Colin Ward (New York: Routledge, 2003 [1898]).
29

Le Corbusier, The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be Used as the Basis of
Our Machine-age Civilization, trans. Pamela Knight, Eleanor Levieux, and Derek Coltman, (New
York: The Orion Press, 1967 [1933]).
30

Lacan thoroughly discusses the four discourses in Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques
Lacan. Book XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans Russell Grigg (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2007).
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similarities when none were thought to exist. It also provides a different
understanding of why certain movements failed or succeeded.
!

Lacan’s four discourses are the master’s, the university, the analyst’s, and

the hysterics. They are expressed as formulas:
Master’s !



!

University !



!

Analyst’s !



!

Hysteric’s



In each of the four discourses, the four positions (Agent, Other, Product/loss, and
Truth) remain in these locations:
A
–
T

!

O
–
P

While these four positions remain in their locations, Lacan identifies these

slightly differently in his seminars. These differences, and the discourses
themselves, will be explained more fully in chapter 3. The meaning of each of the
four concepts that occupy the four positions ($, ¨, ©, ) change slightly
depending on their position and their relation. Generally, though, $ is the barred
subject, ¨ is the master signifier, © is another signifier or knowledge, and  is
objet petit a, the ‘little other,’ the object-cause of desire. The master’s discourse
represents the ‘nonsensical,’ ‘because I said so!’ power. It interrogates claims to
knowledge, though enjoying the products of this knowledge. Since the truth is
that master is also a barred subject, the master’s power is revealed as a sham.
The university discourse is what Lacan argued ruled his time (1950s–70s,
roughly). It is a discourse of science, automation, mechanization, and logic. It
seeks to rationalize the ambiguities of life and desire. It is a system of knowledge
that does not know everything, but claims to have a way or system to ‘know’ all
things. The hysteric’s discourse is the one that talks back to the master,
demanding the master ‘prove’ himself. ‘Hysteric’ in this discourse is not to be
interpreted as derogatory or misogynistic in any way. Instead, the agent here is
the barred subject (male or female – we are all barred subjects) who is enacting

!
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a type of resistance. The analyst’s discourse is the discourse of the clinical
analyst-analysand relationship in which the analyst seeks to position him or her
self as an object of desire so that transference may take place. The product of
this discourse is the symptom (a master signifier) that the analysand ‘coughs up’
and the truth is knowledge gained through clinical analysis.
!

This is a very brief account of the four discourses, but they will be

explained fully in chapter 3 as I show how these discourses can be applied to the
history of cities and urban planning. Generally, the master’s discourse is how we
may understand ancient cities that grew ‘organically,’ while modernist urban
planning initiates itself from the hysteric’s discourse, but ultimately seeks to
establish itself within the university discourse.
!

Chapter 4 sustains the discussion of the four discourses, but with a focus

on Jane Jacobs’ unique approach to cities. While she also begins from the
hysteric’s position, and though her critics seek to dismiss her as such, she
immediately situates herself in the analyst’s discourse and remains there,
resisting the urge to fall into the university discourse and the lure of its authority.
As in the previous chapter, I present a close reading, this time of Jacobs, which
counters many contemporary interpretations of her ideas and arguments. Jacobs
will be shown to be correct in her insistence that declaring a limit of ‘too little’ or
‘too much’ urbanism is not reconciled by a number, calculation, or ratio but
instead is the kernel of urban life.31 While many take her seminal work, The
Death and Life of Great American Cities, as a valourization of human-scaled,
livable, walkable urbanism, I argue that the primary concern of this book is the
economic aspects of cities.
!

The final chapter continues to explore the problem of economics to reveal

how the contemporary resurgence of cities is largely a result of changing
economic tendencies. Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist-inflected account of cities and

31

Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1992
[1961]), 209.

!

Introduction!

13

urban space is presented in greater detail than in chapter 1. This provides the
context for Castells’ economic theory of networks, technology, time, and space.
The final section of this chapter takes up what I argue is an important but
overlooked influence of the arrangement of cities and urban everyday life: mobile
communication technology. We will also see how Castells, despite taking an
interest in contemporary economy, networks, and new forms of space and time,
ultimately reveals his conservatism in declaring there needs to be a limit to the
‘space of flows’ that has overwhelmed traditional ‘space of places,’ and that too
much of traditional time has been lost to the compression and desequencing of
‘timeless time.’ Georg Simmel’s theories of urban life and technology are
introduced to show how we may negotiate the demands of mobile technology
and our own enjoyment of urban space. Like Jacobs, Simmel seeks to find a
nebulous balance between opposite extremes of complete indifference and
indiscriminate suggestibility in urban space,32 and of objective technology and
subjectivity,33

which I use to discuss contemporary mobile communication

technologies.
!

The conclusion to this dissertation extends my discussion of limits to

present a theoretical framework which takes the city as symptom. I argue the
symptoms of the city are the things we enjoy about urban life: the complexities,
messiness, flaws, and contingencies. But these objects and relations can
become a problem when we have judged and declared a limit. High density is the
obvious example: the large number of people living in a city is what allows for the
myriad of enjoyments of urban life, but at various times we declare a limit and
judge there to be ‘too many’ people. I also argue that we must follow the spirit of
Jacobs and be suspicious of any plans or codes that promise make these
symptoms disappear or promise to make this judgment for us by determining

32

Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” in Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, ed.
David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), 174–185.
33

Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 3rd Edition, ed. David Frisby, trans. Tom Bottomore
and David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2005). The final chapter of this book is where Simmel
discusses technology.

!

Introduction!

14

before the fact a clear distinction between objects of enjoyment and objects of
frustration. While many have sought it, from Le Corbusier’s modernist principles
to New Urbanism’s ‘Smart Code,’ there is no code, formula, ratio, or calculation
to determine in advance the limit between enjoyment and problem. Instead, I
argue that we need to make this judgement ourselves, either individually or
collectively. While this will, as Jacobs says, “depend on our wits,”34 taking the city
as symptom would ensure we do not take objects of enjoyment as problems from
the start. This would allow us to enjoy the city while maintaining a fidelity to our
desires rather than the superego’s cruel imperative, “Enjoy!”
!

There are many theories, movements, and writers are reader might expect

to be discussed in this dissertation but are not addressed. Perhaps most
conspicuous in his absence is Lewis Mumford.35 His historical account of cities is
much more detailed than what I present here, but mine is informed by with a
different theoretical framework with a different purpose. His preferred form of
cities, however, is well represented in my detailed discussion of Ebenezer
Howard’s Garden Cities. Though the reader will find a few references to David
Harvey’s work, there are no other references to the work grouped under the
umbrella of ‘postmodern cities.’ While connections could be made between my
arguments about ‘messy urbanism’ and ‘bottom-up’ instead of ‘top-down’ urban
planning or the arguments found in central ‘postmodern cities’ writers,36 I have
not articulated these connections for a few reasons. Mainly, the ‘postmodern
cities’ field deeply saturated and so a fair discussion of the various works and
themes would take considerable space and distract from the arguments and
theories I present. There is also a deep divide between the central theorist of this
dissertation, Lacan, and the defining features of postmodern thought – the

34

City Limits, DVD, directed by Laurence Hyde (Toronto: National Film Board, 1971).

35

Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & Company, 1938).
36

For example, Michael Dear, Steven Flusty, Allan Irving, Edward Soja, and Mike Davis.
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“incredulity toward metanarratives” and a suspicion of structure.37 Further, while
there is a clear connection between Jane Jacobs’ arguments and some of what
falls within ‘postmodern cities,’ I am seeking to ‘redeem,’ if not provide an original
interpretation of her work through Lacanian psychoanalysis and I do not wish
there to be any confusion or easily drawn parallels between her work and
postmodernism. With my focus on space and movement, one might expect to
find the theories of Gilles Deleuze and/or Felix Guattari.38 While their theories are
useful, especially to understand Jane Jacobs’ epistemological position,39 I leave
it up to others to theorize the urban with their approaches and concepts – a
project I believe would be worthwhile and interesting.40 As well, there are a host
of everyday life thinkers not accounted for, but this is because I am seeking to
provide an original contribution to everyday life theory that is not within earlier,
usually Marxist, traditions.
!

Throughout this dissertation are the themes of space and movement.

Arrangements of space for movement (circulation) are presented early, while
later chapters discuss new arrangements of space and time implicated by
mobility. Mobile connectivity participates in a new form of ‘de-locating,’ which
appears to defeat both time and space. However, time and space are not
37

Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv. While it
is up for debate as to whether Lacan is presenting a ‘metanarrative’ (many attribute Lacan with
‘deuniversalizing’ Freud’s theories), there is no doubt that Lacan provides a structural analysis of
the unconscious and social relations – this will be abundantly clear in chapters 2 and 3.
38

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans.
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
39

See the final chapter of Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, particularly
where she argues that to understand cities we must think like a city.
40

There are a few central reasons why Deleuze’s and/or Guattari’s theories are
incommensurable with this project. One is that I am deploying Lacanian psychoanalysis as a
methodology to theorize the urban, whereas they take a decidedly anti-psychoanalytic approach.
See: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans.
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1983). Further, their concept of ‘mechanistic desire’ is a desire without a subject that does not
allow for a number of theoretical moves I make here, including taking a city’s ‘texture’ as the
unconscious. Lacan’s theory of desire, with its related concepts, allows me to take up the city as
the Other and the Other’s desire. Finally, my position is that this ‘mechanistic desire’ is an attempt
to avoid the problems of human desire, not a resolution – but this is up for debate.
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‘defeated’ but have become rearticulated and experienced in different ways with
simultaneous ‘nows’ and a blurring of ‘heres’ and ‘theres.’ While many of the
theorists and urbanists presented here take space as a direct object of analysis,
it should also be noted that Lacan is himself a spatial thinker. Many of his
concepts and relations are presented as spatial arrangements, such as in the
graph of desire and the rotations of the four discourses.
!

Finally, I would like to address the meanings of the two central terms of

this dissertation: ‘city’ and ‘urban.’ ‘City’ is derived from the Latin cīvitās and
concretely means “the body of citizens, the community.”41 While more will be said
about this term in chapters 1 and 2, it should be noted here that the connection
between ‘citizen’ and ‘city’ has largely been lost in contemporary usage.
Citizenship is now under the purview of the state, not the city, and ‘city’ refers a
governing body and concerns all residents, not just citizens.42
!

The Latin form urbs came into use after cīvitās and refers instead to the

specific site occupied by a community, distinct from rus (rural).43 While it referred
to the site of a city, it signified the behaviour or style of those in the city: civilized,
refined, and even “being free of embarrassment.”44 The root urbs has largely
survived through the term ‘urbane’ (from the French urbain) with the similar
meaning of refined behaviour that derived from life in towns. Not until, or just
prior to, industrialization was the term ‘urban’ used more widely to signify a

41

Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘city.’ Ancient Greece used the term πόλις (polis), which is the
same root as ‘politics.’
42

While there were cīvitātes in Britain during Roman times, the Angles and the Saxons applied
the term burh (borough) to all towns and cities. Burh is derived from the German burg and
originally meant a fortress or castle, the owners of which were burghers, from where we now
have the term ‘bourgeois.’ ‘Borough’ is still used in North America, with the obvious of example of
the ‘five boroughs’ in New York City which are each somewhat separate administrative units. And
burgh is still found in the names of many US cities such as Pittsburgh and Gettysburg. In Canada
we find ‘borough’ in the names of cities like Peterborough and the former city of Scarborough,
now part of Toronto.
43

Witold Rybczynski, City Life: Urban Expectations in a New World (Toronto: HarperPerennial,
1996), 37.
44

Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘urban.’

!

Introduction!

17

section within the larger city.45 And this is generally how these terms are used
and understood here: ‘city’ refers to the entire administrative area, whereas
‘urban’ indicates the denser parts of the city (usually the ‘downtown’)46 and the
behaviours, attitudes, and ‘style’ associated with it.
!

However, much of this dissertation is concerned with interrogating these

terms. In chapter 1, we will see how Foucault finds a symmetry between the
eighteenth century practices of ‘policing’ and ‘urbanizing,’ so that ‘urban’ comes
to be understood as tactic, not a descriptor. Further, Foucault’s theory of
governmentality is predicated on the shift of governance from that of a territory to
that of the people (‘population’). This does not dispense with the notion of
‘territory’ but rather recasts it so that instead of taking ‘city’ as the people and
‘urban’ as the location, each has specific meanings of both its subjects and the
territory. In chapter 2, I will argue that attempts at precise definitions of either
‘city’ or ‘urban’ necessarily fail to capture their full meanings because they are
bound up with our fantasies and the Other’s desire. Chapters 3 and 4 will take up
the history of ‘the city’ with Lacan’s four discourses so that ‘city,’ its inhabitants,
planners, and urbanists come to occupy various roles and relations within these
discourses. Chapter 5 positions the city within Castells’ theory of the ‘space of
flows’ and ‘timeless time’ as well as demonstrate the influence of mobile
communication technology on changing notions of the city and urban space.
Ultimately, rather than clarify or narrow down definitions of ‘city’ and ‘urban,’ this

45

Both the US and Canadian census define an “urban area” as having at least 1000 people and
400 people per square kilometre (or 1000 per square mile).
46

‘Downtown’ is used nearly exclusively in North America and, surprisingly, came into use after
the term ‘uptown.’ See: Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘downtown’ and ‘uptown.’ ‘Town’ is derived
from the Old English word tūn which originally meant a fenced in enclosure and then came to
signify large or small walled-in settlements. Contemporary North American usage takes ‘town’ to
refer a settlement where the people have close emotional and identifying ties to the countryside,
whereas ‘city’ refers to larger settlements that are mostly self-sufficient with few affective ties to its
surrounding countryside. Thus, it is not uncommon for a place to be called a ‘large town’ and
another a ‘small city’ even though both have similarly sized populations: the former indicates
connections to the surrounding country side, whereas the latter is largely self-sufficient and most
necessities are imported from afar.
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dissertation will show how these terms are much more amorphous than they
appear.47

47

Though there does not appear to be a clear etymological link between ‘amorphous’ and the
Latin amor (love), the connection between attempts to define ‘city’ and love is worth considering,
especially in latter parts of chapter two. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests the ancient
Romans named their city Roma as an anagram of amor. See: Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. ‘city.’
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CHAPTER 1: FOUNDATIONS, GRIDS, AND GOVERNANCE
What is Toronto? Where is Toronto? Answering these questions seem easy since
we are comfortable with the discourse imposed by these questions. But the
rather mundane question, ‘Where is Toronto?’ relies on a vast network of
philosophies of space, time, and the metaphysics of existence. Common
answers to this question assume that Toronto is a tangible object in a stable
place. If one leaves Toronto, one knows they can get back to Toronto. Even if
someone has never been to Toronto, it is not difficult to get to. Like the “road to
Larissa” in Plato’s Meno, one need not ever have been in Toronto or know
anything about it and still figure out how to get here. But where is it when one
‘arrives’? What is necessarily foreclosed to insist that a particular location in
space is understandable and stable under a single sign ‘Toronto’? And what
remains? What determines where Toronto is? It cannot be its geography, as that
has changed (rivers filled, hills flattened, the shoreline extended outward, etc.).
Similarly, it cannot be based on its buildings, for they come and go just as the
people do; and it cannot be in relation to other places, for these places change
and move as well. Though the question ‘Where is here?’ is found in so many
books and articles that it is nearly a cliché, I pose the question for the purpose of
making the ‘space’ or ‘place’ of Toronto strange. Perhaps we should ask Kevin
Lynch’s question: “What time is this place?”1
Consider the location of “Historic Fort York.” The site has been preserved,
but visiting it today one cannot help but wonder why it is where it is. History tells
us that the location for the fort was chosen for being on the shore of Lake Ontario
at the mouth of Toronto bay. ‘Historic Fort York’ is in the ‘same spot’ (some of the
original buildings remain), but between it and the Lake now stands the towering
Gardiner Expressway and about a half a kilometre of land. What was once the
mouth of Toronto bay is now what is known as the “Western Channel” of Toronto
Harbour, and this Channel is only one hundred metres or so of water, with an

1

Kevin Lynch, What Time Is This Place? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).
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impossibly straight shore lines. What was once a peninsula forming the bay is
now a series of islands, between which most of the harbour’s boat traffic now
travels. Regardless of these changes, it was ‘Toronto’ then, and it is now. Despite
these uncertainties, we still find our way ‘here,’ we usually know when we have
‘arrived’ and there are times when we know, without a doubt, that we are ‘in
Toronto.’
We know Toronto because of the particular way ‘Toronto’ has been
produced as a space. From Henri Lefebvre’s theory of space as a social
production and the history of urbanization, this chapter will also employ Michel
Foucault’s theories of grids and policing to argue that governmentality is a
specifically urban phenomenon to show why the space of Toronto is produced
and arranged the way that it was and remains. Because of the close connection
between urbanizing and policing, Jacques Rancière’s critique of Foucault’s
theories of power and governance is discussed here to counter possible
criticisms of Foucault’s applicability.
I will be assuming Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space to provide
a critical history of the space produced as ‘Toronto.’ Rather than take the area of
Toronto as blank space (Kantian, necessarily a priori, etc.),2 Lefebvre’s theory of
space as a social production will give insight as to how the space of
contemporary Toronto has been produced on culturally, socially, and historically
specific notions of space and time. This chapter will only briefly present
Lefebvre’s crucial arguments; the final chapter, along with a discussion of Manuel
Castells, will deploy Lefebvre’s theories more fully.

2

I will show in the final chapter that, though Lefebvre claims to present an ‘anti-Kantian’ theory of
space, I am not convinced he has extracted himself from a ‘Kantian universe.’
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Following the tradition of Foucauldian scholars of ‘governmentality,’3 I
argue that governance has shifted from governing territory to governing people,
and in doing so has recast the meaning of territory. Urban is a relatively new term
that refers to a particular space or territory, whereas the millennia-old term city
refers to a collection of ‘citizens.’ However, it is not simply that ‘urban’ signifies
space and ‘city’ signifies subjects but that ‘urban’ and ‘city’ each understand the
subject and the territory differently. Just as the subject of the city is different than
that of the urban, the territory of the urban is different than that of the city. When
considering contemporary ‘issues facing Toronto,’4 it is clear that nearly all issues
are those that concern or affect the people of/from/in Toronto, yet most of
Toronto’s structure of governance assumes a responsibility to the space of
Toronto, not its citizens. In political discourse, the phrase ‘issues facing Toronto’
implies that the space of Toronto is the subject of governance, not the citizens.
Perhaps this should not be surprising since the structure of governance defines
Toronto as a locatable space (its borders are drawn by governance/jurisdiction)
so that governance defines the ‘legal’ parameters, limits, and borders of the
space of Toronto. Thus, to understand the space of Toronto, there needs to be a
concern with the governance of Toronto since governance is one way in which
the borders of Toronto are defined. This chapter will cover some of the early
history that led to the current formation and arrangement of space of Toronto and
demonstrate how its physicality is intimately connected to Foucault’s theory of
governmentality. John Graves Simcoe’s act of producing a box on the shore was

3

Those who theorize territory through governmentality are largely international relations theorists,
such as Michael Dillion, David Campbell, and R.B.J. Walker. Much of this work was presented to
the North American audience when Walker became editor of the journal Alternatives: Global,
Local, Political in 1983 though governmentality did not become a topic in the journal until 1990,
particularly volume 15. These ‘critical international relations theorists’ then published a collection
of essays: Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker, ed. Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows,
Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Most of the
governmentality scholarship on urbanism does not concern territory but rather critiques of ‘neoliberal’ economics.
4

Such as transit, motorways, walking and cycling, city services, parks, libraries, its economy and
funding, garbage pickup, etc.
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‘political’ (or ‘policing’) and still informs desires in contemporary everyday life
(easily oriented, efficient movement).

Lefebvre: The Social Production of Urban Space
Before turning to the ‘founding’ moments that influenced the production of the
space of Toronto, I will here present some of the crucial concepts and theories in
Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, in which his main argument appears quite
simple: “(social) space is a (social) product.”5 Each society or community creates
its own space, a space as distinct as the society or community. For example,
ancient Greece produced a space particular to it (i.e. the polis), different from,
say, York (i.e. a fort town).6 While the specificity of ‘social space’ is emphasized,
Lefebvre often broadens this to space in general. However, Lefebvre accepts
something called ‘natural space’ – a form of space which is then altered by social
production.
Lefebvre presents two corresponding triads for thinking the social
production of space. One is composed of “spatial practice,” “representations of
space,” and “representational space.” The second triad is, respectively,
“perceived space,” “conceived space,” and “lived space.”7
Spatial Practice !
!
à Perceived Space
Representations of Space !à Conceived Space
Representational Space ! à Lived Space

This triad will be explained more fully in the final chapter, but is briefly
explained here to provide an initial theoretical lens through which the early
history and founding of York will be understood. Spatial practice concerns

5

Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991), 30.
6

When Simcoe established a fort town at what is now ‘Toronto,’ he named it ‘York.’

7

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 40.
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production and reproduction and makes certain a social group has coherency
and cohesion, which reveals how that society perceives space. Representations
of space concern knowledge, signs, and codes, which go beyond perception of
space to conceived space. Scientists and urban planners, for example, function
within this space. Finally, representational spaces are more complex and refer to
the space that is directly lived and concerns affect and emotion.
Lefebvre makes an important distinction between “absolute space” and
“abstract space.” Absolute space concerns the sites of habitation chosen for their
natural features, such as caves, mountains, rivers, and lakes. But as soon as
these places were consecrated as ‘spaces’ they lose this quality to become
abstract space.8

Abstract space is formal and quantitative, creating

generalizations at the expense of specifics. The outcome of abstract space is
“the reduction of the ‘real’ … to a ‘plan’ existing in a void and endowed with no
other qualities” while at the same time reducing it to “the flatness of a mirror, of
an image, of pure spectacle under an absolutely cold gaze.” 9
Lefebvre locates the beginning of abstract space in the historical shift that
moved labour outside the domestic realm and into factories.10 Spatial practice, in
opposition to abstract space, defines the places of the local through
symbolization that makes them desirable, benevolent, sanctioned, or forbidden.
Spatial practice concerns “the places of a purely political or social kind.”11 It
would seem that spatial practice is political because it counters the “violence
intrinsic to abstraction.”12 By “violence,” Lefebvre is referring to a loss inherent to
abstraction (as opposed to the concrete thing immediately present), which
imposes a particular order onto nature.

8

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 48–49.

9

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 287.

10

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 49.

11

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 288–289. Emphasis added.

12

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 289.
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In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre begins by declaring that society has
been completely urbanized.13

Lefebvre argues that, because of the social

relationships of production, pre-industrial or industrial cities are not like the
modern form of the urban, which comprise not just the built world of cities, but all
manifestations of the dominance of the city over the country. This process of
urbanization is represented in the “space-time axis” which shows (from left to
right) the absence of urbanization to total urbanization:

Fig. 1. Lefebvre’s space-time axis. (Diagram from Henri Lefebvre, Urban
Revolution, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2003), 15.)

!

The shift from nomadism to agriculturalism is, for Lefebvre, merely “a

gathering” of people. Urbanization only begins when authoritarian pressures
begin the development of the modern state and its administrators, represented
here as the “political city,” which is an order of ruling and being ruled.14 It was
populated by priests, princes, nobles, and administrators, and its function was to
administer, protect, and exploit a territory. Later, industrialization is responsible
for “the urban” and replaces “the city.” This shift from the “merchant city” to the

13

Henri Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003).
14

It may be worth noting here that, just as Lefebvre does not accept the “mere gathering” of
people as constituting a politics, Rancière does not accept that politics is a necessity that comes
from the gathering of people. Both locate the political in an order of ruling and being ruled.
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industrial urban space marks what Lefebvre calls a “process of implosionexplosion.”15 The “implosion” refers to excessive concentration of people, activity,
wealth, goods, and thought, while “explosion” refers to an outward projection
towards the peripheries of suburbs, vacation destinations, and satellite towns.16
!

Lefebvre’s theories from The Production of Space and Urban Revolution

will be more fully explained in chapter 5. And, though this ‘space-time axis’ is the
means by which Lefebvre discusses the industrial and post-industrial city, we can
also place the founding of Toronto (York) on this axis, in the middle at “transition
from agrarian to urban.” Positioning York here will be made clear in the following
sections of this chapter.

Toronto’s Early History and the Founding of York
With Lefebvre’s work in mind, this section will discuss some of the early history of
the area now known as Toronto. I will offer a selective history to show the
continuity and its impact on contemporary Toronto. In some ways, I will rehearse
the traditional narrative of Toronto’s history, but my goal is to demonstrate that
this narrative persists is shaping contemporary understandings of Toronto. That
said, I will devote scant attention to the pre-colonial history of the area, and to
what might be called ‘French Toronto’ (usually understood as 1615–1759). The
reason for this omission is that very little of the pre-colonial or ‘French Toronto’
period has much influence on contemporary Toronto, or at least the
contemporary Toronto that interests me.
!

Histories of Toronto often begin with the story of the arrival of John Graves

Simcoe, some going so far as saying, “Toronto began in the summer of 1793 –
the morning of Tuesday, July thirtieth to be exact.”17 Simcoe, the first Lieutenant15

Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 14.

16

Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 14.
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William Dendy and William Kilbourn, Toronto Observed: Its Architecture, Patrons, and History
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 1.
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Governor of the newly created Upper Canada in 1791, established the area as a
colonial fort and produced the space so as to encourage a society (a village). We
will see that he ‘drew the map’ that still informs the social space of contemporary
Toronto. Of course, prior to Simcoe’s arrival the space of Toronto had already
been undergoing a social production, demonstrated in the fact that it had a name.
It may or may not have been “tkaronto,” but it had a name nonetheless. And the
relationship between the aboriginals and European (mostly French) explorers, fur
traders, missionaries, and visitors developed a particular ‘knowledge of’ the area
and this (social) space came to be (socially) produced. This production of space
was essential for Simcoe’s decision to establish Toronto as a fort and town.
The Toronto Carrying Place was a significant space produced by early
aboriginals, French explorers, and fur traders in the seventeenth century. Though
subject of historical debate, it is usually agreed that in 1614 the French explorer
Samuel de Champlain sent his translator, Étienne Brûlé, down the Toronto
Carrying Place and that he was the first European to do so.18 The Toronto
Carrying Place is a portage route between Lake Ontario and the Holland River
which flows into Lake Simcoe. The route mostly follows along the Humber River
but sometimes up the Rouge River (near today’s Markham). While it is contested
as to whether or not Brûlé actually took the Toronto Carrying Place route, this
space was then produced/known as a portage route and many French people
took the route in the decades that followed. For much of the seventeenth century
there were competing French and British fur traders meeting at the Toronto
Carrying Place.
In 1720 the French established a small fort near the mouth of the Humber
but it only lasted a decade. A larger log fort (Roullie) was constructed in 1751 on
what is now the Canadian National Exhibition grounds.19 The defences of New
France began to crumble and in 1759 those posted at Roullie was told to burn

18

Derek Hayes, Historical Atlas of Toronto, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2008), 10.

19

Dendy and Kilbourn, Toronto Observed, 3–4.
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everything and come back to Montreal. The following year, the American
adventurer Major Rogers and his Rangers took possession of the site in the
name of George III. The Toronto area came under British rule by way of the
Treaty of Paris in 1763.
The British did not seek to colonize the area until after the American
Revolution, which split the empire of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes in
two. Dendy and Kilbourn suggest the British “wished to protect their Indian allies”
and “believed that the land they inhabited should be acquired only by treaty.”20
The British negotiated for the “river lands on either side of Kingston and Newark”
which they would then offer to prospective settlers.21 The then governor-in-chief,
Lord Dorchester, negotiated the purchase of the Toronto region from the
Mississaugas who occupied the land on the north shore of the lake. As part of
this negotiated treaty, in August 1788 HMS Seneca arrived in Toronto bay with
one hundred forty-nine barrels of goods and a small amount of cash, valued at
£1,700 in all. 22 Though this ‘purchase’ took place in the summer of 1788, the
British did nothing with the land for five years until Simcoe arrived in the summer
of 1793.
!

Simcoe’s situation prior to founding York helps explain why he chose York

as the new capital. Before coming to Toronto bay, Simcoe had been living in
Newark (now Niagara-on-the-Lake) and had been developing it as Upper
Canada’s new capital. Simcoe disagreed with (and held in contempt) his
superior, Lord Dorchester, who insisted that Kingston, where Dorchester was
posted, ought to be the capital. Still, with fears of an American attack, Simcoe
sought to establish a capital further away from the American border than Newark.
Early in 1793, he brought a few soldiers and pushed through the land to what is

20

Dendy and Kilbourn, Toronto Observed, 4.
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Dendy and Kilbourn, Toronto Observed, 4.

22

Dendy and Kilbourn, Toronto Observed, 4. In essence, Toronto was ‘bought’ for two thousand
gun flints, twenty-four brass kettles, ten dozen looking glasses, two dozen laced hats, a bale of
flowered flannel, and ninety-six gallons of rum.
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now London, Ontario. He performed a single-day’s survey of the area, named the
river ‘Thames’ and the town ‘Georgina’ (in honour of King George III), and
campaigned for it to be the new capital of Upper Canada. The first Loyalist
settlers were “horrified” at Simcoe’s plans because the site was in the middle of
dense forest and very difficult to access. Richard Cartwright, the leading
merchant of Kingston, mused that Georgina could only be visited by the
Montgolfier brothers’ new invention, the hot-air balloon.23
!

With pressure from Lord Dorchester for Kingston to serve as the capital of

Upper Canada, Simcoe abandoned his somewhat radical proposal to establish
Georgina as the capital and began to consider the Toronto bay. The land in the
area was swampy 24 and the slow running creeks would limit the number of mills,
but there were many tall pines for ship masts, and there were patches of
farmable land. Simcoe also knew from the aboriginals about the Toronto Carrying
Place, which provided fresh water and a trade route to the northwest along the
Humber River to what was then Lake Toronto (which he named Lake Simcoe in
honour of his father), and on to Georgian Bay. 25 Toronto served as a terminus for
a trade route from Georgian Bay to Lake Ontario, all without going through
American territory.
So, in many ways, Simcoe’s choice of the Toronto bay was because it was
‘good enough’ and was not Dorchester’s Kingston. However, historians
traditionally argue that Simcoe’s choice of Toronto bay was primarily a militarily
strategic one; Simcoe chose the site because he expected war with America. The
Treaty of Paris, which formally confirmed the United States independence from

23

Dendy and Kilbourn, Toronto Observed, 5.
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At the time it had the largest “wetland” in North America.
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Tom Cruickshank and John de Certeau Visser, Old Toronto Houses, rev. ed. (Richmond Hill,
Ontario: Firefly Books, 2008), 17.
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Britain, had been signed in 1776, and many believed the victorious army would
continue to advance north into British Upper Canada.26
!

Even though the land was swampy and full of slow-running creeks, the

Toronto bay was protected by a peninsula that ran from its east side extending
westward, leaving a fairly small channel on the west side.

26

The American army did attack in 1812. Had Simcoe followed through with his preference for
Georgina (London, Ontario), one can speculate on just how different the outcome would have
been.
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Foundational Grids

Fig. 2. Toronto Purchase map. (Untitled map called “Toronto Purchase” map, with
signatures on reverse. William Chewett, 1805. Library and Archives Canada: RG
10, Vol. 1841, IT 039.)

This “Toronto Purchase” map (Figure 2) was created for and signed at a meeting
on August 1, 1805. The Toronto Carrying Place is marked through the centre of
the mapped area, and the Etobicoke Creek near the western border is marked by
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a “maple tree blazed on 4 sides,” as written on the map. It should also be noted
that an area to the west (the “Mississauga Tract”) was also surrendered at this
meeting. As with the maps to follow (Figures 3 and 4), there is little regard for the
terrain of the land and a rectangle is imposed on top to define the area that now
‘belongs’ to the British crown. It also marks a limit to the territory that will define
the borders of York County, making colonization and settlement manageable.

Fig. 3. Plan of the Harbour of Toronto with the Proposed Town and Settlement.
(John Collins, 1788. Toronto Public Library: T1788/4MIrg)

!

This Plan for the Harbour of Toronto (Figure 3) dated 1788, was prepared

for Lord Dorchester and Major General Simcoe. This map is a plan which was
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never fully implemented, but is important since it represents a common aspiration
for both British and French colonists in the eighteenth century. What is
remarkable about this plan (and other plans and maps of the time) is how the grid
is imposed on the terrain. The Toronto Carrying Place is well marked (labelled
here as “Part of a road towards Lake La Clie,” now Lake Simcoe), as are the
nuances of the shoreline. However, the surveyed lots do not account for these
rivers at all. In fact, the River Don and its valley are completely absent from this
map. In the central town square we can see both Garrison Creek and Taddle
Creek, but again the grid is imposed over it. I will address this idea of imposing a
grid later in this chapter, but here we should at least note how clean and
‘sanitized’ the grid appears over the terrain.
The common area and town square in this plan are of interest because
they were never implemented. The shore on either side of the proposed town is
marked “ground reserved,” and the area across the top is marked “common,” to
be left for each town inhabitant to use in common as an early form of public
space. The legend also tells us that the four corner parcels enclosed with ‘A-A-AA’ are “reserved lots for public purposes.” The legend on the bottom left tells us
that the red ‘A’ marks the place where defences are to be set up to protect the
harbour but this did not turn out to be the location of Fort York.
In the spring of 1793, Simcoe sent a few soldiers to clear some land in
Toronto bay, and in the early summer Simcoe set sail from Newark to Toronto bay
with his wife Elizabeth and three youngest children. They arrived July 13, 1793,
and set up a camp at the mouth of the Garrison River (what is now Bathurst
Street and Lake Shore Boulevard West). Simcoe established Fort York here
(where “Historic Fort York” remains today) and fortified the tip of the peninsula,
Gibraltar Point, to protect the bay from a water attack.27 That afternoon they
sailed east to the mouth of the Don River and walked around, deciding the area
just west of the Don River near the lake would be the centre of the new town. He
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and his team surveyed a grid, decided the first row of buildings would be near the
river along the embankment that rose above the waters of the bay.
!

Simcoe and his soldiers established a ten-block town site: Front, George

(just east of Jarvis), Duke (now Adelaide), and Parliament streets. “[L]ike all good
Georgians” he made it a grid, a response to the problems of the chaotic British
street systems.28 Other examples of Georgian grid plans are Bath, England, and
Savannah, Georgia – but York’s grid did not have a clear focal point or centre,
nor a civic square nor a park. This lack was not a result of a shortage of ideas.
There are a handful of ‘plans’ that remain which map the area with a town square
as a focal point. Figure 3 is just one example. It is likely that Simcoe was wary of
providing a common area that might encourage any form of American-influenced
democratic sentiments.

Fig. 4 Plan of York Harbour Surveyed by order of Lt Govr Simcoe. (Alexander
Aitken, 1793. U.K. National Archives CO 700 Canada 60.)

28

Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, Old Toronto Houses, 17. The only Georgian house from
this period that survives is Campbell House, which was moved from its original site on the north
side of Adelaide at Frederick to Queen and University.
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Figure 4 is the first map that Simcoe sent to Britain after founding York.

Here we have nearly all the rivers and creeks accounted for, as well as indicating
the River Don and its valley. The grid at ‘D’ is the ten-block town site that Simcoe
established, ‘C’ (left side of map) indicates the barracks of Fort York, ‘E’ (right of
ten-block town site) refers to a viewpoint mentioned in the accompanying letter
and the numbers in the bay refer to depth of the water (fathoms). The horizontal
line close to the centre of the map is Lot Street (now Queen Street), so called for
the numbered lots that run north of it. Lot Street is the result of a line drawn at 90
degrees to the eastern border of York County (now Victoria Park Avenue). Again,
we see the imposition of a grid without regard for the terrain. The River Don
weaves back and forth across the border between lots 15 and 16. The southern
edge of the ten-block town site ignores the contours of the shoreline, as though
Simcoe knew that eventually much land would be literally ‘produced’ in the lake
and the shoreline would be made into a straight line. The lots that run north of Lot
Street were to be given to officials and other wealthy, loyalist families to settle
and, perhaps taking from the earlier plan of the town, the area south of Lot Street
is marked “reserved” for industry and government buildings.
!

Beyond the ten-block town site, the outlying area was divided up into 200-

acre lots by ‘orderly’ surveying, similar to rural Ontario roads. The borders of
these lots still survive as Toronto’s main arterial roads. The entire area was not
divided up into these 200-acre lots, however, since Simcoe had the idea to
reserve a string of one hundred acre “park lots” running north from present-day
Queen Street to Bloor, and just west of the Don River to Dufferin Street. These
lots were granted to “political allies” and government officials as compensation
for their service to the new colony.29 This was a bit of ‘cronyism’ on Simcoe’s part,
but he thought it would help populate the town with ‘the gentry’ and develop it like
the manors of England. Only the Grange remains as one of these original
estates.30
29

Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, Old Toronto Houses, 17.
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Cruickshank and de Certeau Visser, Old Toronto Houses, 17.
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This grid that Simcoe laid out was neither original nor surprising, though it

should be. This map clearly shows that the geography does not lend itself
particularly well to a grid. The shoreline is clearly at odd and changing angles,
while the Don River runs in a crooked line. The map also does not show the
elevation of the terrain nor the conditions of the ground (swamp, soil, rock, clay).
We might understand that Simcoe saw the Don River with its swampy mouth as
the eastern border – it would be difficult to cross in order to build and settle on
the other side. And it seems reasonable to tuck a settlement within a harbour to
protect it from invading armies. But less clear is why Simcoe established the
original ten-block town site on the eastern reaches of the surveyed land. If he
were establishing a new governable city, he would likely have placed the centre
of the town in the centre. Seeing that Simcoe did not include a focal point of the
ten-block town site (such as in Savannah, Georgia, or other contemporaneous
‘new world’ towns), it might suggest that Simcoe was not concerned with
establishing a new urban city. Instead, Simcoe was settling a camp, or at least a
“mixed-use” camp and a colonial outpost to be inhabited by the gentry. Simcoe’s
chosen site for the ten-block town and the plan for lots above Lot Street left little
room for expansion of the civic parts of town. All courthouses, parliament or
council buildings, markets, banks, etc. were built westward from the ten-block
site on the strip of land between the lake and Lot Street. Today, this ten-block site
remains, but it does not have any distinguishing boundaries and if one is not
specifically looking for the original town, it is easily missed. And, because of the
poor quality of the original buildings and two ‘great fires,’ all of the ‘old’ buildings
around the ten-block site are in fact from the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century.
!

The location of the town at the eastern edge of the surveyed area reflects

this “mixed-use” camp and colonial outpost. That is, rather than seeking to
establish a new metropolis with a set of ‘zoning’ usages, Simcoe was more
concerned with providing some rough form of a town for basic needs and then
simply parcelling up the rest of the land, with clear borders, to give to upper-class
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families currently residing in Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake). These families were
likely more interested in being self-sustaining with little need for a truly varied
society like one would find in their contemporary cities in Britain and elsewhere in
Europe. Indeed, so many of the upper-classes in Canada were here precisely to
avoid the messy urbanism from which they fled.
Organizing a town or city on a grid goes at least as far back as ancient
Greece 31 and continues to inform contemporary plans for cities and towns.
However, the justifications and reasons for the grid of ancient Greece are not the
same as they were at the end of the eighteenth century, when Simcoe had this
map (Figure 4) created and delivered to England. So why do Simcoe and the
other planners and dreamers of the time impose a grid on this terrain? Why not
organize the new town around the natural features? Establishing the ten-block
town at the base of the Toronto Carrying Place (i.e. where the Humber flows into
Lake Ontario) would place the town on the wrong side of the defences of the
Toronto Bay. But the question remains: why the imposition of straight lines and
square boxes, and not the concession of diagonal or winding roads?
!

Some might be tempted to suggest that all these plans, including the plan

Simcoe implemented, were a result of the times – it was the Georgian period.
This might be true, but it does not help much. This descriptor, based on the
names of reigning monarchs, simply refers to the time period and nothing to do
with the particular monarch. The ‘Georgian period’ is so called because of the
four successive kings of England named George that spanned the years 1714–
1830. Among many things that happened in this period were the beginnings of
the abolition of slavery and the implementation of ‘social reforms’ such as
orphanages and hospitals. Perhaps the most notable events that occurred in this
period were the French Revolution and the American Revolution, which took
place concurrent with Britain expanding its massive empire through colonialism.

31

Aristotle, “Book II” in The Politics, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. by Jonathan Barnes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). See especially section 1267b where Aristotle
praises Hippodamus of Miletus “who invented the art of planning cities.”
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The founding of York in 1793 occurred during this amassing of colonial territory.
What was essential to this colonial project was the ability to take the world as an
object that could be dissected and parcelled out.
!

Prior to the colonization of North America, including the founding of York,

western states were practicing cadastral mapping on their own ‘home’ territories.
Cadastral mapping is the technique of surveying land to have a clear record of
what property existed and who owned it, for the purpose of taxation. While this
practice does not provide a comprehensive explanation for York’s grid plans, it
does begin to show how the space of York was produced: a particular production
of space informed by the practice of cadastral mapping.
!

If we compare these British plans with the earlier, aboriginal ‘maps’ drawn

on birch bark, it is clear the latter has nothing to do with parcels of land equally
divided but more to do with movement. Birch bark maps were to assist in
following a known route. They were never meant as an objective representation
of an area; they did not distinguish ‘parcels’ of land nor suggest private property.
Though cadastral maps were a matter of course in the nineteenth century, during
the eighteenth century “the cadastral map was a highly contentious instrument
for the extension and consolidation of power, not just of the propertied individual,
but the nation-state and the capitalist system which underlies it.”32 Beginning in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries “cadastral mapping became increasingly
professionalized,” concerning itself with the cataloguing of private estates for the
purpose of tax reforms and levies.33 While cadastral maps were used by the
governments of many European states in the sixteenth and seventeenth century,
Britain was a little late to the game. Not until the Enclosure Acts of the late
eighteenth century were maps required by the government,34 which coincides
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Roger J.P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State: a History
of Property Mapping (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 8.
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John Pickles, A History of Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping, and the Geo-coded World
(London: Routledge, 2004), 101.
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with the founding of York. However, cadastral maps were not necessarily grids.
Grids are usually found on plans, imposed on what is deemed ‘virgin territory.’
Cadastral maps seek to represent what already exists: the already agreed-upon
borders. In some cases, where land is being ‘re-claimed’ (such as in the
Netherlands where swamps were infilled), the cadastral maps indicate a grid. Yet
it is clear that when producing knowledge a territory for the purposes of
identifying the ‘properties’ and their borders, it is much easier for the borders to
be straight lines and for the property to be a squared box.
Important, though, is that these grids insisted on a form of equality – that
each parcel was of equal size and each contributed to the overall “fabric” of the
city/society. Of course, some land is more valuable or useful, and some people
get more than one square, but on paper it is an equal distribution and the sum of
the parts make up the whole. It is not a coincidence that this abstract notion of
space appears concurrently with liberal-democratic political philosophy
(inalienable rights, social contracts, the critique of divine right of kings, etc.) in
which ‘men’ are thought to be equals and each ‘man’ or ‘citizen’ makes up the
whole or fabric of society.
There is little research or theory on gridded street networks. While many
urbanists note that the grid is important and worthy of note, little is said about
them beyond a tenuous link to rationality. Lefebvre’s ‘triad’ helps to ensure we
note the production of this space and the gridding of a territory clearly falls within
‘representations of space’ (‘conceived space’) as it reflects historically and
culturally specific signs, codes, and knowledge. As Hannah B. Higgins tells us,
the grid begins with a plan, not with what exists, and the space is then filled in – it
traces the space between – between lives, homes, buildings. And what is traced
relates to how we see ourselves in space in terms of organized social systems,
not in organic or ‘natural’ terms.35 However, Higgins and other urbanists who take
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time to note the importance of grids do not sustain a discussion of these
connections or make any specific arguments concerning the implications of grids.

Foucault on Grids and Urbanization
Foucault does provide a sustained discussion about the role of the grid as a
means to allow circulation in the collection of lectures published as Security,
Territory, Population.36 He also connects gridded street networks to new practices
of security and governmentality. Above, we saw how a grid makes an area
knowable as a representation on a map within Lefebvre’s ‘representations of
space,’ which, to a large extent, agrees with Foucault’s arguments. However,
Foucault provides a much more detailed and complex theory, linking these
‘representations’ to broader historical shifts and implications.
!

Since Simcoe established York as a fort town, a place thought to be more

‘secure’ from an anticipated American attack, it is worth looking at the meaning of
‘security.’ In Security, Territory, Population Foucault breaks down security into
three modalities. First the basic penal law, such as “you must not kill, you must
not steal,” with a series of punishments in place if one contravenes one or more
of them.37

The second modulation is the same law and punishment, but

accompanied by “a series of supervisions, checks, inspections, and varied
controls” that make it possible to determine if a person is going to steal or kill or
not.38 There is a concomitant shift from mere punishment for an offence to
“penitentiary techniques” such as obligatory work, correction, and moral
discipline.39 The third modulation follows the previous two modulations, but the
corrective punishment (introduced in the second modulation), accompanies a
series of questions such as the “average rate of criminality” and how to predict,
36

Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978,
ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009).
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through statistics, the probability of criminality in a particular place and time.40 In
what areas of a town and at what times can we predict criminality? What other
variables are at play to increase or decrease criminality? Foucault provides a
large number of questions that can be – and are – asked of this type of security
including the costs, the possibility of reforming the criminal, and the predictability
of re-occurrence of the crime. It is this third modulation that the grids assists and
enables.
!

Foucault does not speak about criminality as though it were divorced from

the rest of society. He wants to make it “absolutely clear” that the dominant
“juridico-legal system” up until at least the eighteenth century had a strong
emphasis on “the disciplinary side.”41 Many of the punishments imposed on those
determined to have broken the law rarely had any consequence. What was
important was the “corrective effect,” not so much on the guilty party (for being
hanged is hardly corrective), but on the population as a whole.42 Thus, when a
particularly harsh sentence was delivered for a relatively minor offence (such as
petty theft being met with the sentence of death), it is clear that the punishment
was aimed at altering (namely, decreasing) the probability of such thefts
occurring. With this preoccupation with probability, Foucault is able to point to the
beginnings of a type of “mechanism of security.”43 Foucault insists that there is
not a successive series of disciplinary practices (that the three modulations of
security outlined above are not a historical ‘progression’). Instead, these
modulations intertwine with one another; they do not replace one another.
!

It is with this type of disciplinary-security that we find, not the invention of,

but a new deployment of the partitioning grid. During outbreaks of the plague and
exclusion of lepers toward the end of the Middle Ages, the grid was imposed to
indicate which areas were infected and which were not, where people could go,
40
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where they could not, which foods could be consumed, which homes had to be
presented to inspectors, etc.44 This is a production of urban space based on a
particular notion of security – the security of the population.
!

For Foucault, discipline is exercised on bodies, but not primarily on

individuals: “discipline exists only insofar as there is a multiplicity or an end,”
such as in the school, military or workplace.45 Moreover, the space of a town
radically shifted from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century as a result of this
disciplinary structure. During this period, the town still had a “particular legal and
administrative definition” that was based on that period’s notion of sovereignty:
control over a territory.46 The town was a specific type of territory, confined within
a tight, walled-in space that had more than a military function, since it was much
more highly mixed in terms of social and economic practices than the
countryside.
!

During this period, this mixed nature of the town led to increasing

complexity and a number of defined ‘problems’ for its development,
administration, and control. Trade and the rise of urban demography brought to
bear the problem of the compact, walled-in nature of the town. In broad terms,
during the eighteenth century, “what was at issue … was the question of the
spatial, juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the town: resituating
the town in a space of circulation.”47 Following Foucault’s argument, we ought to
see the founding of York as military camp and as a capital; a defence camp and a
town to be populated by people who are not directly involved in the military.
!

Foucault directs us to a study done in the mid-seventeenth century by

Alexandre Le Maître. Again, this is the mid-seventeenth century, about 150 years
before Simcoe’s settlement of York, and though it provides a different framework
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than York’s actual settlement, it does help us understand the earlier Plan for the
Harbour of Toronto (Figure 3). His study, La Métropolitée, posed the question,
“Must a country have a capital city, and in what should it consist?”48 Le Maître
argues that the state is comprised of three elements: the peasants, the artisans,
and the sovereign and his officers. The state itself ought to be an “edifice” of
these three components. The peasants are the foundation, in the ground and
underground, of this edifice, who are unseen but ensure the solidity of the whole.
The artisans occupy the “common parts,” the “service quarters,” in this
architectural metaphor. The upper tier, the sovereign and his officers, occupy the
living and reception areas.49 For Le Maître, the “foundations” of the state are the
peasants – and only the peasants – who live in the countryside, the artisans live
in small towns, and the nobles occupy the capital city. Beyond these two spatial
relationships and metaphors, Le Maître depicts the state as a circle with the
peasants at the furthest reaches, the artisans closer to the centre, and the
sovereign at its very centre. Were a state’s territory to be another shape (square,
rectangle), the sovereign would not be able to fully exercise control over the
entire territory were he located at one end or corner.
!

For Le Maître there are a number of functions and roles the capital must

take: it must govern the entire territory of the state; it must be an example and set
the morality of the people within the state; it must be the location of the best
religious orators and academics; and it must be the centre of the state’s
economy. The latter means the capital must be a site of luxury, the place which
attracts products and investments for trade and manufacture. Foucault points out
a final argument of Le Maître that will be central to Foucault’s analysis: “the
capital must be the ornament of the territory.”50 This notion of ‘ornament’ will
reoccur with Foucault’s discussion of the police and its role of providing
“splendour” to the city. Foucault interprets Le Maître’s utopian depiction of the
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town as a town based on the principles of sovereignty; that the “primary
relationship is that of the sovereign to the territory, and this [relationship] serves
as the schema, the grid” for understanding what a town should be and how it
ought to function.51
The Plan for the Harbour of Toronto (Figure 3) follows Le Maître’s theory
of how a town ought to be set up: surrounding farmland for the peasants (large
grid), a tighter grid for the ‘artisans’ and trades people, with the seat of
sovereignty at the central square. What actually happened, though, was quite the
opposite (Figure 4): the upper-class were located out in the ‘fields,’ away from the
centre of town, and the town itself was a muddy necessity for market-trade. In
fact, the first council meetings of York were held to the west of Simcoe’s tenblock town (at what is now St. Lawrence Market), and the ‘seat of sovereignty,’ in
the form of town and city halls, continually shifted further to the west and away
from ten-block town.
The shape of the plan and the actual town (York) are significantly different
from Le Maître’s theory. Le Maître states that the territory must be circular, not a
rectangle or square, so that the sovereign may exercise control over the entire
territory. In York, the sovereign was not present; the sovereign resided in Britain.
Thus we can think of the exercise of sovereignty in York as an ‘abstract’
sovereignty. Though Simcoe, acting on the sovereign’s behalf, was physically
present, he was not acting as a ‘ruler’ over the territory. His concerns were more
to do with the functioning of the military and ensuring the fort succeeded in its
purpose. Sovereignty here was more a combination of ‘governance at a
distance’ and ‘self-governance.’ One can think of the sovereign actually existing
in the middle of a circle insofar as England positioned itself at the centre of the
globe which it sought to colonize (we still live with the remnants of this – standard
time, cardinal direction, etc.). What is more important for the subsequent history
of Toronto and its contemporary state is this notion of self-governance. York was
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not like other British colonies (compared to India or anywhere in the so-called
‘Orient’) as it was created to be fairly self-ruling, not ruled. The population of York
was to be upper-classes, high-ranking military officials, British citizens, etc. –
‘good liberal individuals.’ This is ‘in line’ with the gridding of the territory – an
equal plane of space.
!

Nonetheless, York falls within what Foucault calls the “grid of sovereignty,”

in which there appear a number of specifically urban functions: economic, moral,
and administrative. For Foucault, the “interesting thing” is the desire to link the
role of the sovereign to a “spatial distribution” so that an effective sovereign is
one that is “well placed within a territory” and the territory is “well policed” so
obedience to the sovereign is based on the territory’s spatial layout.52 In York, we
can think of the sovereign being “well placed” insofar as he is both placed in
‘abstraction’ and placed within each self-governing individual. The actual layout
of the territory is, itself, a form of sovereignty.
!

Essential to this form of spatial sovereignty is circulation; the circulation of

ideas, desires, orders, and commerce. The circulation of capital around, and in
relation to, the capital city is central to the economic system of mercantilism, the
system in which Le Maître is writing. A good capital city is a city which is wellcapitalized, and so Le Maître’s idealized state is one in which the sovereign is
able to best exercise control over a spatial territory.
!

To give another form of town from roughly the same period, Foucault then

turns to one of the many towns built where previously there was nothing. To build
a town from scratch, the form of the Roman camp is used along with military
knowledge for the purpose of discipline. While Le Maître’s form of the town was
built on a broad, general understanding of a large territory, the town based on the
military camp is based on a “smaller, geometric figure … namely the square or
rectangle.”53 Camp towns, such as Richelieu, were built with a main street
52

Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 14.

53

Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 16.

!

Chapter 1!

45

running through its centre and other streets running parallel or perpendicular and
subdivided in greater or smaller distances. This leaves some city blocks larger
and others smaller, with people living only within the larger blocks, and artisans
and shops in the area with the smaller blocks. This commercial area with smaller
blocks encourages circulation and this circulation is hemmed in as it is bordered
by large churches. Finally, the residential area is further subdivided so that some
houses are built with multiple floors and face the main street, while others are
single-storied and face the quieter streets, to reflect the differences in social
status and wealth.54 Whereas Le Maître “capitalized” a territory, this camp town
reflects a different disciplinary treatment of space. The camp town constructs an
empty, closed space and produces artificial multiplicities within, according to
principles of hierarchy, communications of relations of power, and specific
functional effects. So, rather than “capitalizing” (or ‘sovereigntizing’) a territory
which already contains people and relations of power, the camp town structures
a space based on a disciplined order of construction.
!

For a third example, also concerned with the problem of circulation,

Foucault points to the “real development of towns that actually existed in the
eighteenth century,” using Nantes as the specific example.55 While Nantes is a
very old city, in the eighteenth century it was undergoing commercial
development, and “the problem” became one of overcrowding, of new
administrative and economic functions, and of new relationships with the
surrounding countryside, all the while allowing for growth.56 In relation to the
founding of York, though, we imagine London, England, rather than Nantes,
which shares the similar problem in the eighteenth century of overcrowding and
new functions and relationships as Nantes. Again, Foucault points to the concept
of circulation, in this case having the “form of a heart that ensures the circulation
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of blood.”57 Of course, Nantes is not designed on the circulation system of the
body, but this was the prominent idea governing many proposals. What did, in
fact, occur was the cutting of routes through the town to make streets wide
enough for four main functions: (1) opening up areas of the town for hygiene and
ventilation where “morbid miasmas accumulated in crowded quarters” with ‘too
much’ density; (2) ensuring trade could occur within the town; (3) connecting this
network of streets to external roads so that goods from outside the core can
reach the core; and (4) allowing for surveillance. Since trade and circulation of
goods required the walls of the walled-in city to be removed, there was the
concern for the circulation of the undesirable: the beggars, thieves, criminals, etc.
that would come from outside the town. In other words, there needs to be a
means by which to distinguish ‘good’ circulation from ‘bad’ circulation.
!

While these are the four functions Foucault describes for what actually

happened in ‘fixing’ existing urban centres in Europe, we can see how each of
these functions play out in the development of York.
Regarding the first function, ventilation and an opening up of areas too
densely crowded, Simcoe avoided this problem by laying out a very small tenblock town, off to the side of the rest of the land to be populated. This would
severely limit the possibility of ‘too much’ density occurring in the main or central
part of town – and it was small and isolated to a specific area.
!

The second function of ensuring trade within the town is fairly clear – this

is what this ten-block site was intended for. It was also located close to the lake
for trade with places like Kingston, and even beyond to England.
!

The third function, to connect the core of the town to the outlying areas, is

clearly displayed in that simple line through the centre – Lot Street. Each of these
lots were connected along Lot Street, which ran straight to the ten-block town
site. Further, shortly after founding York, he had men clear two roads: Yonge and
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Dundas streets. Yonge would run north-south pretty much in the centre of the
township, while Dundas would run just north and parallel to Lot Street.58
!

Finally, as regards the fourth function of surveillance, we only need to look

at the actual fort and the fortified point of the peninsula. While Foucault discusses
the ‘threat’ of undesirables entering the town from the countryside, York was
concerned with invasion from the water – and the surveillance of the water was
precisely the point of Fort York.
!

I want to stress Foucault’s point about circulation and the space of

circulation. To answer his own question, “What is a good street?”59 Foucault
insists that “poly-functionality” is most important.60 He makes an interesting
statement here: “A good street is one in which there is, of course, a circulation of
what are called miasmas, and so diseases.”61 In other words, a ‘good street’ is
one that has disease circulating! This is, of course, something that has to be
managed and not particularly desirable. A good street is also one in which
merchandise can be transported and there are shops – and it will also be
possible for thieves and rioters to move down the street.
!

In terms of planning a town, Foucault tells us, “the town must not be

conceived or planned according to a static perception that would ensure the
perfection of the function there and then, but will open onto a future that is not
exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable, and a good town
plan takes into account precisely what might happen.” 62 We can see Simcoe
following this notion of ‘town planning.’ While he designated one small area as
the ten-block town, it was off to the side and he left the large area to west along
58
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the shore line ‘blank.’ Some may criticize Simcoe for not developing a full plan of
the area, but he was likely right to leave this up to current and future citizens to
determine its use. It is in this area that we now find the ‘core’ of Toronto: the
financial district, the CN Tower, the Skydome – all the things that seem to define
Toronto as Toronto and the destination of Toronto’s tourists.63
!

To organize a town with a concern for its future is, in fact, a concern about

security. The technique for this is a problem of the series, “an indefinite series of
mobile elements” that circulate: “x number of carts, x number of passers-by, x
number of thieves, x number of miasmas, and so on.”64 Alongside this series of
circulations is the “series of accumulating units”: how many inhabitants, houses,
buildings, etc.65 The space in which this occurs, Foucault terms the ‘milieu’: “The
specific space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers to
the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be inserted within a given
space.”66 This space is the milieu – the space in which this series of uncertain
events unfolds. Foucault tells us the milieu is what is needed to “account for
action at a distance” and is “therefore the medium of an action and the element in
which it circulates.” Regarding the role of sovereignty, we can see York being
produced as the space of milieu as it becomes a space for governance at a
distance. Further, it is thus “the problem of circulation and causality that is at
stake in this notion of milieu.” 67 While the term or concept of milieu was not
present in the work of Simcoe, the “pragmatic structure which marks out in
advance is present in the way in which the town planners try to reflect and modify
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urban space.” 68 In other words, the milieu is that thing in which circulation is
carried out; it is in the milieu where the apparatuses of security work. And Simcoe
was trying to set the scene for this security.
!

Importantly, the milieu is the field of intervention. Instead of taking

individuals as legal subjects capable of voluntary actions, or as a multiplicity of
organisms, or bodies capable of performances – the milieu allows one to
intervene and affect a population. However, York was not a “total milieu” as it
depended on people’s own self-governance. It was this ‘quasi milieu’ that
enabled this self-governance to occur.
!

At first glance, it would appear that Foucault’s ‘milieu’ is much the same as

Lefebvre’s ‘representational space,’ as it is the space in which “urban planners”
intervene. However, it might be more appropriate to think of the milieu as the
embodiment of Lefebvre’s triad. It is a spatial practice as it reveals how that
society perceived space, and is caught up in representational space as it informs
how the space is directly lived by its inhabitants.

Grids, Urbanism, Politics, Police
The grid that Foucault discusses, the grid of The Plan for Toronto Harbour
(Figure 3), and the grid that Simcoe imposed on/as York are all, among other
things, a response to the messy, crowed ‘naturally’ developed urban spaces of
Europe. Those winding, narrow streets that developed without an overarching
plan, but were the result of slow and steady ‘growth,’ had become a problem: a
problem of governance and a problem of security. The grid was meant to ‘solve’
this problem and was a means to organize the population along clean lines and
square boxes. I argue that the early form of the city (narrow, winding streets) was
a “natural” development – they were not planned, they were not worked out on
paper beforehand but developed as individuals or small groups extended the city.
68
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The disciplining or securitizing grids imposed in the eighteenth century (like York)
and right up until the middle of the twentieth century are, I argue, a symptom not
of the imposition of rationality on what appears to be the chaos that develops if
“nature” were left to run its (‘her’) course, but rather the symptom of the dream,
fantasy, or belief that an imposed grid would solve this problem of chaotic nature.
!

Another important aspect of these grids is perspective. When one looks at

either the Plan for the Toronto Harbour (Figure 3) or the map that Simcoe sent
back to Britain (Figure 4) (or even any contemporary map), there is literally no
perspective. It might appear that it is a perspective from above, but is not from a
specific place above the territory. There are some very interesting “bird’s-eye
view” maps of Toronto made as souvenirs, but these were made later in the midnineteenth century. It is worth recalling the infamous line about Simcoe’s idea to
place the capital in Georgina (London, Ontario): that it was only reachable by
“hot-air balloon,” which was then a new invention. The hot-air balloon lifts a
person up to give them this “bird’s-eye view,” which may have contributed to
thinking and representing a space from above in the mid-nineteenth century.
However, again the hot-air balloon provides an actual perspective, not the nonperspective of the Plan for the Toronto Harbour (Figure 3) or the map of what
Simcoe had imposed (Figure 4). Some might even claim that these abstract grids
are a ‘God’s perspective,’ but they are not. They go ‘beyond’ this perspective to a
complete abstraction based on European rationality.
!

The contemporary complaint about gridded street networks is that they are

‘boring.’ But, as Jan Gehl argues, grids are only boring from above.69 From a
person’s eyeline (five or six feet off the ground), grids are not boring at all, but
quite useful and enjoyable. Similarly, suburban curvilinear streets might look a bit
interesting on paper, they’re frustrating and can be quite boring on the ground. In
any case, we ought to think of the grid of the Plan for the Harbour of Toronto
(Figure 3) and Simcoe’s map (Figure 4) are ‘slow grids,’ whereas the later, mid69
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twentieth century, grid of Le Corbusier are ‘fast grids’ that correspond to the
airplane and helicopter.

Policing and Urbanization
Let us now turn to how Foucault understands the role of the police in relation to
urbanization. Foucault argues that policing and governance go hand-in-hand,
and that to police is the same thing as to urbanize. Foucault also argues that the
meaning of ‘politics’ in the seventeenth or eighteenth century shifts to become
the ‘art of governance’ rather than control over a territory. Following a discussion
of how Foucault understands the police in relation to the urban and his historical
definition of politics, I will then turn to Jacques Rancière’s rather unconventional
notion of politics and the police order. I should say here that, Rancière’s work is
in some ways a criticism of Foucault and his attendant theory of omnipresent
power. However, this criticism is founded on Rancière’s assumption that Foucault
equates power with politics. Though power is an essential aspect of the political,
nowhere does Foucault equate power with politics. Further, while Foucault
provides an historical account of the shift of meaning of the political and the role
of governance, Rancière provides a much more ‘absolutist’ or ahistorical
definition of the political in which governance is not politics.
!

When Foucault discusses the rise of the problem of scarcity or epidemic

or contagion in the middle of the eighteenth century, it is linked to the
“phenomena of the town itself.”70 Contagion and epidemic are the problem of the
town as disease and sickness are the problem of the home. The town is also the
place of revolt. The town is “at the heart of these different examples of
mechanisms of security” and it is the town that created “new and specific
economic and political problems of government technique.”71 It is the creation
and development of towns, of urban spaces, that shifts the technique of
70
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governance from one of controlling a territory to what Foucault calls
‘governmentality.’ However, prior to the full implementation of governmentality
techniques, it was the town that was an exception from territorial governance – to
some extent, it was a space of self-governance. Foucault argues that it is the
“fact of the [existence of the] town and legitimate sovereignty [which] had to be
reconciled. How can sovereignty be exercised over a town?” 72 In other words,
sovereignty up until the middle of the eighteenth century was exercised over a
territory – a well-defined space which is understood to be rather static. The town
introduces the problem of circulation, to which sovereignty responds with the
techniques of security and governmentality.
!

Governing circulation, movement, exchange, and contact – specifically

urban phenomena – are in many ways beyond the early, Machiavellian,
conception of sovereignty (how to maintain a principality as it is, how to
demarcate or fix its borders). This early conception of sovereignty is concerned
with ‘safety’ as security: how to keep things stable and ensure the sovereign’s
power is not endangered. The shift in the conception of sovereignty occurs when
circulation becomes the object to secure, though allowing (and even
encouraging) circulation to occur. Thus, the shift is from the ‘safety’ of the
sovereign and the territory to the security of circulation and the population.
!

This shift gives rise to “urban research, ways of preventing or at least

controlling food shortages” and epidemics.73 This urban research is no longer
about “a relationship of obedience between a higher will, of the sovereign, and
the wills of those subjected to his will.”74 Rather than passive obedience to the
sovereign, “urban research” concerns “physical processes,” “natural processes,”
or “elements of reality.” 75 Rather than a strict prohibition (you will not do this or
that), law finds itself becoming a “progressive self-cancellation of phenomena by
72
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phenomena itself.”76 So, instead of a simple prohibition it becomes a matter of
marking a limit, an encouragement of behaviours, delimiting a point of ‘too
much.’ This marking of a limit, of declaring ‘too much’ relates directly to
Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality.’ This shift from territorial sovereignty to
governmentality occurs just prior to the foundation of York. While this
governmentality was somewhat ‘new,’ I argue that it is the principles of
governmentality that inform Simcoe and his means to plan, establish and, secure
York as a ‘fort-town.’
!

I also contend that governmentality is a specifically urban phenomenon.

The tactics of governmentality occur at the level of the urban, and it is the
existence of the town that gives rise to governmentality. This is a distinct
contribution to the governmentality literature since it largely concerns the state or
the international (the space between states). There are some articles and book
chapters that discuss governmentality in relation to urban policy (which is hardly
surprising) but many of these are written from a health policy perspective. In any
case, there are certainly no discussions of the founding of York or more recent
Toronto in relation to governmentality.
!

Foucault’s concept of governmentality has had quite a bit of currency in

English political theory since it was one of the few lectures ‘leaked,’ translated,
and published. A first transcription of this lecture appeared in the Italian journal
Aut-Aut in 1978 and was then republished in a few other journals.77 The first
English translation of that Italian version appeared in the journal I&C in 1979 and
then reached a large, English-speaking audience when this translation was republished in The Foucault Effect in 1991. Not surprisingly, much of this lecture
had been lost or altered. This lecture, as it appears in Security, Territory,
Population, is based on the many cassette recordings of his lectures in
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consultation with Foucault’s own lecture notes. !This lecture on governmentality
revolves around Machiavelli’s The Prince and a few texts, published in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which critique the book. For Machiavelli,
whom Foucault takes as the model of sovereignty during this period, the
sovereign is concerned only with his territory. Foucault is tracing a ‘genealogy,’
documenting a shift in which political writings turn from ‘advice to the prince’ to a
new ‘art of government.’ The Prince is about a prince’s ability to hold his
principality, while the anti-Machiavellian literature Foucault is presenting seeks a
new ‘art of government.’ What is perhaps most important in this shift is the role
that the family plays – from a model of government to an instrument of
government.
!

From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, most political thinkers sought

to distance themselves from ‘Machiavellianism’ because in The Prince the prince
appeared as a singularity, as an externality transcendent from his principality.
There was, in fact, no link between the sovereign and the territory, so an ‘art of
government’ (if there is one to be found in The Prince) is two-fold: identify
dangers, and manipulate relations to keep the principality in the prince’s control
and dominion. Quite simply, the only ‘art of government’ to be found in The
Prince are ways and means for a prince to keep his principality. But this, Foucault
tells us, is not the ‘art of government’ that the anti-Machiavellian literature seeks.
Foucault presents us with a text from the seventeenth century by La
Mothe Le Vayer that distinguishes between three types of government: the art of
self-government that belongs to the realm of morality, the art of managing a
family, which is essentially economy, and the science of ruling the state, which is
understood as politics proper. Whatever we may think about these distinctions, it
is clear that politics is clearly demarcated, as well as separated from these other
‘fields’ of reality – morality and family.78 The art of government here becomes a
problem of re-introducing morality and the control of individual behaviour (family)
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through the techniques of the government, which concerns the problem of
properly re-introducing the matter of ‘economy’ into the realm of politics. In other
words, it first spatializes and removes these ‘realms,’ then seeks to re-order
government with economy and morality.
Foucault seeks to link this re-ordering to an earlier statement found in
Guillaume de La Perriere’s text Miroir politique: “Government is the right
disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a suitable end.”79 We are
reminded that in The Prince the only ‘things’ on which sovereignty is exercised
are the territory and the inhabitants. For La Perriere, though, government is not
particularly concerned with territory, but with a multitude of ‘things’: men and their
relations, including wealth, resources, climate, irrigation, customs, habits, etc.
This type of governance is expressed in the metaphor of governing a ship – the
captain must account for the sailors, the cargo, and the ship itself. What is
important here is that property and territory (the objects of sovereignty found in
The Prince), while essential, are only mere variables.
The latter half of La Perriere’s statement (“arranged so as to lead to a
convenient end”) suggests that government has its own end, its own finality. This
final end, La Perriere tells us is the “common welfare and salvation of all.”80 This
common good is often reduced to obedience – which means that the people
should conform to the laws imposed by God, nature, and the sovereign. Thus,
the end of sovereignty is sovereignty; sovereignty ensures there is submission to
sovereignty (much like what we find in The Prince). However, Foucault sees
something new in La Perriere. Since government is concerned with ‘things,’ it
seeks a whole range of ends to these various things – a series of finalities that
become the objective of government.81 It is not so much a matter of imposing
laws which subjects must obey, but an arrangement of various things so as to
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lead to a particular end. Here, then, we see that government no longer takes
territory as its primary object, but in all of the ‘things’ it manages.
!

Government begins to develop its own rationality – its own means, tactics,

relations – that are seen as ‘intrinsic’ to government itself. In this time, the
existing framework of sovereignty was too large, abstract, and rigid, while these
new theories on the ‘art of government’ were too weak. They were too weak
because they took the family as the model for the ‘art of government.’ New
theories on the ‘art of government’ began to emerge, which sought to give
government its own realm separate from the sovereign. They did this by
reconfiguring the family as an instrument of government, not its model. ‘Family’
was reordered around the problem of population. Populations – which include
families, the realm of economy – are seen to have their own laws, patterns, and
regularities that are not reducible to the longstanding model of the family as a
political organization. This is where, Foucault argues, our modern conception of
‘the economy’ emerges as separate from its root of ‘running a household’ and as
separate from government. I would argue that this form of ‘population’ is largely
an urban population. The tactics for producing and ‘accounting’ for this population
are deployed by the police, who, as we will see below, are specifically urban,
since “to police and to urbanize is the same thing.”82
The ‘art of government’ begins to find its own rationality. It is not so much
that this new ‘art of government’ “invented” its own rationality, but that the
relations between government and people were themselves revealing relations
with a seemingly inherent rationality irreducible to the family. Rather than a model
for government, family becomes an instrument for government to manage
populations: vaccinations, marriages, and the means through which to gain
information (statistics) about the population.
Population, not sovereignty, becomes the ultimate end for government.
Government sees its purpose as, well, government. That is, government is no
82
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longer primarily concerned with merely its own survival (as is the case in The
Prince). Rather, the purpose of government is the welfare of the populations, the
improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.
Importantly, the means for government to manage these things is somehow
viewed to be immanent to the population. Foucault terms the emergence of this
new art of government “governmentality.”83

Governmentality targets the

‘intersection’ of the interests of the particular people (what individuals want) 84 and
the interests of the government. That is, governmentality seeks to transform
individual’s interests into the interests of the government. Populations are the
instrument for this ‘art of government,’ they become a particular ‘field of
intervention.’ It removes ‘family’ or economy as a model of government and reintroduces and re-orders ‘economy’ as its own ‘field’ of reality. Put another way,
governmentality seeks to align individual desires with collective desires.
!

Foucault concludes this lecture with an argument that the state is

overvalued. He argues that the state, despite having the affective quality of the
“cold monster,”85 does not have “this unity, individuality, and rigorous functionality,
nor … this importance. After all, maybe the state is only a composite reality and a
mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think. Maybe.”86 It
seems Foucault is suggesting the state is not as important as we think because
this new form of governance (governmentality) is an urban practice. Foucault is
much less concerned with the state’s takeover of society than he is with the
“governmentalization” of the state: “we live in the era of governmentality
discovered in the eighteenth century.”87 This governmentalization of the state has
become both the life-blood of the state as well as the “only space of political
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struggle and contestation.”88 Again, governmentality is the “space” of the political.
Governmentality is also (i.e. not the same) the measure to define what does and
does not belong in the state’s domain. I add that governmentality, by virtue of
determining a “convenient end,” is one of the measures of determining ‘too
much’ or ‘too little’: too much or too little circulation, too much or too little density,
too much or too little state intervention, too much or too little freedom-security.
The following chapters will show how this ‘too much’ figures prominently in the
psychic state of the urban dweller. For now, I will turn to how this ‘too much/too
little’ plays out in the realm of the police.
!

While governmentality finds its birth in the archaic notion of the Christian

pastorate, it “acquires its present dimensions … in the old, seventeenth and
eighteenth century sense of the word ‘police.’”89 As we will see, to police and to
urbanize are essentially identical.
!

There are about three or four lectures in Security, Territory, Population that

discuss the shift from earlier notions of politics and governance to the “art of
government” that defines the “threshold of modernity.”90

In general, what

occurred was a shift away from Plato’s notion that the ‘State’ should exist in a
permanent ‘state’ (an idealized ‘perfect’ government) to an art of governance that
consists of “manipulating, maintaining, distributing, and re-establishing relations
of force within a space of competition”; in other words, “government is deployed
in a field of relations of forces.”91 This ‘deployment’ occurs through “two major
assemblages of political technology.”92 The first concerns the ‘balance of powers’
in establishing the thing called ‘Europe,’ in which each state is to be ‘powerful’ but
not significantly more powerful than another state. The second, the one that
concerns me for this chapter, is the “police.”
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Foucault argues that there was a major shift in the understanding of police

at the end of the eighteenth century (again, the time of York’s founding). In the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, ‘police’ referred to a “form of community or
association governed by a public authority.” 93 There would be lists like, “states,
principalities, towns, police” so that “a police” was a human organization that was
smaller than a town, but had a public characteristic unlike a family. Thus, what we
now call a “community” was then called “a police.” The notion of “police” as a
“poorly defined society” would last until the beginning of the seventeenth century.
During this period, “police” would also refer to the set of actions that direct these
communities. And, “police” referred to the result of “good government.” 94
!

From the seventeenth century onward, Foucault argues that “‘police’

begins to take on a profoundly different meaning: … the set of means by which
the state’s forces can be increased while preserving the state in good order.”95 It
begins to refer to the “mobile, yet stable and controllable relationship between
the state’s internal order and the development of its forces.”96 In a word, Foucault
calls this “splendor.” In his 1611 text, La Monarchie aristodémocratique, Turquey
de Mayerne writes that the police are to be concerned with “everything that gives
ornament, form, and splendor to the city.”97 Foucault unearths this quotation from
1776: “I accept the definition of those who call police the set of means that serve
the splendor of the entire state and the happiness of all its citizens.”98 Foucault
defines “splendor” as the “visible beauty of the order and the brilliant, radiating
manifestation of a force. Police therefore is in actual fact the art of the state’s
splendor as visible order and manifest force.”99
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Earlier, we saw that the “capital [city] must be the ornament of the

territory,”100 and here we see the police function as the means by which to
provide “splendor” to the state. Related to this ‘splendor’ is the need for the police
to concern itself with the ‘interior’ of a state: to ensure the “good use of the state’s
forces” so that each state will be well-policed and maintain the ‘balance’ or
‘equilibrium’ of Europe. Thus, it is essential that all states have good police to
ensure this equilibrium and from this there begins a type of intra-state ‘science’ of
the police. This science is statistics: “police makes statistics necessary, but police
also makes statistics possible.”101 Statistics are the set of procedures for the
forces of the state so that “statistics is the state’s knowledge of the state” –
knowledge of both itself and other states.102
!

But what is it that the police are concerned with specifically? Foucault

returns to Turquey de Mayerne’s text: “‘everything that gives ornament, form, and
splendor to the city.’ It is ‘the order of everything that one can see’ in the city.”103
Foucault interprets this as being the entire art of government. Turquey de
Mayerne breaks down the offices and officers of the police. Without going into
the details of all these, allow me just to say that the essential concern of these
officers is with the role and behaviour of the people who make up the population.
Adding to the traditional institutions of justice, the army, and finance, the police
become an additional institution, “which is administrative modernity par
excellence.”104 The police then concern themselves with a moral regulation of the
population, wealth and household management, education, and the
professionalization of the individual.
!

The fundamental aspect of police is forming and taking “man as the true

subject on whom virtue and vice are impressed” so that he may perfect himself
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and take up some occupation to which he devotes himself.105 This is a concern
for the police since it makes possible the perfection of the state. It is important to
princes, sovereigns, or the state that men be virtuous, obedient, and working –
rather than a concern for men’s wealth, the disputes the state as police are
concerned with are what men ‘do,’ with their ‘occupation.’ These are tactics
deployed at the level of the urban. Further, the police are concerned with the
number of men in a state, the necessities for life, their health, and circulation.
Setting aside the first two, the problem of health connects to the theory of
miasmas and affects the shape of a “new urban space.”106 The air, ventilation,
and “politics of amenities” in towns will be organized with reference to this
problem of health, such as the width of roads, the dispersion of poisons, and the
location of butchers, abattoirs, and cemeteries.
!

Circulation is the final objective of police. While this is meant to be

circulation throughout the state, much of this relates to urban space: roads,
public squares, etc. The circulation of goods, the products of these “proper
subjects,” will be through roads, canals, rivers, etc. so that the space of
circulation becomes a “privileged object” for police.107

God has provided

circulation and communication through nature; man by the police.108 And not only
the circulation of the material goods themselves, but the set of regulations,
constraints, limits, or the facilities and encouragements that allow for this
circulation within and beyond the borders of the state.
!

Generally speaking, the fundamental object of police is “men’s

coexistence with each other.”109 Police must concern themselves with people
living together, depending on one another for their needs and desires,
reproducing – all of this occurring within a space of circulation. So, while the
105
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police must ensure that people have the basic necessities for survival, it goes
beyond this to ensure they are “produced, divided up, and put in circulation” so
that the state can draw its strength from them.110 At the end of the sixteenth and
the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, “police is a set of interventions and
means that ensure that living, better than just living, coexisting will be effectively
useful to the constitution and development of the state’s forces.”111 Police ensure
the “splendor of the state and the felicity of each” individual.112
!

Foucault unearths some texts from the early eighteenth century that list

the concrete functions that must be of concern to the police. Without listing them
all, they can be grouped as “goodness of life” (religion and morals), “preservation
of life” (health and subsistence), “convenience of life” (buildings, arts, science,
manufacture, commerce), the “pleasures of life” (games, theatre), and what is
considered “a considerable part of the public good”: the elimination and control of
poverty.113
!

Foucault argues that first and foremost, these “are all essentially what

could be called urban objects.” 114 These are ‘urban’ because these things only
exist in a town or because there is a town. We might object to “goodness of life”
or the “preservation of life” being specifically urban issues, but Foucault points
out that these were considered by the police in terms of urbanism – for the
police, they are problems of coexistence and dense coexistence.
!

Secondly, these problems that concern the police relate to market

exchange – the buying and selling of goods, ensuring a space of circulation in
which this trade can occur, that products meet some standards, etc. For the
police, it is about the “circulation of men and goods in relation to each other. It is
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the whole problem, precisely, of these vagrants, of people moving around.”115
The term “vagrant” shows up here rather unexpectedly, but it relates the problem
of those who are nomadic, those who do not ‘circulate’ per se, but move about as
they seemingly wish. In other words, vagrants move around ‘too much’ whereas
“men and goods” ought to circulate at the appropriate rate of speed. In any case,
for Foucault, these rules, concerns and regulations of the police are “urban
regulations.”116
!

Of course, all these things that the police consider problems or things they

sought to implement were already in existence prior to their ‘policies.’ Roads,
markets, violence, crime, vagrancy – all these were already in existence. But in
the seventeenth and eighteenth century, with the police taking these things up as
their concern, Foucault argues we begin to see the “urbanization of the
territory.”117 By ‘urbanizing the territory,’ Foucault is referring to the ways in which
an entire state or principality becomes organized like a town, arranging things to
function as a town, as a perfect town. It allows for a population to communicate
with each other, to live together and circulate, exchange, buy and sell because
there are police regulating the rules of this circulation. Police, then, are the
condition of possibility for an urban existence. This fits within Foucault’s larger
argument that governance had shifted from territory to population, and this
‘urbanizing the territory’ is part of the governance of populations, re-defining
territory with concepts of the population. Thus for governmentality to function ‘on’
a territory, the territory must be urbanized: “to police and to urbanize is the same
thing.”118 Since governmentality is interested in the “fine materiality of human
existence and coexistence, of exchange and circulation,” it functions through an
intervention at the level of the urban or the town (“health, roads, markets, grains,
and highways”).119
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Rancière’s ‘Police Order’
Since Foucault argues this equivalence between policing and urbanizing, I feel it
is worthwhile to bring Jacques Rancière’s distinction of the political from the
‘police order’ into this discussion. The history of political theory is largely
concerned with governance and very few theorists have provided any ‘radical’ (in
the literal sense) theory of politics. That is, very few have theorized the meaning
of ‘the political.’ Even the few theorists who have, such as Schmitt and Weber,
understand politics primarily as governance. While Schmitt provides a clear
definition of ‘sovereignty’ in Political Theology (“sovereign is he who decided on
the state of exception”),120 he also makes a compelling case for his definition of
‘the political’: marking the distinction between friend and enemy.121 Schmitt is
referring to states: that states distinguish between friends and enemies in the
international.
Rancière provides a very compelling definition of the political in relation to
what he terms the police order and, moreover, his theory is a thinly veiled critique
of Foucault. But, even if we agree with Rancière’s theory of the political, there is
still ‘room’ for Foucault. Generally, I think Foucault’s theory of the police gives a
very good analysis of Rancière’s ‘police order.’ While Rancière’s project is to
mark a limit to the political, there is nothing to suggest that the police order is
unimportant. His point is just that re-arranging the police order does not count as
politics. In many ways, his theory of the police order is a theory of the social,
something distinct from politics. Rancière argues that politics is not the same as
power. Though Foucault is ‘the’ theorist of power, nowhere does he write that
power is the same as politics – and nowhere does he argue that politics is simply
governance. Foucault’s theories of power and governance only clarify what
Rancière means by the police order. Moreover, in History of Sexuality, Foucault
120
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is clear that ‘emancipation’ or resistance does not come from “saying yes to
sex”122 – resistance does not come from saying ‘yes’ to the police order, or by
creating a ‘better’ police order.
In Disagreement,123 Rancière presents his argument that much of what we
normally understand as politics is not politics but what he assigns to the ‘police
order.’ He begins with a foundational conflict in which there is a dispute among a
“community of the just and unjust from the capacity of any speaking being.”124
From this, “two logics of human being-together must” be discerned: politics and
the police order.125 By “police,” Rancière is referring to something beyond the
normal understanding of “the truncheon blows of forces of law” but rather what
encompasses all possible arrangements of “tangible reality in which bodies are
distributed in a community.”126

The term “police” refers to the “system of

distribution and legitimation” that involves the “organization of powers, [and] the
distribution of places and roles.”127 It concerns all the things, borrowing from
Foucault, regarding “‘man’ and his ‘happiness.’”128 In reference to Althusser’s
Marxism, policing is not meant to be “pejorative” or to refer to “state apparatuses”
by which the state imposes order, for this would already involve a prior
understanding of politics confused with police.129 Police refers to “an order of
bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of
saying, and sees those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and
task.”130 In another reference to Foucault, it is what allows particular speeches to
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be a proper discourse and another as “noise,” and it is not so much “disciplining”
as it is that which allows certain things and operations to “appear” and be
deemed “actually occurring.”131
Politics is completely different and antagonistic to policing. Politics refers
to “whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or
lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in
that configuration.” 132 In simpler terms, ‘politics’ is whatever breaks the police
order. This break is manifested on the part of those who have no part in the
configuration of the police order. That the presupposition of the configuration is
“outside” of the configuration can be thought of as a “constitutive outside,” similar
to how Derrida theorizes the “centre” of a structure.133 From this definition of
politics as that which breaks the police configuration, it follows that “political
activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a
place’s designation.”134 Political activity makes visible what once was obscured,
makes heard what once was mere “noise,” or makes the unconsidered
considered. Political activity is a “mode of expression that undoes the perceptible
divisions of the police order” and “demonstrates the sheer contingency of the
order.”135 Furthermore, “politics occurs when there is a place and a way for two
heterogeneous processes to meet.”136 One of these processes is the ‘police’ and
the other is “the process of equality,” by which he means the “open set of
practices” that insists on the “equality between any and every speaking being.”137
Rancière’s understanding of “equality” does not refer to equality as a
“given that politics then presses into service,” nor is it “embodied in a law” which
131
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is then put into practice.138 Rather, it is the “mere assumption that needs to be
discerned with the practices implementing it.”139 It is not the equality we are
familiar with in the liberal democratic state; that ought to be understood as
policing. It is the equality of humans as speaking beings. Thus, if one person or
group were told they were not equals, they would be equals in Rancière’s eyes
as they were assumed to understand what they were being told. In some ways,
this notion of equality relates to the previous discussion regarding the grid and
the type of equality it represents/produces. Above I had suggested that the grid
relates the type of ‘liberal equality’ that was gaining acceptance. Now we might
understand this type of equality expressed in the grid as a material manifestation
of the police order.
In what many have taken as a critique of Foucault, Rancière takes issue
with the claim that “everything is political,” which stems from the somewhat
recent “discovery” that “power relationships” are at work in nearly everything.140 It
would be more accurate to say that “everything is policing,” but this would imply
that nothing is. Rancière is clear on this point: “Nothing is political in itself merely
because power relationships are at work in it.”141 To those who would take this as
a critique of Foucault, I would counter that this is a critique of those who have
taken up Foucault for their own projects. From the late 1960s onward, many have
sought to ‘politicize’ that which had been taken as ‘normal.’ However, ‘politicize’ in
this sense really means to show that power-relations are at work, and Foucault’s
theory of power supported these movements. But nowhere in Foucault’s work
does he argue that ‘power’ is synonymous with ‘politics.’ In fact, the clearest
articulation of his theory of power is found in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1
under the chapter heading “Method.” This means his theory of power is how he
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seeks to understand sexuality and the productive nature of its discourse.142
Further developments of his theory of power can be found in both his theory of
disciplinary society and his theory of discourse (notably in The Archeology of
Knowledge).143 Both of these branches of his theory concern how certain things
come to be objects of knowledge, and how the realm of what can be known or
said about these objects of knowledge is delimited and defined. Again, I would
argue that power-as-method, disciplinary society, and discourse’s powerknowledge all share similarities to Rancière’s police order: a distribution of what
can be sensed and known, the ‘field’ in which this occurs and situating objects
(as objects) of knowledge.
!

For Rancière, the only “things” that are political are those that give “rise to

a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in advance.”144
What is important here is that nothing is political in itself, but anything can
become political if it opens the space for these two logics to meet. Rancière gives
the example of the politicization of the space of the domestic household. It is not
political simply because there are power relations at work, pace Foucauldians,
but because “the subject of [the] argument [is] a dispute over the capacity of
women in the community.”145 Following this, we should not assume that urban
space is political in itself merely because there are power relations at work. As
well, we must not confuse politics in the urban with the imposed orders or
distributions of bodies to assigned places, which is the function of the police.
However, the urban can become a space for politics if it gives rise to itself, or the
subjects in it, being heard as legitimate speaking beings, no longer as mere
noise. The urban can be a space for politics if its ‘babble’ (its rhythm) is heard as
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a legitimate speaking being, either as an unheard collective or as unheard
subjects in the space of and/or on behalf of the urban.146
!

However, none of this is to suggest that the police order is not important,

just that it does not ‘count’ as politics for Rancière. Nearly all of our everyday
urban lives are, dare I say, ‘structured’ by the police order – it constrains and
enables our actions, behaviours, thoughts, and beliefs. Simply walking down a
sidewalk we are implicated in the police order: where to walk, how quickly, for
what purpose, what we focus on and ignore, expecting certain things to be in
certain places (and other things not). The distribution and location of various
objects (the street, sidewalk, buildings, etc.) as well as their functions (where to
circulate, where to stop, where to cross the street, the use of the buildings) are all
caught up in the police order. However, since this is a material manifestation of
the police order, it lends itself to a Rancièrian politics: one can disrupt this order.
We can assume, then, that refusing the specified ‘use’ of building (‘zoning’) could
count as politics. Indeed, as we will see in chapter 4, Jane Jacobs’ insistence on
a diversity of uses in an area (commonly called ‘mixed-use’) goes against the
then-common notion of ‘single use’ zoning ‘counts’ as a rupture of the police
order. In other words, Jacobs’ Death and Life is, in Rancière’s terms, a political
text.
!

Let us now turn to a few passages from Rancière’s “Ten Theses of

Politics.”147 Here we find a similar argument as in Disagreement but it takes a
different tack, from structures of governance. “Thesis One” states that “politics is
not the exercise of power.” Instead, politics is to be understood as “part-taking” in
ruling and being ruled. This is essentially Aristotle’s understanding of what
constitutes political philosophy: “he who partakes in the fact of ruling and the fact
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of being ruled.”148 Following this, Rancière finds that modern democracy has led
to a “sad” state of affairs in which the common good is displaced in favour of “the
masses” and “necessity,” leaving any notion of what constitutes the good in the
hands of “experts” which essentially reduces the political to functions of the
state.149 Rancière’s concern is to demonstrate that “democracy is not a political
regime.”150 Democracy is the institution of politics: democracy institutes the form
of “part-taking” in “ruling and being ruled,” denying the relationship between
these two, which is the denial of politics.
Rancière challenges another common understanding of politics: “politics
cannot be deduced from the necessity of gathering people into communities.”151
This understanding of politics as a necessity, which underwrites ‘social contract’
theories, is an “exception” from the “‘normal’ order of things” in which “human
communities gather together under the rule of those qualified to rule – whose
qualifications are legitimated by the very fact that they are ruling.”152 In other
words, humans do not gather into groups and then engage politics; the very
gathering of humans is done through the relationship between ruling and being
ruled. From this, we ought to understand ‘urban politics’ not simply as some
‘politics’ that occurs within urban space, but the very process of urbanization
itself, and in the processes of grouping inside and outside the urban (i.e. the
back-and-forth movement between the urban and the suburban).
Politics cannot occur if “the people” is not already constituted as a group,
such that the “poor” is a “particular disadvantaged sector,” the “proletariat,” or
only “industrial workers.”153 This merely reflects the police configuration. There is
politics, though, when “the people” concerns a “supplement to the count of the
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parts of society, a specific figure of ‘the part of those who have no-part.’”154 In
other words, there is politics when there is a group who does not ‘take part’ in the
‘part-taking’ as ascribed by the police order. The “political issue” and “object” of
politics concerns the existence of this “supplementary” part.155 Thus, a conflict
between “interest groups” is not politics, but merely power relations of the order
of the police. Rather, “political struggle … is an opposition of logics that count the
parties and parts of the community in different ways.”156 Within the urban and the
processes of the urbanization, we can find many who are a ‘part of those who
have no-part,’ such as the homeless, the disenfranchised, and many recent
immigrants. Moreover, the built form of the urban can and does contribute to this
exclusion.
Consider the space produced in various ‘urban renewal’ projects, such as
Regent Park in the late 1940s, which sought to ‘contain’ its population. Streets
which ran through Regent Park were removed, the multiplexes and apartment
buildings were built facing inward and only those who were ‘in need’ were
allowed to rent apartments there. This was thought to be helpful for the residents
by giving them their own space, protecting them from the outside and allowing
them to have their own ‘community.’ However, as Regent Park came to be
synonymous with ‘ghetto’ and ‘poverty,’ this ‘space of their own’ became
‘isolation.’ The built form of Regent Park has come to be understood as the
biggest factor in its failure: it literally created the residents as those who ‘have nopart’ in the rest of the city. The recent redevelopment has an identical enthusiasm
as that in the 1940s. This new redevelopment ticks off each latest trend in
housing: mixed-use, mixed income, integrated with surrounding area,
geothermal, solar panels, sustainability, etc. However, the root cause of poverty
or the need for a place like Regent Park is not addressed. It is as though
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everyone has convinced each other that if we just build good buildings and lay
them out in a good manner, poverty will go away by itself.
!

In any case, let us return to the distinction between police and politics, as

they are presented as “two ways of counting the parts of the community.”157
Police count “empirical parts” of the “social body” – the “actual groups defined by
differences in birth, by different functions, locations, and interests.”158 Police is
not “repression” or “control,” but rather has its essence in a “certain manner of
partitioning the sensible.” 159 Police, then, characterize society as a totality with
everything and everyone “dedicated to specific modes of action,” leaving “no
place for a void.”160 The “police-principle at the heart of statist practices” is the
“exclusion of what ‘there is not.’”161 I think here we find a strong symmetry with
Foucault’s governmentality which seeks the ‘right disposition of things’ just as the
police order ‘partitions the sensible’ to ensure there are specific modes of action
in specific spaces.
Rancière takes this type of analysis further than Foucault by introducing
‘politics,’ which “counts ‘in addition’ a part of the no-part” – it counts the
supplementary part that does not take part in part-taking.162 In other words, I
would suggest that Rancière’s ‘politics’ as that which breaks with or goes beyond
the police order, could also be understood or ‘used’ as a way to break with or
move beyond the ‘structure’ of governmentality. By “supplementing” the police
order with the “no-part,” politics seeks to disturb the police order. Political
struggle is “that which brings politics into being by separating it from the police”
order that either denies the ‘no-part’s’ existence or seeks to subsume it into its
own logic; politics is, “first and foremost, an intervention upon the visible and the
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sayable.”163 In other words, politics makes visible and sayable that which was
invisible and unspoken or unheard in the police order.
!

In relation to space, “the principal function of politics is the configuration of

its proper space.” 164 To explain this point, Rancière gives an example from the
everyday. He rejects Althusser’s example of interpellation, in which the subject is
brought into being (subjugated) by the police’s call “Hey, you there!” Instead,
Rancière argues that “police intervention in public space” gives legitimacy to
what there is and what there is not.165 Rather than “Hey, you there!,” Rancière
invokes the police’s phrase “Move along! There is nothing to see here!"166 This
urban scene tells us that “that there is nothing to see on a road, that there is
nothing to do but move along.”167 Rancière argues that this asserts the space of
the road as “the space of circulating,” so it remains “nothing other than the space
of circulation.”168 Politics would intervene in this scene to transform “this space of
'moving-along' into a space for the appearance of a subject.” 169 Politics refigures
what “there is to do … what is seen or named” in the particular space inscribed
by the police.170
!

Again, we see reference to Foucault – this time in relation to circulation.

Foucault tells us that policing and urbanizing are the same thing since both share
a desire to specify uses to places and produce populations that ultimately benefit
the state. Interestingly, one of the examples Rancière gives of a rupture with the
police order is the “activity of demonstrators … that literally turned urban
communications paths into ‘public space.’”171 While streets were initially ‘urban
163
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communication paths’ as we saw in Foucault’s discussion of circulation, by the
time of these demonstrations, streets were already broadly understood as ‘public
space’ so Rancière’s example is not particularly convincing. There are many
contemporary examples of groups and individuals ‘re-purposing’ streets, which, if
we recall Foucault’s arguments, are not of Rancière’s “political.” What would
stopping circulation do in Foucauldian terms? I think it would count as
‘resistance’ for Foucault, but it should not count as ‘politics’ for Rancière, since it
is merely a response within the police order’s demand for circulation. Further,
Foucault is not talking only about ‘normal’ circulation since these streets were
meant to circulate beggars and thieves too. So, a different subject circulating is
not the issue for Foucault, and neither for Rancière – it is doing something in a
space designated for circulation that is completely different, not simply stopping
circulation. Consider the annual event known as “Park(ing) Day” where people
take over on-street parking spots with couches and fake grass and just hang
out.172 This interruption of circulation is surely not what Rancière reserves as
politics proper. As for demonstrations, it is hard to accept that an organized
‘march’ (still circulation) along streets counts as Rancièrian politics. Even Critical
Mass rides, in which a group of cyclists ride without permits or police escorts for
the simple purpose of declaring cycling’s existence, is about circulation.173
Though it is about circulation specifically, it appears to simply be a re-ordering of
the police order. Foucault tells us that urban space is produced to allow for
circulation, but not just for circulating goods to the market, but also the vagrants,
disease, riots, etc. Thus, we should not find a resistance or ‘politics’ (in
Rancière’s sense) by simply circulating other things (marches, protests, electric
cars, bicycles, or people walking). Even the stoppage of circulation would just be
a reaction to the police order.
!

A proper Rancièrian politics would occur only if the space of circulation is

completely transformed into something else entirely. His example of transforming
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the space of circulation (the street) into a public space with demonstrations is a
reference to (perhaps nostalgia for) the late-60s notion of demonstration, not the
contemporary organized and, literally, police-led demonstrations. And it is this
shift which points to a serious problem in Rancière’s theory of politics. Nearly
everything that at one time was thought to have ruptured the police order was
absorbed by the police order. Perhaps this is less a ‘problem’ than an argument
that Rancièrian politics is something that is not as ‘static’ or universal as he
presents it. The actions which mark an event as ‘politics’ are unlikely to always
produce a political event. Though Rancière’s notion of politics is inflected with
time (a rupturing event), his definition of ‘politics’ is formal in the Kantian sense
which makes it vulnerable to this criticism. Thus, an action or event that ruptures
the police order is extremely likely to be incorporated within the police order. This
means that that action or event was, for Rancière, proper politics, but once
incorporated within the police order (such as contemporary street
demonstrations), it no longer counts as politics. Rancière almost admits this
himself in this passage from “Ten Theses on Politics”: !
In order to refuse the title of political subjects to a category –
workers, women, etc… – it has traditionally been sufficient to assert
that they belong to a ‘domestic’ space, to a space separated from
public life; one from which only groans or cries expressing suffering,
hunger, or anger could emerge, but not actual speeches
demonstrating a shared aisthesis. And the politics of these
categories has always consisted in re-qualifying these places, in
getting them to be seen as the spaces of a community, of getting
themselves to be seen or heard as speaking subjects (if only in the
form of litigation); in short, participants in a common aisthesis. It
has consisted in making what was unseen visible; in getting what
was only audible as noise to be heard as speech; in demonstrating
to be a feeling of shared ‘good’ or ‘evil’ what had appeared merely
as an expression of pleasure or pain.174
When Rancière argues “the politics” is “re-qualifying spaces,” or making them
“spaces of a community” it is as though he means making these spaces of the
174
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police order. Recall that what was once referred to as ‘police’ is what we now
refer to as ‘community,’ so we can rephrase Rancière in a more literal way:
“getting them to be seen as the spaces of the police order.” The purpose of my
critique here is partly to show the limitations of Rancière’s definition of politics,
but also to insist on the importance of what he calls the police order, which, I
argue, is the focus of Foucault’s work. So, instead of a criticism of Foucault, I
suggest that Rancière has actually given a series of reasons for the importance
of Foucault’s work.
!

While Schmitt’s definition of the political is of the international (that is, that

states mark a distinction between friends and enemies), I argue that everyday
people do this as well. Further, I would like to take this notion of ‘marking a
distinction’ or declaring a limit in the form of ‘too much’ is also a political act. That
is, each subject marks his or her own limit and I am suggesting that the marking
of this limit is political. We mark a limit to nearly everything within the urban:
circulation and density being the two most important. The urban is largely defined
by these things (circulation and density) and judged in terms of too much or too
little. Too little density does not ‘count’ as urban, whereas it is declared a problem
if there is too much. Too little circulation occurs with the problems of congestion
or “gridlock,’ while a limit is placed on circulation through speed limits, restricted
turns, one-ways streets, etc. For example, Bloor Street West loses its urban
texture in the morning as there are relatively few cars so the circulation is too
fast. During the day and at night, there are more cars, causing congestion and
the street regains its ‘charm,’ its urban texture. This argument about marking a
limit also relates to understandings of the political as judgment (making a
judgment when we know not the outcome) since the marking of a limit is
essentially a judgment. As shown above, governmentality is a matter of balance
(not too much, not too little), since it is the ‘right disposition of things’. For
example, in the above discussion of Regent Park, it was political to declare that
there was ‘too much’ poverty and subsequently destroy the area. It is political
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insofar as it makes a judgment about what constitutes the good life, and does so
without knowing the outcomes of the action informed by the judgment.
!

Thus, I would add to Rancière’s theory that a rupture of the police can

occur from within that order. That is, the poverty and inequality that existed in
Toronto in the 1940s were tolerated and considered part of the arrangement of
the police order. But this arrangement within the order reached a limit as
evidenced by the judgment that ‘something’ had to be done. The tactics of
governmentality concerned the negotiation of circulation: both ‘good’ and ‘bad’
things to circulate, as well as how much. The limit of this was exemplified in
Foucault’s point about the ‘vagrant’ who circulated ‘too much.’ Schmitt’s theory of
the political also concerns this judgment of a limit insofar as he defines the
political as distinguishing between friend and enemy. Similarly, Schmitt’s
definition of sovereignty rests on a limit to the normal course of things: the
exception. The grids of The Plan for the Toronto Harbour (Figure 3) and of the
map of what Simcoe established (Figure 4) are clear examples of establishing a
police order.
!

This chapter has introduced Toronto as the city of analysis of this

dissertation and has demonstrated connections between its foundational grid and
Foucault’s arguments about a new form of disciplinary-security, the opening up of
towns to allow for spaces of circulation – circulation of people, goods for trade,
and disease. Foucault links this to a shift in sovereignty and governance (from
maintaining a territory to developing populations), which he terms
‘governmentality.’ This chapter argued that the shift in governance is specifically
urban since governmentality concerns “the right disposition of things”175 which
requires an arrangement orchestrated by the police – and Foucault argues that
“to police and to urbanize are the same thing.”176 Prior to the seventeenth
century, ‘police’ referred to a level of human organization that we now call
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‘community,’ but then came to take on a new meaning: the means by which the
state can increase its forces while preserving order. The concerns of the police
“are all essentially urban objects.”177 Because of the importance of the police in
this shift toward urbanization, Rancière’s distinction between politics and the
‘police order’ are then introduced. While Rancière’s work is partly a critique of
Foucault, or more accurately, Foucauldians who equate power relations with
politics, this chapter has argued that Foucault’s work helps to understand
Rancière’s police order. This chapter then provides a critique of Rancière’s
concept of the political and presents a different theory of the political: the
judgment and declaration of a limit.
!

In the following chapter, we will see how marking a limit relates to ‘excess,’

to trimming off the excess, and to the Lacanian concept of jouissance, in that ‘too
much’ jouissance is unbearable (enjoy, but not too much).178 We will also see
how many urban planners and theorists are responding to a limit or ‘too much’ –
too disorganized, too organized. This will also allow us to think about the
relationship between the urban and the suburban: desire for the suburbs is a
result of the ‘too much’ in urban, while disdain for the suburbs comes from the
sense that it does not have enough of the urban.
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CHAPTER 2: A PSYCHOANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY URBAN LIFE
The industrial cities of late nineteenth century gave rise to a new production of
cities and urban spaces. Those dirty, polluted, and disease-ridden industrial cities
(the “Dickensian Hell”) led to new ways of thinking about the kind of cities we
want to live in. People were no longer content to let a city or urban space come
into being by accidental factors or effects of other forces (like industry or war).
Instead, people began to ‘plan’ cities, bringing about the invention of the town
planner. Of course, there were designed cities and towns during ancient Greek
and Roman times, but, as I discussed in the previous chapter, plans of the
sixteenth and seventeenth century were the exception, a frill, a philosophical
exercise. These were plans based on abstract, even unconscious principles to
create spaces for circulation or isolate areas for particular uses. Industrial
capitalism created similar – though much worse – conditions than the sixteenth
and seventeenth century urban theorists sought to resolve: overcrowding,
disease, impediments to circulation. Urban dwellers coped with these industrial
cities, but their problems eventually reached a ‘limit’ and some began to propose
other ways of organizing urban space. One of the most influential of these early
proposals was Ebenezer Howard’s “Garden City,” which sought to develop new
towns away from industry with the benefits of nature (mainly clean air). The early
twentieth century saw the rise of the town planner and many cities across North
America were planned according to their principles. The sudden rise in popularity
of the automobile in the early twentieth century saw many of those early
planners’ ideas ignored in favour of means to efficiently move automobiles
around and to cities. In the post-war era, ‘freeways’ or ‘highways’ with cloverleaf
interchanges were built, along with elevated highways that cut through traditional
downtowns, and the population shifted from traditional cities and towns to
suburbs. Though artists like Constant Nieuwenhuys proposed a radically different
version of city living in his New Babylon, this automobile-driven town planning
was finally challenged by Jane Jacobs with her opposition to Robert Moses’
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plans for an elevated highway through New York City 1 and the concurrent
publication of her 1961 book The Death and Life of Great American Cities.2 This
debate between automobile-based town planning and developing cities for
people is still prevalent.
!

The following chapter will explain these movements much more

thoroughly, but for now let us note that though these plans are radically different,
essentially spanning the ‘spectrum’ of imagination and vision, what much of this
planning history shares are conceptions of what people want from their cities and
towns. People wanted them to be free of garbage and pollution, while allowing for
industry to continue. Then people wanted roads and highways on which to drive
their cars. Then people wanted to reclaim their cities from the dominance of the
automobile. Currently, there is a whole host of demands on cities: to be clean,
efficient, sustainable, liveable, walkable, to have bike lanes, public spaces, and
parks, more trees, better sidewalks, to accommodate accessibility issues, etc.
While on the surface, these seem like a series of demands on the city, I would
like to turn this demand around and explore what demands the city places on us.
!

In The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema, Slavoj Žižek begins with this argument:
The problem for us is not ‘Are our desires satisfied or not?’ The
problem is ‘How do we know what we desire?’ There is nothing
spontaneous, nothing natural about human desires. Our desires are
artificial. We have to be taught to desire. Cinema is the ultimate
pervert art; it doesn't give you what you desire, it tells you how to
desire.3

1

See: Anthony Flint, Wrestling with Moses: How Jane Jacobs Took On New York’s Master Builder
and Transformed the American City (New York: Random House, 2009).
2

Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1992
[1961]). As we will see in chapter 4, Jacobs is not opposed to all automobiles, but arranging
urban space primarily for automobiles.
3

The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema. DVD, directed by Sophie Fiennes (Vienna: Mischief FIlms,
2006).
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And, by implication of telling us how, it tells us what to desire. It is this basic
Lacanian formulation4 that I wish to employ to understand the role of cities and
our desires: while we ought to take interest in whether or not a city, an urban
space, or a particular plan gives us what we desire, more important is how a city,
urban space, or plan teaches us what to desire. That is, there is a difference
between an urban space or city making a demand on us and an urban space or
city teaching us what we desire – these are intertwined but ought to be kept
somewhat conceptually distinct.
!

Consider some fairly innocuous objects and situations specific to urban

space. Public space is something that has come to be seen as more and more
important in cities. Though public space is something we all desire,5 the question
is: why do we? What does this public space demand of people? Who uses public
space? How do we know it is public space and know what we ‘should’ be doing
there? There has been a fairly recent shift in what we want the shape of urban
streets and their designated uses to be – why is this? And what do these urban
streets and sidewalks demand of us? We all like cafes and bars to have patios
facing the street, but why, and what are they asking of us?
!

One theoretical structure that will help us formulate and think through

these questions is Jacques Lacan’s graph of desire.6 This will be the central
framework in which to theorize the relations of urban space and its inhabitants,
between what we want for our cities and what we think the city wants from us.
4

See: Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI, The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), particularly
Chapter 2.
5

Mark Kingwell provides an worthy critique of ‘public space’ as a “master signifier”: a “loose and
elastic notion” and “nobody admits they have no idea what it means.” See: Mark Kingwell,
“Masters of Chancery: The Gift of Public Space,” in Rites of Way: The Politics and Poetics of
Public Space, eds. Mark Kingwell and Patrick Turmel (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier Press,
2009), 3.
6

The graph of desire is discussed in Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the
Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English,
trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). My presentation of it here is influenced by
Bruce Fink, “Reading ‘The Subversion of the Subject’” in Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits
Closely (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 106–128.
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How do we ‘mutilate’ parts of the city we love? If it can, how does the city ask
“Chè voi?” (“what do you (plural) want?”) and how do we ask “Chè vuoi?” (“what
do you want?”) of the city?7 How do the city and its subjects respond? The graph
of desire is the main framework in which I ask, ‘What do we want for our cities?’
and ‘What do we think our cities want from us?’ Because of the ambiguity and
‘excess’ of the term ‘The City,’ I am tempted to suggest that ‘The City’ be placed
at the top left of the complete graph. Does the subject approach the City as he or
she approaches the Other? Can we understand the City, in its messiness,
disorder, and excess (rhythms), as the space of jouissance? Perhaps the City
ought to cover the entire top of the graph? Can we not understand the subject of
the City as seeking to be what the City wants from him or her (e.g. the injunction
to ‘be urban’)? Does the City not ask us, “Chè vuoi?” and do we not make our
demands on the City (be clean, be safe, entertain me, etc.) – and perhaps these
demands are not our demands at all, but what we believe the City wants? Is it
really our demand for more ‘green space’? Later in this chapter I will make a
clearer distinction between ‘what the city wants from us’ and ‘what we think the
city wants from us’ with a longer discussion of enjoyment (‘jouissance’) and the
psychoanalytic concept of ‘transference’ to give a theory of the ‘voice of the city.’

The Graph of Urban Desire
The graph of desire, as I present it here, can be understood in some ways as the
‘story of the subject.’ Though it begins in a particular place, it does not ‘conclude’
in finality but rather shoots out in multiple directions and loops back on itself. And
though the graph depicts the “advent” of the subject through language, it should
not be understood as a ‘single’ early moment of the subject coming into

7

“Chè vuoi?” is Italian and means “What do you (singular ‘you’) want?” Vuoi is the ‘familiar’ form
of ‘you,’ whereas Lei is the ‘formal’ form of ‘you’ – a distinction similar to that found in French with
tu and vous. If one were to ask “Chè vuoi?” to a group of people (like the citizens or inhabitants of
a city), and one wanted to maintain the ‘familiar’ form, it would be “Chè voi?” If one wanted to
invoke the ‘formal’ sense of you in the plural it would be “Chè volete?” “Chè vuoi?” is pronounced
‘K-vwoy’; “Chè voi?” is pronounced ‘K-voy.’
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consciousness. Though the ‘complete’ graph of desire is actually the fourth
graph, it is worth beginning with the first, ‘elementary cell’:

Fig. 5. Graph 1. (Image from Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition
in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 681.)

!

The vector across the top (SS') represents the unending sliding of

signification, which is ‘pinned down’ by the loop of subjectivity (). The 
represents the presubjective, prelinguistic human as the basic living organism. At
the same time,  represents ‘mythical intention.’8 It is the beginning of the loop of
subjectivity, of a retroactive movement of meaning making. This loop of
subjectivity () is also the ‘button tie’ or ‘quilting point’ (point de capiton) that
pins down meaning. At the end of the loop we see the result of subjectivization,
the barred subject () barred because of language and the constant sliding of
signification.
!

Before moving on to the second graph, more needs to be said about this

‘quilting point.’ While this dissertation is not particularly concerned with the
philosophy of language, it is a problem that returns through nearly all the
theorists employed here. One of Lacan’s main concerns was to provide a critique

8

Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso Press, 2008), 112.
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of Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of language,9 and Lacan’s critique is radically
different than Jacques Derrida’s.10

Language and the relationship between

signifier and signified are fundamental to Lacan’s theory of the subject; it is
through language that the subject comes into being and, because of the absolute
Otherness of language (language is not the subject’s), the subject is alwaysalready a ‘barred subject’ (). For Lacan, self-consciousness arises through the
internalization of the Other, bringing within the self or ego the Other’s approval
and disapproval. The ego-ideal’s (‘I’) approvals or disapprovals of the ego
(‘myself) are mediated through language. In Lacan’s words, the means “in which
the ego assures itself an indisputable existence … is in no way immanent to the
ego, but rather transcendent, since consciousness is based on the ego-ideal [‘I’]
as a unary trait.” 11 That is, there is a ‘second order’ of consciousness (selfconsciousness) that is figured ‘outside’ of consciousness that acts as a
guarantee that the self is a stable, knowable object.
!

This ‘self-consciousness,’ however, does not apply to the subject. The

subject may want things and not know it, speak without knowing it, act without
knowing it, etc. The subject does not take itself as an object; the unconscious is
there but is not known by the subject. While the unconscious cannot be known, it
is “passively registered, inscribed or counted.”12 The unconscious is written in the
subject without the subject being aware of this writing. And this writing of the
unconscious occurs precisely in the gap between signifiers and between
signifiers and signifieds. Thus, in the first graph,  represents the movement
() from pre-subjective ‘human’ () to barred subject () and the intention of

9

See: Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally and Albert
Sechehaye, trans. Roy Harris (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986).
10

See: Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) and; Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the
Discourse of Human Sciences,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1978): 278–293.
11

Lacan, Écrits, 685.

12

Fink, Lacan to the Letter, 109.
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meaning () to the resultant meaning, the signifier with a lack (). This loop is
‘pinned’ down by the sliding signification of signifiers (SS').
!

It should also be emphasized that the ‘quilting’ of signification/meaning is a

retroactive loop, not a linear series. For Saussure, and many language theorists,
each signifier gains its meaning in a type of ‘additive’ series so that signifier a +
signifier b + signifier c = meaning of sentence. For Lacan, the meaning of a
signifier is determined retroactively and the subject tries to ‘pin down’ or ‘quilt’
meaning. The term ‘pin’ is perhaps misleading – creating meaning between or to
signifiers is not ‘pinned’ or connected to anything transcendent or outside of
language – the ‘quilting point’ (point de capiton) has a type of “independent
suspension” that holds things in place on its own, not attached to something else
– no ‘external reality,’ no referent.13 So, the ‘loop’  in graph 1 can be
understood as the ‘thread’ of the quilting point and the movement of the signified
(SS') can be understood as the ‘fabric’ of signification being tied down.
Importantly, this retroactive attempt to tie down meaning begins with a ‘mythical’
intention () and results in : the barred subject and the ‘barred signifier’ in that
the full or ‘true’ meaning is never achieved/never was.
!

In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek prefaces his discussion of this

first graph by outlining the debate between descriptivism and antidescriptivism.
This debate concerns how names refer to the objects they do. For descriptivism,
the word or name is “the bearer of a certain meaning – that is, it means a cluster
of descriptive features.”14 Descriptivism assumes that words, like ‘table’ or ‘gold,’
have a meaning in themselves and that, so long as an object meets the criteria of
that meaning, then that object is then called ‘table’ or ‘gold,’ or what have you.
Antidescriptivism, on the other hand, argues that an object and name are
connected by a “primal baptism” and so the link between the word and object
remain even if the cluster of descriptive features which initially determined the
13

Fink, Lacan to the Letter, 113.

14

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 98.
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meaning changes radically. ‘Table,’ we can suppose, has always referred to what
it refers now. ‘Gold,’ however, refers to something different now than it did when
first ‘baptized’ ‘gold.’ In other words, what is referred to as ‘gold’ has changed
over history; the meaning of the word ‘gold’ has changed (which, in a way,
disproves descriptivism). Žižek presents us with this debate to show that the
“fulfilment of desire” is central: “when we encounter in reality an object which has
all the properties of the fantasized object of desire, we are nevertheless
necessarily somewhat disappointed.”15 In other words, when we encounter the
object it never lives up to what we thought it would be. For Žižek, Lacanian
theory helps us get at what both descriptivism and antidescriptivism miss – the
“radical contingency of naming.”16
!

While my purpose here is not to get into an extended discussion of the

theories of language, I bring this up to suggest that this relationship between
fantasy, desire, the name, and the object can help us to understand the words
‘city’ and ‘urban.’ What we understand by the terms ‘city’ or ‘urban’ is caught up in
fantasy, so whenever we encounter the city or the urban in reality, it necessarily
fails to meet that fantasy. That ‘surplus’ that remains in the name (like ‘city’) but is
never found in the object is objet petit a – the ‘little other [autre].’ So, while Žižek
uses the example ‘gold,’ we can think of the name ‘city’ – “we search in vain in its
positive, physical features for that X which makes of it the embodiment of, [for
gold, its] richness.”17 Likewise, to find the meaning of the terms ‘city’ or ‘urban,’
we will search in vain by looking at any empirical, physical features. Consider all
the empirical ways people have tried to define ‘the city’: population, density
ratios, economic activity, political boundaries, etc. All of these empirical criteria
never really get to the ‘kernel’ of the word ‘city.’ Instead, the meaning of ‘city’ (or
‘urban’) exists as fantasy; it is a concept not so much laden with as it is produced

15

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 100.

16

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 101.

17

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 104–105.
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by desire. The term ‘city,’ then, is that surplus-X, the object-cause of desire that is
retroactively named in the ‘quilting’ of the first graph (above).
!

However, fantasy in Lacanian theory is not something wholly from ‘within’

– fantasy is, as is everything in Lacanian psychoanalysis, caught up in the Other.
So, as we will see in graph 2, the relation between an object and its name is
largely determined by the Other. Rather than look to some ‘empirical reality’ to
find a (lack of) correspondence between the object and the name, Lacanian
theory would instead point to the Symbolic order itself, the realm of the Other
(what Žižek calls the ‘big Other’). This is where we find the “dogmatic stupidity” of
the signifier: a word refers to an object because that is what the object is called.
This ‘what it is called’ invokes the big Other, the dimension of the Symbolic
beyond a particular subject. So the city is called ‘the city’ because that is what it
is called – because that’s what the Other calls it. This is why understand the city
or urban by its ‘feel,’ its ‘urban-ness’ or its ‘city-ness.’ A city, as a collection of
‘citizens,’ is nothing without the space: the attendant roads, buildings, and
infrastructure. And the ‘urban,’ as a particular built-form space, is nothing without
other people and the particular ‘urban’ social relationships. Nonetheless, that a
city is called a ‘city’ because that is what it is called should appear an
unsatisfactory answer. In the final, complete graph we will see why we cannot
depend on the Other to justify what a name refers to because the Other is lacking
as well, which is why it is symbolized as  – Autre crossed out.
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Fig. 6. Graph 2. (Image from Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition
in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 684.)

While the ‘starting point’ of graph 1 was , ‘intention,’ in graph 2 we see that  is
now at the beginning of the vector SignifierVoice. From this we can understand
the ‘intention’ of the signifier which is ‘quilted’ by the Other. The ‘voice’ represents
the ‘remainder’ or ‘surplus’ of the ‘intention’ pinned down by the Other. The
‘voice,’ according to Žižek, is not that which precedes language (the ‘presence’ of
voice or language) but rather the leftover of the signifying operation, what
remains after the quilting operation. Žižek gives the example of the ‘hypnotic
voice’ in which a repeated word loses all meaning and becomes its own object.
Nonetheless, we should not confuse the ‘voice’ represented in this graph with
what I will later refer to as the ‘voice of the city.’ The ‘voice of the city’ will be more
of a ‘projected agency’ than the ‘remainder’ of the signifying operation, which I
will demonstrate below through a discussion of transference. Here, however,
allow me to suggest a link between the ‘voice’ represented in this graph and the
‘rhythm’ Lefebvre writes of in Rhythmanalysis,18 such as the hum of fans, buzz of
traffic, din of the crowd, etc. These are the leftovers, remainders or surpluses of
the operations of the city. And yet these remainders and surpluses are precisely
the ‘sounds of the city’: honking cars, rumbling streetcars and subways, people
18

Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life, trans. Stuart Elden and
Gerald Moore (London: Continuum, 2004).
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talking, sirens, etc. Without these sounds, there is no ‘voice’ of the city. It is like
the sound of lapping waves of the ocean: though quite audible, it is peaceful and
we bristle at a piercing sounds overtop, and we might find a silent ocean shore
uncanny. Likewise, in the city, we bristle at excessively loud vehicles, someone
talking too loud. And, while some seek out pure silence in an urban area, were
the city to be completely silent we would find it uncanny. In fact, the silent, empty
city is a common theme of anxiety in contemporary movies.19
!

The bottom half of this graph is essentially the mirror stage. The ego is

represented here as m (moi). Opposite the ego, we see the imaginary other
(i(a)), which is an alter ego or a ‘little other like oneself,’ a semblance of the ego.
i(a) acts as a ‘mirror’ (or mold) for the ego (m) which provides ‘imaginary
identification.’ The ‘imaginary other’ provides a fixed point (not unlike a quilting
point) outside of the ego that gives the ego its unity, stability, and/or coherence.
!

I(A) is the Other’s Ideal or the ‘ego-ideal’ that the subject internalizes, what

the subject feels he must become to be the ideal of the Other. I(A) stands for
symbolic identification, the subject identifying with some signifying feature or trait
(I) in the “big Other”/ symbolic order.20 The ego-ideal is a vantage point outside
the ego (m) from which the ego observes itself. What is important here is that for
the ego (m) to achieve self-identity, it must identify with an Other/other outside
itself. This is how Lacan understands ‘alienation’ and why psychoanalysis is a
social theory.
!

Again: imaginary identification i(a) is identification with the image in which

we appear likeable or loveable to ourselves – what we would like to be. Symbolic
identification I(A) is “identification with the very place from which we are being
19

One of the best examples of this occurs in the 1997 film, Abre los ojos translated as Open Your
Eyes. (The film was remade in 2001 as Vanilla Sky.) The main character César (played by
Eduardo Noriega) begins his routine commute to work, enjoying the lack of traffic in his sports car
only to slowly realize that the lack of traffic is because the city is entirely empty – literally enjoying
a lack. He stops and gets out of his car, calling out “Hello! Hello?” to anyone (the Other): Abre los
ojos, DVD, directed by Alejandro Amenábar (Spain: Live Entertainment, 1997).
20

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 116.
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observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves
likeable, worthy of love.”21 This interplay of imaginary and symbolic identification
is the “mechanism by means of which the subject is integrated into a given sociosymbolic field,” like the city.22 For the ego (m) to achieve self-identity, it is
necessary that it identify with something outside itself, which is how Lacan
understands ‘alienation.’ Later, we will see how the subject ‘turns’ from
‘alienation’ to ‘separation.’
!

Here, though, we need to pay attention to the difference between

imaginary identification/alienation and symbolic identification/alienation. While the
mirror stage necessarily involves an other, it is the other-like-ourselves. Much
more important, and interesting, is the identification with the big Other, symbolic
identification.
!

But let us first look at imaginary identification. Lacanian theory insists that

the trait on the basis of which we identify with someone is hidden, and it is not a
‘glamorous’ feature.23 Žižek gives some examples from European elections in the
mid-1980s, but we can take as an example the 2010 election of Rob Ford as
mayor of Toronto. It was obvious that his campaign promise was flawed: maintain
city services while lowering taxes. This is a popular platform that has elected
many politicians, none of whom have been able to deliver on it, but it resonates
with the fantasy of contemporary, ‘small government’ conservatism. The structure
of fantasy is “I know very well, however…” Thus, this conservative fantasy is “We
know that governing and providing services requires money (hence the corporate
donations, privatization, etc.) but we continue to act as though it can be done for
free. But the point to be made here regarding voters’ imaginary identification with
Ford involves his character flaws. Though born into a wealthy family, inheriting a
multi-million dollar international company and a network of political allies, Ford
claims to speak up for the “little guy,” on side with the working-class, and
21

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 116. Emphasis original.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 123.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 117.
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frustrated by the privilege of the power elites (of which he is one). Prior to the
election, opponents, citizens, and the media pointed out many of Ford’s
character or personal flaws, but his popularity continued to rise. Some examples:
drunken verbal abuse to strangers at a sports game; caught drinking and driving
in possession of marijuana; saying in Council that if people were not gay or did
not use needles they would not get AIDS; also in Council, saying that it is
cyclists’ “own fault” if they get hurt or killed by cars in the city. The lesson here is
that the traits of Ford’s which people identified were traits considered failures and
weaknesses, so that, as Žižek writes, “by pointing out the failure we can
unwittingly reinforce the identification.” 24 People ‘recognize themselves’ in these
flaws. So, the lesson for those opposed to Ford’s city-destroying policies is to
stop pointing out his character flaws. And, for a candidate who appears to the
public as ‘too smart,’ ‘to perfect,’ or ‘over qualified’: invent some minor character
flaws.
!

Similarly, we might also identify with the city, not with its successes, but

with its flaws. Recently, some have started advocating for what is termed ‘messy
urbanism’25

– a recognition that what has traditionally been considered

‘problems’ of the city (bit of litter, a lack of coherency, a certain ‘grittiness’) are
actually the things that make a city a city. Consider, too, the horror we would
ultimately feel were the city to function as smoothly as an efficient machine.
!

Now, this type of identification that occurs by identifying with a ‘flaw’ is

imaginary identification. Symbolic identification is something we need to consider
on another register – it is something that occurs “on behalf of a certain gaze in
24
25

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 117.

See: Josh Shelton, “Costumes, Grains, Lizards, Bones, and Vacuum Cleaners: The Urban
Wilderness of Waldo,” Review (Nov 2007): 26–31. Retrieved from: http://www.eldo.us/wp-content/
uploads/2010/10/waldo.pdf. The phrase “messy urbanism” has gained popularity in Toronto after
observations of the Los Angeles planner, James Rojas, which can be found here: Shawn Micallef,
“Toronto’s Messy Urbanism from the Perspective of an Angeleno,” Spacing Toronto, Oct 17, 2007.
Retrieved from: http://spacingtoronto.ca/2007/10/17/toronto%E2%80%99s-messy-urbanism-fromthe-perspective-of-an-angeleno/. The value of cities’ impracticalities and inefficiencies were noted
previously by Jane Jacobs. See: Jane Jacobs, “The Valuable Inefficiencies and Impracticalities of
Cities,” in The Economy of Cities (New York: Random House, 1969): 85–121.
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the Other.”26 So, beyond looking to see what model or person the subject is
seeking (imaginary) identification, we need to ask, “for whom is the subject
enacting” this identification?27 Under what gaze does the subject consider him or
herself when taking on this identification? Žižek tells us that the gap between the
way the subject sees itself and the point from which the subject assumes to be
observed helps to understand hysteria: the hysteric offers herself as the object of
the Other’s desire, but somehow ‘knows’ what the Other (the Other’s gaze)
wants. Žižek also gives a reading of Dickens – though Dickens provides an
‘admiration’ of the common, poor people in his novels, he nonetheless is
providing this ‘sympathy’ from the “point of view of the corrupted world of power
and money.”28 Similarly, Rob Ford enacts a concern for the “little guy” (the
“taxpayer”) even though he has inherited a large printing company, the money
from which he uses to support his mayorship.
!

And do we not see this operation occurring within urban everyday life?

Take the plethora of ‘lifestyles’ that one can seemingly ‘choose’ from in the city:
hipster (young, claims irony, listens to indie music, etc.); eco-yuppies (young
professionals with new children, a dog, expressing an exaggerated concern for
the environment); the student, the professor, the athlete, the yogi, the business
person, etc. All of these identifications are, of course, fed by the big Other, which
is what gives subjects the cultural cues. But we might wonder under what gaze
do these subjects assume they are being observed; for whom are they doing it? I
would argue that it is for the gaze that only the urban provides: the gaze of the
city itself. With its large and dense population, cities ensure that one is nearly
always seen by an other, captured in Jane Jacobs’ famous phrase, “eyes on the
street.”29 We know, for example, that people enjoy sitting on patios, porches,
balconies, or near windows that look out onto the street. Consider the insistence

26

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 117.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 117.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 119.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 35.
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which impels suburban teenagers to ‘go to the mall’ or to ‘go downtown’: they’re
playing with various imaginary identifications, but what is the point of having this
identification with a little other if there is no gaze of the big Other? A friend of
mine who is fanatical about yoga admits that you could just do yoga at home,
“but it’s just not the same…” In other words, are so many people doing yoga for
yoga itself, or are they doing it so they can walk along a busy street with a rolledup yoga mat under their arm? Do hipsters go to concerts to enjoy obscure music
or do they go to be seen there? Do we enjoy having a drink on a patio or do we
enjoy being seen to enjoy a drink on a patio? Ultimately, do city dwellers enjoy
the bustle of the city, or do they enjoy being seen to enjoy the bustle?
!

Allow me to explore this theory of the ‘gaze’ a bit further with three specific

examples.30 Recently on Bloor Street West, two food establishments opened up
and both are very popular. One is a location of the frozen yogurt chain
(Menchies) situated on the ground floor with very large windows so that the entire
inside can be viewed from the outside. The other is a second location of the very
popular restaurant “Guu” which is situated on the ground floor but ‘shuttered’ to
the street by ‘shabby-chic’ boards, however, these boards have about a dozen
view-holes which allow people on the street to literally peer into the restaurant.
Though these two examples seem opposite, they are both playing on the notion
of the gaze. Menchies provides a ‘transparent’ facade for the gaze of the Other
the clearly look in;31 Guu appears to limit this gaze, but in fact draws more
attention. And, since 1976, Toronto has endured its own gaze via the CN Tower.
We are able to gaze at it from nearly anywhere in the city, while the tower itself is
constructed with an ‘observation deck’ for people to gaze out at the city. One of
the more popular projects during 2010’s Nuit Blanche involved the CN Tower: the
LED lights that run up the tower were altered by people sending text messages

30

Lacan’s theory of the gaze is discussed further in chapter 5 in relation to Lefebvre’s theory of
the gaze and the ‘blind field.’
31

Adding to the gaze of Menchies is its association with celebrity culture. Celebrities are often
‘caught’ with the product in paparazzi-style photos published in celebrity tabloids. Thus we have
regular people wanting to be seen enjoying the thing that other people see celebrities enjoying.
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to a special number. People would text “power” to the number and see the lights
become brighter and race up and down more quickly. It could be thought of as
giving people the ability to ‘control the Big Other.’ Unsurprisingly, many people
said, “I don’t think it really works.”
!

In any case, i(a) is always already subordinated to I(A); imaginary

identification (mirror stage, etc.) is always already subordinated to symbolic
identification (the gaze from which we assume to be observed). The symbolic
identification determines the imaginary form in which we appear likeable to
ourselves.32 In imaginary identification we “imitate the other at the level of
resemblance.”33 That is, we identify with the image of an other insofar as are like
that other. In symbolic identification, we identify ourselves with the other at the
point where the other is unable to be imitated, at the point which eludes
resemblance. In terms of symbolic identification, consider the injunction to ‘be
urban.’ We see this on condo ads as a means to market to young people who live
or grew up in suburban areas. But what does it mean? To ‘be urban’ is to attempt
to identify with something that eludes resemblance. It is only a vague notion of,
perhaps, being more ‘sophisticated,’ ‘cultured,’ or ‘elite’ – none of this really helps
us understand what ‘being urban’ means. Beyond these condo ads, this
injunction to ‘be urban’ is felt by many city dwellers – a demand to enjoy the city,
to take it all in, and not go crazy from the excessive stimulations the city
provides. But, as we saw with the term ‘city,’ ‘urban’ in this injunction does not
have any empirical meaning … it is a case in which we try to be this ‘je ne sais
quoi.’ We do, however, increasingly see urban life portrayed in popular movies
and television shows. And the form of the urban is drastically different than it was
portrayed twenty or thirty years ago. Instead of the bleak backdrop of Escape
from New York,34 the opening scenes of Jacob’s Ladder (set in 1975 New York),35
32

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 120.

33

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 120.
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Escape from New York, DVD, directed by John Carpenter (Los Angeles: AVCO Embassy
Pictures, 1981).
35

Jacob’s Ladder, DVD, directed by Adrian Lyne (Culver City, California: TriStar Pictures, 1990).
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or the gritty streets that provide the backdrop of Taxi Driver,36 we now see
manicured storefronts, stylish café patios, and characters mingling safely on busy
streets. This is not to say there were not positive portrayals of the urban
environment in the 1980s or earlier, and it is difficult to pin-point a specific
example here, but I argue that the urban is increasingly represented positively,
especially in contemporary television shows from the vapid Pretty Little Liars37 to
HBO’s new series The Newsroom.38 I suggest that this trend began with Seinfeld
(1989–1998)39 and movies such as You’ve Got Mail (1998),40 which presented
the urban positively. Around the same time, movies such as Edward
Scissorhands (1990),41 The Truman Show (1998),42 and American Beauty
(1999)43 began stressing the banalities of suburban life. These shows and
movies present us with particular (and decidedly contemporary) notions of what
‘being urban’ means: such as what we should do in these spaces and what we
should expect of others and ourselves.
!

Graph 2 (Figure 6) also shows the transformation of ‘need’ into ‘need

addressed to the other,’ which is also phrased as ‘the demand,’ represented by
the upwards movement i(a)A. This demand is not self-evident to the Other and
thus must be interpreted. The Other’s interpretation of the demand is represented
on the other side of the top vector as s(A), the signified’s meaning supplied by
the Other. And, as I have been arguing, the Other here can be understood as the

36

Taxi Driver, DVD, directed by Martin Scorsese (Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures, 1976).

37

Pretty Little Liars, television series, multiple writers and directors (New York: ABC Family,
2010–present).
38

The Newsroom, television series, multiple directors, written by Aaron Sorkin (New York: HBO,
2012–present).
39

Seinfeld, television series, directed by Art Wolfe et. al. (New York: NBC, 1989–1998).

40

You’ve Got Mail, DVD, directed Nora Ephron (Burbank, California: Warner Bros., 1998).

41

Edward Scissorhands, DVD, directed by Tim Burton (Los Angeles: 20th Century Fox, 1990).

42

The Truman Show, DVD, directed by Peter Weir (Hollywood: Paramount, 1992). Interestingly,
The Truman Show was filmed in Seaside, Florida which was the first town built on New Urbanist
principles, which I will discuss further in this dissertation’s conclusion.
43

American Beauty, DVD, directed by Sam Mendes (Universal City, California: DreamWorks
Pictures, 1999).
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city. Our needs and demands are often placed at the feet of the city. But the city,
like the Other, can never satisfy the subject’s demand. The original demand can
never be fully formulated in language so the Other can never know what we
really want, only what it seems we are asking for. The subject’s need is never
completely expressed in his or her demand: the demand is not all we want. The
objects the Other provides in response never fully satisfy us; we always want
something more. This ‘more,’ (remainder, surplus) is desire. It is the space
represented as d, the puddle which spills over the Other in the third graph.

Fig. 7. Graph 3. (Image from Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition
in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 690.)

!

The primary demand made to the Other is recognition: “I want to be

wanted.” The subject then seeks to know the Other’s desire: “What does the
Other want from me? What can I do to make the Other desire me?” The subject
seeks to position him or herself as the object of the Other’s desire. The subject is
then continually seeking to figure out what the Other’s desire is so that he or she
can satisfy it. What gets lost is the ego’s own desires. So, desire is not about
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what the ego wants, but rather what it believes the Other wants from it and desire
is, literally, the Other’s desire. The subject of the city – citi-zen – asks, ‘what does
the city want or desire from me?’
!

To the subject’s search for the Other’s desire, the analyst asks, “Chè

vuoi?” (“You are telling me all this, but what do you want with it, what are you
aiming at: What do you want?”). At first, the subject’s answer (were it honest)
would be “I want to be the object of the Other’s desire!” But the point of asking
“Chè vuoi?” is for the subject to momentarily leave aside what he or she believes
the Other wants and consider the ego’s own desires. This split is essential and is
represented in the graph: the top arc represents what the subject wants, while
the arc below “Chè vuoi?” represents what the Other wants from the subject. So,
“Chè vuoi?” is asked and answered by both the subject and the Other.
Importantly, it is desire (d) that introduces this gap between the subject and the
Other.
!

We make our demands on the City (be clean, be safe, be entertaining, be

sustainable, have green space, etc.), but perhaps these demands are not our
demands at all, but what we believe the City wants. Is it really our demand for
more ‘green space’? Green space, urban farming, urban tree projects, green
roofs, etc. – are these not attempts to fill the hole/lack in the Other/city? Or
consider the term the urban designer Jan Gehl uses to guide his designs –
‘invite.’ He sets up urban space to invite people to use the space: sit, walk, cycle,
etc.44 And he makes urban space ‘un-inviting’ for cars, literally inscribing a desire/
demand in the infrastructure. Or think of circulation or the concept of induced
traffic, which shows that adding another road or another lane to a highway does
not relieve traffic congestion, but actually results in more traffic. The built
environment demands (or expects) a certain behaviour of the subject.
!

The subject should begin to realize that the Other – the city – does not

fully articulate what it wants or lacks. Thus, the subject’s attempt to be what the
44

Jan Gehl, Cities for People (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2010).
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Other wants is doomed to failure. The subject can never be that ‘final’ (object of)
desire that puts an end to it. So the city is a ‘perpetual project’ – it is never
finished; there will never be the ‘final’ green space or ‘final’ highway.
!

The movement from d (desire) to  (fantasy) is motivated by the

subject’s own question: “What does the other want? What does it lack? Where
can I fill/fit in?” – desire is still caught up in trying to be the Other’s desire or the
object of the Other’s desire.
!

So, in the lower part of graph 3 (Figure 7), the subject identifies with the

Other and tries to be what (the subject thinks) the Other wants. The status of the
subject here in the lower half is ‘alienation.’ In the upper half of graph 3 (Figure
7), the subject’s status is ‘separation’ – separation from the attempt to be the final
object for the Other. ‘Separation’ is as close as Lacan gets to traditional leftist
ideals of ‘freedom’ or ‘emancipation.’ In this upper half of Graph 3, the subject
must face the fact that the Other has a lack or a gap between the Other’s
conscious and unconscious wants. In other words, the subject is confronted with
the fact that the Other wants something different than it claims. The subject may
begin to realize that the Other does not fully articulate what it wants or lacks,
which is what the subject is trying to be, and realize the futility. The subject can
never be the phallus (the signifier of the Other’s desire) for the Other. In other
words, the subject can never be the ‘final signifier’ of the Other’s desire; it can
never be that ‘final’ (object of) desire that puts an end to it. As we will see, the
subject must take responsibility for his or her own desire.
!

Žižek argues that the split between demand and desire is what defines the

hysterical position. For Lacanian theory, the hysterical demand is ‘I’m demanding
this of you, but what I’m really demanding of you is to refute my demand because
this is not it!’45 That the Other can answer “Chè vuoi?” comes only from a
hysterical subject position in which he becomes exasperated: “Why am I what

45

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 124.
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you are telling me that I am?”46 That is to say, the hysteric’s question is opening
the gap between the what the subject is and what the Other sees or finds in the
subject – that ‘surplus object’ in the subject that causes him to resist
interpellation. The ‘final moment’ or ‘breakthrough’ (not ‘cure’) in the analystanalysand relationship occurs when the subject/analysand begins to resist asking
the Other the “Chè vuoi?” question and begins to accept his being as “nonjustified by the big Other.”47 However, the subject needs to be the addressee of
the “Chè vuoi?” question, and provide his own answer and take responsibility for
his own desire.
!

So, one answer to “Chè vuoi?” is (a), fantasy. Fantasy functions as a

means to fill the void of the desire of the Other by constructing an answer to
“what does the Other want?” Fantasy is what allows us to “evade the unbearable
deadlock in which the Other wants something from us,” though it is impossible to
figure out what it is the Other wants.48 Very often what the Other really wants is
both prohibited and impossible and so fantasy acts as a resolution to (or
compensation for) this deadlock.
!

How might we see this play out in the city? A common complaint

(sometimes a point of praise) of the city is that there is just ‘too much’ going on.
There are too many ‘things happening’ and a person cannot ‘keep up’ with them
all. So, we construct a fantasy about this: we make the appearance of keeping
up, knowing very well that it is impossible to keep up but carry on like we can. We
try to fill in this gap by just being aware of all the things going on, reading about
them, telling people about them (not with any detail, just that they ‘happened’).
The city of Toronto is often described as the ‘city of neighbourhoods’ in an
attempt to pretend the city is smaller, more small-town than big-city.49 Many in
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 126.

47

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 126.

48

Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 128.

49

This is likely explained by the desire for the “oceanic feeling” that Freud describes in Civilization
and Its Discontents (discussed later in this chapter).
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Toronto also seek to ‘fill in’ the desire of the city by assuming it requires more of
the rural in the form of trees and urban farms. This fantasy of Toronto needing the
rural also appears in the insistence of many that should be able to drive their cars
anywhere and park them anywhere. People from residential areas come into the
city for the services, entertainment, and life that only a dense population can
provide, but then become annoyed at this dense population (too loud, too
crowded, too busy).
!

As I have been suggesting, ‘The City’ can be understood as the Other (A)

on the graph of desire. Below I will suggest that it can also be understood as %
(the Other with a lack), but allow me to suggest that ‘The City’ could be placed on
the graph of desire directly under “Chè vuoi?” were we to think of The City taking
the place of the analyst. Pinning it here would allow The City to have a relation to
desire, fantasy, the Other (A), and, in the final graph (Figure 8), the ‘barred
Other’ (%).

Fig. 8. The Complete Graph. (Image from Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First
Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005),
692.)

!
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Down the left side of the complete graph (Figure 8) we have S, the lack

in the Other, the inconsistency of the symbolic order. Then a, the formula of
fantasy, which functions to conceal this inconsistency. Finally, there is s(A) which
is the effect of the signifier as dominated by fantasy. It is important to remember
that for Lacanian theory, fantasy is not the realization of desire. Rather, fantasy is
what constitutes desire; fantasy teaches us “how to desire.”50 Thus, fantasy
exists as a sort of paradox – it provides the co-ordinates of our desire while at the
same time acting as a defence against “Chè vuoi?” since it acts as a screen over
the void in the desire of the Other. Further, there are really two forms of desire
here: the desire constructed by fantasy is actually a defence against desire on a
higher register – the ‘pure’ desire of the Other. Thus, when Lacan formulates an
ethical maxim (not to give “ground relative to one’s desire”),51 he is referring to
the “desire of the Other beyond fantasy.”52 Similar to not giving way on one’s
desire is the notion of ‘traversing the fantasy’ or ‘going through the fantasy.’ This
involves exposing how the object of desire comes to be seen as containing that
unknown X that makes it desirable: by entering the framework of fantasy (a).
So, what then are the true desires in the fantasies listed above (Toronto as a ‘city
of neighbourhoods,’ the city needs more rural, should provide clear highways and
free parking, and provide the things a dense population provides without the
dense population)? Perhaps it is that these people actually do not like cities. Or
perhaps they really do like urban life, but have ‘sacrificed’ this desire under the
(false) assumption that it would be better to raise a family in the suburbs. Or
perhaps they do not actually like the things they come into the city to see and
experience, but just like the idea of it; they want to appear to enjoy these things
like we saw above in the discussion of symbolic identification.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 132.
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Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, trans.
Dennis Porter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), 319.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 132.
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The complete graph (Figure 8) is essentially divided into two elements: the

lower half is the level of meaning while the upper half is the level of enjoyment.
The previous graphs and my discussion of them have already covered the lower
half, so I will focus here on the upper half. The main ‘problem’ of the upper half
appears in the field of the signifier’s order (the big Other/Autre), when it is
“perforated [or] penetrated by a pre-symbolic (real) stream of enjoyment” – in
other words, when pre-symbolic enjoyment (jouissance) becomes caught up in
the signifier’s network.53 Thus, we see jouissance come out the other side of the
signifier’s network as ‘castration‘ – the removal or evacuation of enjoyment. The
first point of ‘contact‘ of the vector jouissancecastration is S(), which
represents that the lack of consistency in the Other, that there is no Other for the
Other, that there is no God or guarantor of what the Other says. No statement
has a guarantee. Jouissance is placed ‘prior’ to, or ‘outside’ of S() because
jouissance cannot be symbolized: as soon as it is, it is a loss of enjoyment. What
is crucial to recall is that, while it is fairly well known that the Lacanian subject is
‘barred’ (), the Other is also ‘barred’ (). The Other, the symbolic order itself, is
structured around a central lack. Without this lack in the Other, the symbolic
order would be a totalized and closed structure leaving the subject with only
radical alienation with the Other/symbolic order. But, since the Other contains this
lack, the subject is able to experience a “de-alienation” or “separation.”54 This
means that the subject is able to understand and experience that the object
(within the symbolic order) is separated from the Other itself – that the Other
“hasn’t got it.”55 In other words, the Other is blocked as well, the Other has desire
(a lack) as well. Thus, as Žižek likes to remind us, “there is no big Other” – the
Other is not the totalized order it appears to be. Similarly, the symbolic order of
the city ‘does not exist.’
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 136.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 137.
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Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 137.
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Lacan explains S() through a discussion of Hamlet by arguing that

Hamlet assumes his mother’s (Gertrude) desire for his uncle is lacking (S())
when, in fact, she does not: she ‘has an answer’ for her desire (s(A)). Since
Lacan allows the Other (either A or ) in these formulas to be a familial, juridical,
or religious Other, I argue we can think of the city as this Other – a particular
physical and social structure with mores, demands, desires, rules, etc. I would
like to suggest that can we can replace the Hamlet character with an everyday
city dweller and Gertrude with the city itself. That is, the city dweller asks the city
what it is lacking, what it desires from him or her, assuming that the Other (the
city) is lacking in some way. That is, expecting an S() type of answer. But the
city responds with an answer much like Gertrude’s – it does not require anything
from one particular subject; it ticks along with or without the subject. That is, it
provides an s(A) type of answer. The city does not need him to put in a new
highway or park. Hamlet knows very well what he wants (he has a clear answer
to “Chè vuoi?”): he wants to avenge his father’s death. But the problem for
Hamlet is how he reconciles his mother’s desire. He cannot accept that she
enjoys getting it on with his gross uncle. Similarly, a city dweller may know very
well what he wants, but has a problem with the city’s own indifference. The city
doesn’t really need anything from him or her. So we just make it up: the city
needs ‘beautification,’ it needs to add or remove a rather banal rule, we express
nit-picking complaints, etc. For example, many cyclists in Toronto argue that if all
cyclists ‘followed the rules of the road,’ they would gain respect from the city and
drivers (A). But, of course, this will never work because there is no Big Other ().
!

A different example: recently, plans were released concerning Queens

Quay and changing the location of the uses of that street.56 From the water north
it was to be: pedestrian space, bicycle space, street car tracks, then two lanes of
motor vehicle traffic. It was good plan. But, instead of just accepting this (“Looks
good! Go ahead!”), many people interested or concerned with urban planning got
56

The plans were created by West 8 and DTAH for Waterfront Toronto. See: http://
www.waterfrontoronto.ca/explore_projects2/central_waterfront/queens_quay
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caught up in a discussion about the grass beside and between the streetcar
tracks. What kind of grass would it be? How would it be cut without interfering
with the streetcars? How would it be watered without soaking people waiting for a
streetcar? The discussion ended up with some very technical specifics about
growing grass and examples from around the world were brought in to support
various arguments. Of all the things regarding this street-scaping plan, the grass
was hardly a major issue – the plan did not really need anything, so people made
up a lack to fill in.

Urban Jouissance
So, in the lower level of the complete graph (Figure 8), the Other provides
something (namely, ‘meaning’) represented by s(A). In the upper-level, the Other
provides nothing and no meaning represented by S(). Bruce Fink argues that
the Other often has to “work very hard” to not provide an answer or meaning – to
say nothing.57 When the Other is ‘successful’ in not providing an answer (being
S() instead of s(A)), the Other points beyond itself and the subject must desire
something beyond the Other. In desiring something beyond (something without)
the Other, there is an absence (what it is without). This absence is jouissance
(), and without the Other, the subject must take responsibility for his or her own
jouissance. Because the subject and the Other are structurally caught in
language, there is a remainder or surplus. As Fink expresses it, “the subject as
jouissance encounters the signifier of a lack in the signifying order as such.”58
Crucial here is that the subject is an enjoying subject; the subject is the subject of
jouissance. The subject is ‘caught’ between language and jouissance: the subject
is a pure linguistic machine, inscribed with language, but there is a remainder.
The remainder is the living being that escapes signification, the surplus that has
no (mechanistic) purpose. Because jouissance is a surplus to language, and this
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Fink, Lacan to the Letter, 123.

58

Fink, Lacan to the Letter, 125.
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jouissance (of the) subject does not serve a purpose, it thwarts the aims of
science. It is a Truth beyond Knowledge. It is beyond knowing and concerns
enjoying.
!

The subject encounters S() and thus encounters jouissance: , the

signifier of the very process by which the signifier dominates and creates the
signified. Jouissance is what the Other lacks, the lack which grounds the Other
as the set of all signifiers or the very functioning of signifiers. The Other is the
‘treasure trove’ of all signifiers, but its lack is apparent in that it does not contain a
signifier for the signification process. With Lacan’s symbols: the Other contains S,
S', S'', S''', etc. but does not contain . That is, the Other contains all signifiers
but does not contain the process by which the signifier creates the signified. So,
what does contain the process by which the signifier creates the signified, the
signification process as such? jouissance ().
!

In the graph, jouissance does not only ‘move’ from S() away from the

graph (to the left). Jouissance also crosses the top of the graph (to the right),
represented by the vector jouissance¯S()(D)¯castration as it results in -
(minus phi), a loss of jouissance. Here we can think about S() as similar to 
(the master) in the master’s discourse (further discussion on the four discourses
below); as the power without reason, such as the father in the structure of
Oedipus or the Name-of-the-Father/No-of-the-Father (nom-du-père, non-dupère).59 This is the way the Father names the Mother’s desire. This naming of the
desire, since it uses signification, takes away from pure jouissance and prohibits
the subject/child’s desire. Jouissance is lost in its very symbolization; the lack
comes in only insofar as it is named. Fink compares it to an animal hunger –
jouissance is like an animal’s hunger, which can be satiated and forgotten. But if

As noted above, S() is similar to  (the master) in the master’s discourse, and I wonder if
these can be thought of as Rancière’s police order? Is there a connection to be made between
the political as that which breaks the police order and jouissance as that which breaks with the
order of signification? Doesn’t the political come from the ‘excess’ of the police order – that which
breaks with it is what defines it – like jouissance from the excess of language?
59
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this ‘hunger’ is given a name, it is represented, and can be re-represented at any
time and persist.60
!

Now, this loss of jouissance represented by - does not mean the total

end of jouissance – there is still the satisfaction of the drives, represented as
D.  is, again, the barred subject, while D is the Other’s demand or symbolic
demand. Once a subject can ‘traverse’ his or her basic fantasy (a), he or she
can then “live out the drive” and can experience enjoyment, represented as D.
Castration, the other side of D is not an end to enjoyment, but is rather the
persistence of enjoyment in spite of prohibition and loss. Interestingly, Žižek uses
the term “gentrified” to described this watered-down jouissance (-). There is
clearly a link between this watered-down enjoyment and the disdain most hold for
urban gentrification.61 What is missing from ‘gentrified’ urban developments?
Jouissance! A ‘real’ urban space has ‘grit,’ a dark pleasure to it – gentrification
‘evacuates’ this. This point inflects what I have argued before: that we identify
with the ‘flaw’ in the city, it is that surplus that we enjoy, the messiness, when it is
not efficient or purely functional. Here, though, I am arguing that the most
successful urban spaces, at least in Toronto, are those that are not ‘perfected’ or
‘gentrified’ and, further, these are the urban spaces that most people like.
!

Consider the changing nature of Queen Street West. In the late 1970s

Queen West from around McCaul to Spadina had a number of bars, art spaces,
and unique retail stores. Above these ground level spaces were cheap
apartments where many artists and other creative people lived. It was the model
of what Richard Florida refers to as a ‘creative class district.’ The bars were not
clean and bright but dirty and messy. The art spaces were not upper-class
galleries and the retail shops were not chain outlets but independently owned.

60
61

Fink, Lacan to the Letter, 126.

‘Gentrification’ is a term that is thrown around quite a bit. Its precise meaning is simply the
influx of middle-class people into an area largely populated by people of a lower socio-economic
class. For an excellent discussion of the nuances of gentrification, see: David Ley, The New
Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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The area was pretty ‘rough’ in the evenings, with many ‘punks’ walking the
streets, selling and buying dope, getting worked up at a punk show. The area
became well known and well liked, evidenced by the increasing rents. Those who
had made the area what it was were unable to afford these higher rents, but
large retail chains could. The large chains moved into the area, ‘capitalizing’ on
the existing ‘cultural capital.’ Sure, the area is still popular, but as many say, “It’s
just not what it used to be.” The only thing keeping the area alive are a few stores
from the old days (John Fluevog, The Rex, The Horseshoe Pub and, until
recently, the focal point – Pages Bookstore) and, more importantly, the modernday ‘punks’ who still hang around.62 It is perhaps not surprising that this stretch of
Queen West attracts ‘local tourists’ (people from the surrounding suburbs), and
people who live nearby mostly avoid the area in favour of other areas, including a
stretch of Queen further west (Queen West West) and even further west in
Parkdale, “scummy Parkdale.”63 My point is that successful and desirable urban
areas are those with a certain ‘grit,’ disorder, and messiness. Most urban
‘improvement’ plans define these types of things as problems and seek to clean
up streets, impose an order, separate uses, and make things function smoothly
and efficiently. While these seem like reasonable goals, and while a totally ‘rundown’ area is neither successful nor desirable, it is precisely this messiness that
makes an urban area successful.
!

The lesson here is that desirable urban space is between full, painful

jouissance and watered-down, gentrified jouissance. In other words, we desire
some jouissance, but not too much. Thus, the early days of Queen West had ‘too
much’ jouissance for most people, but with the influx of retail chains, many feel it
does not have enough jouissance. This limit is determined by the subject, and
62

For a detailed analysis of Queen Street West’s transformation, see: Katharine N. Rankin,
Commercial Change in Toronto’s West-Central Neighbourhoods (Toronto: Cities Centre University
of Toronto, 2008). Retrieved from: http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/publications/
RP214RankinCommercialChangeWestToronto9-2008.pdf
63

This phrase has recently been used by Amy Lavender Harris in reference to the refrain of a
popular 1990s-era spoken word piece performed by Cad Lowlife and Rob Siciliano. See Amy
Lavender Harris, Imagining Toronto (Toronto: Mansfield Press, 2010). Also see http://
imaginingtoronto.com/2011/05/08/parkdale-scummy-parkdale/
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the judgment of this limit is what I argue is the moment of ‘the political’ as I
discussed in chapter 1. On a social level, there is a shared judgment on the limit
of jouissance, which helps to explain a community’s values and perceptions of an
area’s safety. A quiet, suburban community will have collectively marked the limit
of jouissance much more so than people who choose to live in dense, diverse
urban centres. On a more fine-grained subjective level, some choose to live in a
dense urban area and choose an apartment on a busy street above a store.
Others want to live downtown but on a quiet, residential street: they like the city,
but not too much! “We don’t mind a bit of noise, but…”

Enjoy the City!
Lacan provides a provocative understanding of the superego: the “superego is
the imperative of jouissance – Enjoy!.”64 Žižek has brought this up many times in
his books, referring to the “superego injunction ‘Enjoy!’”65 Above, I spoke about
the injunction to ‘be urban,’ though, in various guises, we are also often told to
‘enjoy the city.’66

If we understand the imperative ‘enjoy the city!’ as the

superego’s injunction, one might be tempted to think that the imperative ‘be
urban’ is the ego’s injunction. However, as we will see, any injunction or
imperative can only come from the superego. A reasonable question here would
be, ‘What’s wrong with enjoying things? Why not enjoy the city?’ I will now
address these questions.
!

In order to contextualize Lacan’s and Žižek’s arguments about the

superego’s imperative or injunction ‘Enjoy!,’ let us briefly recall Freud’s theory of
the pleasure principle and the reality principle. In Freud’s early writings, he
64

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits
of Love and Knowledge, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 3.
65

For example: Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 56; Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As
a Political Factor (London: Verso, 2008), 9–10 and 239.
66

It could be that ‘enjoy the urban!’ underlies the injunction ‘be urban.’ That is, perhaps the
injunction to simply ‘be’ something assumes enjoyment of that something – at least in this case.
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suggests that this mental energy works a bit like an economy or a system of
exchange.67 Since it takes a great deal of psychic energy to maintain repression,
when the psyche is able to relinquish repression and partake in enjoyment,
psychic energy is reduced. Though it seems counter-intuitive, the psychic energy
expended during a moment of pleasure is less than it was when this pleasure
was denied and repressed. Or, the other way around: when we are able to
(partially) lift repression, pleasure occurs. It was in Freud’s later writings where
he introduced the pleasure and reality principles, which provide a theory of the
drives – what actually motivates the psyche, not just economy of exchange.68
The pleasure principle desires more and more pleasure, but the reality principle
represents the obstacle to this pleasure and marks the place of a law that
pleasure seeks to transgress. Freud found that the pleasure principle still works
on the ‘principle’ of economy – that its tendency is to reduce psychic energy.
Again, the psyche seeks to return to its initial state, to calm down its energy to
the point of death.
!

The pleasure principle and the reality principle work together: the pleasure

principle seeks to explain the drive towards pleasure, while the reality principle
stands as the limit of what one can take pleasure in. That is, the pleasure
principle represents our fantasies, while the reality principle represents that
barrier or safeguard to our (impossible) fantasies. By conceiving the psyche as
constantly working to calm down its impulses, Freud found that the aim of life is,
in fact, death. That is, the limit or outcome of calming down the impulses is
death.69

67

See: Sigmund Freud, “Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious,” in The Standard Edition of
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII (1905), trans. James Strachey
(London: Vintage Books, 2001).
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Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVIII (1920–1922), trans. James Strachey
(London: Vintage Books, 2001).
69
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With the pleasure principle and reality principle working in tandem (that it

seeks pleasure, but defines and limits this pleasure through the transgression of
the law of the reality principle), we are given the frustrating injunction to enjoy,
but not too much. To go ‘beyond the pleasure principle’ is thus to seek to enjoy it
all – to enjoy what is not allowed to be enjoyed. However, this limit to enjoyment
and pleasure is what in fact structures desire. To go ‘beyond’ is to deny that there
is a transgression involved in enjoyment.
!

We see this more clearly in the instance of going beyond the pleasure

principle in Civilization and Its Discontents.70 The ‘oceanic feeling’ that Freud
describes is the psyche’s sense of a connection to the rest of the world. The ego
wants to distinguish itself from the world and be unique while at the same time
dreaming of a connection to the whole, which plays out in cities as the desire for
“community.” This unconscious desire to return to an oceanic oneness with the
world is another attempt to go beyond the pleasure principle – to be a unique ego
while also attaining the whole. To make this task manageable, the ego reduces
the world to a smaller scale and finds the world represented in the space (that is,
the psyche) which makes it appear possible to connect the world to the
conscious ego. But the unconscious remembers that the world is much larger
and unattainable so that there is an internal conflict and latent recognition that
the ego is not, in fact, connected to the entire world. Thus, it is not surprising that
David Harvey insists that “community” is not a ‘thing’ but a process: we are not, in
fact ‘connected,’ so we can only work at it.71 Thinking that we are part of a larger
whole is thus to attempt to go beyond the pleasure principle, to deny the limits of
what the reality principle allows.
!

Lacan discusses the superego in Freud’s Papers on Technique, locating it

in the symbolic order (not the imaginary) with speech and language: “The
70

Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume XXI (1927–31), trans. James Strachey (London:
Vintage Books, 2001), 64–68.
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David Harvey, “Contested Cities: Social Process and Spatial Form,” in The City Reader, 4th
edition, ed. Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout (New York: Routledge, 2007): 225–232.
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superego is located within the symbolic plane of speech [I(A)], in contrast to the
ego-ideal [i(a)],” which is located within the imaginary.72 Though the superego
has a relationship with the Law, it has a different character. The Law is a
symbolic structure and ensures the integration of the subject. The superego,
however, has a “senseless, blind character, of pure imperativeness and simple
tyranny.”73 The superego is ‘like’ the Law, but functions as a “senseless Law” and
even ‘misrecognizes’ the Law.74 Lacan teaches us that the superego is found to
be overworking in the “neurotic … because the morality of the neurotic is a
senseless, destructive, purely oppressive, almost always anti-legal morality.”75
The superego is the “you must,” it is “speech deprived of all its meaning” – it is
the command or imperative and thus ‘of’ language.76 It is not the ‘voice of the
Law’ but rather a command without a reason, much like the master in the
master’s discourse.77
!

“The superego is an imperative.”78 Lacan argues that this imperative is

Kant’s categorical imperative but whose specific command is ‘Enjoy!’ – “the
superego is the Other insofar as the Other commands the subject to enjoy.”79
This imperative of the superego, “Enjoy!”, is “the expression of the will-to-enjoy,
which is not the subject’s own will but the will of the Other.”80
!

Dylan Evans tells us that jouissance was not used much by Lacan until

1960, at which point he develops the opposition between pleasure and

72

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I, Freud’s Papers on Technique, trans.
John Forrester (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 102.
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The pleasure principle functions as a limit to enjoyment; the

pleasure principle demands the subject enjoy as little as possible – ‘enjoy, but not
too much!’ The subject, however, seeks to transgress the pleasure principle’s
prohibitions and go ‘beyond the pleasure principle.’ This does not lead to more
pleasure, but pain, since there is only so much pleasure the subject can bear. It
is this “painful pleasure” that Lacan calls jouissance.82

In Lacan’s words,

“Jouissance is suffering.”83 Jouissance is the “paradoxical satisfaction that the
subject derives from his symptom … the suffering that he derives from his own
satisfaction.”84
!

So, Freud’s theories tell us that the reality principle and superego function

to limit our pleasure and enjoyment. For Freud, the superego functions like a law
which marks a limit on what can be enjoyed or how much enjoyment can take
place. For Lacan, however, the “superego is the imperative of jouissance –
Enjoy!”85 The superego’s “Enjoy!” is a “correlate of castration,” the specifically
Lacanian notion of ‘castration,’ the loss of jouissance.86 This latter sense of the
superego (castration, the loss of jouissance) is more in line with Freud’s notion of
the superego as the prohibiting father, the law, etc. Lacan’s argument is that the
imperative ‘Enjoy!’ is not the opposite of prohibition, but rather a correlate. And an
imperative can only come from the superego.
!

The superego is normally understood in basic Freudian terms (prohibition,

law, etc.), which becomes increasingly cruel the more we try to satisfy it. Though
Lacan understands the superego as telling us to ‘Enjoy!’ it is still excessively
cruel. It is worth remembering the social and historical context in which Lacan
was writing and giving his seminars. Lacan first began this line of thought in the
81
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1950s but fully stated “the superego is the imperative of jouissance – Enjoy!” in
1972-1973 seminar On Feminine Sexuality.87 While we are familiar with the
various cultural shifts in western society in the so-called ‘post-war era,’ allow me
to present one example that shows Lacan was diagnosing this shift in the
superego’s demand, not inventing it. When Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho was
released in theatres in 1960, it was accompanied by a clever marketing
strategy.88 One poster outside theatres read, “The theatre requests: see Psycho
from the beginning to insure your own total enjoyment of it.” Also in front of
theatres were cardboard cut-outs of Hitchcock holding a sign that read, “We
won’t allow you to cheat yourself! You must see Psycho from the beginning to
enjoy it fully!” Other promotional material demanded people “see the uncut
version TV didn’t dare show!” Here we have Hitchcock himself, as it were, taking
the role of the superego (the symbolic, the Big Other), insisting that we enjoy the
film and, further, that what we are going to enjoy is some ‘excess’ or more that
was ‘cut’ (castration) from the televised, gentrified version. This level of
enjoyment helps to explain the early gentrifiers of 1960s, often called
“whitepainters,”89 which refers to young professionals buying run-down houses in
downtown Toronto, most notably in Cabbagetown and the Annex90 , though
Bruce’s article refers to Farnham and Woodlawn avenues (off Yonge, just south
of St. Clair). Though termed ‘whitepainters,’ these pioneering gentrifiers painted
the exterior brick of old houses a pastel colour. They would buy an old house,
“clean out the cockroaches, replace the plumbing and generally exploit the
building’s sweet possibilities.” 91 Bruce notes the common stylings of these
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gentrifiers: wrought iron railings, coach lamps, bootscrapers, and other
adornments associated with farms and the countryside. Thus, while these early
gentrifiers wished to live in the city, they clearly did not want all the city had to
offer. They were like those who only saw the “uncut version TV didn’t dare show.”
Again, we encounter a problem of limits: wanting some of the city, but not too
much.
!

Essential to enjoyment and jouissance is its relationship to transgression.

We find this in a seminar prior to On Feminine Sexuality: the seminar entitled The
Ethics of Psychoanalysis. He argues that the myth of the murder of the father,
which was supposed to open the path to jouissance, does not in fact open this
path. Rather, it strengthens the prohibition.92 Lacan’s point is that whoever
attempts to submit to the demands of the superego, and submits to moral law,
will see these demands as increasingly cruel.93 Whoever seeks to access
jouissance by rejecting some form of moral law only ever encounters more and
more obstacles. So, Lacan agrees with the formula “that without a transgression
there is no access to jouissance.” 94 Pushing this point further, there is no
jouissance without the Law – transgression of the Law is required for jouissance.
So, if the Law (such as the internalized Law of the superego) demands that we
‘Enjoy!’ (that we experience jouissance) then we cannot actually experience
jouissance.
!

Žižek has an analogy he likes to tell about so-called “postmodern

parenting.”95 He gives the example of the earlier, “totalitarian father” who tells his
child, “You’re going to your grandmother’s house today!” which allows the child to
be annoyed but still follow this ‘duty’; she can be rebellious about it and thus
maintain her own ‘freedom.’ The contemporary “postmodern or permissive father”
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will say, “We’re going to your Grandmother’s house today. You should come with
us, but you don’t have to. You know your grandmother loves you very much and
would really like to see you, but it’s up to you.” This puts the child in the position
of a ‘false choice’ and takes away the child’s ability to rebel. However, we can
alter the analogy slightly to explain the imperative to enjoy. We can imagine the
“totalitarian father” saying, “You’ll go to your grandmother’s house today whether
you like it or not!” The “postmodern or permissive father” will now say, “You’ll go
to your grandmother’s house today – and you’ll like it!” It is this type of imperative
to ‘Enjoy!’ that Lacan was pointing toward.96 Much contemporary urbanism utter
this imperative regarding the city: Richard Florida, Edward Glaeser, admonishing
environmentalists, and various formations of the Big Other defining the urban as
‘cool’ all insist that you will live in the city, and you will like it.
!

In On Feminine Sexuality, Lacan tells us about ‘usufruct’ – the legal notion

that you can enjoy things but must not waste them. He argues that this is the
“essence of law – to divide up, distribute, or reattribute everything that counts as
jouissance.”97 This is one way to interpret the graph of desire – jouissance, as it
moves from left to right, becomes caught up in language, in the law. He tells us
that jouissance is “no more than a negative instance. Jouissance is what serves
no purpose.”98 The point is that, while we have a ‘right’ to enjoy things, there is
nothing that forces anyone to enjoy things – nothing except the superego. “The
superego is the imperative of jouissance – Enjoy!” 99 So, when we hear the
injunction to enjoy, we must remember that this injunction comes from the
superego. We can enjoy ‘on our own’ in a sense, but when we are told to, it is
from the superego.
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Consider usufruct in relation to public space – you can enjoy its ‘excesses’

but not the thing itself. That is, you can enter the space, enjoy the space, but you
cannot make any permanent private claims to it – you cannot call it your home or
alter it in any way that would take away someone else’s enjoyment of the
space.100 Further, you must follow certain rules while in that public space.101 In
Sunnybrook Park in Toronto, a sign is posted that says, “Welcome to Sunnybrook
Park, enjoy your visit. Please be respectful of other and Future [sic] users.” The
sign then lists a series of rules and regulations. There are nine rules: keep your
dog on a leash, no cycling, no fires, no groups of more than twenty-five without a
permit, no kite flying, and several others. These rules clearly fall into the ‘enjoy –
but not too much’ category. Were one to transgress these rules, would they not
be on the ‘path’ to jouissance? However, we get a hint at what will be discussed
shortly: that one of the ‘laws’ is that you enjoy your visit. A contrary example: on
the Toronto Islands some of the public spaces there have signs that say “please
walk on the grass!” Of course, this is a take on the common ‘keep off the grass’
signs we are familiar with, but the subtext is ‘enjoy the grass!’ Or consider the
enjoyment of Toronto’s nightlife. There is an astounding amount of rules for bars,
night clubs, and alcohol, and even more rules to serve alcohol on a patio.
Perhaps all these rules are what make some rather banal activities so enjoyable,
and perhaps why, late at night, bar patrons are so rowdy: they are continuing to
enjoy the transgression. In other words, being loud and screaming ‘woo!,’
messing up people’s yards, and walking in the road is not what is enjoyed; it is
the transgression that is enjoyed.

100

People in public spaces do, however, make temporary claims to (usually a portion of) the
space, which is part of the notion of usufruct: the object (public space) may be enjoyed but not to
the detriment of others. One can see this clearly at work by observing where people sit in public
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The superego’s imperative ‘Enjoy!’ is related to the command ‘love thy

neighbour.’ Lacan agrees and takes further Nietzsche’s and Freud’s contention
that ‘god is dead.’ For Lacan, though, what remains is the commandment which
orders man to “love thy neighbour.” This edict is a horrifying proposition because
of the role of jouissance. Following Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents,
Lacan tells us that “jouissance is evil … it is suffering because it is suffering for
my neighbour.”102 And it is here that Lacan tells us that jouissance is what is
“beyond the pleasure principle.” 103 Here we find out that jouissance is what is
involved in aggression, exploitation, humiliation, suffering, and torture – all in
relation to one’s ‘neighbour.’104 Lacan’s point here is that traditional moralists and
ethicists always assume that pleasure is a good thing and the path to the good is
paved with pleasure, whereas Lacan is arguing that pleasure involves suffering
and evil. Interpreting Freud, Lacan argues that Freud found loving one’s
neighbour “horrifying”105 because the fundamental nature of the neighbour is
“bad.”106 There are more reasons why one should not obey the command to ‘love
thy neighbour.’ One’s love is a “precious” thing that should not be just given to
someone just because he or she happens to be there.107 The ethic of ‘love thy
neighbour’ is a solipsistic, egoistic altruism that does not contain an articulation of
the Good and avoids the problem of evil in the neighbour and oneself. What is
desired is “the good of others in the image of my own.” 108 Then it becomes “the
good of others provided that it remain in the image of my own,” which quickly
degenerates into a good that “depends on my efforts.”109 The moral good, then,
becomes the fantasy of sacrificing one’s own happiness so that the other may
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have happiness, which as it turns out is a “harmful, malignant jouissance.”110
Because of the “unconscious aggression that jouissance contains,” the
resistance to the demand ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’ is the same
resistance present when man stops himself from attaining his own jouissance.111
One’s neighbour’s jouissance is “harmful” and “malignant” – and so is one’s
own.112 Lacan is drawing our attention to “the unconscious aggression that
jouissance contains, to the frightening core of the destrudo,” which he claims
constantly appears in “analytic experience.”113 And, it appears in the urban
experience. This aggressive loving of the neighbour is the “togetherness” that
Jane Jacobs finds “nauseating” in suburban communities, which I discuss further
in chapter 4.114 Jacobs is referring to the gossip and meddling in other’s affairs
prevalent in secluded suburbs. A different form of ‘community’ develops in dense,
urban areas in which people trust one another yet maintain a social distance:
they do not “love” their neighbours, but trust them and stay out of their affairs.
!

Further, “the energy of the so-called superego derives from the aggression

that the subject turns back on himself.”115 In other words, and this is a crucial
point, the aggression at the core of jouissance is that aggression that ‘reappears’
in the subject’s own superego. This ‘aggression’ of the superego is why Freud
and Lacan repeatedly state that the superego is ‘cruel.’ It becomes increasingly
cruel since, once the subject concedes to the superego (by trying to obey its
rules), there is no limit; it just generates “ever more powerful aggression in the
self.”116 We “retreat from loving my neighbour as myself because there is
something on the horizon there that is engaged in some form of intolerable
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cruelty. In that sense, to love one’s neighbour may be the cruelest of choices.”117
The laws the subject’s conscience know are sacred are the laws that are
“trampled underfoot” by the unconscious and are what “excites jouissance.” 118
!

My previous examples of transgressing laws in a public space pale in

comparison to what Lacan is aiming at here. Urban examples of the eruption of
jouissance through ‘trampling underfoot’ would involve some mass breakdown of
social rules: perhaps a riot or, to a lesser extent, the behaviour of young drunks
after last call. Or we might understand the eruption of violence on the part of the
police during the June 2010 G20 meeting in Toronto as an eruption of jouissance.
The police were ‘finally’ able to do what they signed up for and became extremely
violent. They punched, kicked, and beat people with batons. They arrested over
one thousand people and then detained them in horrible conditions. Many
reported being abused physically and emotionally, and women complained of
crude sexual harassment. It has since been revealed that there was little
‘command structure’ and so the violent abuse by the police was not the result of
orders, but the individual officers. Many of the protestors, too, had their eruptions
of jouissance: because of their large numbers, it gave them a chance to enjoy
their expressions against the police. Very few of the emotional or violent
outbursts were directed at the stated purpose of the demonstrations (opposing
G20 policies) but instead at the police.
!

Of all these forms of enjoyment, Lacan argues that “the only thing of which

one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire.” 119 We often
have to ‘give ground’ on our desires to do good, and this is where guilt comes in.
So this ‘maxim’ of Lacan’s is not an ethic and it should be noted this seminar took
place in 1959–1960 and Lacan never spoke of this ‘maxim’ again.120 Rather, it is
the statement of the paradox surrounding ethics and desire. We are either
117

Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 194.

118

Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 195.

119

Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 319.

120

Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, 54.

!

Chapter 2!

120

betraying ourselves or someone else.121 But, on another register, things are not
so cut and dried: Lacan telling us to hold dear our desires is a way of asking us
“Chè vuoi?” That is, asking us what our desires are and keep them separate from
the Other’s desire.
!

In Žižek’s comments on the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, he suggests that

this loss of the Big Other and its prohibitive Law really began with Kant. The
prohibitions we now deal with are self-posited, which helps us understand why
the prohibitions and the imperative ‘Enjoy!’ come from our own superego. Kant’s
philosophy clearly argues that we are all free and all limitations or constraints are
self-posited.122
!

Žižek invokes Bataille’s ‘passion for the Real’ and pursuing the excesses

in life to show that Bataille depends on the Law – to achieve these excesses and
the ‘Real,’ one must transgress the Law. The “‘passion for the Real’ relies on
prohibition.”123

But Bataille’s ‘dialectal interdependence’ of law and its

transgression fails to fully account for the paradox that one needs to “install
prohibitions in order to be able to enjoy their violation.”124 Žižek argues that
Bataille is unable to perceive the consequences of Kant’s “philosophical
revolution”: that “the absolute excess is that of the Law itself.”125 In other words,
the ‘excess’ that Bataille proposes is not a transgression of the Law, but is found
in the Law; “serving the Law is the highest adventure,”126 obeying the Law only
leads to crueler superego, etc. It is here that Žižek compares this problem of
transgression to the “superego injunction ‘Enjoy!’” Late-capitalist ‘permissive’
society is “in the thrall” of this injunction, which “elevates excess into the very
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principle of its ‘normal’ functioning.127 Žižek tells us that the contemporary
“journalistic description” of our age being the “age of anxiety” is only true insofar
as transgression has been elevated into the norm under which we are expected
to labour. There is a lack of prohibition that would sustain desire, and this lack
puts us in the “suffocating proximity of the object-cause [objet petit a] of
desire.”128 So, what used to be prohibited (such as sex) we are now told to not
only go ahead and do it, but also enjoy it, we lose the ability to develop a sense
of individually in opposition to a norm, and we also lose the guilt associated with
it. However, the price we pay for this loss of guilt is anxiety.129
!

To clarify the distinction between the object of desire and its object-cause,

Žižek provides an example: A woman who feels guilty for regular one-night
stands ought to be told the one-stands are not morally wrong. This should reveal
to the woman that what she is, in fact, enjoying is the ‘masochistic’ feeling of guilt
and hopefully lose interest since she is not enjoying the object of desire, but the
object-cause of desire (objet petit a). So, the question to be asked is, ‘do we
enjoy the object or the obstacle to the object?’ We see this play out in the urban
in many ways. Above, I gave the example of people leaving bars late at night,
yelling, screaming ‘woo!,’ and disrupting the neighbours. Again, I would argue
that these people are not enjoying these actions, but only the transgression. In
fact, we can recall times when someone sarcastically exaggerates another’s
yelling and ‘wooing’ which has the effect of demonstrating that what they are
doing is not, in fact, enjoyable.
!

Do we enjoy driving over the speed limit simply because we are

transgressing the law? Bicycling is enjoyable in the city because one is able to
transgress the laws with the knowledge that doing so is not particularly
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dangerous and actually makes more sense, giving us the sense that we know
better than the law, like the small thrill we feel when we ‘jaywalk.’130 Beyond rules
of circulation, we see ‘self-posited’ prohibitions to entice us into spaces, such as
the ‘velvet ropes’ of a club or entertainment venue. It is well known that bouncers
and people who work ‘the doors’ at night clubs will restrict entry, keep a line-up,
etc. only to make the appearance of ‘exclusion’ or ‘exclusivity.’ A recently opened
park in Toronto, Sherbourne Commons, has a number of various water features,
one being a concrete basin similar to a creek with shallow water. The design is
set up so that people can sit on its edges and put his/her feet in the water or
wade in the ankle-deep water. However, there are signs all along it that say ‘no
wading.’ Just about everyone in the park on a hot day will wade or dangle their
feet in the water anyway. The ‘no wading’ signs are likely in place for obscure
legal reasons, but perhaps they unintentionally work to increase the user’s
enjoyment. And perhaps the astounding success of Kensington Market is partially
a result of these minor transgressions of the law. Many of the shops are pushing
the limits of what bylaws allow. Circulating through the streets and sidewalk by
bike or on foot, one is almost forced to break conventions by walking on the road,
cycling against one-way streets. On the other hand, boring and uninspiring areas
of the urban are usually those that allow for no transgression of the law.
Suburban areas and malls are designed so that users can do little but follow
established rules.131 Toronto has an arcane law that prohibits road hockey on any
street, even though many people play this anyway with few problems. Recently, a
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city councillor sought to have this bylaw revoked so that it would be legal for
people to play road hockey. But once the councillor and city staff began looking
into this, they quickly realized that there was little they could do. To make road
hockey legal meant there would be a host of other rules governing it (when,
where, how long, etc.) and would open them to the possibility of lawsuits were
anyone hurt. The councillor came to realize the best thing was to leave the law
as is, and suggest the police not enforce it.
!

In The Puppet and the Dwarf, Žižek presents his oft-repeated argument

about enjoying objects without their dangerous element. He gives the examples
of “coffee without caffeine,” “beer without alcohol” and more.132 He is arguing that
contemporary, tolerant, liberal, multicultural society implores us to enjoy the
Other deprived of its Otherness: “a product deprived of its substance.” 133 It is this
particular twist that Žižek adds to the ‘imperative of the superego – Enjoy!’:
“Everything is permitted, you can enjoy everything, but deprived of its
substance,” deprived of what makes it dangerous or ‘transgressable.’134 “God is
dead, we live in a permissive universe, you should strive for pleasure, you should
avoid dangerous excesses, so everything is prohibited if it is not deprived of its
substance.”135 Or, “If God is dead, the superego enjoins you to enjoy, but every
detrimental enjoyment is already a betrayal of the unconditioned one, so it should
be prohibited.”136 In The Sublime Object of Ideology, it is the symptom that is the
kernel of enjoyment. It persists as a surplus and “returns though all attempts to
domesticate it, to gentrify it,” by which Žižek means the “strategies to
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domesticate the slums as ‘symptoms’ of our cities.”137 Tellingly, one of these
‘strategies’ is to name the symptom, to put it into words. As we saw above in the
graph of desire, once jouissance is named, it loses its force: it becomes
gentrified. Common to all gentrified areas in Toronto is the giving of a name. In
what was once largely an industrial and warehouse area, many condos and a
few shops were built and it became “Liberty Village.” There is nothing particularly
‘liberating’ about these condos, and it is decidedly not a village. This naming
happens in the suburbs, but is reversed. Many suburban areas are named after
the thing or quality that is no longer there because of the development: creeks,
meadows, woods, etc.
!

Another way in which we can understand Lacan’s theory of enjoyment is

when we are enjoying the Law itself, enjoying that which we feel is oppressing
us. At the end of The Other Side of Psychoanalysis is an appendix that
transcribes a session that took place at Vincennes, an experimental university on
December 3, 1969.138 The date is not insignificant as the protests of 1968 were
still fresh in people’s minds. During this session are a number of ‘interventions’ by
audience members who are rather hostile to Lacan. Eventually someone
dismisses him as a “liberal” after it becomes clear that most of the opposition is
coming from a Marxist-Leninist position. Lacan implies that these so-called
revolutionaries are, in fact, seeking a new master and that psychoanalysis is
what will “enable you to locate what it is exactly that you are rebelling against.”139
He then tells these ‘revolutionaries’ that they “fulfill the role of helots of this
regime. The regime is putting you on display. It says, “Look at them enjoying!”140
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This is a very compelling analysis of how the so-called ‘progressives’ functioned
during Toronto’s public consultations of the recent ‘core services review’ (July
2011). Just over 300 people registered to make a deputation to the Core
Services Review Committee on the service cuts proposed in the Core Services
Review Report. While the deputants made many impassioned pleas not to cut a
variety of services, one could help but notice how much fun they were having.
There were huge cheers for each deputant, laughter at each of the witty remarks,
etc. A ‘sleepover’ was organized on Facebook and many came with pyjamas and
pillows. People in the ‘spill-over room’ watched the proceedings on a big-screen
TV, eating snacks and enjoying the proceedings as if they were at the movies.141

Urban Transference
Transference concerns the ‘intersubjective relationship’ on which the ‘four
discourses’ elaborates, which will be the subject of the following chapter. Above,
in my discussion of the graph of desire, I suggested that ‘The City’ could be
understood as the Other (A) and also be thought of as the ‘barred Other’ (%). Of
course, A is always % because “there’s no such thing as the Big Other” – the Big
Other (A) ‘hasn’t got it,’ there is always a gap in the Symbolic order. ‘The City’ is
not, of course, a conscious subject in any way, but gains this status through
transference and projection. So, I would argue that, through transference, The
City becomes A or % depending on the context or question posed to it. Through
transference we can think about the following questions: Does The City provide a
meaning s(A) or does it provide no meaning S(%) and point beyond itself?
Further, when we ask “What does The City want from us?” doesn’t transference
allow us to reformulate this question as “What do we imagine The City wants
from us?”
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In July 2012, on the one-year anniversary, some returned to City Hall to remember and
celebrate the event.
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Freud thought of transference as any transmission of affect from the

patient to the analyst. For example, the patient might have a disagreement with
his father and, through transference, have this disagreement with the analyst. In
other words, the analyst takes the place of the person with whom the patient has
an emotional relation.142

Lacan, however, theorized transference rather

differently. Perhaps most importantly, Lacan recognized that transference is not
something specific or originating from the analytic setting but can happen
anywhere.143 Lacan also makes a distinction between positive and negative
transference: “positive transference is when you have a soft spot for the
individual concerned … and negative transference is when you have to keep
your eye on him” 144 In an everyday setting, we might come to like or dislike (love
or hate) someone simply because they remind us of someone else we like or
dislike. This transference that concerns negative or positive feeling is of the
imaginary. Below I will show how symbolic transference works to make the city
the ‘subject supposed to know.‘ In the imaginary register, transference in cities
occurs, for example, when someone who grew up in the suburbs comes to dislike
the suburbs simply because that is where he or she grew up and, further, feel the
city’s urban centre is a good thing. However, not everything is the result of
transference: a person might grow up completely happy in a suburb and later
come to prefer an urban area and find the suburbs boring.
!

Transference occurs because of some sign the analyst projects – a shape

of the nose, jewellery, clothing, way of speaking, etc. For Lacan, transference
“does not refer to any mysterious property of affect” but rather reveals itself in the
relationship between subjects or between subjects and objects.145 In Freud’s
Papers on Technique, Lacan tells us that any exchange of signs (i.e. speech) is a
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Bruce Fink, Fundamental Concepts in Psychoanalytic Technique: A Lacanian Approach for
Practitioners (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 127.
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Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 124–125.
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Jacques Lacan, “Presentation on Transference,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in
English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 183.
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transference – a symbolic transference.146 Thus, transference is not simply
emotion or affect, but involves signifiers. Signification thus shifts transference
from the register of the Imaginary to the Symbolic. While Lacan devoted an entire
year of seminars to transference (Transference 1960-61), I would like to focus on
what he says in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, specifically
how transference relates to the ‘subject supposed to know,’ since I will argue that
the city becomes The City as it takes on this status of the ‘subject supposed to
know.’147

The City Supposed To Know
Transference and the ‘subject supposed to know’ are intimately connected: “as
soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere … there is
transference.”148 Lacan’s discussion of the ‘subject supposed to know’ is explicitly
in the analyst situation – that it is the analyst who becomes the subject supposed
to know for the analysand. I need to be clear here that the phenomenon of
transference as it relates to the subject supposed to know is explained by Lacan
in the analyst situation. The subject supposed to know is a phenomenon that
occurs by the analysand – it identifies that function whereby the analysand
‘supposes’ the analyst as a subject of total knowledge about the subject himself.
!

Lacan argues the only way to begin to understand transference is to start

with the ‘subject supposed to know’: “The transference is unthinkable unless one
sets out from the subject who is supposed to know.”149 This involves “the transfer
of powers from the subject to the Other … the locus of speech and, potentially,
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the locus of truth.”150 What he is supposed to know is signification itself. By
‘signification itself,’ Lacan means the analyst is supposed to know the “secret
meaning of the analysand’s words.”151 This has the effect of the analysand
changing his or her words or behaviour, or re-evaluating what he or she had said
before – how his/her words, gestures, or behaviours might have been interpreted
by the analyst.
!

We see this phenomenon when the analyst finds out something important

about the analysand and asks “Why didn’t you tell me earlier!?” To which the
analysand replies, “because you might have taken it as something important,
something responsible for all my problems, etc.”152 The “patient may think that
the analyst may be misled if he gives him certain facts.”153 Lacan asks: shouldn’t
the person who might be misled always be suspicious of being misled? In other
words, one should always expect transference.
!

The subject supposed to know becomes so “simply by virtue of being a

subject of desire.”154 That is, the analysand ‘creates’ the analyst as the supposed
subject of knowledge because the analysand desires that the analyst have this
special knowledge of the analysand. The essential element of transference, the
“axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer,” is desire.155 However, Lacan reminds
us that “Man’s desire is the desire of the Other.” 156 If a subject recognizes that
her desire is the desire of the Other, then she will realize that his desire will never
be recognized and “this obstacle will never be lifted.”157
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“Transference is not, of its nature, the shadow of something that was once

alive.”158 Transference is not “ectopia”159 ; it is not displacement. Rather, it is
something ‘new,’ but nonetheless “transference is the enactment of the reality of
the unconscious.”160
!

Lacan suggests that transference is not so much about the “liquidation” of

the unconscious as it is about “the subject who is supposed to know who must be
liquidated as such.”161 This relates to the so-called ‘maxim’ to not give ground on
your desires since ‘liquidating’ the subject supposed to know means the subject
stops looking to the Other for the answers. Instead, the subject turns his own
desire/knowledge for the answers.
!

Now, if transference and the ‘subject supposed to know’ is something

specific to the analyst and analysand and involves two subjects, how would this
help us understand the relationship between the city dweller and the city? I argue
that in many instances, the city dweller enacts transference onto the city, turning
the city into ‘The City’ as the ‘object supposed to know.’ It is in this way that the
line between object and subject become blurred, for how else could an object
contain knowledge? While this might seem like I am playing fast and loose with
these terms, I do not believe I am ‘inventing’ this so much as I am ‘diagnosing’
this. Consider how many people become exasperated and exclaim to ‘no one’ in
particular, “What am I supposed to do?” This occurs frequently when someone is
frustrated in their attempts to circulate in the city. Certain roads are congested,
other roads limit direction of traffic, certain intersections limit turns, and people
cry, “They’ve made it so I can’t get to where I want to go!” Who is the ‘they’ in this
sentence? On one level it is the Big Other (as we saw earlier in the “dogmatic
stupidity” of the signifier: it is called that because that is what it is called). But I
think we can also think of the ‘they’ as the city itself, as though the city were an
158

Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 253.
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entity unto itself, as though it made the rules and regulations. In fact, it makes
more sense that to try and hold responsible the myriad of people who made the
rules at different times with different goals – the ‘accidental city.’162 However, this
example seems to show that the city is given the status of ‘subject supposed not
to know’ … though it should! Indeed, Toronto’s current ‘slogan’ is “We’ve been
expecting you.” In the 1970s it was “Toronto: Affectionately Yours…” Much
different from the 1940s: “Toronto: A good place to work, A nice place to live!”163
!

There are a number of ways in which subjects reveal transference in their

understandings of the city as the ‘subject supposed to know.’ All of these
transferences share the commonality that the subject feels the city has a
knowledge or truth to it; when they think the city knows what they really think. For
example, when a person follows a rule or set of rules of the city without question,
he or she assumes the city knows best. This assumption is very apparent in the
current debate among Toronto’s cyclists: quite a few believe that, if cyclists follow
the ‘rules of road,’ the city will respect them. However, these rules are in place for
motor vehicles and many of these rules are inapplicable to bicycles while others
make cycling dangerous. Another example: when people go to a seemingly
random street or area to find satisfaction of an unknown (unconscious) desire;
they do not consciously know what they want, but figure the city will tell them
once they get there. Pedestrians often rightfully complain about having to press a
button at semi-actuated traffic lights as they often do not work, or take a long
time to change the lights. They could easily cross before it changes with little
danger, but they assume the traffic light knows best. When it takes really long
time, people rarely ‘blame’ the fairly simple electronics involved but rather ‘the
city’ itself is somehow to blame: “it happens all the time!”
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Finally, from the so-called ‘marathon’ committee meeting of July 2011 with

many deputations about the core-service review mentioned above, Councillor
Gord Perks said, “we heard the voice of Toronto” and believed what it said was
true (mainly because he is opposed to the service cuts the mayor would like to
make).164 Here we have an example of the ‘voice of the city’ expressing what ‘it’
wants as though it speaks, and is, in this case, ignored. But, of course, the
‘voice’ of the city rarely speaks, if at all. Though we wish it could.
!

But the city does not speak. It is dumb. It does not want anything from

you. This silence of the Big Other plays out in a number of films and movies. For
example, Juan Antonio Bayona’s 2007 film The Orphanage tells the story of a
woman, Laura, who returns to run her childhood orphanage with her husband
and son, Simon.165 Simon befriends an ‘invisible’ masked child, Tomas, with
whom Laura fears he will run away with. The horrific scenes involve the masked
child, who appears with a burlap bag over his head simply staring at Laura.
These scenes are frightening for both Laura and the viewer because Tomas is
not asking or demanding or doing anything. He just stares. It would be a relief if
he attacked Laura, or even stated his intentions no matter how awful. Or even if
he removed the burlap bag so we might ‘read’ his face. At least we would know
what he wants. A similar scene of terror reoccurs in David Lynch’s television
series, Twin Peaks. With some frequency, BOB, a menacing figure, appears as
some otherworldly being. Only Laura’s family members can see BOB (Laura is
the girl who is murdered; finding her murderer is the plot of the entire series).
When BOB appears in the family member’s visions, he mostly just stares and
leers. For the most part he does nothing and says nothing.166 He does not want
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In the episode “Demons” of the television series Twin Peaks, Agent Cooper asks Mike ‘The
One-armed Man’, “What does BOB want?” Mike answers, “He is BOB. Eager for fun. He wears a
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anything. Again, it would be ‘better’ were he to attack or say something – at least
then we would know what he wants.
!

Similarly, the city does not want anything from you. It is dumb – it has no

knowledge. We try to fill it in like it does have a desire or some knowledge or
truth of us, but it does not. It just stares at us dumbly. It is indifferent. As I argued
above in relation to the graph of desire, the city does not need its subjects to
build another park or highway, it ticks along just fine without a particular subject.
We find this lack of desire or intention or demand from the city terrifying, so we
try to fill it in with demands and desires. It is as though the city is % and we try to
make it A, or perhaps the city is objet petit a and we try to make it A.

Urban Love
Conspicuously absent from this discussion of transference is love. Love is the
biggest transference of them all … “Transference is love. But why love someone
like that?”167
!

For the last few years, the Kensington Market BIA has held ‘Pedestrian

Sundays.’ On the last Sunday of each month during the warmer months,
Kensington Market is closed to vehicles and various performers and vendors set
up on the street. It is extremely popular – it is hard to just walk through the
market because of all the people. However, unlike regular days in Kensington,
Pedestrian Sundays seem too contrived. While there are a few permanent stores
catering to the latest trends, the Market is mainly comprised of food shops that
have been there for years. They are run largely by people who have immigrated
to Canada in the post-war era, people who just want to carve out a living, and are
not particularly interested in the latest trends. Their shops sell their goods
cheaply without much ‘merchandizing.’ During Pedestrian Sundays, however,
167
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Française, 1982). Translated as “Lacan Speaks,” subtitles by John Forrester.

!

Chapter 2!

133

there are vendors selling food that claim to be vegan, locally produced, ethically
grown, gluten free, etc. And the people selling these types of things are
caricatures of those who would be concerned about these things (unkempt,
ragged clothes, bandanas covering their hair, etc.). When walking through the
Market on a Pedestrian Sunday, one is constantly subjected to injunctions to
“Have fun!’” “Enjoy!” and generally find everything “Awesome!” On a July 2011
edition of Pedestrian Sundays, a man with a megaphone implored us to “Check
out the carpet of love! – It’s awesome!” He was referring to chalk drawings all
over the street, many of which referenced the theme of love. The person with the
megaphone continued: “We got a carpet of love on the street! Who wants to help
draw love! Who doesn’t love love?!” Another person with a bucket of chalk was
offering chalk to anyone interested. But no one was. Many people, looking a bit
nervous though friendly, kindly shook their heads to the woman with chalk. I am
sure most, if not all, the people there have nothing against love but when given
the injunction to love something, people tend to recoil. One might also consider
that if this act of drawing ‘love’ on the street is so enjoyable, so wonderful, why
would there need to be this injunction?
!

Lacan spent much of his seminars, even devoting one entire seminar On

Feminine Sexuality, to the topic of love. In The Other Side of Psychoanalysis,
Lacan tells us “that there is a love of weakness is no doubt the essence of love”
so that “love is giving what one doesn’t have, namely what might make good this
original weakness.”168 For Lacan, love is something that exists only in and
through objet petit a. When people say they love someone, Lacan understands it
as “I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you –
the objet petit a – I mutilate you.”169 That is, when someone loves someone or
something, they are actually in love with some surplus, some “thing” that does
not actually exist in the person or object. In The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the
Technique of Psychoanalysis, Lacan tells us that objet petit a is not an other
168
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(autre) at all since it “coupled with the ego.”170 Above, in my discussion of the
graph of desire, we encountered a in the matheme of fantasy ($&a) and
imaginary other (i(a)). In the ‘four discourses,’ which I will discuss next, objet petit
a comes to be understood as the object of desire that we seek and find, though it
is not really there, in the other whom we love and desire.171 Lacan develops this
notion of objet petit a through a reading of Plato’s Symposium, wherein
Alcibiades speaks of Socrates as a worthless wooden box that contains
something precious. But, since this ‘precious’ thing contained does not in fact
exist, and can thus never be obtained, objet petit a comes to be understood and
not just the object of desire but also the cause of desire and is thus often called
the ‘object-cause of desire.’ It is also worth noting that objet petit a is understood
as a ‘remainder’ or ‘left-over’ of the Symbolic order, and that the drives do not
seek to obtain objet petit a but instead circle around it. In the four discourses, one
signifier attempts to represent all other signifiers but leaves a remainder and this
remainder is objet petit a.
!

Now, these are all related though somewhat distinct ‘definitions’ of objet

petit a. Much of this ambiguity is the result of Lacan’s changing notions of objet
petit a but it also allows for greater and more creative applications of the concept.
So when people make the ridiculous claim that they “love” their city, this is why it
sounds so ridiculous; a proper response to this claim is, “My God! What are you
talking about!?” People can only say they love their city by covering over and
falsely solidifying the city as ‘The City’ through transference or inventing an
excess object/cause of desire.
!

This chapter has focused on the central argument that we take the city as

the Lacanian Other, investing it with its own desires and lacks. This has been
discussed mainly through an interpretation and application of the concepts found
on the graph of desire, along with his theories of enjoyment, jouissance,
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transference, and love to present multiple arguments about the arrangements
and behaviours associated with everyday urban life. This chapter addressed the
central questions of “What do we want from our cities?” and “What does the city
want from us?” – the answers to which are bound up with enjoyment, fantasy,
jouissance, and, especially, transference. For Lacan, transference depends upon
the ‘subject supposed to know,’ and I argued that, in the urban situation,
transference depends on subjects taking the city as the object supposed to know,
investing it with its own desires, lacks, and apparent ‘knowledge’ of the subject
itself. Ultimately, though, the city is ‘dumb’: it does not want or need anything
from its inhabitants. Using this Lacanian methodology to examine everyday
urban life, I argued that the urban spaces most enjoyed are those with a degree
of ‘messiness’ or ‘grit’ to them and that we identify with the ‘flaws’ of urban
spaces. This ‘degree’ or limit to the amount of ‘grit’ or ‘messiness’ is understood
here as a limit to jouissance – some, but not too much.

136

CHAPTER 3: EARLY URBANISM: FROM THE MASTER’S TO THE
UNIVERSITY DISCOURSE
This chapter begins by outlining Jacques Lacan’s four discourses. Once this
theoretical framework is established, I will then briefly show how these four
discourses can be used to interpret contemporary everyday urban life. The
majority of this chapter is devoted to examining the writers and movements who
have heavily influenced the shape of North American cities and the lasting built
environment. Early, unplanned cities to which these movements and writers
respond are understood through the master’s discourse. I will present a brief
history of nineteenth century Toronto as an example of the rotation from the cities
of the master’s to those of the university discourse. Following this, I will discuss
the influential parks movement initiated by Fredrick Law Olmsted which wavers
between the hysteric’s and the university discourse. The Garden City movement
of Ebenezer Howard will mark the beginning of the dominance of the university
discourse. Le Corbusier and CIAM (Congrès internationaux d'architecture
moderne) are shown to be clearly within the university discourse. However, all of
these movements and writers begin their response from the hysteric’s position,
then seek to situate themselves in the university discourse. The following chapter
will discuss Jane Jacobs, who also briefly begins from the hysteric’s position, but
immediately positions herself in the analyst’s discourse. The purpose of
theorizing this history through Lacan’s four discourses is to provide an original
interpretation of this oft-citied history. This will also show these movements and
writers take the city as a problem of the Other’s (the city’s) desire. This analysis
also demonstrates that, though Olmsted and Howard are usually seen in stark
contrast to Le Corbusier and CIAM, they share many similarities. In the following
chapter, Jane Jacobs will be positioned within the discourse of the analysts,
which helps to explain why she is, rightly, held in such high regard.
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Lacan’s Four Discourses
The four discourses are those of the master, the university, the analyst, and the
hysteric.1 The word ‘discourse’ here has a specific meaning and, while similar,
should not be conflated with Foucault’s notion of discourse.2 Each of these
discourses can be thought of as “that kind of social bond which we will call a
social agreement.”3 These discourses concern “life as such, the life we live [i.e.
‘everyday life’] … we’re aware of it all the time [but] it’s a question of thought, of
seeing life as a concept.”4 They are theories of the intersubjective relationships
that occur in society. The master’s discourse is primary and each subsequent
discourse is formulated by a quarter turn counter-clockwise. They are
represented as follows:
Master’s !

!



University !



!

Analyst’s !



!

Hysteric’s



In each of the four discourses, the four positions (Agent, Other, Product/loss, and
Truth) remain in these locations:
A
–
T

O
–
P

1

Lacan discusses the four discourses in Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book
XVII, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007); and
in Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits
of Love and Knowledge, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999). The presentation of
the four discourses here also borrows from Bruce Fink, “The Four Discourses” in The Lacanian
Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995),
129–137.
2

Foucault’s concept of discursive regimes refers to particular social arrangements that determine
what, and in which circumstances, certain things can be said or asked, while others literally
cannot. See: Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans, A.M. Sheridan Smith
(London: Routledge, 2002).
3

Jacques Lacan Parle (extracts from a lecture at l’université Catholique de Louvain, Oct 13
1972). Directed by François Wolff (Brussels: Radio-Television Belge de la Communaute
Française, 1982). Translated as “Lacan Speaks,” subtitles by John Forrester.
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However, in The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan identifies the four positions
as:5
desire!!
–––––!!
truth! !

Other
–––––
loss

And later in the same seminar:6
agent ¯!
––––– !
truth! !

work
–––––––––
production

As we go through each of the four discourses, it will become clear why ‘product’
and ‘loss’ are somewhat interchangeable (or at least intimately connected) and
why ‘agent’ takes the place of ‘desire’ and ‘work’ takes the place of ‘other.’ The
meaning of each of the four concepts that occupy the four positions ($, ¨, ©, )
change slightly depending on their position and their relation. Generally, though,
$ is the barred subject, ¨ is the master signifier, © is another signifier or
knowledge, and  is objet petit a, the ‘little other,’ the object-cause of desire.
While it seems the top left position is the ‘dominant’ position of each discourse, in
all discourses “it is always the one up here on the right [top right] that does the
work – and thus gets the truth to emerge.” 7 So, while each discourse is named
after the ‘primary position’ (top left), it is that which is Other that is most
important, which is yet another example of how Lacan’s theory is a social theory.

5

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 93.

6

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 169.

7

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 105.
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Master’s Discourse


In the master’s discourse, we see  (the master) in the position of the

!

agent with  (slave/knowledge) as its Other. The product of this relation is 
(objet petit a), the truth of which is  (the barred subject).  (the master) is a
nonsensical signifier; it holds great power without reason or justification. The
master’s discourse is best exemplified in the (lack of) justification in the ‘reason,’
“because I said so!” (which is addressed to ). Borrowing from Hegel’s ‘masterslave dialectic,’  comes to mean ‘knowledge’ by virtue of its position as the
slave. For Hegel, the slave’s work for the master results in the slave learning
‘something,’ which Lacan calls knowledge.8 In the work the slave does for the
master, a ‘surplus’ is produced: . Fink suggests that, taking the master as the
capitalist and the slave as the worker,  represents ‘surplus value’ the capitalist
‘steals’ from the worker.9 This ‘surplus’ can also be thought of as jouissance,
which the master ‘steals’ from the slave. Lacan also refers to this ‘product’ as the
master’s “tithe.”10 The truth of the master’s discourse is that the master, like all
subjects, is a barred subject: . That is, all subjects are barred insofar as they are
known to themselves only through language, language being radically Other.
(This ‘bar’ also occurs through alienation with the ‘specular image’ as outlined in
the previous chapter.) Thus, the truth of the master’s discourse is that the
master’s power is a sham.
!

In The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan makes this reference to Marx

and the connection between surplus value and jouissance. He also tells us that
the master’s discourse is “all philosophy ever talks about.”11 The knowledge in
8

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 21.

9

Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 131.

10

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 80.

11

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 20.
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question here (represented as ©) is ‘know-how’ (savoir-faire). Getting this knowhow into the position of the master is what defines epistemes.12 Lacan refers to
Plato’s Meno in which the slave boy is shown to have the knowledge, but in a
derisory way, essentially ‘robbing’ the slave boy of his knowledge. However,
Lacan insists that the master does not in fact really want to know, but just
“desires that things work.”13

University Discourse


!

In the university discourse, knowledge takes the position of the agent and

addresses  and seeks to rationalize or account for the surplus, here understood
as whatever is unknown to the ‘knowledge’ of . Lacan argues that the university
(philosophy, science) has always worked in the interests of the master, which is
why it holds the position of truth in this discourse. Lacan states that while the
master’s discourse was the dominant discourse for ages, the contemporary
discourse is the university.14 This is not because © is “knowledge of everything”
but “all-knowing.” 15 That is, the knowledge of university or science does not know
everything, but that it has a system (a discourse) to discover all knowledge – or
at least functions as though it does.

12

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 22.
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Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 24.
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Analyst’s Discourse


!

The analyst’s discourse puts the analyst in the position of the agent as the

cause of desire, pure desirousness: . The analyst interrogates  (the barred
subject) who in turn “coughs up” an as yet undiscovered master signifier. The
truth of this discourse is knowledge, meaning that the analyst is ‘not really’ the
cause of desire, but has only positioned himself as such through his clinical
knowledge. What the analyst produces is the “hystericization of discourse”; the
analyst ‘artificially creates’ the hysteric’s discourse.16 The “institution of the
analytic discourse … is the mainspring for transference.”17 While the analyst is
positioned as the subject supposed to know, what is “striking” is that the
analysand is given the freedom to speak as he pleases and “we recognize that
he may speak as a master, that is, as a birdbrain.”18 The product of the analyst’s
discourse is that the master’s discourse is masked (i.e. $): the master is a barred
subject too.
Hysteric’s Discourse


!

While it may appear that the hysteric’s discourse is the ‘opposite’ of the

master’s discourse, it is not. Lacan is clear that psychoanalysis and the analyst’s
discourse are what truly undermine the master’s discourse in all its guises.19 The
hysteric’s discourse, which ‘talks back’ to the master, is only seeking a new
master, whereas the analyst’s discourse disrupts the entire structure of the

16

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 33.

17

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 38.

18

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 38.

19

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 87.
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master’s discourse. It is the analyst’s discourse that teaches us the Big Other has
a body, but does not actually exist.20
!

The hysteric’s discourse as it is the one that, after the master’s discourse,

best describes urban life. It is the discourse that ‘talks back’ to the master. It is
the discourse that interrogates the master and demands it prove its right to
power. While it might appear that this would be the function of the university
discourse, the hysteric’s discourse is the literally the opposite of the university
discourse. Rather than knowledge, the agent here is the barred subject with all
its conscious and unconscious contradictions, alienations, and desires. In some
ways, it is just as nonsensical as the master it goes after! This is why , the
object/cause of desire, is positioned as the truth of this discourse. It is in the
hysteric’s discourse that the bottom right-hand side changes from ‘product’ to
‘loss.’ We see that what results in this relation is that the cracks in the master
appear – these interrogations of the master produce various schemas and
understandings: knowledge. The “hysteric’s discourse reveals the master’s
discourse’s relation to jouissance, in the sense that in it knowledge occupies the
place of jouissance.”21 The hysteric is “alienated from the master signifier” and
“refuses to make himself its body.”22 The hysteric is not the master’s slave – the
hysteric “goes on strike … doesn’t give up her knowledge.”23 While the hysteric
“unmasks … the master’s function” she does not refuse it. The hysteric is looking
for a new master and requires the master for her very speaking position. What
the hysteric “ultimately want[s] one to know is that language runs off the rails
concerning the magnitude” of his jouissance and that the Other in the discourse

20

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 66.

21

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 94.

22

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 94.

23

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 94.
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knows just what a “precious object” he is.24 “What the hysteric wants … is a
master.”25
!

These discourses reveal themselves in the film Lacan Parle.26 During a

lecture, Lacan is interrupted by a ‘situationist’ – the student walks up to Lacan’s
desk, pours his drinking water over the table, messes up his papers but does not
demand anything or seem to have any reason. As he says, he is “just making a
spectacle” to disrupt things. He tells the audience to ignore Lacan, saying he is
just a stooge for the ‘system,’ a ‘master’ trying to make miserable bourgeois lives
bearable. He says we all need to get together to overthrow this system, walk out
of the lecture, join the free lectures taking place outside, etc. Once this spectacle
is over, Lacan comments on what happened. He says that the situationist was
asking us to “close ranks,” to “form a new whole,” create a “new order … the
order of the discourse of the master, since ‘master’ is the very term which
organization implies.” Lacan admits there can be a lot of progress by doing such
things “if we call that progress.” Lacan points out the fundamental paradox of this
type of activism: in trying to achieve a new whole, one ignores the “volonté
subjective” (the will of the subject) which “can only manifest itself through its own
division” and that is not “the achievement of total harmony.” He goes on to say
that the situationist’s “appeal to him [Lacan] was love … it’s love preaching to
you.” Lacan exhibits his horror: “if we were all like that, all together, loving each
other … mon dieu! Fuck!”
!

Why is this so horrifying to Lacan? Because it implies the university

discourse in which things will be resolved “in terms of mechanics, ballistics,
equilibria, currents and the more we understand the better.” It implies that we will
be like “products, a certain type of individual who will fit in with everyone and
everything.” This notion is contrary to experience which clearly shows that there
24

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 34. Lacan is purposefully playing with the gendered
pronouns. Women do not have a monopoly on the position of the hysteric.
25

Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 129.

26

Jacques Lacan Parle. All quotations in this paragraph are from this film.

!

Chapter 3!

144

is only “one language,” the language we have all grown up with, the one we were
taught at an early age that is “full of contradictions and confused reality.” Love
turns on this, that “vibrant call to that union with … what? Something alienating.”
The situationist was speaking as though he could “awaken” us from confusion,
but forgetting that these confusions and contradictions are essential to life.

The Four Discourses and Contemporary Urban Life
These four discourses help us to examine various instances of everyday urban
life as well as consider how subjects and groups seek to position themselves as
particular agents, and how they position those they deem to be other to them.
Currently, there seem to be many instances in which some agents position
themselves as a type of ‘analyst’ by embodying pure desirousness (e.g. spaces
of nightclubs, marketing). In the debates surrounding urban planning and land
use, local government may not be so much in the position of the master than in
the act of appropriating the university discourse by arguing what is ‘logically
best,’ based on ‘data’ and the sudden interest in ‘open data.’27 The opposition to
‘urban planning’ (as university discourse) could be the hysteric’s, analyst’s, or
even a ‘return’ to the master’s discourse. Similarly, opposition to an urban form
based on the master’s discourse could be situated within the university’s,
hysteric’s, or analyst’s discourse. These resistances are dependent on how the
subject positions that which he or she resists. However, these resistances will
vary in their success since, for example, the hysteric is, in fact, demanding a new
master and the university discourse works to prop up the old master.
!

Some of the most interesting spaces of the city are of the analyst’s

discourse – whatever is riddled with the unconscious and structure of desire
(unintended consequences/uses of spaces, the ‘backstage’ areas). The analyst’s
27

‘Open data’ refers to the recent movement in which governments and organizations make
available to the public the data they collect. This data is usually that which mathematical formulae
produce, such as the frequency and location of emergency services calls or public transit
schedules.
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discourse also helps to explain the urban flâneur since his or her wanderings and
explorations of the city is a method for provoking the city to ‘cough up’ something.
Or would the flâneur be some ironic master, since the flâneur goes where he
goes because that is where he goes? What is the discourse of the shopper? Or
the window shopper? Would the city’s discourse be the analyst’s insofar as it
embodies pure desirousness? Or is it of the master’s or university discourse?
Again, it depends on how the subject or others position it. For example, ‘NIMBY,’
the pejorative acronym (Not In My Back Yard) which is directed a person or group
who appear to accept the need for a particular building or some infrastructure but
do not want it near their residences. Examples which we would be sympathetic to
residents would be a garbage dump or a sewage plant, but planners and the
larger population have less sympathy for NIMBYs opposing, for example,
shelters for those suffering domestic violence. There are other similar pejoratives,
such as BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything (or
Anyone)), which refers to groups that oppose nearly every proposed
development, and the even more sardonic NOPE (Not On Planet Earth). When
planners and the larger population deploy terms like “NIMBY,” planners are
seeking to position themselves as the rational agent of knowledge within the
university discourse and their opponents as hysterics. Another example: when a
person or group insist on a politically correct ‘community,’ such as those who
desire well designed parks, children’s playgrounds, ‘off leash’ areas for dogs, and
farmers’ markets, but do nothing to address problems of, for example, housing or
income inequality. We can understand them as partaking in the hysteric’s
discourse because they take the city as master in their assumption that these
things (farmers’ market, etc.) are a good in themselves, require no justification,
but only a new master to organize and protect these features. Who could
possibly be opposed to ‘community’?
!

While these four discourses can help us interpret various things in

contemporary urban life, they will also help us understand important movements
in the history of urban planning, with particular regard for how these movements
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played out in Toronto. I will not be providing an exhaustive account of the history
of urban planning. Instead, I will focus on the movements and planners that have
influenced contemporary Toronto, and I will be explaining this history mainly
through Lacan’s four discourses. That is, I will be arguing that the early history of
urban planning represents the rotation from the discourse of the master to that of
the university by way of the hysteric. I will be focusing on the role of desire
insofar as certain desires are ‘materialized’ in various urban planning schemes
whereas other plans are meant to teach the population what to desire.

Toronto: From the Master’s to the University Discourse
Contemporary Toronto, known officially as the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), is
comprised of an older ‘downtown’ core with residential and commercial areas
well beyond this ‘core.’ Some of these are now known as ‘inner suburbs’ and
further out as ‘suburbs.’ Like many cities, Toronto’s area grew as an outward
sprawl but Toronto (then York) incorporated smaller villages that once lay at its
outskirts. This shape of the city is mostly defined by events from the late 1800s to
the present. However, a brief history from the founding of York in 1793 to the late
1800s shows how its growth and development is of the master’s discourse and
university discourse.
Master’s Discourse


!

Prior to modernist urban planning, there were only a few attempts to

design a city on paper and then build following these plans. Most cities
developed without any overarching plan: someone would build one thing here,
and another something else over there. In the “master’s discourse”, the master
() is a nonsensical signifier that gains its authority and power without any
particular reason (“because I said so!”). And, as Žižek explains, the Master
Signifier refers to the “dogmatic stupidity of the signifier”: the word means what it
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means because that is what it means! Similarly, cities prior to modernist planning
were arranged in the way they were because they were arranged in the way they
were. Sometimes these old cities are described as ‘growing organically,’ meaning
they grew the way they did because that’s how they grow… It is this ‘knowledge’
of the city that is received/addressed to ©.
!

In the master’s discourse,  (or objet petit a), represents the loss/product

of the master. In cities which developed without a ‘master’ plan, we encounter a
strange phenomenon: either no desire is expressed or desire is all that is
expressed; that is, the cities are developed based on a plethora of desires (I want
to build over here) or with a loss of desire (there is no expressed desire
accounted for the development of the city as a whole – there is no plan that
would contain that particular desire).
!

The product or truth of the master’s discourse is $, the barred subject or

the truth that the master is itself ‘barred,’ caught up in language, and does not
have a direct relationship to authority. The truth of these old cities is that their
arrangement without plan is not natural or ‘organic,’ but contains a multitude of
problematic reasonings and, most importantly, contains many problems. On
investigation, there is nothing natural or absolute about these city’s
arrangements. In fact, quite the opposite: their arrangement is arbitrary.
!

As noted in chapter one, John Graves Simcoe ‘founded’ the town of York

just west of the Don River at the shore of Lake Ontario, established a ten-block
town site, and created a few of the streets that still remain: Queen Street (then
Lot Street), Yonge Street, and Dundas Street to name a few. Most important for
the contemporary shape of Toronto was Lot Street. Shortly after Simcoe’s arrival
surveyors marked the township line of York and Victoria Counties which is now
Victoria Park Avenue. A line was created straight to Lake Ontario, then another
line was created at 90 degrees and this became Lot Street. On the north side of
Lot Street were residential lots, on the south were industrial or commercial lots.
Each lot was one acre. The only remaining original lot is the area that is now
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Grange Park, the Ontario College of Art and Design University, and the Art
Gallery of Ontario, bordered by Queen, McCaul, Dundas and Beverley Streets.
All the other lots were subdivided by the respective landowners. Though only one
original lot remains, this basic grid formation of Lot Street and its lots created the
template for further gridded street and lot formations.
!

During the early 1800’s, enterprises were mostly situated along what is

now King Street and most of the residential areas were just to the north. Various
villages were established just north of Bloor Street and further north as well. The
City of Toronto incorporated in 1834 with a population of roughly 9000, mainly
because a wave of British immigrants arrived in the 1820s and early 1830s and a
better administrative system was needed. In 1841, Toronto lost its reason for
existence: with the union of Upper and Lower Canada, it was no longer the
capital of Upper Canada, and it was no longer needed as a military outpost. At
this time, Toronto would have been recognizable to Simcoe since it was pretty
much the same, only larger, and with some houses north of Queen Street. The
City occupied the area from the Gooderham and Worts Distillery in the east to
just beyond the Garrison in the west, between the lake and Queen Street. At this
time, people still felt the effects of the recession that sparked the Rebellion.
Government invested money to help the economy along, giving Toronto better
roads, a jail, a new city hall, and gas-lit streets. The Ontario University was built
and opened in 1843. In the 1850s, Gooderham and Worts started the first bank
and others followed. Many businesses were established and were successful:
Christie’s bakery, Heintzman’s piano factory, and many mills, publishers,
steamship builders, and furniture builders. By 1860, Toronto had radically
changed. The shore of Lake Ontario was dominated by warehouses and tracks
and a terminal for three rail lines. In 1841, Toronto’s population was 14,000; by
1867, the year of Confederation, it was 50,000.28

28

William Dendy and William Kilbourn, Toronto Observed: Its Architecture, Patrons, and History
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), 41.
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While this is a fairly substantial growth of population, by 1901 Toronto had

235,000 people. During the 1880s, the physical size of the city doubled as it
annexed and incorporated the villages of Riverdale, Yorkville, the Annex, Seaton
Village, Brockton, and Parkdale. Between 1871 and 1891, the number of
factories increased five times from 500 to 2,500 and the industrial workforce grew
from 9400 to 26,000. All of this development occurred while the economy was in
recession roughly between 1873 to 1895.29
!

It was during these last two decades, especially the last decade, of the

1800s that many of the houses and buildings that still remain were built. Just
about every “old house” from Dupont south was built during the 1880s and
1890s. This makes it rather easy for the amateur architectural enthusiast to
answer “When was that house built?” Nine times out of ten, “around 1890” would
be the correct answer. These houses range from the “Bay-n-Gables” prevalent
throughout Toronto (and are unique to Toronto) to the larger homes of the Annex
and Rosedale.30 As we will see, town planning and home building was intimately
connected to morality and this was obvious at the time. The pre-eminent property
owner and builder of the late 1800s was Alexander Manning, who was also an
alderman and mayor. Perhaps most famously, he built the Hospital for Incurables
(later known as “the lunatic asylum,” now officially The Centre for Addiction and
Mental Health, or more commonly as “the place that used to be called the ‘lunatic
asylum’”). Manning was also the president of a brewing company and so his
political career came to an end with the temperance movement in 1886. He lost
to a reformer, William Holmes Howland, who promised, as mayor, to usher in a
new era of the now-infamous “Toronto the Good.”31 Howland took up many
causes, from providing clean drinking water to improving housing for the poor to
stopping the incarceration of drunks. He and the city’s first Medical Health Officer,
29

Dendy and Kilbourn, Toronto Observed, 94.

30

‘Bay-n-Gable’ is a style of row-house that are distinctive to Toronto. See Patricia McHugh,
Toronto Architecture: A City Guide (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985), 16–17, 211.
31

For humorous and self-depreciating account of “Toronto the Good,” see: C.S. Clark, Of Toronto
the Good: The Queen City of Canada As It Is (Montreal: The Toronto Publishing Company, 1898).
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Dr. William Canniff, struggled unsuccessfully to bring sanitary garbage disposal,
proper sewage treatment, and clean drinking water to the city. Howland was only
mayor for two years before stress and exhaustion caused him to retire (and he
died six years later at age 49). However, historians credit Howland with creating
“an expectation among the citizenry – which grew and lasted – that Toronto’s
civic administration should actively intervene to promote the welfare of all its
people.”32
!

Also during the last fifteen or so years of the 1800s, the Toronto Public

Library began, a proper City Hall was built (and still remains as “Old City Hall” at
Bay and Queen),33 two large high schools (one on Jarvis, the other in Parkdale)
were built, and Upper Canada College was built in 1891 (and still remains at that
site). And, innumerable churches sprang up in the 1880s and 1890s.
!

So, what is important to recognize is that much of contemporary Toronto

was built in the last two decades of the 1800s. It is during this time that London,
England, was developing a number of “solutions” to the problems of overcrowded
industrial towns and cities. Fredrick Engels’ The Condition of the Working Class
in England in 1844 was likely the first to address the terrible living conditions of
the working class. It gives minute detail to the deplorable conditions of the
proletariat – overcrowding, lack of sewers or clean water, hardship, disease, etc.
The infamous 1848 Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels even spoke of
“gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country.”
!

However, nearly everyone agreed at this time that the city was a site of

evil, and for the most part, they were right. Factories that produced polluting air
and other waste were built where people were living, and often homes for the
factories’ workers were built beside the factory. Little if any thought was given to
the general well-being of the workers. Meanwhile, most streets were not paved.
32
33

Dendy and Kilbourn, Toronto Observed, 97.

Old City Hall was never completed. One need only glance at the room that was once the
Council Chambers to see this: there are large panels on the walls that were meant to be portraits
and artwork but remain blank.
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Horses were the main mode of transportation, and the amount of horse shit on
the streets was overwhelming. Since nearly no one had a toilet, human shit was
dumped in the streets’ gutters. While many dreamed of fleeing the city, and
doctors often ‘prescribed’ that women be sent to the country for a few days or
weeks to regain their health, the city was also the location of both economic and
social relations. This fact meant that simply leaving the city was not a viable
solution, thus bringing some of the country into the city was thought to be a
practical solution.34
!

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, a variety of social reform

groups organized, some of which felt the working class deserved more, others
felt the working classes’ conditions were their own fault. Some advocated
different living arrangements while others argued for stricter morals, including the
beginnings of ‘temperance’ movements. While some improvements were made in
terms of sanitation and clean water, the main response to these problems was to
build more parks within the city.
!

This new parks movement was largely based on and inspired by Louis XIV

and his Versailles compound. Versailles’ gardens brought a ‘balance’ of nature
and society since the gardens are full of plants and flowers but ‘tamed’ or
‘domesticated,’ controlled and purposefully designed. It served as ‘the’ example
of a new form of nature, one which is not full of rot, decay, and destruction, but
one marked by order, beauty, and pleasure. So, in 1844, Liverpool hired Joseph
Paxton to make Birkenhead Park and the following year Victoria Park in London,
England was created (expanded in 1872). It was during this time that Napoleon
III appointed Haussmann to re-arrange Paris with wide boulevards. Paris had
grown like many European cities – a maze of streets with little planning. Henry IV
with his Bourbon dynasty in 1589 tried to impose some building codes, but these
plans were lost to the ‘natural’ growth of the urban maze. With extremely high
34

Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motors, argued “We will solve the City Problem by leaving the
City” (sic): Henry Ford, “The Modern City – A Pestiferous Growth,” in Ford Ideals: Being a
Selection from Mr. Ford's Page in the Dearborn Independent (Dearborn Michigan: Dearborn
Publication Company, 1922). Retrieved from: http://archive.org/details/fordidealsbeings00fordiala
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densities, and overcrowding, along with narrow streets, it was believed to allow
crime to escalate and contribute, in part, to the success of the French Revolution.
When Napoleon III took power, he wanted the city’s streets to be cleared of
people to make it less safe for revolutionaries and large boulevards for his
military to cut down urban rebels. Along with this defensible space, he wanted to
create a legacy for himself.35 Napoleon appointed Haussmann in the late 1840s
to enact these ideas over the 1850s. He evicted thousands from their homes,
overtook parks, tore down landmarks, and spent four times the total budget of
Paris to build the wide boulevards and new buildings to line these ‘streets.’ The
results were ‘monumental’ streets with little life on them.36
!

Though not as ‘organic’ as the growth of early cities, Simcoe’s founding

act is largely of the master’s discourse. While he did design and establish a basic
grid pattern (of the university discourse, not simply because since grids rely on
rational calculation, but because grids represent – if not materialize – a
systematized knowledge), it was an arrangement of the master’s discourse for
two reasons. The grid and established town were set with little reason, coupled
with the fact that the grid was large and mostly unplanned, suggest that he was
relying on others to do with the land what they will. That is, he was allowing the
town, within the large grid, to grow and develop however people wished. And that
is largely what it did, giving rise to the problems that the university discourse
seeks to solve: overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, spreading of disease, etc.
!

The important events and practices of the end of the nineteenth century in

Toronto reflect a slow shift from the master’s to the university discourse. It is a
slow shift. The rotation from the master’s to the university discourse is also a
result of declaring ‘too much’ to the problems that arise in these cities of the
35

Marx famously describes the reign of Napoleon I as “tragedy” while the repetition of his
nephew’s reign (Napoleon III) as “farce.” See: Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, second edition, ed. David McLellan (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 300.
36

Historical dates from the “Commentators’ Introduction” in Ebenezer Howard, To-morrow: A
Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy &
Colin Ward (New York: Routledge, 2003).
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master’s discourse. There had always been problems of crowding, sanitation,
disease, etc., but they eventually reached an intensity or a limit that could no
longer be accepted. This declaration of a limit is what guides the rotation toward,
and response from, the university discourse.37 One of the central figures in this
gradual shift is Frederick Law Olmsted, the main advocate for the parks
movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The Parks Movement
Hysteric’s Discourse

University Discourse





Beginning in the late nineteenth century, various ideas and plans were created
(some of which I have outlined above) in response to these “nonsensical” cities.
These responses include the parks movement, Howard’s Garden Cities
movement, Le Corbusier’s plans, and the aims of CIAM. These responses and
plans can be understood as functioning with the ‘university discourse.’ Olmsted,
however, wavers between the discourse of the hysteric and that of the university.
In the university discourse, the position of the agent is taken by knowledge (),
which address : the surplus/loss of desire. Urban planning seeks to position
itself as operating purely on knowledge and tries to account for the excesses of
previous cities, why people built where they did, and to make up for the lack of an
articulated desire of how the whole city would be built. The product/loss in the
university discourse is $, the barred subject or the lack of pure signification (no
direct connection between signified and signifier); the knowledge of the university
discourse is not, in fact, objective and all-knowing, but is rather caught up with

37

In chapter 1 we saw sixteenth and seventeenth century designs for a city, but these were
largely a ‘frill’ or a ‘philosophical exercise.’ I would suggest that the industrial city of the eighteenth
century gave rise to thinking of the city as a problem, and aside from the problems of sanitation
and living conditions, the problem was that of enjoyment. Hence the proposals for parks – spaces
of enjoyment.
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the lack inherent in language38 so that claims to truth expressed in language
cannot be truth, and, moreover, the university discourse (as will the other
discourses) are entangled in unconscious desires that cannot be calculated
away. Put another way, all these responses to the old ‘master’ cities and the
plans for new arrangements all share a common feature: failure. Degrees of
failure, to be sure, but none live up to the promise of its ‘all-knowing’ knowledge.
The authors of these responses and plans are barred subjects with their own
lacks, deficiencies, failures, etc. While presented as objectively true responses
and plans, they were caught in language and do not have direct access to the
truth. How can we understand the ‘truth’ of the university discourse as  (the
master) in these responses and plans to the old ‘master’ cities? Lacan argues
that the truth of the university discourse is the master because all the knowledge
the university discourse produces actually props up the master. It does not
appear that these responses and plans actually work to prop up the old master
cities. Perhaps, though, the ‘truth’ is the city itself – that the responses and plans
share the theme of wanting something very ‘uncity like,’ a clean arrangement
without the messy, chaotic order that is inherent to cities. But the truth is that
these plans, with clear lines and rationalism, are a sham and the actual result will
be a ‘return’ of the chaotic messiness, a return of the city proper.
!

Perhaps the most well-known advocate for parks within existing cities was

Frederick Law Olmsted, who designed and created Central Park in New York
City. His son, Frederick Law Olmsted Jr., started the first school of urban
planning, known then as Landscape Architecture, at Harvard in 1900.39 Currently,
Olmsted’s largest influence is on the ‘Landscape Urbanism’ movement headed
by Charles Waldheim. The first major event to define contemporary Landscape
Urbanism was a conference in Chicago in April 1997, while this movement’s work

38

This inherent lack in language is shown in Figure 5, Graph One, explained in the previous
chapter.
39

Anthony Alofsin, The Struggle for Modernism: Architecture, Landscape Architecture, and City
Planning at Harvard (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 23.
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is well documented in an issue of a journal40 and a collection of essays.41 The
general thesis of Landscape Urbanism is that cities ought to be designed and
defined by their landscapes, not the architecture of its built form.42

Lewis

Mumford credits Olmsted spearheading the movement to “re-ruralize the town”
by planning and developing a new form of park: one that does not over-sculpt the
land, nor consist of “vain architectural embellishment,” and instead make heavy
use of native flowers and shrubs.43 P.D. Smith’s expansive account of the history
of cities also characterizes Olmsted as early proponent and builder of the “classic
garden suburb.”44
!

On February 25, 1870, Olmsted presented a paper to the American Social

Science Association at the Lowell Institute in Boston, which he called “Public
Parks and the Enlargement of Towns.”45 In this paper, Olmsted provides an
interesting analysis of the relationship between town and country in America and
who wants and does not want to live in the country.
!

Olmsted begins by arguing that very few people in America want to live in

the country. Olmsted cannot fathom how anyone would want to live in these “halfequipped cities” while thousands of acres of farmable land and “the finest forests
in the world” go undesired.46 This is evidenced by the “women and girls arriving
by the score” at train stations to visit the city during the day and returning to
farms in the evening.47 The attraction to the cities is not difficult to comprehend:
more services, stores, social connections, better chances of employment.
40

Charles Waldheim, et. al. Landscape Urbanism – Kerb 15 (Melbourne: RMIT Press, 2007).

41

Charles Waldheim, The Landscape Urbanism Reader (New York: Princeton Architectural
Press, 2006).
42

Waldheim, The Landscape Urbanism Reader, 108.
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Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1938), 219.
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P.D. Smith, City: A Guidebook for the Urban Age (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 154.
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Olmsted even tells us that rural housewives complain about their servants – only
the poorest will work as servants in the country and, as soon as they can save
some money, will move back to the city.
!

Olmsted is not convinced that the population’s “strong drift townward” is a

“moral epidemic.”48 Rather, he sees this movement of urbanization as “human
progress” and it is “more rational to prepare for a continued rising of the
townward flood” than to expect it to subside.49 Olmsted’s concern is that the land
of towns is being divided up and sold or given away with little thought. He
proposes that public parks be established so that these rapidly growing towns will
have some green space.
!

Interestingly, Olmsted argues that it is women who are the cause of this

movement toward towns: “we all recognize that the tastes and dispositions of
women are more and more potent in shaping the course of civilized progress,
and we may see that women are even more susceptible to this townward shift
than men.”50 He argues that many men will give up his residence in the country
for a smaller home in a town out of consideration for their wives and daughters.
His reasoning is that women can find many more educational opportunities,
services, and life in towns than in the country. And, because of the people,
lighting, and infrastructure, it is cleaner and safer.
!

While Olmsted agrees that towns offer a wide variety of advantages, he

nonetheless marks a limit with the possibility of “an unhealthy density of
population.”51 He does not give a specific number, but instead states “the
advantages of civilization can be found illustrated and demonstrated under not
other circumstances so completely as in some suburban neighborhoods,” where
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houses are spaced “fifty to a hundred feet or more” from each other.52 Olmsted
inserts the argument that “man’s enjoyment of rural beauty has clearly increased
rather than diminished with his advance in civilization.”53 There is no reason
given or any explanation of this claim. What could he have meant? It appears
that Olmsted assumes that the ‘rural’ is the ‘natural’ place for humanity. This
assumption follows a long tradition of philosophy that sees man pulled from his
‘natural’ habitat within nature toward groupings with other people in villages,
towns, and cities. In other words, man is meant to live alone within nature, but
necessity pulls him toward living with other people.
!

Montesquieu discussed the problem of ‘nature vs. society’ in ‘Myth of the

Troglodytes,’ in which people were bound by necessity to leave their solitary
existence and forced to come together for mutual protection.54

Hobbes

articulated this with his account of the ‘state of nature’ (“solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short”) to show the necessity of creating a state to extend the life of
each person – and their betterment.55 This gives us the concept of ‘civilization.’
Rousseau’s arguments on nature and society, however, are closer to Olmsted
(and, we will see, many others in the town planning canon). Rousseau insisted
that man was at his best before any social groupings or state formations. He
was, literally, a radical conservative.56
!

In any case, Olmsted finds that the only problems with these new suburbs

are the loss of time, inconvenience, and expense of traveling between suburb
and town, and so he proposes a “cheap and enjoyable method of conveyance”
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as the solution. Once this is in place, suburbs ought to be “indefinitely
extended.”57 It needs to be emphasized that the only problem with suburbs for
Olmsted is the difficulty of movement to the main city and back to the suburbs.
Though he has spent considerable time explaining the draw of the city, he seems
unable to even imagine that someone might choose to live in the city. However,
he does envision each suburban train station becoming its own quasi-town with
services and shops. This idea is nearly identical to the recent movement ‘transit
oriented development’ (TOD).58 Olmsted is suggesting a ‘balance’ of town and
country – towns just large enough to provide urban amenities and small enough
to retain the benefits of the country (fresh air, nature, etc.). This is clearly a
foreshadowing of Howard’s Garden Cities.
!

While Olmsted is certain that the enlargement of towns will continue

unabated and contribute to the advancement of civilization, he also warns us that
these large cities do have, and will increase, the death-rate, disease, crime, and
all the other “special evils” a city brings.59 He points to foul air in dense towns. He
also highlights the loss of sociability in towns – the need to carefully walk so as to
not bump into people and the indifference of people to each other. This
“unfriendly” or “hardening” means of interaction has become so common that
townspeople are not conscious of it.60
!

Since Olmsted is resigned to the fact that towns and cities will continue to

expand, both in population and in the “distance from the interior to the
circumference of towns,” and that people ought to live in these suburban
‘villages,’ he argues that roads and sidewalks of the main town need to be made
sufficiently wide to accommodate this back-and-forth traffic and for an abundance
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of trees.61 One can imagine his ideal street plan: wide road (perhaps 200 feet
wide), space from road to sidewalk for trees, with houses set far back on the lot
to accommodate even more trees.62
!

Olmsted finally gets to the main topic of his talk – public parks. He begins

by stating that there is a particular “evil to which men are specially liable when
living in towns” and this evil will become aggravated in the future since these
towns are becoming larger and contain more and more people.63 The ‘evil’
Olmsted is referring to are the conditions that corrupt and irritate both the body
and the mind, which he simply names as “bad air.”64 Just as then-modern houses
had ‘parlours’ for a family to spend evenings together, he argues that a town
ought to have areas separate from dwelling and commerce. These separate
areas would need to provide recreation that would either “stimulate exertion on
any part or parts needing it” or “cause us to receive pleasure without conscious
exertion.”65 The former Olmsted terms “exertive,” the latter he terms “receptive.”66
He then further subdivides “receptive recreation” into “gregarious” and
“neighborly.” “Gregarious” recreation is that “looked upon by New England
society as childish and savage” because it involves little intellectual activity.67
Oddly, Olmsted’s example of this “gregarious recreation” is a moment when
people come together in public parks for no other reason than to be with other
people. An individual, just by adding “his presence,” adds “to the pleasure of all”
gathered.68 Olmsted finds this type of gathering to be a “good thing” for all
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involved as it gives each person a sense of “light-heartedness.”69 Thus, such
public parks ought to be included when planning the extension of towns.
!

Olmsted’s observation that people enjoy coming to places with other

people has been ‘rediscovered’ by contemporary urban planners and theorists.
Holly Whyte finds that people are attracted to other people.70 Jan Gehl’s entire
urban planning philosophy is based on the simple, but unfortunately radical
principle that urban spaces ought to be designed for people because it is people
that make an area vibrant and successful.
!

How Olmsted describes “neighborly receptive recreation” is very similar to

how Jane Jacobs describes a bustling sidewalk: children playing among adults
conversing, with nothing being too extravagant or outlandish, but also not tired or
unkempt. However, Olmsted is much more hysterical and paints the picture much
darker than Jane Jacobs (as we will see in the following chapter): people sitting
on doorsteps, rows of men sitting on the curb with their feet in the gutter,
‘anxious’ mothers concerned about their children playing among the strangers,
and the “noisy wheels on the pavement.”71 He also describes young men
lounging on and obstructing sidewalks, men who have no respect for anyone
who passes by, men who will go into nearby basements “where they find others
of their sort, see, hear, smell, drink, and eat all manner of vile things.”72
!

It might seem obvious that Olmsted’s solution to these problems is the

creation public parks. These public parks must be part of what is fairly new at the
time – plans for a town on a large scale. Were a town allowed to grow slowly and
incrementally based on the wishes of independent developers (that is, the cities
of the master’s discourse), Olmsted argues they would not set aside land for
public parks. Instead, assuming the university discourse, he insists the local
69
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government or administration needs to establish a larger ‘master plan’ that would
include public parks. Indeed, the hysteric demands a new ‘master.’
!

Olmsted describes these public parks as being a place where a husband

can meet his family when he is done work to have a picnic in the evening near a
brook. People would bring musical instruments, tables, seats, and objects to
provide shade. These would be a “pleasing rural prospect … unbroken by a
carriage road or the slightest evidence of the vicinity of the town.”73 Where
Olmsted has witnessed such parks and gatherings, he claims to “have never
seen such joyous collections of people,” including “tears of gratitude in the eyes
of poor women as they watched their children enjoying themselves.”74
!

These public spaces are parks, places where people hear or feel “nothing

of the bustle and jar of the streets, where they shall … find the city put far away
from them. We want the greatest possible contrast with the streets and the shops
and the rooms of the town.”75 Olmsted tells us that he ‘wants’ a simple, broad,
and open space of “clean greensward.” 76 These parks are to have enough trees
at their edges to “completely shut out the city from our landscapes.”77 This is how
Olmsted defines the “most valuable” public space – the ‘park.’78 It is worth noting
that the etymology of ‘park’ refers to an area set aside from another area.
Contemporary usage of ‘park,’ as in ‘park the car,’ refers to placing an object in
an area set aside for a particular purpose. So, even the term ‘park,’ ensures that
it is something separate from the city itself.
!

Olmsted is quite clear in his bias toward nature: “there is no more beautiful

picture, and none can be more pleasing … than that of beautiful meadows.”79 To
73

Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22. Emphasis added.

74

Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

75

Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

76

Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

77

Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

78

Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 22.

79

Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns,” 23.

!

Chapter 3!

162

be fair, though, Olmsted has already spoken of the good things from ‘gregarious
recreation’ (the gathering of people), and when describing his plans for public
parks, he suggests that there ought to be a “promenade” at the edge, though he
ensures we understand that its purpose is significantly different than the
“greensward” of the park proper. The promenade is for people to watch
“congregated human life under glorious and necessarily artificial conditions.”80
!

Olmsted, within the university discourse, props up the cities of the

master’s discourse when he states that the “park should, as far as possible,
complement the town.”81 He is referring to his ideal park as being “rugged” with
“abrupt eminences” rather than being “picturesque”: “Openness is the one thing
you cannot get in buildings. Picturesqueness you can get. Let your buildings be
as picturesque as your artists can make them.”82 Nice buildings make the town
beautiful, whereas the park should be flat: meadows, prairies, green pastures
and still waters. “What we want to gain is tranquility and rest to the mind.
Mountains suggest effort.” 83
!

Furthermore, the type of park Olmsted is advocating is not the “artificial

and exotic form … [that] the French have lately introduced.”84 Interestingly, he
singles out iron fences: “the influence of iron hurdles can never be good.”85 So it
should be clear that the type of ‘park’ Olmsted is proposing is not a highly
manicured ‘landscaped’ park, but one that allows the so-called ‘natural’ features.
Here we see Olmsted resisting the university discourse and, instead, proposing a
partial return to the cities of the master’s discourse. We often term the manicured
green spaces as ‘gardens,’ those in which flowers are cultivated and arranged
symmetrically, where people are meant to stroll along particular paths without any
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expectation of games or recreation. Olmsted’s idea of a ‘park’ is what we
normally understand as a ‘park’ – open space, rugged ground, ponds full of
algae, fish, turtles, etc.
!

Now, we might wonder why Olmsted is often cited as beginning the parks

movement, or why he remains influential. Olmsted designed and oversaw the
building of Central Park in New York City. In the final section of this lecture,
“Public Parks,” he gives his account of how Central Park came to be.
!

In 1851, what finally became Central Park was first proposed on the east

side of Manhattan Island. Olmsted tells us that the actual location of the park was
determined without much thought, but only by someone pointing to a map. It took
many years of public and government discussion, with much opposition from the
public. In the seventh year of discussion, the Herald newspaper ran a lead article
arguing that only the lower classes will use the park, intimidating other park
users, and that “Central Park will be nothing but a great bear-garden for the
lowest denizens of the city.”86 Olmsted implies that oppositions lasted for twelve
years, yet the mayor and local government went ahead and began building the
park anyway. Labourers worked around the clock to get the park built as quickly
as possible to avoid anyone successfully stopping it. Stating that the last four
years (i.e. 1866–1870) saw at least thirty million visits, Olmsted counts Central
Park as a success. Indeed, one could hardly imagine New York City without it.
Olmsted tells us that in these four years, women and daughters visit the park with
little incident, physicians find their patients healthier and are able to advise them
to visit the park rather than give up their business and leave the city entirely. The
success of Central Park led to further parks built in New York City and other
North American cities.
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Garden Cities
With the early parks and social reform movements, along with the rising
dominance of the university discourse, Ebenezer Howard presented his own
solution to the problem of the industrial city with the publication of To-morrow: A
Peaceful Path to Real Reform87 in 1898. This book has been extremely influential
since its publication, but not in the way Howard had hoped. While it proposes
new towns built with ample gardens, open space, and fresh air, the majority of
the book is devoted to a radical form of property ownership (hence the “Real
Reform” in the original title, dropped in subsequent publications). Rather than
garden cities, builders produced thousands of garden suburbs. In The Culture of
Cities, Lewis Mumford praises Howard for providing “statesmanlike proposals” for
a properly “balanced urban environment.”88 Mumford’s largest praise is for
Howard’s “sound sociological conception of the dynamics of rational urban
growth.”89 Unlike many other accounts of Howard’s work, Mumford ensures his
readers know of Howard’s more radical proposals concerning economic and
social arrangements. P.D. Smith gives the typical reading of Howard: the man
who began the British movement for leafy suburbs.90 Howard’s ideas, though, still
admired. Peter Hall and Colin Ward position the garden city movement as a
precursor to the contemporary discourse of sustainability.91 Hall and Ward seek
to reclaim Howard’s legacy from suburban developers and insist on the benefits
of building clusters of new towns connected by rail lines.92 I will now give a close,
if selective, reading of Howard’s original text to show how it is of the university
87
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discourse, what we have inherited from the garden city movement, and what we
have lost.
!

Howard begins To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform from the

hysteric’s position with the assumption that, no matter what political party or
“sociological opinion” anyone holds, we all agree that people should not
“continue to stream into the already over-crowded cities.”93 Underlying the
concern for overcrowding is hysterical moralizing about alcohol and the
temperance movement. By quoting some prominent people of the day about the
“evils” of London, he argues that people need to get out of the city and back into
the countryside. Howard is very clear in his assumption that people once lived
where they should (in the country) and have been misled into cities: “that
beautiful land of ours, with its canopy of sky, the air that blows upon it, the sun
that warms it, the rain and dew that moisten it – the very embodiment of Divine
love for man – is indeed a Master-Key … to pour a flood of light on the problems
of intemperance, of excessive toil, of restless anxiety, of grinding poverty.”94 The
“Master-Key” is, of course, the omniscience of the university discourse; it is that
system that claims to explain all.
!

Howard is not particularly concerned with the specifics of what drew

people into the cities, but is content to term them “attractions,” and so proposes
that new Garden Cities have their own attractions to draw people to them. This
discourse of ‘attraction’ is furthered in his famous ‘Three Magnets’ diagram
(Figure 9) (magnets attract), but it is also caught up in a discourse of desire.
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Fig. 9. The Three Magnets. No. 1. (Image from Ebenezer Howard, To-morrow: A
Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with Commentary by Peter Hall,
Dennis Hardy and Colin Ward (New York: Routledge, 2003), 24.)

!

Howard is much different than contemporary planners insofar as he

believes his proposal for new towns will respond to people’s desires, rather than
having to teach people what to desire. There are many similarities between
Howard’s Garden Cities and the contemporary “urban sustainability” movement,
but the latter spends much of its time convincing people that they want
environmental sustainability (creating the demand), whereas Howard believes
the demand is there and he is only offering ‘supply.’ One need only consider the
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amount of “consciousness raising” done by environmental protection groups such
as Greenpeace or those involved in the recent re-development in Toronto’s Don
Valley of an abandoned brick plant into the Evergreen Brick Works. It features
renovated buildings using newly established ‘sustainable’ materials, native
plants, power for electric cars, and a weekly farmers’ market. Evergreen Brick
Work’s press released and stated goals continually refer to educating the public
about, and ‘galvanizing interest’ in, sustainable urban development. They clearly
assume that there is not much interest in what they are doing, but need to teach
people why it is important. David House, the Site Development Advisor, insists
that “the world needs this kind of place – a place to understand what impact
we’re having on the rest of the environment.”95

Other Toronto-based

organizations, such as LEAF96 and Not Far from the Tree 97 spend the majority of
their time “educating the public” as to why their organization’s actions ought to be
desired. The point is simply that Howard was responding to the public’s already
established desire for more park land, whereas many contemporary
environmental groups are ‘activist’ in nature: they educate this desire.
!

As shown in the Three Magnets diagram (Figure 9), Howard makes

gestures to the need and desire for both town and country, though he has a
strong bias for the latter. He writes that neither town nor country “represent the
full plan of and purpose of nature. Human society and the beauty of nature are
meant to be enjoyed together.”98 However, Howard only states that the town is a
symbol for human society and togetherness, whereas: “And the country! The
country is the symbol of God’s love and care for man. All that we are, and all that
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we have come from it.”99 Howard’s enthusiasm for the country is partly explained
in the sexual metaphor he often provides: “The two magnets [of attractions of
town and country] must be made one. As man and women by their varied gifts
and faculties supplement each other, so should town and country.”100 Here we
see Howard suggesting the ‘attractions of the country’ are like the things that
attract men to women, and that woman is aligned with nature and beauty. It is
worth recalling masculinity’s fantasy about the illusory nature of Lacan’s ‘feminine
jouissance’ since this fantasy is aligned with Howard’s romantic notions of the
countryside.
!

Howard tells us the country is the source of everything. It provides bodies,

clothes, warmth, and shelter. It is what inspires all the arts, “its forces propel all
the wheels of industry,” all health, wealth, and knowledge.101 We might wonder,
then, why bother with cities or towns at all. Nonetheless, nature’s “fullness of joy
and wisdom has not revealed itself to man. Nor can it ever, so long as this
unholy, unnatural separation of society and nature endures. Town and country
must be married, and out of this joyous union will spring new hope, new life, a
new civilisation.”102 Again we have the sexual metaphor of town and country
‘marrying’ one another to produce a new offspring – the Garden City.
!

After these hysterical complaints of the cities of the master’s discourse, he

then seeks to situate himself within the university discourse. Howard’s idea of the
Garden City (the ‘marriage’ of town and country) was to be on 6000 acres of asyet untouched land, with 1000 acres for central core, and 5000 acres for
surrounding agricultural land. It would have a set population of 32,000. This
means that density would be around ninety to ninety-five persons per acre, which
is not quite ‘dense’ or ‘urban.’ However, Lewis Mumford, likely the most wellknown advocate for Garden Cities, argues that 90–95 persons per acre is
99
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‘compact’ and ‘urban.’ Jane Jacobs, in contrast, argues that 200 dwellings per
acre is the top end of what most people can comfortably deal with.103 The
following chapter will deal with densities in more detail, but here I will say that the
90–95 persons per acre in Howard’s plan is not what one would think of as
compact or urban. 90–95 persons per acre could resemble what we would think
of as urban, but this is dependent on a host of factors that Howard does not
address: if roads and streets ‘count’ as part of the area measured, the proposed
heights of the buildings, and whether or not this density ratio includes
employment and not only residential. Again, density ratios will be discussed more
fully in the following chapter, but we should note here why Howard proposes this
90–95 persons per acre density ratio. This ratio is what he assumes is between
the low density of the countryside and the high densities of his contemporary
industrial London. So, again, we find the marking of a limit: the countryside’s
density is too low, but the city’s is too high. And for Howard, this limit is guided by
that “Master-Key” of man’s supposed ‘natural’ relationship within nature, which he
attempts to quantify in this density ratio (again, situating himself in the university
discourse). Jacobs, as we will see, is basing her density ratios on what she
experiences on the street: suggesting that the density ratios of areas that are
successful and have diversity are the desired density ratios.
!

One of the things later planners and urbanists have praised Howard for is

that his Garden City plan was not really a ‘plan’ so much as a general idea that
would require a specific site before any specifics. Howard writes, “this plan, or if
the reader be pleased to term it, this absence of plan...” in reference to a lack of
specifics until a site acquired.104

However, Howard, implicitly seeking the

authority of the university discourse, provides many specifics about each street,
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each house, each manufacturing place, and the width of streets, stating that the
“grand boulevard to be 420 feet wide.”105 So, while it appears he is just providing
a general scheme for the inhabitants to create what they will, it is in fact highly
planned.
!

Later in the book he repeats that the town is not fully planned without a

specific site and this would be the work of many minds. In his clearest
formulation of his opposition to the cities of the master’s discourse and desire to
position himself within the university, he argues that there needs to be “a unity of
design and purpose” and that “the town should be planned as a whole, and not
left to grow up in a chaotic manner as has been the case with all English
towns.”106 Howard relies on his love of nature to make this point: “A town, like a
flower, or a tree, or an animal, should, at each stage of its growth, possess unity,
symmetry, completeness.”107 He argues that American cities are “planned” but
only “in a most inadequate sense.”108 He is referring to the grid pattern of
American cities as better than the “intricate maze of streets” found in Europe,
since it helps a person find his way around the town.109 Nonetheless there is
“little real design, and that of the crudest character.” Howard argues that these
American cities have monotony by design and do not provide a sufficient link to
nature: “this city [Washington, the streets of which he praises] is not designed
with a view of securing to its people ready access to nature, while its parks are
not central, nor are its schools and other buildings arranged in a scientific
manner.”110 So, while he praises the natural amenities, he is seeking to position
this ‘good’ type of city building within the university discourse’s claim of
systematic knowledge (the “scientific manner”).
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As further evidence of Howard’s complete dislike for cities, and the

persistence of his hysteria, he writes that it is much better to just abandon the
current city and start afresh. He does this by highlighting the problems of trying to
fix up an area of London. There was a plan to put “a new street between Holborn
and the Strand” and it was going to displace many working class people.111 To
rehouse them would be very expensive, and likely impossible to do fairly.
Howard’s point is that instead of trying to fix cities like London, it is better to start
on new, blank land: “it is obviously always easier, and usually far more
economical and completely satisfactory, to make out of fresh material a new
instrument, than to patch up and alter an old one.”112 However, what Howard
ignores are the actual conditions of the people in this area. While it may be
easier to start fresh elsewhere, it does not address the issues of the established
area in question. The actual events of what took place to put in this new street
(Kingsway, which still remains) show just how difficult it is. Many of the people
who lived here worked close by and could not, as Howard seemed to assume,
just move out to a suburb or new Garden City. The city of London had to figure
out where to move these people and keep them close to their jobs. Demolition for
the new street began in 1889 but the street was not opened until 1906.
!

In “Chapter 13” of To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, we find the

famous diagrams, which show the Garden Cities close to each other with road
and rail connecting each of them to each other. These diagrams are as famous
as they are misleading.
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Fig. 10. Group of Slumless Smokeless Cities. Diagram 7. (Image from Ebenezer
Howard, To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform, Original Edition with
Commentary by Peter Hall, Dennis Hardy and Colin Ward (New York: Routledge,
2003), 158.)

When referring to the “Group of Slumless Smokeless Cities” diagram (Figure 10)
he again reminds the reader that his plans are only general guidelines:
the reader is asked not to suppose that the design is put forward as
one likely to be strictly carried out in the form thus presented; for
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any well-planned town, and, still more, any well-planned cluster of
towns, must be carefully designed in relation to the site it is to
occupy. [This] diagram as I have here sketched may be useful, as
showing some of the broad principles which should be followed.113

While Howard ought to be commended for not planning an entire town or district
regardless of the site, it is worth noting that his “broad principles,” like the MasterKey, are of the university’s discourse. It is that same form of knowledge: the
system that claims to account for everything. So, though this “Group of Slumless
Smokeless Cities” (Figure 10) is not a site plan, it is telling how much and what
type of details are present. Perfect circles represent each ‘city,’ and the ringed
and straight roads and railroads speak to the assumption that geometrical forms,
drawn with the mathematician’s tools, are the proper way to organize life. And
while there are some necessities planned (water reservoirs and farms), the
aspects of life accounted for are rather disturbing: “home for waifs” (homeless,
usually youths), “insane asylum,” “home for inebriates” (alcoholics), “epileptic
farms,” and a “cemetery”. One wonders if these cities are where people go to
drink, lose their minds, then die.
!

Howard ends the book with a hysterical rhetorical flourish, claiming that

Garden Cities will solve just about every problem known to humankind: poverty,
work, justice, disease, suffering, saving the elderly, and even a reference to it
ending wars.
!

What I have skipped over in this brief explanation of Howard’s book are

the long and detailed passages on how the land in these Garden Cities would be
owned co-operatively and ‘rents’ would be paid by each person to the general
coffers to maintain roads, water, sewage, etc. There is also considerable detail
on how the Garden Cities would be ‘administered’ and it was much different than
democratic governance. As well, two chapters (10 and 11) are devoted to a
review of the large number of then current social reform movements. It needs to
113
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be stressed that Howard was not just proposing a type of suburb with trees and
flowers – his main concern was to provide a remedy for the social ills of the time
(hence Real Reform in the title) and he clearly shows that he is very familiar with
the various quasi-socialist co-operatives and rural colonies ideas. One-fifth of the
book is devoted to the financial aspects of Garden Cities. It is clear that his
intended audience are potential financial backers who would buy the land and
begin to build the homes, roads, and infrastructure.

From Real Reform to Leafy Suburbs
Howard’s book was largely self-financed – he published it himself and charged a
nominal fee to anyone who wanted a copy. It was very well-received.114 In less
than a year a “Garden City Association” was formed as an organization for those
who wanted to support and implement Howard’s ideas.115 Four years later,
building began on the first Garden City, Letchworth. The main architects were
Richard Unwin and Barry Parker. Welwyn was the second Garden City and
construction began just after WWI. However, neither of these cities were properly
Garden Cities. In fact, a Garden City as planned and presented in Howard’s Tomorrow was never built.
!

While many of his contemporaries liked the basic ideas in To-morrow,

those on the left critiqued it mercilessly. Leftwing British parliamentarians did not
agree with Howard’s belief that this ‘middle way’ between socialism and
capitalism would work, nor did they believe capitalists would be persuaded by
rational argument and found Howard’s ideas hopelessly utopian.116 Meanwhile,
those with the money – the book’s intended audience – slowly pushed Howard to
the sidelines as the first town was being considered. The financial backers
stripped away much of the more ‘radical’ notions of communal property, and
114
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when the book was re-published in 1902, the title was changed to Garden Cities
of To-morrow to leave out the “real reform” of the original title. Thus, when
Letchworth was built, it did not have any of the ‘contentious elements’ of the
original plan: none of the radical rent schemes, administration system, the public
services, the area reserved for agriculture, restrictions on growth and the design
layout. It seemed that Howard was content to be relegated to the position of
“ideas man” and happy to collect his portion of the profits. This, for better or
worse, would be the legacy of the Garden Cities movement. There were many
appropriations of “Garden City” as a descriptor for speculative housing
developments.
!

By 1909, the Garden City Association accepted these new ‘garden-ish’

developments as somewhat reasonable attempts to change the way planning
was done. They renamed themselves the Garden Cities and Town Planning
Association. Howard and few other devotees to the cause kept the flame alive.
After WWI they began a second experiment, Welwyn Garden City. It had a
reputation as a ‘socialist town,’ but it was not and did not contain any of the
‘radical’ notions (just like Letchworth). In 1939, the Association again changed its
name, this time to Town and Country Planning Association, dropping any
reference to ‘Garden City.’ The Town and Country Planning Association still exists
today.117
!

Prior to WWI, there was interest in Garden Cities from across Europe,

America, and Japan. Between 1910 and 1916 there were many American
developments that purported to be Garden Cities, one of which was Forest Hill
Gardens near New York City, built in 1912. In 1923, the Regional Planning
Association of America formed to promote a ‘purer form’ of Garden Cities.
Clarence Stein was the group’s leader. He and Henry Wright built Radburn, New
Jersey, which was to be a Garden City incorporating motor vehicles. The original
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plan for Radburn never materialized and it just became a leafy suburb in the late
1920s.
!

In 1945, the “Labour Administration” in England (i.e. the government),

tabled the New Towns Act (passed in 1946). As the name suggests, this Act was
to develop new towns outside London that were self-contained communities for
working and living. The main lobbyist and supporter as Frederic Osborn and the
towns were highly influenced by Garden City principles. The first was Stevenage
(built immediately after the Act passed in 1946). Eventually the Act led to twentyeight new towns built across Britain.
!

What needs to be emphasized is that no town was ever built as Howard

intended. While Letchworth and Welwyn were close to what Howard proposed,
neither of these towns incorporated the complex system of co-operative land
owning or the rent system to fund the town’s services. These two towns (along
with the twenty-eight towns built under the New Towns Act) did, however, follow
Howard’s ideas of providing each home with a front garden and a back yard,
each of these occupied by a single family. The lots were larger than found in the
nearby cities and land uses were separated. That is, there was a central area
with shopping and public space, with industries away from both the residential
and shopping areas. This basic notion of separating forms of land use is the
primary legacy of Howard’s Garden Cities plan.
!

While nearly everyone today argues in favour of ‘mixed-use’ and not

separating land use, we can easily see why Howard proposed this separation.
Again, the cities at the end of the nineteenth century were extremely dirty,
congested, overcrowded, and unpleasant. Further, unlike nearly all contemporary
town or city planners, Howard was attempting to provide for a desire, and not
seeking to ‘teach a desire.’ That is, Howard took the popularly held desire to not
simply ‘escape’ the city, but find a balance between the social and economic
relations the city provides and the seemingly ‘natural’ need for fresh air, water,
and sunlight. In this way, Howard is rare in that he is a town planner and not a
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‘pervert’ in the Lacanian sense. Recall the discussion of Lacanian fantasy in the
graph of desire explained in the previous chapter. Fantasy () is the
relationship between the barred subject and the object-cause of desire. While
fantasy does teach us what and how to desire, perversion (), the reversal of
fantasy, makes this instruction of desire paramount and imposes it on the
subject. In other words, instead of attempting to be or give what the other wants,
the subject imposes his or her own desire on the other. In Howard’s case, he
sought to provide an object that people desired instead of providing an object
that people need to be taught to desire. For the most part, anyway. His ideas for
co-operative land ownership and rent systems were, indeed, novel and fairly
radical. Thus, Howard seemed willing to give these up since that was not what
most people wanted. People wanted a nice town with air, water, and sunlight and
he was willing to compromise his ideals to give it to them.
!

Again, the unplanned cities up to the late nineteenth century fall within the

master’s discourse. These cities grew in the way they did because that is how
the city grew: the maze of streets, with buildings wherever they were built with no
overarching plan. In these early non-planned towns, the master is the “dogmatic
stupidity” of the order of the town – things are where they are because that is
where they are. It is the symbolic order; it is that dogmatic stupidity of the signifier
discussed in the previous chapter. Just as a word means what it means because
that is what it means, things in these cities are where they are because that is
where they are. In this discourse, the other is the slave or knowledge. The other
is what ‘does the work.’ In these old towns, it was, clearly, the workers and their
‘know-how’ that did the work in making the town. The product in the master’s
discourse is objet petit a, the object-cause of desire. In these old towns the
object-cause of desire is the town itself – the ‘city’ as an ephemeral object that
comes to be loved (later, nationalism), desired, romanticized, and begins to
shape the co-ordinates of the town’s subject’s desires (what can be had or done,
should be desired, etc.). The truth of the master’s discourse is that these towns
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were not organized by any authority (that is, the master), but was done arbitrarily
and without justification.
!

We can then understand Howard’s proposal for Garden Cities as the

beginning of the first rotation of the four discourses: from the master’s to the
university discourse. In the position of the agent is knowledge, where we find
Howard’s own knowledge of the city’s failings, of the previous and then current
attempts at social reform, of the system of rents and, most importantly, the
“scientific” lay-out of the proposed towns. Howard’s proposal takes the
perspective of no-perspective: his diagrams are purely abstract and rely on and
reinforce ‘scientific’ knowledge of how a town ought to be laid out, a place for
everything and everything in its place. In the university discourse, the agent
(knowledge) addresses , the surplus that its knowledge cannot account for.
Howard is addressing the surplus of the city – its apparently obvious awfulness
but nonetheless attractive (hence the overcrowding). That is, what Howard is
seeking to solve is the tension between people’s desire to live in cities and the
subsequent ‘problems’ of people living in close quarters. The barred subject () in
the university discourse is located in the lower right of the matheme (),
which, at least in The Other Side of Psychoanalysis,118 falls into the category of
‘loss.’ This means that, while Garden Cities were ostensibly planned for the
town’s inhabitants (that is, the barred subjects), the plans do not take them into
account. There is no ‘street-level’ perspective or concern for how one might live
in these Garden Cities on an everyday basis. Lacan tells us that the ‘truth’ of the
university discourse is the master because the knowledge of the university
discourse fails and works in the interests of the master.119 Howard’s Garden
Cities, while claiming to provide “real reform,” ultimately meant the continuation
of industrial capitalism without ‘too much’ of its detrimental effects. Thus, the left
at the time was highly critical of Howard’s ‘incremental’ approach or middle way
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Howard might have believed he was

providing a path to “real reform,” but his Garden Cities would not provide any
such reform, only lessen the exploitation of the working class; he was not
addressing the causes of the working class’s suffering and the ills befalling the
city.
!

Finally, I would like to stress that Howard’s Garden Cities was proposed

with the best of intentions. He barely had to ‘identify’ the problems with late
nineteenth century London (or other ‘coke towns’ of the time) because they were
so obvious; few, if any, defended these towns and cities. Howard was seeking to
provide a novel way to solve definite problems and provide something that
people desired. As explained above, many later urban planners seek to do the
opposite, and fall within Lacan’s relation of ‘perversion’ (&$). These later
planners (especially during the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first century),
unlike Howard, seek to ‘teach’ people what to desire, offering plans for towns,
cities, or neighbourhoods that no one wants.
!

The same, however, cannot be said of the actual outcome of Howard’s

proposals. The various suburbs marketed as “garden suburbs” claimed to
provide one thing but actually gave another. And the subsequent “parks
movement” was clear in its paternalistic tone: parks were not something that
many wanted, but their proponents insisted they knew what was best and would
like these parks once built.

Hystericizing the Garden City
Following some of the ideas in Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City proposal,
Raymond Unwin provides his own form of Garden City development that shows
the clear break from Howard’s more ‘radical’ ideas and what has survived:
garden suburbs. Unwin’s famous text Nothing Gained By Overcrowding! is clearly
120
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within the hysteric’s discourse, though there are a few attempts to appear within
the university discourse.121 The title’s exclamation point reveals the hysterical
position, and one might rightly ask, “Whoever argued overcrowding was good?”
He exaggerates the problem and presents his solution as self-evident.
!

Unwin repeats the common argument: with industrialization, cities grew

too quickly over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and little thought was
given to the general health of the cities or their populations. Thus, the Garden
City idea was to combine the benefits of both town and country by building a new
town based on these principles. Unwin is here proposing that the Garden City
principles can be adopted within established towns and cities with good effects.
However, though Unwin’s article is an argument about improving conditions in
existing cities, Lewis Mumford interprets this text, Nothing Gained By
Overcrowding!, as guiding “the most effective suburban planners.”122 Mumford
praises Unwin for proposing designs that will limit the number of “needless
streets” and providing enclosed garden-style courtyards for children to play.123
!

Unwin is concerned with what many today call “sprawl.” Contrary to

Mumford’s reading, Unwin is, in fact arguing against “suburban development” of
existing cities based on “the detailed principles advocated for in a Garden
City.”124 Unwin is proposing that existing cities establish a “green belt” around
their current size and establish “detached suburbs” with their own town centres.
Unwin argues that people can only “enjoy the advantages of social intercourse”
when the village in which they dwell is small enough for each to have “immediate
personal knowledge of each other.” 125 These smaller villages would then form a
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group, and each group within smaller villages would interact in a ‘federated’
manner. This is based on what Unwin calls the “natural principles of
organisation.”126
!

Just as the Garden City principles advocate for a green belt surrounding

each town, Unwin is arguing that this same principle needs to be applied to
individual houses and buildings. That is, each house or building needs to have
“garden space” surrounding it. His concern is with the “overcrowding of buildings
upon the land.”127 In an attempt to claim the authority of the university discourse,
he argues that instead of a standard city block having five cross streets
intersected by one central street, there be only one cross street with no
intersecting street. In Unwin’s proposal, each house would have a larger lot and
the area behind the two groups of houses would consist of “tennis courts,
children’s playground and bowling green.”128 The effect of his scheme would
reduce the number of houses by half and increase triple the size of each plot of
land – the difference is made up by reducing the amount of road space.
!

Unwin provides some detail on the cost of such plans. What becomes

apparent from a close reading is that he is skewing the numbers to make it
appear that his scheme is more profitable. In “Table I”129 he compares three
“schemes”: “Scheme I is what has normally been done with plots of land and
housing in major cities, while the other two are his proposals (though he calls
both ‘Scheme II’). While claiming his proposal (Scheme II) is cheaper, one ought
to notice he is providing less than half the number of houses than Scheme I, and
his claims for an even cheaper proposal depend on the purchase farm land,
meaning that these savings are only available to new developments outside a
city. What he is ultimately ‘banking on’ is to build these new blocks on farmland
since it sells for cheaper than city land. The only real savings in his proposal
126
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come from reducing the number of streets needed, though if these plans are,
indeed, for existing towns and cities, it is likely that the streets already exist. So,
not only is his scheme poor economically, but he is advocating building suburban
developments on farmland even though he began by arguing these plans were
for existing towns and cities. Unwin acknowledges that the distance between
these suburban outposts and the city proper will increase significantly, but states
that this is “a comparatively unimportant matter.”130
!

Unwin sees his contemporary cities as overcrowded and explains this is

the result of developers seeking maximum profit, even though he goes to lengths
to convince us that it is not profitable. Further, Unwin does not explain what
constitutes overcrowding (i.e. what density counts as overcrowding) nor does he
explain in any detail what is wrong with what others would simply call ‘high
density.’ So, while he is proposing that cities pass laws that limit the number of
houses built on an acre, he does not give any particular reason for this.
!

Unwin’s publication ends with a dozen photographs showing the difference

between developments based on Garden City principles and those built by
developers. What is striking is that, while the Garden City examples show leafy
lawns, the examples of “bad” planning look exactly like the highly desirable urban
streets of Toronto. In fact, his example of “bad planning” is nearly identical to
contemporary plans for “Smart Growth” championed by New Urbanists. One of
these photographs even shows a row of what are nearly “Bay-n-Gable”
townhouses. “Bay-n-Gable” houses, as mentioned above in this chapter are
indigenous to Toronto, with a few examples in Hamilton, Ontario: “New York has
its Brownstones; Toronto has its Bay-n-Gables.”131 The earliest example is the
“Struthers/Ross” house built in 1875 at 30–32 Lowther Avenue.132 The style was
then copied and became catalogue homes which could be built quickly and
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cheaply. Hundreds, if not thousands, were built at the end of the nineteenth
century and have remained incredibly popular and versatile. They were partly
responsible for Toronto’s “love affair with downtown living” of the 1970s and their
interiors have been altered to house multiple families, a single family, and singles
and couples in smaller apartments.133 These houses feature large bay windows,
which allow for sunlight and cooling breezes, peaking gables decorated with
bargeboard to keep rain out, and front porches, which were essential to the
social life of the street. The Bay-n-Gable style is now mimicked in many North
American ‘urban renewal projects’ and New Urbanist developments. I suggest
that the peaked roofs, which were borrowed from Gothic architecture, were to lift
the eyes toward the heavens, while the front porches suggest a sociability, an
invitation to passersby. The modern period, which we will turn to promptly,
flattened the roofs to refuse the spiritual and revoked the invitations to ‘fellow
man’ with brutalist concrete exteriors, even calling for the ‘death of the street.’

Le Corbusier and CIAM
Le Corbusier is perhaps the strangest figure in the history of urban planning.
Even more strange is his enduring legacy.134 His drawings and plans for urban
areas (if they can still be called that) are radically different than anything else
proposed or considered at the time (beginning in the 1920s and 1930s). Le
Corbusier was the classic ‘eccentric’ whose ideas might have been met with
bemused interest, but should never have been implemented. That he was so
influential on urban planning and development has less to do with his ideas than
his involvement with Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne (better
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known as CIAM), which included many members that advanced so-called
‘modernism’ in architecture, which radically changed urban areas.135
!

Aside from a few ‘concrete fetishists,’ contemporary architecture and

urban planning is very much opposed to Le Corbusier’s and CIAM’s visions.
While Le Corbusier was only one member of CIAM, it is worth looking at his
ideas and plans closely because he did have an enormous influence on
architecture and urban planning, and that influence is evidenced in many urban
spaces, including some in Toronto.
!

This section will present the central ideas from Le Corbusier to show how

and why he is important in the development of urban planning and the shape of
contemporary cities. Le Corbusier is clearly within the university discourse, but
he also displays his hysterical moments. Just as Olmsted and Howard sought to
position themselves in the university discourse, Le Corbusier does as well,
though much more excessively. Because of this excessiveness, he unwittingly
becomes hysterical and reveals the failures of the university discourse.
!

I will now explain some of Le Corbusier’s key ‘arguments’ (really, claims to

Truth) from The Radiant City,136 taking care to show what Le Corbusier was
actually proposing, since many of his critics misrepresent his ideas (usually to
make him sound worse than he is). We will see in the following chapter, in the
section “Reply To Howard and Le Corbusier,” how Jane Jacobs mis-reads Le
Corbusier, particularly with regard to his plans for automobiles and streets. Ken
Greenberg similarly mis-reads Le Corbusier’s plan to devote the entire ground137
to pedestrians as a plan for “separate circulation paths and gathering spaces for
pedestrians.”138 James Howard Kunstler, the humorously snarky spokesman for
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New Urbanism, reduces Radiant City to a “complex of twenty-four sixty-story
high-rises set amid parklike grounds and served by limited-access automobile
roads” and, oddly, lumps Mies van der Rohe in with Le Corbusier’s visions.139
While these are just a few examples, contemporary urbanists hold a host of
incorrect assumptions about Le Corbusier’s work. It is not my intention of
‘defend’ Le Corbusier’s work, but rather to point out the actual problems with his
work, not the assumed problems. That so many have this tendency to misrepresent Le Corbusier is rather strange, since there are many problems with his
ideas for urban planning that there is no need to libel him to find fault. For
example, contemporary opponents to Le Corbusier would also be surprised, as I
just mentioned, that he wanted to give the entire ground to pedestrians. And,
while many contemporary urbanists are clearly opposed to Le Corbusier’s
insistence on the “disappearance of the street,”140 they might find themselves
agreeing with his account of suburban life. Le Corbusier provides a somewhat
humorous “dialogue with my secretary” who lives in a ‘garden suburb.’141 She
complains about not being able to arrive to work on time because of the trains,
which are overcrowded with men who “aren’t too pleasant.” She has to walk too
long on muddy roads to the train station. She is unable to catch a train until 7:30
or 7:45 in the evening, so she does not get home until 8:30 or 9:00 at which time
she only has the energy to eat dinner, then go to bed to rise at 5:00AM to start all
over again. Le Corbusier sympathizes, but assumes that Sundays must be nice
in the suburbs. The secretary sets him straight: it is boring and there is nothing to
do. For any entertainment or social interaction, she must board a train and come
back into the city, something she does every work day and understandably does
not want to do on a Sunday. She tells Le Corbusier, “I’ve spent the best years of
my life on the train.”
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A few historical facts are worth noting to contextualize The Radiant City.

The first meeting of CIAM was organized by Le Corbusier on June 26–28, 1928,
in Canton of Vaud in Switzerland. Some of the essential proposals, formulations,
and concepts that came from this meeting are printed in The Radiant City.142 Of
primary importance to CIAM is concrete and steel. These were then new
materials for building, and these materials lead to a number of consequences.
Architects were able to abandon traditional methods of building for new ones,
along with further standardization and mass production. Concrete and steel
allowed architects to leave interior space completely open since “load walls” are
no longer necessary, and it removed the need for the inclined roof. These new
flat roofs, CIAM insists, will “lead to the creation of roof gardens.”143 That these
modernists are proposing flat roofs for roof gardens might surprise their
contemporary critics, since roof gardens are now seen as a way to assist in the
‘sustainability’ of urban areas. However, CIAM does not limit these new flat roofs
to gardens; they also propose they be used as promenades, cafes or stores.
Aesthetically, CIAM champions the flat roof since it will “provide a pure city
skyline.”144 A consequence of using flat roofs for living spaces is that it takes
away from life on the street, and this would be a ‘happy coincidence’ for CIAM
since they are advocating for the disappearance of the street.
!

Concrete and steel also allow for another feature now famously

associated with modernist architecture: pilotis. Raising buildings two and a half to
four meters on poles allows the architect to “recuperate almost all of the surface
covered by the house” to allow for “play, car parking or continuation of the garden
under the house.”145 While CIAM proposed that the pilotis provide “double
superimposed streets” with heavy traffic on the ground and lighter traffic on an
upper, bridge-like street, Le Corbusier’s plans for Radiant City will be markedly
different.
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CIAM also proposes the elimination of the corridor street in favour of the

indented street (à redents). This will allow houses to be set back as far as
possible from ‘streets’ (really, ‘roads’ since their sole purpose will be to carry
vehicular traffic). Concrete and steel, for CIAM at least, mean the “prohibition of
the courtyard,” the elimination of the roof template, the façade template, the bow
window (a round bay window).
!

Standardization is also a primary concern, with CIAM even advocating for

elimination of all building trades save one: fitters. All of a building’s elements will
be manufactured in a factory then taken to the site to be assembled by the fitters.
Windows, doors, stairs, and other aspects of buildings will also be standardized
in size and materials.
!

To prove that CIAM is not thinking on a small scale, they also propose that

the League of Nations be approached to establish the worldwide teaching of a
“universal technical language” for the new fitters, concrete mixers, electricians,
etc. Aside from making international contracts possible and easy, they also argue
it would also mean a “tremendous contribution to the pacification of the world.”146
Since CIAM’s reform recommendations are to be “extended simultaneously to all
cities, to all rural areas, across the seas,” they call for a centralized agency to
curb any “general confusion” where “chaos prevails,” in which “danger is
everywhere.”147
!

These recommendations are from CIAM’s first meeting in 1928. Architects

from the Soviet Union were to be involved in CIAM but were unable to obtain
visas to attend. A meeting was scheduled to take place in Moscow in 1933 but
just prior, the Soviet government rejected Le Corbusier’s plan for the Palace of
the Soviets which suggested that they were not interested in CIAM’s doctrines.
Le Corbusier’s plan for the Palace of the Soviets was originally titled Reply to the
Soviets and, partly due to their rejection, Le Corbusier developed his ideas
further and renamed the project The Radiant City. While this is a bit of trivia
related to this project’s title, it is also worth noting that Le Corbusier’s plan was
146
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not acceptable by the Soviet dictatorial government. In fact, Le Corbusier insists
that his Radiant City plan is meant to answer man’s cry for individual liberty. Le
Corbusier recounts a story of a friend of his who is a technician and works to
solve various Soviet city planning issues. He objected to the Radiant City plans
because they go against Soviet theory, which sees large cities as “an expression
of capitalist rule; they are monstrosities intended as prisons for millions of
suffering beings.”148 They want cities of no more than 50,000 people and were
pursuing a strategy of “deurbanization.” Again, Le Corbusier’s plan, originally
titled “Reply to Moscow” promotes a type of freedom and liberty at odds with
Soviet theory.
!

So, despite the appearance of Le Corbusier’s plan, it is decidedly not

meant to restrict or impose on human liberty. Le Corbusier is within that school of
thought in which technology and machines are to be used to liberate humanity
and aid in its historical progress.

The Radiant City and the Good Life
Published in 1933 and republished with revisions in 1964, The Radiant City
contains the most detailed explanation of his approach and vision for buildings
and urban space. The title page of The Radiant City tells us right away the ideas
that are informing Le Corbusier’s plans for our cities. What appears to be an
unofficial subtitle to the book fits within the university discourse: “elements of a
doctrine of urbanism to be used as the basis of our machine-age civilization.”
However, also printed on the title page is the hysterical, “This work is dedicated
to AUTHORITY” (sic). The title page also has a short, fourteen-line ‘poem’ of
sorts which begins, “Plans are not Politics. / Plans are the rational and poetic
monument / set up in the midst of contingencies.” The poem continues by stating
that these contingencies (people, culture, climate, etc.) are “resources” to be
“liberated by modern techniques,” the latter of which “are universal.” So, what
can we take from this title page? His dedication to ‘AUTHORITY’ appears
148
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hysterical since it is the master the hysteric addresses in the discourse of the
hysteric. Further, he reveals the truth of the hysteric’s discourse insofar as he
seeks a new master: as he explains later in the book, this dedication is not to
mean that he has fascistic tendencies, but rather that he wants the ideas and
plans presented in this book to find their way to political leaders so as to realize
these ideas and plans. That is, he desires a new master to implement his
hysterical vision. Thus, it becomes a bit clearer what he means by ‘politics’ when
he writes “plans are not politics.” From the university discourse, he argues that
plans are neutral, that they are objective, that they contain a truth outside of
power or emotion or affect, and that plans should not become ‘partisan’ or
ideological.
!

One might certainly wonder if Le Corbusier seriously believed that urban

plans (even his own) would not be contested or that they were not imbued with a
particular ideology. Perhaps he really did believe that we were in a “machine-age
civilization” and that anyone who objected to this characterization was simply
wrong, which is precisely the position of knowledge in the university discourse.
!

Le Corbusier paints a clear picture of the problem of the city and how it

destroys liberty. He describes the city as the place where anxiety and depression
“spring up afresh” because it is “swelling” and “filling up” as the city builds itself
“on top of itself.”149 For him, the street is “appalling, noisy, dusty, dangerous”
where automobiles can only crawl along and pedestrians are “herded together on
sidewalks” and bump into one another.150

The city “is like a glimpse of

purgatory.”151 With no light or space for relaxation, no one is able to “live” and
“there is no freedom for men in this present age, only slavery.”152 In the city, one
cannot live, laugh, be a master of one’s own home, or experience the light of the
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sun, greenery of nature, or the blue of the sky: “the man in a city is a lump of coal
in a brazier.”153
!

Reminiscent of his ‘dialogue with my secretary’ (see above), Le Corbusier

heaps scorn on the suburbs. The train has made these spaces possible, but it
means so many are stuck on these trains in the morning and evening. Though
they are surrounded by greenery in these ‘garden suburbs,’ they sit “all alone in
their little green nests.”154 He describes the suburbs as “broken, dislocated limbs!
The city has been torn apart and scattered in meaningless fragments across the
countryside.”155 Le Corbusier wonders what the point of life is in the suburbs, or
how one is expected to even live. “Suburban life is a despicable delusion
entertained by a society stricken with blindness!”156
!

Le Corbusier points to the problem of overproduction in the 1930s. Just

prior to this, the ‘machine age’ allowed for the implementation of the eight-hour
workday since the mechanization of factories sped up the process of production.
However, this advance in production resulted in the crisis of overproduction in the
1930s. Le Corbusier’s solution to this is rather simple, even simplistic: “produce
less” so that the worker is only required to work five hours a day. And “we must
master the machine” so that it does not create these crises of overproduction.157
Le Corbusier also cites the entry of women into the workforce as a cause of
unemployment: that “if the wife goes back to her home, to her children, then
there will be less labour on the market.”158 However, he insists that if “the
husband” is to only work five hours a day, so should “the wife” on the household
chores. So this increase in machine-aided production, reduced working hours for
men in factories and women in the domestic sphere appears to be the key
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foundation for Le Corbusier’s new city. It is on this rearrangement of working life,
“to organize a whole new way of life,” that his new city will account.159 What is
required for the “drawings of this new city … to be superimposed on the city as it
stands today” is “a process involving the replanning of private property.”160 And
this is why Le Corbusier dedicates his book to “AUTHORITY!” for it will take
some power like ‘authority,’ but “the necessary authority must be created” to
radically change the structure of private property. Le Corbusier is vague about
what this new ‘authority’ would consist of or how this administration or
government would be run. Nonetheless, he repeatedly states throughout this text
that the freedom of the individual is paramount: “I have laid it down that the
cornerstone for any form of organization in a machine civilization must be a
respect for the liberty of the individual.”161
!

So far I have shown what I would call Le Corbusier’s ‘political philosophy.’

I call it this because these are his ideas and assumptions about ‘the good life’:
how we ought to live and organize ourselves. I want to stress that Le Corbusier is
seeking a complete overhaul of how cities are to be planned and built. He is not
observing or studying cities as they actually exist and proposing changes, either
small or large, to actually existing cities. Instead, his plans for the Radiant City
(as well as his other city plans) are to be built on either untouched land, or only
after an existing city is entirely demolished. In other words, there is absolutely
nothing redeeming about any existing city – they must be demolished to make
way for his Radiant City.

Clarification of Le Corbusier’s Overlooked Details!
While I will not recount every detail of Le Corbusier’s plan for Radiant City, for he
does a good job of that himself in this book of that name, I will continue to point
159
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out the aspects of his plan that many, including those mentioned above (Jacobs,
Kunstler, and Greenberg) have overlooked. We have already seen that Le
Corbusier is opposed to both the Garden City and its offshoot, the garden
suburb. Le Corbusier is often used as a shorthand by planners and urbanists to
indicate totally car-dominated city plans, elevated highways, streets destroyed to
make way for expanded road beds, etc. However, only part of this is true. In fact,
there are many similarities with Le Corbusier’s plans for Radiant City and
contemporary planners who actually like cities, which is strangely an exception.
That is, contemporary planning that seeks to encourage environmental
sustainability, ensure walkability, increase densities, etc. to make cities more
‘liveable’ will find many of their aims and ideals voiced by Le Corbusier. While Le
Corbusier now signifies the opposite of these ideals, I believe this occurs
because of a conflation of Le Corbusier’s actual plans and what other planners
and architects have done and built with a selective reading and/or citation of Le
Corbusier.
!

For example, let’s consider the elevated highway. It was seen in the

1940s, 1950s and 1960s as the epitome of a modernist city. Visions of cars
whizzing by overhead, out of urban stop-and-start traffic – a pure freedom of
mobility. Whole neighbourhoods in cities across North America were demolished
to make way for them. Toronto began erecting the elevated Gardiner Expressway
along its waterfront in the mid-1950s and continued to add to it until the
mid-1960s. Named after the first mayor of Metro Toronto, Frederick Gardiner,
(who ensured it was built) it was seen by most as the solution to the city’s
problems of congestion and ensured that suburban living would be easier for
those who worked in the core of the city. Now, many see elevated expressways
as ruinous to the vitality of cities, particularly those, like the Gardiner, that act as
a ‘wall’ between the city and its waterfront. Many planners and urbanists blame
the ‘Le Corbusian’ approach to city planning for these elevated expressways.
However, while Le Corbusier did in fact advocate for elevated expressways, it
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was within a larger plan that was never implemented by those cities that took
only the plan for elevated expressways.
!

In fact, what could arguably be Le Corbusier’s first statement once he

finally turns to the plans and drawings of The Radiant City involves pedestrians:
“The city dweller, as a pedestrian, must have the entire ground surface of the city
at his disposal.” 162 He explains that the entire ground surface is to be one
continuous park so that “no pedestrian ever meets an automobile.”163

All

automobiles are to be “in the air, passing by behind screens of foliage.”164 So
here we see that while Le Corbusier did champion elevated roads, it was meant
so that all automobile traffic would be on these elevated roads. Le Corbusier
envisioned every apartment building (and all residential buildings would be
apartment buildings) would have a garage at level with these elevated roads so
that one could immediately get into one’s car and drive on these elevated roads
to another apartment building or office tower, each of which would have its own
garage.
!

Of course, what is lost in this plan is the street, which effectively evacuates

the most urban of things: building frontage (door, landing, steps, etc.), sidewalks,
and roadbed. Le Corbusier clearly advocates for the removal of streets in favour
of elevated roads (with automobiles only) while the ground surface would be
park-like: grass, trees, and other plants with ‘promenades.’ The ‘street’ with
people and shops, he proposes, would be inside the buildings. While he spends
time explaining that the police will no longer have to endure the weather, but
instead patrol the interior streets, he does not explain what these streets are for.
Perhaps it is just assumed that this is where ‘life’ will happen – the random
sociability that a street provides – but it does not seem to serve any purpose in
his ‘machine age’ city.
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He does, however, devote considerable space to explaining what we

would understand as ‘an apartment,’ but he, tellingly, refers to them as “cells.”165
Each ‘cell’ would be soundproofed so that “even a hermit in the depths of a forest
could not be more cut off from other men.”166 In fact, if we recall that Le Corbusier
believes it best to be able to get from one’s ‘cell’ (i.e. apartment) to their car as
quickly as possible and travel in this hermeneutically sealed ‘pod’ to their
destination above the city and its people, it should not be too surprising to find
him proposing each “man” ought to (or would want to) live as isolated as
possible. Though, perhaps ‘isolated’ is not strong enough a word – each city
dweller would be ‘protected’ from the city and all other people. Each ‘cell’ would
have glass walls so that they can “look out on a magnificent vista of parks, of sky,
of space, and light and sun.”167 This list of things city dwellers view from their
‘cells’ is not an arbitrary one. One would not see other people encountering other
people, but only grass and trees, the sky and sun, and open, empty space.
!

Here we will clearly see the university discourse at work: everything is

calculated. But these calculations cannot account for the desires of this city’s
inhabitants nor the externalities and felicities of life. What Le Corbusier fails to
recognize is that the thing he claims to value most, freedom, cannot be
calculated. Le Corbusier simply states that the size of the ‘cells’ will be
determined by the number of occupants. Each person will have “14 square
meters of floor space at his disposal” and he provides a number of tables to
calculate the size of each cell depending on the number of parents (always two)
and the number of children.168 These tables take up nearly an entire page.
!

As to the outside of these apartment buildings, Le Corbusier is also

extremely specific. There are to be nurseries immediately outside in the parks on
the ground level, which will be “run by qualified nurses and supervised by doctors
165
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– security – selection – scientific child-rearing.”169 Also in these parks will be
schools, sports grounds, and, for every 160,000 square meters of apartment
building, one swimming pool. On the roof of these apartment buildings will be
roof gardens with “sandy beaches” that will be “18 to 20 meters wide and
kilometres in length.”170
!

Le Corbusier also proposes a new system of delivering food and other

consumer goods to each apartment, calculating how many loading bays are
required per number of residents. This system would do away with “les Halles,” a
central market in Paris.171 Other centralized delivery systems would do away with
other service shops and stores. While Le Corbusier notes that this would put
“thousands of little private businesses” out of business, he argues this does away
with “waste” and will bring down the cost of living.172
!

What is perhaps the most important thing that defines a city as a city are

streets. Streets are to cities what fields are to farms. Le Corbusier, however,
insisted on the “death of the street.”173 To contextualize contemporary streets, Le
Corbusier points back to Louis XIV, the ‘Sun King.’ Like the sun that beams
straight lines of light, Louis XIV had straight roads built throughout Paris. This, of
course, was for horse and carriage, but it was these new straight roads that
allowed the easy inclusion of the automobile. For Le Corbusier, the automobile
age has simply “arrived” and is fatalistic about this innovation: “we have to build
new cities” to accommodate the increasing numbers of automobiles.174
169
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What is interesting, however, is the connection made between speed and

space. He argues that “human biology is now in the grip of a new speed,” namely
the speed of automobiles.175 With this new speed, more space is required. Mark
Wigley provides a compelling reading of Le Corbusier’s understanding of space
and speed: despite the tall towers of his plans, Le Corbusier is “immensely
horizontal.”176 Wigley insists that many of Le Corbusier’s drawings are composed
of horizontal lines, and that much of modernist architecture is a “structure of
parallel planes – stacked up horizontally from the ground plane within a regular
form.”177 This horizontality implies that Radiant City was meant to be approached
at a high rate of speed (traversing the horizontal) by either a vehicle on one of
the speedways or, better, by helicopter because of the vast spaces between
buildings, while the interiors of the towers is “just a slower speed of the city.”178
!

Le Corbusier suggests that pedestrians are like fish in a water tank and

are doing just fine. But adding fish that move at twenty times the speed of the
others will result in “a massacre.”179 The solution is a larger water tank. Oddly, Le
Corbusier never considers leaving the tank alone and removing the speedy fish.
!

But we need to be careful with Le Corbusier’s line of thinking here. While

he is fatalistic regarding the increasing numbers and speed of automobiles, his
concern is for pedestrians. He wants to ensure that people will not be injured or
killed by automobiles. To this end, he states that “streets are an obsolete notion”
that “no longer work.”180 Thus, instead of tinkering with the existing conditions of
cities, he argues we must demolish them wholesale and start with “clean sheet of
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paper.”181 On this “clean sheet of paper” he “calculates” that “normal biological
speeds must never be forced into contact with the high speeds of modern
vehicles.”182 He also “calculates” that all traffic must be one-way so that no
vehicle ever has the possibility of crashing head-on nor ever has to cross the
path of other vehicles. Intersections are to be eliminated.
!

Nonetheless, Le Corbusier takes some time to mock proposals that would

give the ground surface to vehicles and put pedestrians up on catwalks. He
argues that this would make people depressed and depraved until finally the
people will “blow up the catwalks, and the buildings, and the machines, and
everything!”183
!

Le Corbusier then offers a rather poetic definition of cities:
Cities are magnetic fields; the area over which they exert their pull
can vary, and according of this pull, according to the qualitative
differences of its components, so attitudes, attractive power,
function within a national context, property value, etc., will all vary
from city to city.184

While Le Corbusier does make the connection, clearly there is one to made to
Howard’s “Three Magnets” (figure 9). In that diagram, Howard implies that only
the combination of town and country will attract people, as the qualities of the
town and country separately are nearly all negative. Le Corbusier, however, is
providing a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between cities and
people’s desires. He rightly notes that there are many factors (“qualitative
difference”) of cities that attract different types of people and in different types of
ways. Put another way, it also points to region surrounding a particular city and
how that region affects the character, texture, and desirableness of that city.
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He provides what could be used to understand Toronto’s position within

Canada, with its national identity bound up with pioneers and prairie farmland:
The word city indisputably signifies the center of gravity for a
geographical region, the natural center of gravity for a given
producing area. But it also signifies, because of much more subtle
attractive forces at work, the center of gravity for an even vaster,
sometimes immense, spiritual hinterland.185
Interestingly, were one to replace “word” with “world” in the above quotation, we
would get a glimpse of contemporary discourses of cities and global capitalism.

Le Corbusier At His Best: The Radiant Farm
Towards the end of The Radiant City, Le Corbusier publishes a plea from a
farmer, who signs his letter Norbert Bézard. This farmer asks Le Corbusier to
take a moment to consider the village and farm, to design a “Radiant Farm” or
“Radiant Village.” This farmer has been bitten by the ‘efficiency bug’ and would
like his farm and nearby village to be re-organized, particularly in light of new
technologies on these farms (tractors replacing horses). Interestingly, Le
Corbusier’s reply, which contains ideas for re-organization of the farmable land
and the location of necessary buildings in the villages are much more compelling
than his plans for cities.
!

The opening line of his reply is telling: “During these recent years of

research, I had been forced to the conclusion that our cities are bulging with
human detritus, with hordes of people who came to them to try their luck, did not
succeed, and are now all huddled together in crowded slums.”186 Besides his
famous “death to the street” mantra, it is clear here that Le Corbusier does not
like cities. Odd, then, that he would want to plan them. Perhaps cities are Le
Corbusier’s ‘symptom’ in one Lacanian sense. In the seminars that took place in
185
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1974–75, Lacan suggested that the symptom is “the way in which each subject
enjoys the unconscious.”187 From this, we might interpret Le Corbusier’s planning
the thing he dislikes as a way for him to enjoy his dislike.
!

This enjoyment of his dislike of cities becomes clearer in his delight in the

countryside and farms. Le Corbusier’s ideas for a “Radiant Farm” or “Radiant
Village” respect the existing farms and villages, and spends considerable time
praising their work and products. This is in direct contrast to his feelings toward
any existing city (they are to be destroyed). For Le Corbusier, the farm is
completely in tune with nature: “nothing could be artificial here: everything is the
harmonious expression of a complex of real facts: nature and man.”188
!

Another telling aspect of Le Corbusier’s respect for farms, in contrast to

his disdain for cities, is that, with Bézard’s help, he spent “six months gradually
penetrating the secrets of rural life.”189 In other words, Le Corbusier took the time
to learn about his subject before offering up plans and ideas. The insistence that
one learn about one’s subject prior to offering up plans is at the forefront of
contemporary, ‘progressive’ urban planning. No longer are urban planners to
design urban spaces far away from said urban space, but must spend time in this
urban space, learn how it works, what people want, what people do with it, etc.
Le Corbusier writes, “it is easier (for people like me!) to approach the industrial
problems of large cities than the complex annual development of work in the
fields.”190 Perhaps Le Corbusier would have done better to think that dealing with
the ‘problems of large cities’ was not so easy, and should have taken the same
attitude he does towards farms and the rural. And why would Le Corbusier tell us
that the rural is more complex than a large city? Why, indeed.
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The proposals and plans for “The Radiant Farm” are completely

reasonable, and one would imagine most welcomed by farmers of the time (mid1930s). The farm house is to be large enough for living, but also for celebrations
and guests. Here the pilotis make sense – it raises the house off the dirt and
muck allowing for a dry and hygienic space. Raising the house also allows the
people to look out over the fields of their farm. The space under the raised farm
house, unlike the raised apartment buildings, is practical. It is not just a space for
strolling, but for washing clothes and, during warmer months provides shade for
eating dinner, socializing with family and friends. Under the raised house is “an
active, living area, in contact with the outside.”191 The house itself is to have large
bedrooms, large windows, and bathrooms for “a good scrub” after working on the
farm. All reasonable things.
!

The farm itself would have a gate leading to a ‘farmyard’ with a concrete

floor with drainage so there would no longer be “mud and muck” to stand in.192 Le
Corbusier provides details for the housing of animals, systems for feeding and
watering them – again, all reasonable proposals. Interestingly, though Le
Corbusier despised any roof other than flat in cities, these farm buildings are all
to have curved roofs since they are functional.
!

It is not necessary here to recount Le Corbusier’s details of the plan for

the near-by village, though a few things ought to be pointed out, particularly the
contrast to his plans for cities. A variety of necessary buildings (post office, gas
station, school, community centre, etc.) are all accounted for – but here they are
their own buildings. In the Radiant City, these things were to be part of the larger
towers that also contained the ‘cells’ (i.e. apartments). Though Radiant City
would see the destruction of the central market, the Radiant Village sees such a
thing created in what he calls a “co-operative building.”193 He also calls for a
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single building, “The Club,” as a space for entertainment and social functions.194
Why does the village get a market and club? So that “village life will become
more intense, more active; the whole community will be woken up.”195 If one
wonders why the Radiant Village would have these social buildings and not the
Radiant City, the answer is lurking here: “The countryman will become one of the
nation’s active forces again. His intellectual participation is indispensable to the
spiritual awakening of the whole country.”196 In other words, the countryman, the
farmer, is essential to the nation’s ‘spiritual identity,’ which cannot be said for the
“human detritus,” how Le Corbusier sees the city dweller.

How Does ‘Man’ Walk?
Prior to The Radiant City, Le Corbusier published Urbanisme, the eighth edition
(published 1929) of which has been translated as The City of To-morrow and its
Planning.197 In this text we find many of the same themes as The Radiant City
but in a much more straightforward manner. The beginnings of his heralding of
the ‘machine-age’ as seen in The Radiant City are expressed here clearly within
the university discourse: as an “enthusiasm … for exactitude … carried to its
furthest limits and raised to an ideal: the search for perfection.”198 We also find
the kernel of his ideas for separating motor vehicles from pedestrian traffic still
with this concern of “sacrifice to death” by “innumerable motors.” 199 And we find
his hysterical revulsion of the city: “The city is crumbling, it cannot last much
longer; its time is past.”200
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What is of interest here, and why I introduce this book, relates to this

disjuncture between the plans for the ‘Radiant City’ and the ‘Radiant Farm.’ The
first chapter begins with this epigraph: “Man walks in a straight line because he
has a goal and knows where he is going; he has made up his mind to reach
some particular place and he goes straight to it.”201 This is repeated as the first
sentence of the first chapter, so we can be sure that this is an important
‘observation’ of his. He then contrasts the “pack-donkey’s way” with “man’s way”
by stating that, unlike man, the pack-donkey meanders along, stops here and
there, zigzags to avoid large stones, obstacles, or steep climbs, or to gain some
shade. So, for Le Corbusier, Man takes the straightest line; the pack-donkey
takes the path of least resistance.
!

For Le Corbusier, a town of winding roads is a dangerous thing. They lead

the people to laziness, a lack of concentration, and it is in this way “that cities
sink to nothing and that ruling classes are overthrown.”202 These are the final
words of this book’s first chapter, so it is up to us to draw the connection between
winding roads and the overthrow of the ruling classes. We should note first off
that the overthrow of the ruling class is not something that Le Corbusier
advocates or desires. As we saw in The Radiant City, the book is addressed to
“authority” since authority of some form would have to power to demolish entire
cities and implement Le Corbusier’s plans. But if we take the side of the
revolutionaries, or even oppose the installation of this type of ‘authority’ (i.e.
totalitarianism), and we look at the reasons for Le Corbusier’s insistence on
roads with straight lines and square angles, we can see how winding roads can
create problems for ‘authority.’ A gridded street network makes it “easy to police
and to clean,” as we have already learned from Foucault.203 That a gridded
network allows for easy policing suggests that winding city streets make it difficult
to police and easy for subversive elements to organize and evade the police.
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We can understand Le Corbusier’s point about winding streets with regard

to old European cities of the master’s discourse that grew without an overarching
plan. However, if we consider contemporary suburbs with the curvilinear roads, it
is almost comical to think of these suburbs as leading to the overthrow of the
ruling class. While some European suburbs have witnessed riots, North
American affluent suburbs with their curvilinear roads do not, generally, have
“subversive elements.”204 On the other hand, one will not find people governed
solely by calculation and rationality on a gridded street network. I think the only
thing we can draw from Le Corbusier’s assumption that winding streets lead to
laziness and/or revolution is a heightened sense of self-importance and hysteria.
!

Moreover, his contrast between winding streets and a gridded network is

hardly accurate. That is, the city dweller often takes the ‘pack-donkey’s way’; the
city dweller rarely “governs his feeling by his reason” and lets the city’s sights,
sounds, obstacles, elevations, etc. to shape his route of travel.205 Sure, many
people in their “commute” to and from work, likely because it is done day in and
day out, want to get “from A to B” as directly as possible. But many of us, even
during a commute, will allow many things to alter our route. Perhaps something
lures us over, perhaps there is a crowd we wish to join or avoid. Le Corbusier,
however, does not seem to accept this and demands the new city be created with
straight lines mainly for speed. He asserts that cities ought to be designed with a
road network of straight lines and square angles for fast-moving motor vehicles.
Streets with pedestrians are to be abolished; only roads where no pedestrian
shall ever be. Pedestrians are to exist only on the ground surface (where there
are no cars). People, he assumes, only walk for pleasure not for any purpose.
Thus, winding garden-type paths are their only option.
204

The suburbs I am referring to are those built at the edges, and beyond, of cities, which contain
middle and upper class residences. Older, “inner” suburbs, which generally have residents of a
lower socio-economic status, have roads less curvilinear and are more of a ‘soft grid.’ Recently,
the musical group, The Arcade Fire released an album, The Suburbs, along with an
accompanying short film, Scenes from the Suburbs, that depicts the militarization of a typical
contemporary suburb. Scenes from the Suburbs, DVD, directed by Spike Jonze (New York: MJZ
Productions, 2011).
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Contemporary planning has taken up the concept of ‘desire lines,’ which

are the paths that people want to take while on foot. While this acknowledgment
of people’s desires in urban planning is normally seen as ‘progressive’ and as
opposed to modernist, Le Corbusierian conceptions of cities and people, there is
actually a strong affinity between the two. These ‘desire lines’ nearly always
show pedestrians finding the shortest distance to popular destinations. For
example, a winding path in a park is often ignored in favour of a direct route to
some destination on the edge of the park or beyond. In Toronto, where Lowther
Avenue and Walmer Road meet, where there once used to be a traffic circle,
there is now a small public park called “Gwendolyn MacEwen Park.” Just north of
this Square is a public school and just south is an entrance to the subway, which
means that many pedestrians cross the Square. The recent re-design of the park
sought to put a path through the square based on this concept of ‘desire lines,’
where people actually walked.

The Athens Charter
Though Le Corbusier published a number of books, his main professional
association was with the Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne (CIAM).
CIAM’s principles were agreed upon and expressed in the document, The Athens
Charter, drawn up in 1933. It was never published and Le Corbusier took it upon
himself to have in published in his book in 1943 as La charte d’Athenès.206 Other
members of CIAM were not consulted and some have said that what Le
Corbusier published was not accurate. Thus, this version of the Athens Charter
may not be exactly what CIAM agreed to, but it is the only copy available to the
public. The Charter sets out their view of the world, identifying various constants
(land, sun, etc.) and various variables (economies, political arrangements, etc.).
It also marks the beginning of the “machinist age” which has significantly altered
the way in which production occurs as well as the concentration of people in
206
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cities.207 This is a “world-wide evolution without precedent in history. Chaos has
entered the cities.”208 This “chaos” is relative to the “ancient equilibrium” that
previous eras enjoyed, with a few craftsmen in cities, farmers in the fields, and
“the natural relationships that used to exist between home and places of work.”209
The “evil” that has resulted “is expressed in the cities by an overcrowding that
drives them into disorder.”210
!

Thus we see CIAM holds a similar concern as Unwin (Nothing Gained by

Overcrowding!). As I argued in the earlier discussion of Unwin, there is a sense
that there cannot be too few people in cities and there cannot be too many. CIAM
marks the line of ‘too many’ with a density that exceeds 200 inhabitants per
acre.211 However, this density is based on the construction techniques that were
not until then available (that is, prior to concrete and steel constructions) which
permitted buildings of a maximum of about six stories. CIAM argues that, with
buildings no taller than six stories, a density beyond 200 inhabitants per acre is
termed “a slum.”212 The problem is that there is not enough space for each
person (though CIAM does not state how much space a person needs), there are
not enough openings to the outdoors, a lack of sunlight, the likelihood of disease
spreading, and a lack of sanitation facilities. The final concern with ‘too much’
density is “promiscuity” which arises “from the interior layout of the dwelling,” the
arrangement of buildings (too close to one another) and the “presence of
troublesome neighborhoods.”213
!

The Charter devotes a number of pages to the development of suburbs

and how these have been built with no plan and only make it more difficult for
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people in the core of cities to get fresh air. Of the number of “requirements” for
city zoning and bylaws is one of particular interest: “The alignment of dwellings
along transportation routes must be prohibited.”214 The Charter is clear that by
“transportation routes” it means “the streets of our cities.”215 These streets are a
“menace” and no dwelling’s front door is to open to them. As with Le Corbusier’s
Radiant City, all pedestrian and vehicle traffic is to be separated. Other
“requirements” include building tall towers for living with “verdant” areas between
them (i.e. open green spaces). The Charter, however, does not give a density
ratio for these towers in parks. It only states that it will have to be determined
once these towers are built.216 Thus, it is these towers and parks that take
precedence – only afterwards will the people be considered.
!

While CIAM is often ‘credited’ with the long-imposed separation of uses,

the Athens Charter is quite specific about this, and rather surprising. Schools are
to be close to where people live. “The distances between places of work and
places of residences must be reduced to a minimum.”217 This is to reduce the
time people spend travelling to and from work. Industrial areas are, however, to
be separated from all other areas buffered with a “zone of vegetation.”218 The
“craft occupations,” or what we might think of as ‘retail’ today, are “closely bound
up with the urban life from which they directly arise” and should be located within
the city.219 In this section on “crafts” we also see an early formation of the
contemporary ‘creative class’ thesis: “the crafts … find the creative stimulus they
need in the intellectual concentration of the city.”220
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The Charter also calls for longer blocks so that cars can go faster without

having to brake. Intersections are to be 200 to 400 yards apart, and roads are to
be widened.221 Oddly, though, the Charter insists that “the dimensions of all
elements within the urban system can only be governed by human proportions”;
all aspects of the city must be developed with the human being as the scale of
measurement and “in relation to the natural walking pace of man.” 222
!

This chapter has presented a history of early cities and subsequent urban

planning through Lacan’s four discourses. The slow rotation from the master’s to
the university discourse has been shown in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Toronto as well as the parks movement and Garden City movement. Le
Corbusier represented the completion of this rotation to the university discourse,
though his overidentification with its knowledge-authority unwittingly exposed its
failures. This chapter argued that the parks movement, the Garden City
movement, and Le Corbusier’s modernist principles all shared a commonality of
a near necessity of beginning from the hysteric’s discourse, but then seemingly
chose to situate themselves within the university’s. I have focused on things often
overlooked in the Garden City movement, in Le Corbusier’s theories, and in
CIAM’s principles: things that many progressive, anti-modernist planners and
urbanists share. The theme of ‘limit’ arose here insofar as the parks movement
and the Garden City movement respond to what they perceived as ‘too much’
urbanism of the industrial cities, while Le Corbusier’s plans push the limits of
density, cold calculation, and efficiency. The following chapter focuses on Jane
Jacobs’ work and positions her as understanding cities from within the analyst’s
discourse.
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CHAPTER 4: JANE JACOBS, THE ANALYST
Beginning in the 1930s and for the next few decades, CIAM and ‘modernist’
planning imposed drastic changes on many major cities. As the previous chapter
makes clear, while Le Corbusier and CIAM were influential on ‘modernist’
planning, they are not fully to blame. Many of their proposals and underlying
principles were ignored. In Canada, Toronto and particularly Montreal were
drastically altered, largely for the worse. In Toronto, a ‘problem’ neighbourhood,
Regent Park, was completely demolished and rebuilt in the late 1950s with
modernist principles. Small apartment buildings replaced traditional housing, the
streets were removed, and inhabitants were cut off from the surrounding area.
Similar projects occurred in Boston and Washington, DC, areas which quickly
became known as “the projects” or “slums.” Toronto also saw an elevated
expressway built along the waterfront and numerous plans for other expressways
that would have destroyed various neighbourhoods and communities. While
Toronto saw a number of tall office towers built with little regard for street life, the
western portion of Montreal’s downtown experienced this even more radically.
City planners and developers were continually dreaming up new reasons to
demolish entire areas of cities so that a new, modernist development could be
implemented. The City of Toronto commissioned the Bruce Report in 1934, which
determined that nearly the entire region of what was then Toronto from east of
the Don Valley to Dufferin, and from Bloor south to Lake Ontario, was determined
to be a “problem area” and that the best thing to be done was to demolish all
buildings and erect tall towers arranged on large blocks along with expressways.1
This, of course, did not happen, but it is worth noting that this was the plan.
!

Jane Jacobs witnessed this type of thinking and planning in New York and

eventually had enough. She could not accept that city planners were so hostile to

1

See: John Sewell, The Shape of the City: Toronto Struggles with Modern Planning (Toronto:
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Leadership in the Politics of Toronto’s ‘Slums,’ 1934–1939,” Histoire Sociale/Social History 44, no.
87 (Mai-May 2011): 83–114.
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urban life and had seen too many of their ‘block busting’ programs result in
absolute failure. It was from this frustration that she wrote the now seminal book
The Death and Life of Great American Cities.2 Though there were a few critics,
mostly established planners (whom she was attacking), the book was well
received and became a bestseller.3 She saw these failures and thought she knew
why they failed: planners were too caught up in drawings and abstract ideals and
did not account for how people actually used cities. Rather than sitting in a room
with a drawing board, Jacobs took to the streets. Much of Death and Life was
written while living with her husband, an architect, and her children at 555
Hudson Street in New York City. Her observations and theories about cities and
urban spaces were developed by watching out her windows, walking around and
observing what people were doing. In more theoretical terms, we can understand
modernist planning operating according to Lefebvre’s “abstract space,” whereas
Jacobs draws from “social space.”4
!

In this chapter, I will argue that, as with the urban movements and

planners covered in the previous chapter, Jacobs begins from the hysteric’s
discourse. However, unlike the planners discussed in the previous chapter who
sought to justify their arguments from the authority of the university discourse,
Jacobs situates herself within the analyst’s discourse. There is nothing in
Jacobs’ work to suggest she was familiar with Lacan’s work, and my arguments
about her position as the analyst are only to demonstrate the broad applicability
of Lacan’s theory and, more importantly, to offer an alternative reading of her
work. It will become apparent that she is taking direct aim at the type of urban
planning that I argued sought to position itself within the university discourse. The
2
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3
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Ginger Press, 1997): 47–62.
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first line of her The Death and Life of Great American Cities: “This book is an
attack on current city planning and rebuilding.”5 And this ‘current city planning’ is
that inspired by Ebenezer Howard, Le Corbusier, and the principles of CIAM,
which I discussed in the previous chapter and argued that they sought to position
themselves within the university discourse. Further, since she is taking the city
itself (as it actually exists) as the object of her analysis, it will become clear as to
why I position her within the discourse of the analyst.
!

However, it is worth beginning with the final chapter of Death and Life,

since it presents an argument about the “kind of problem a city is.” As shown in
the previous chapter, all previous urban planners and theorists begin with a
simplistic notion of the problem of the city (too dirty, too crowded, etc.), which
their plans are meant to solve (Garden Cities, more parks, large towers in parklike settings, etc.). Jacobs, however, takes the problem of the city seriously, for
cities do have problems but they are not as simple as previous urbanists thought.
!

I should mention from the outset that Jacobs is cautious of people who

wish to theorize or think about cities. The reason is that she locates the blame for
the failures of modernist approaches on their persistent imposition of a theory or
conception of how cities are ‘supposed’ to be (from the university discourse),
without regard for the specific city or urban space in question. That being said,
Jacobs states that “thinking has its strategies and tactics too.”6 However, it is
essential that whoever seeks to ‘think cities’ needs to consider the kind of
problem a city is.
!

She asserts that whatever we wish to think about, our thinking should not

be structured by the particular way in which we would like to think.7 Instead, our
thinking must be based on the nature of the thing we are thinking. In this
5
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understanding of the relation between thinking and the subject of that which is
thought, we see an implicit dig at Le Corbusier and the Congrès internationaux
d'architecture moderne (CIAM).8 They were explicit in their wish to impose a new
way of thinking (‘machine age’) onto a subject (existing cities). Jacobs’ insistence
that we must base our thinking on the nature of the thing we are analyzing, is
very much like the analyst as objet petit a in the analyst’s discourse. This will be
discussed more fully throughout this chapter, but here we can note that, just as
the analyst seeks to be an object of pure desirousness to encourage
transference, Jacobs is seeking to allow the city to express itself through her.
While Jacobs goes on to discuss the various changes in “scientific” thought
(which is a veiled critique of Le Corbusier’s and CIAM’s ‘rationalism’), it is worth
exploring her epistemological position here. If one wants to think about cities, one
needs to think like a city. Thus, one cannot rely on a simplified formula or code
(pace, New Urbanists!).9 Instead, one should think of a city as a complex bundle
of arrangements, desires, ideals, people, dreams, intentions, necessities: as a
result our thinking about cities needs to be likewise. It is extremely unlikely that
one form of good urbanism can be simply grafted onto another urban space. It
might be, but it is hardly a matter of course.10
!

But what kind of problem is the city for Jacobs? They are “problems of

organized complexity” in which multiple variables are all simultaneously and
subtly interconnected.11

Cities do not present one problem in organized

complexity, which if understood explains all. Variables, or particular aspects of
the city, cannot be understood in isolation from one another; they are all

8
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“interrelated into an organic whole.”12 In what can only be a direct response to Le
Corbusier and CIAM, Jacobs insists that, while the factors of a city are complex,
“there is nothing accidental or irrational about the ways in which these factors
affect each other.”13 Le Corbusier and CIAM might like to assume that ‘rational’
means straight lines, square corners, and clear organization, but it does not. Just
because something appears messy does not mean it is irrational.
!

Jacobs is right to argue that many urban spaces work well in some

respects, but poorly in others. She insists that to “diagnose the trouble” does not
mean to simply find that space’s virtues and faults, as though these things are
not connected. We must approach it as “problems of organized complexity.”14
She gives the example of her street (Hudson Street, NYC), but let us consider
Kensington Market in Toronto.
!

Kensington Market is the epitome of a ‘bustling’ urban space. The many

small shops provide everything from inexpensive foods to bicycles. There are
coffee shops, restaurants, and bars. All of this commerce and life is packed
within a relatively small space with narrow streets. Pedestrians easily outnumber
vehicles dozens to one. Because of this factor, many people have proposed
making Kensington ‘car-free’ and their campaign has been mildly successful
since after experiments with “Pedestrian Sundays” on the final Sunday of each
month in which the streets are closed to cars, these occurrences now take place
every Sunday. While these Sundays are popular (it is nearly impossible to walk
anywhere with all the people), many of those who live and work in Kensington
find these days intolerable. The small shop owners see their sales decline, and
residents find they have to leave the area for the day. It would appear that,
though the pedestrian is the ‘king of Kensington,’ were the entire area
permanently given over to pedestrians the area would fail. Why? Because of
exactly what Jacobs is insisting on here: the area is an organized complexity.
12
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Remove the vehicles and many other seemingly disparate things begin to
unravel.
!

Kensington Market is likely the most successful urban space in Toronto

and yet people have all kinds of ideas to ‘improve’ it. My position is that, rather
than mess around with Kensington, we should be studying and learning from this
urban space. Moreover, rather than seek to ‘transplant’ the things of Kensington
to another area, we would need to look at the processes that brought Kensington
about. We should study the types of people who began to populate the area, the
types of rules that were in place and the rules that were overlooked, as well as
other factors that affected these processes such as the surrounding area, and
proximities to other services and spaces. In fact, Jacobs argues for three main
themes when we want to understand cities and urban spaces: “to think about
processes”; to employ induction rather than deduction; and to seek “unaverage”
clues (in other words, look for the exceptions).15
!

The final aspect I would like to discuss from the last chapter of Death and

Life concerns the old problem of “man and nature.” Jacobs insists that the human
city is just as much a part of nature as the beehive or the bed of oysters, but she
notes a “curious thing” happened in the eighteenth century: the
sentimentalization of nature.16 For the many centuries prior to this recasting of
nature, it was understood as cruel and we organized our lives in cities and
villages to survive. “City air makes free,” the medieval saying goes.17 By the
eighteenth century, cities were common enough that people forgot the ravages of
nature and were able to romanticize it. Jacobs points to Marie Antoinette playing
milkmaid, the “sillier” idea of the ‘noble savage,’ and Jefferson’s “intellectual
rejection of cities” along with his “pathetic dream” of rural yeoman whose land
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was tilled by slaves.18 This this conceptual shift occurred despite the fact that
those living in ‘rural’ or ‘natural’ settings in the eighteenth century were least free
since they were bound by tradition, caught in castes, benighted by superstition,
and fearful of anything deemed strange.
!

Yet, with the ‘distance’ people had placed between themselves in cities

and nature ‘out there,’ it became possible to think of nature as “benign, ennobling
and pure” and cities, because people were in them, or close to them, and could
easily be thought of as the source of all social problems and enemy of what is
natural and ‘true.’19 While this sentimentalization was not quite enough to get
people to move out of cities, it was enough to create a desire to bring this
sentimentalized conception of nature into cities. Thus, we can see why the
Garden City was popular – not so much because it brought ruthless, cruel nature
into a mix with the urban, but because it mixed this sentimental or romantic
version of nature (the ‘garden’) with the urban. This sentimentalization of nature
also helps us to understand why it has become popular for urban dwellers like to
‘play gardener’ and young fashionable people extol the virtues of their beloved
urban parks.
!

The trouble with sentimentalizing nature, for Jacobs, is that it is deeply

disrespectful.20

Thus, while North Americans are likely the biggest

sentimentalizers of nature, we are also the ones who have voraciously destroyed
much farm and rural land. It is a “sentimental desire to toy, rather patronizingly,
with some insipid, standardized, suburbanized shadow of nature.”21 To think of
being with nature as mowing the lawn, tending to flower gardens, sunbathing,
and “contemplative uplift” is obscenely disparaging toward nature.22 And so,
“each day” (this being written in 1961), “several thousand more acres of our
18

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 444.

19

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 444.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 445.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 445.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 445.
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countryside are eaten by bulldozers, covered in pavement, dotted with
suburbanites who have killed the thing they thought they came to find.”23 This,
suggests Jacobs, is why these suburban settlements, which are loved and
desired by one generation, are despised by the next. While she points to these
settlements’ complete lack of infrastructural ‘staying power,’ perhaps it is the
‘nature’ of desire that best explains this. That is, one generation’s desire is not
the next’s, just as one person’s desire is not another’s. The objet petit a found/
placed in the suburban life is not found in the next generation, precisely because
they grew up with it; they were too close to its ‘reality’ to fantasize about it, too
close to sentimentalize it, and it was too direct an experience to cover over the
gaps in the dream.
!

I have begun the discussion of Death and Life with its final chapter

because I feel it contains some very important ideas and rarely do people pay it
any attention. Most ‘readers’ of Death and Life come away from it with a vague
sense of ‘mixed-use zoning’ and something about ‘eyes on the street.’24 And yet
Jacobs proves to be a theorist and deep thinker in her own right as we have seen
in this final chapter. One can only speculate why this final chapter is rarely read
or referenced.
!

Nonetheless, though Jacobs’ main arguments about ‘mixed-use,’ ‘eyes on

the street,’ the ‘ballet of the sidewalk,’ etc. are well-known to any casual urbanist,
it is worth exploring them in detail. Precisely because these ideas are now
‘common sense’ to most contemporary urban planners, we need to be cautious
with them. From where does Jacobs get these ideas? Why does she find them
so important? How have her arguments become ‘common sense’ and the
dominant ideology of contemporary urban planning? We need to maintain a
23
24

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 445.

In what is otherwise an excellent account of experiments with ‘mixed-use’ development in
Canada, the author fails to distinguish between primary and secondary uses: Jill Grant, “Mixed
Use in Theory and Practice: Canadian Experience with Implementing a Planning Principle,”
Journal of the American Planning Association 68, no. 1: 71–84. In the practice of building, the
near-universal conception of ‘mixed-use’ means a tall residential tower with shops on the ground
floor.
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critical distance from these ideas or we risk it (further) becoming ideology. Nearly
all popular contemporary books on urban life 25

agree with Jacobs’ main

arguments though sometimes these agreements are implicit. As I will show, many
of these works that cite Jacobs present her arguments in a selective, if not
misleading, manner. Perhaps most significantly, Jacobs’ argument about the
need for a diversity of primary uses that will then lend themselves to a diversity of
secondary uses is often conflated as ‘mixed-use,’ short-circuiting the primary and
secondary uses.
!

Jacobs begins Death and Life with a hysterical attack: “This book is an

attack on current city planning and rebuilding.”26 Many have misinterpreted this
as ‘an attack on all city planning.’ Jacobs is not opposed to all planning, just what
was going on at the time (and unfortunately still persists). The type of planning
she opposes I have been referring to as ‘modernist urban planning.’ In fact, she
is trying to propose new ways to understand urban planning – new concepts and
variables. She is seeking to explain “why some parks are marvellous and other
are vice traps,” why some areas are and stay slums while others regenerate
themselves, why downtown centres shift, and why some neighbourhoods work
while others do not.27 What is crucial to her theorizing of the city is that she thinks
seriously “about how cities work in real life”; for her this approach “is the only way
to learn what principles of planning and what practices in rebuilding can promote
social and economic vitality in cities and what practices and principles will
deaden these attributes.”28
25

For example, P.D. Smith, City: A Guidebook for the Urban Age (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012);
Ken Greenberg, Walking Home: The Life and Lessons of a City Builder (Toronto: Random House
Canada, 2011); Fran Tonkiss, Space, the City, and Social Theory: Social Relations and Urban
Forms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Allan B. Jacobs, Great Streets (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1993). Sharon Zukin, Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Spaces (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009.) The increasingly influential New Urbanism movement also
cites Jacobs’ work for support. See: Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck,
Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream (New York: North
Point Press, 2000).
26

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 3.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 3–4.
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This shows that Jacobs is positioning herself with the analyst’s discourse

as she is taking her object of study (the city) as a subject in its own right ($). This
means that we are to deal with the problem of the other’s (the city’s) desire with
more nuance than simply imposing a knowledge system which characterizes the
university discourse. Taking the city as a subject in its own right is directly related
to what I already highlighted above from the final chapter of Death and Life: that
we must not impose a way of thinking on an object, but that we must allow the
object of our study to determine our city. In other words, various modernist
planners have sought to impose (usually a moral) order on urban spaces
whereas Jacobs is looking at these urban spaces and learning from them,
allowing the uses and shapes of these spaces to guide her thinking. Some might
just categorize her as “a good empiricist” but I think things are bit more
complicated. She is fully aware that her approach is guided by a theory and a
normative position: then-contemporary urban planning was based on wrong
theories, and her position is that cities are good things. Perhaps most
fundamental to her theory is that she is employing inductive rather than deductive
reasoning (and imploring others to do so as well); we ought to start on the
ground, observing all the details and go from there, not try and fit the small
details into a grand theory. So, as with the urbanists and planners discussed in
the previous chapter, Jacobs begins from hysteric’s discourse but immediately
situates herself within the analyst’s discourse and remains ensconced there.

Jane Jacobs and the Four Discourses
As explained in the previous chapter, early cities and towns were of the master’s
discourse. There was little in the way of plans and these cities and towns grew
‘organically’: they grew the way they grew because that was how they grew. The
parks movement, Howard’s Garden Cities movement, Le Corbusier’s plans, and
the aims of CIAM represented the dominant plans and ideologies that began to
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inform the growth of cities and demonstrated the rise of the university discourse
in response to the ‘master cities.’

Hysteric’s Discourse


We might think of Jacobs operating within the hysteric’s discourse since she is
‘talking back’ to the master (¨), demanding the master prove its right to authority.
But I have positioned the old, unplanned cities as with the master’s discourse.
Further, Jacobs is ‘talking back’ to and criticizing the planned cities of the
university discourse, but this is only a small portion of what she is doing. The
majority of her work is takes the city as it actually exists and reveals its ‘truth’ (©)
at the expense (loss) of the university discourse’s privileging of ‘knowledge’ (©)
However, the hysteric’s discourse does help us understand some of her critics’
initial responses to Death and Life. For example, Lewis Mumford wrote a long
critique of her book in the New Yorker, which relied heavily on gendered
categories of knowledge.29 With a skewed reading of Death and Life, Mumford
suggests “Mrs. Jacobs’ … ideal city is mainly an organization for the prevention
of crime”30 and her biggest concern is “for the smallest unit of urban life” (the
family).31

Mumford finds that Jacobs both unknowingly confirms some of

Ebenezer Howard’s ideas and makes proposals that counter her overall goal.
Mumford is seeking to position Jacobs as the Lacanian hysteric: irrationally
demanding the master prove its worth and providing so-called ‘alternatives’ that
end up being just as bad as the master’s, unwittingly establishing what it seeks to
oppose, full of contradictions, etc. In the ‘discourses’ of urban planning, I think the

29

Lewis Mumford, “Mother Jacobs’ Home Remedies,” in New Yorker December 1, 1962: 148–
179. To be fair, Mumford was a follower of Ebenezer Howard, of whom Jacobs is critical.
30

Mumford, “Mother Jacobs’ Home Remedies,” 160.

31

Mumford, “Mother Jacobs’ Home Remedies,” 170–171.
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hysteric’s discourse best fits with many ‘residents associations’ that fall under
short-sighted NIMBYism.32

Analyst’s Discourse


!

Jacobs fits best, I argue, in the analyst’s discourse. Above, I suggested

that the analyst takes the city as a subject () in its own right. However, we can
also think of  as a product of the university discourse, which the agent in the
analyst discourse interrogates. That is, Jacobs is interrogating the failures of the
supposed ‘objective’ knowledge or truth of modernist city planning. The first line
of Death and Life is “This book is an attack on current city planning and
rebuilding.”33 By “current,” she is referring to the modernist planning of the late
1950s and early 1960s. While we can see the ‘truth’ of Jacobs’ analyst’s
discourse as knowledge of the city revealed through her observations and letting
the city ‘speak’ for itself, we can also understand this knowledge as the
knowledge of the book: not only will we find a wide variety of prescriptions,
principles, and ‘pearls of wisdom’ for cities in the book, but the ‘knowledge’ of the
book has lasted for fifty years now. Jacobs’ ideas continue to inform the work of a
wide array of urbanists and planners. The product of the analyst’s discourse ()
is slightly different than  in the master’s discourse. In the analyst’s discourse, it
refers to a master signifier that the analysand would ‘cough up’ in analysis. It
would be a “word or phrase that puts an end to association.”34 With Jacobs the
phrase could be “cities are an organized complexity” rather than previous
conceptions of cities being a terrible problem, which a simple principle or plan
would solve all issues. In relation to modernist planning, the phrase would be that
32

NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard. A pejorative directed at people who agree a certain building or
project is necessary for the larger community, but do not want it near their residences.
33
34

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 3.

Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995), 135.
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central thing around which modernist planning circles yet never speaks. While it
could be understood as a fetishization of ‘science’ or ‘rationality,’ I argue it is
modernist planning’s hatred of the city. One could imagine a modernist planner
like Le Corbusier or any member of CIAM (or Howard, Olmsted, or Unwin) being
interrogated by Jacobs until they finally admit, “I hate the city!”35 Of course, Le
Corbusier and CIAM did write that they hate cities. This should have put an end
to their circling and ‘free-association’ of various scientific, rationalist, and
functionalist terms and phrases. But what of Jacobs herself as ? In the analyst’s
discourse, it is the analyst who takes the position of the agent as , meaning a
desiring subject or “pure desirousness.”36 I think it is fair to characterize Jacobs
as such as she presents herself in the book as a subject of jouissance: her
obvious love of all things urban, and the messiness of city life that modernist
planning seeks to rationalize and remove. This love is very apparent in one
section of Death and Life wherein she phones Boston’s city planner while visiting
the North End.37 The city planner is shocked to hear she is in this area alone and
urges her to get out of this dangerous place immediately, to which Jacobs
general reply is “No! It’s great! I’m having fun!” She enjoys the very things that
modernist planning is seeking, through its knowledge, to eradicate. In any case,
allow me to leave this aside for now and discuss some details of Death and Life,
in order that my positioning of Jacobs as the analyst in the analyst’s discourse
will become more clear.

35

Many other urbanists reveal their dislike of cities as well, including most of the Marxist
‘everyday life’ writers from the 1960s onward. Henri Lefebvre’s argument about urbanism, to
greatly simplify, is that it is a result of unequal social relations caused by capitalism. See: Henri
Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2003). As shown in the final chapter below, Manuel Castells finally reveals his conservatism and
desire for ‘less urban’ forms of association. See: Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network
Society, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 492. Even Witold Rybczynski, the wellknown contemporary essayist on cities, admits he prefers garden suburbs. See: Witold
Rybczynski, Makeshift Metropolis: Ideas About Cities (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010).
36

Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 135.
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It is probably well-known that Jacobs writes about the ‘small’ things of

cities rather than large, overarching plans. While this does not seem particularly
interesting, it is worth considering more deeply. Modernist planning is not
particularly concerned with what already exists on the ground (unless it is a
‘slum’ it wishes to eradicate). Modernist planning, with at least one interesting
exception, literally does not have a perspective.38 The plans of modernist
planning are not presented as they would appear to a person in the space, nor
are they presented as though viewed from above. They are purely abstract, a
pure representation of space (Lefebvre). So, while many have suggested that
Jacobs brought urban thinking down to street level, this is not accurate. Yes, she
thinks at street level, but earlier planners were not thinking from ‘above,’ they
were thinking from a totally abstract space, the space of calculation with no
regard for specifics. Thus, Jacobs warns the reader they will be disappointed if
they expect her to explain how cities “ought” to work.39 She goes on to say that it
is “futile to plan a city’s appearance” without knowing what type of thing or
problem a city is.40 As mentioned above, the city, for Jacobs, is a problem of
organized complexity, which is not how any modernist urban planner considered
the city.
!
Reply to Howard and Le Corbusier
Jacobs gives a faithful account of Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities project,
making note that what has been done in the name of ‘garden cities’ was not what
Howard intended. She argues that Howard’s ideas “set spinning powerful and
city-destroying ideas” because he proposed that “the way to deal with the city’s
functions was to sort out and sift out of the whole certain simple uses, and to

38

Lacan refers to this as “‘geomatral’ or ‘flat’ (as opposed to perspective)”: Jacques Lacan, The
Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans.
Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 85.
39

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 14.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 14.
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arrange each of these in relative self-containment.”41 Were there one crucial
sentence or argument that we ought to take from Death and Life, this is the one.
Jacobs’ argument is that the various things that go on in cities cannot be
separated. While Howard only saw two actual “Garden Cities” built with their own
separation of uses, nearly all of North America saw new zoning practices that
separated land uses. But to blame Howard for this might be a bit unfair. We
ought to recall the unquestioned, appalling conditions of industrial towns.
Howard’s impetus for separating land use was the existence of residential
buildings right next to factories which polluted the air, land, and water. Though
the issue is not addressed, it would be difficult to imagine Jacobs advocating for
worker dormitories or housing next to factories. Nonetheless, North America took
this idea of separating land uses to the extreme so that certain areas or streets
would only have a single use: retail, restaurants, residential, recreational,
industrial, etc.42 This separation of uses is why North American suburbs do not
have corner stores, but instead any number of corporately owned gas stations
with an attached convenience store at the intersection of two arterial roads.
!

Jacobs also argues that paternalism, if not authoritarianism, is another

aspect of Howard’s plan, which was taken up by modernist town planners. This
refers to large scale developments that were justified by a ‘we know best’ attitude
of government officials.43 Many planners ignored any aspect of city life that could
not be abstracted and controlled. All the following were excluded from Howard’s

41

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 18.

42

The problems that stem from separating land uses are too long to list. Throughout Death and
Life many of these problems are discussed. However, Jacobs does note there are certain
buildings which have functions that ought to be separated. They all share a common feature: they
thwart diversity.
43

This paternalistic attitude is why Frederick Gardiner, the first mayor of Metro Toronto, was
known as “Big Daddy Gardiner.” See: Timothy J. Colton, Big Daddy: Frederick G. Gardiner and
the Building of Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1980). Of course,
Jacobs has in mind Robert Moses, the “master builder” in New York City. Jacobs had organized
opposition to many of his plans, the most famous of which was the proposed Lower Manhattan
Expressway, which Jacobs helped to cancel while completing Death and Life. See: Anthony Flint,
Wresting with Moses: How Jane Jacobs Took On New York’s Master Builder and Transformed the
American City (New York: Random House, 2009).
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plans and most modernist planning: the way “cities police themselves, or
exchange ideas, or operate politically, or invent new economic arrangements.”44
This is by no means a complete list, but it does speak to how planning and its
implementation were understood as static, abstract things which occurred once
without any thought given to process.
!

Jacobs makes the connection between Howard’s Garden City and Le

Corbusier’s Radiant City. Though the Garden City advocates were “aghast” at Le
Corbusier’s plans, its favourable reception was largely due to it being a “vertical
Garden City.”45 Further, it took up the increasingly popular ideas of the “super
block, the project neighborhood, the unchangeable plan, and grass, grass,
grass,” all the while presenting these ideas as the “hallmarks of humane, socially
responsible, functional, high-minded planning.”46 Though Jacobs argues that Le
Corbusier’s plan was taken up by many architects and planners and informed
many buildings and projects, it should be noted that much of Le Corbusier’s plan
was ignored, just as much of Howard’s were in the various ‘garden suburbs.’
Jacobs argues that automobiles were the reason Le Corbusier’s ideas were
(partially) taken up: large highways and arterial roads, one-way streets and fewer
cross-streets that would impede motor traffic.
!

Jacobs writes that Le Corbusier “proposed underground streets for heavy

vehicles” and “he kept the pedestrians off the streets and in the parks.”47 It is
surprising that Jacobs misconstrues Le Corbusier’s plan, which was to have all
personal motor traffic on elevated highways with some underground streets for
heavy, commercial vehicles so that the entire ground would be given to
pedestrians. It is partially true that pedestrians would be “in the parks,” but this is
because the whole city would be a park. This misconstruing of Le Corbusier’s
ideas does not necessarily strengthen Jacobs’ point. In fact, Le Corbusier’s
44
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 22.

46

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 22.

47

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 23.

!

Chapter 4!

224

repeated calls for the ‘death of the street’ are ignored by Jacobs and would make
her criticism much stronger. Below, I will show how Jacobs disagrees with any
notions of car-free streets, including Le Corbusier’s plan where “no pedestrian
would ever meet an automobile.”48
!

Jacobs clearly states that it was Howard’s and Le Corbusier’s ideas that

were “constantly use[d], as fixed points of reference” by all guilty parties: “zoners,
highway planners, legislators, land-use planners and parks and playground
planners.”49 However, there was one other important movement. Not the ‘parks
movement’ outlined above, but a related one: the “City Beautiful” movement that
began in Chicago in the 1890s, very close to the time Howard was formulating
the Garden City. Jacobs describes the City Beautiful movement as a dramatized
“retrogressive imitation Renaissance style.”50 This movement implemented many
grandiose monuments in as many parks as possible, grand “baroque boulevards”
with the general theme of a central town square.51 Jacobs’ critique of these
central civic or cultural centres is that they were planned and implemented with
no regard for the city itself, treated as a separate unit. She argues that, though
people were proud of them, they quickly lost interest. Very few people ever
visited these monuments or squares and the surrounding areas eventually
“acquired a congruous rim of ratty tattoo parlors and second-hand-clothing
stores” or simply became vacant and decayed.52
!

Jacobs as analyst is able to see these seemingly different ideas as one

articulation: the “Radiant Garden City Beautiful,” which, until at least the time of

48

Le Corbusier, The Radiant City: Elements of a Doctrine of Urbanism to be Used as the Basis of
Our Machine-age Civilization, trans. Pamela Knight, Eleanor Levieux, and Derek Coltman, (New
York: The Orion Press, 1967), 113.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 24.
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 24. Toronto’s Old City Hall was planned
to have a public square based on City Beautiful principles, but this was never built. Just east,
University Avenue with a large meridian boulevard and a few monuments is a classic example of
a City Beautiful project, especially since this boulevard is rarely used.
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her writing this book, had informed urban planning.53 The underlying problem is
that all of these plans, separately and together, are “irrelevant to the workings of
cities. Unstudied, unrespected, cities have served as sacrificial victims.”54

Central Arguments of Death and Life
After Jacobs’ “Introduction,” the following three chapters are devoted to
sidewalks; that is to say nearly sixty pages devoted to sidewalks. It would not be
productive to summarize everything in these three chapters, so instead I will
instead pull out a few essential arguments and seek to show how they relate to
the various theories informing this dissertation, to contemporary planning, and to
some examples from Toronto.
!

Earlier, I outlined Foucault’s argument about circulation in the urban.

Jacobs, however, argues that sidewalks are “bound up with circulation but are
not identical with it.”55 That is, there is much more going on with city sidewalks
than merely circulating people and goods. Sidewalks by themselves are nothing
more than an abstraction and only gain meaning and purpose in relation to the
things that surround it: buildings, other land uses, or other nearby sidewalks. This
goes for streets as well. Streets and sidewalks are partially about circulation but
are a city’s “most vital organs.”56 A city’s streets and sidewalks are what define a
city: if they are interesting, the city is interesting. Moreover, if streets are safe,
then that city is safe. And streets are safe not because of policing or the
containment of a certain ‘class’ of people or because they are empty. Rather,
streets and sidewalks are safe because of the people who use them; people
using streets and sidewalks are what make a city safe.

53
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Interestingly, Jacobs points out that these are not the roles of streets and

sidewalks in small towns or suburbs; cities are not like towns, only bigger and
they are not like suburbs, only denser. This is because “cities are, by definition,
full of strangers.”57 So, for a city to function well, people need to feel safe in the
midst of strangers. Though Jacobs repeatedly argues that cities are problems of
organized complexity, that there is not one ‘key’ that will unlock the solution, she
is, in fact, arguing that without safe streets and sidewalks, a city will find itself
with “mountain on mountain of trouble.”58
!

Jacobs goes through a list of the ‘usual suspects’ that people blame for

unsafe streets and sidewalks: slums, older parts of the city, and minority groups.
None of these factors are what cause streets to be or feel unsafe. And streets
and sidewalks are not kept safe by the police, but “primarily by an intricate,
almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the
people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.”59 In fact, parts of
the city where police are constantly present are the least safe parts of the city.
“No amount of police can enforce civilization.”60 Jacobs presents a strong
argument that the safest streets and sidewalks are those that are well-used, a
point which she summarizes accordingly: “A well-used city street is apt to be a
safe street. A deserted city street is apt to be unsafe.”61
!

So, rather than trying to come up with policy or plans to make streets safe,

planners and governments need to think about how to make streets well-used.
Jacobs provides three main qualities streets must have to make them safe.
These three qualities are the central arguments to Jacobs’ work, which are
revisited and relied on throughout the book. They are: 1) there must be a clear
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demarcation between public and private space; 2) there must be “eyes on the
street” and; 3) a sidewalk must have people on it fairly continuously.62
!

The least discussed feature is the first one, that there needs to be a “clear

demarcation” between public and private space and that the two cannot “ooze
into each other” as they do in suburban settings. While Jacobs does not
elaborate on this argument, we can assume that the point is that people need to
be able to clearly understand where public space, like a sidewalk, ends and
private space, like a front yard, begins. Interestingly, this appears contrary to
what Jan Gehl argues in his Life Between Buildings.63 In a later book, Gehl
contends that life occurs between buildings because “something happens
because something happens because something happens” or “nothing happens
because nothing happens because nothing happens.”64 Gehl continually uses the
words “inviting” or “invite” when explaining his theories of urban design: a space
needs to be inviting to people, cities must invite people to use transit or ride
bikes. In Life Between Buildings, Gehl argues that to get people outside, the
space there must be inviting. To this end, he argues that there must be flexible,
not sharp, borders between private space (dwelling) and public space (sidewalk).
Though Jacobs is insisting that there must be a “clear demarcation” between
public and private space, I think Jacobs and Gehl are in agreement, though using

62

Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 35. Jacobs’ arguments concerning safety
of well-used sidewalks, and particularly the concept of ‘eyes on the street,’ have been validated
by the numerous cities that have adopted this theory in their design policies, including Vancouver,
New York City, and even Thunder Bay. The recent re-development of Regent Park in Toronto has
also followed these principles. For the most cited study concerning this theory, see: Oscar
Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design (New York: Macmillan,
1972). Newman was asked to condense and update his theory for the U.S. Federal Government,
which he produced and published: Oscar Newman, Creating Defensible Space (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1996). Retrieved from http://
www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/def.pdf For a succinct account of Newman’s theory in relation
to Jacobs, see: Michael Lewyn, “Crime and Design: Oscar Newman 36 Years Later,” Planetizen
August 13, 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.planetizen.com/node/34530
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Jan Gehl, Life Between Buildings: Using Public Space, trans. Jo Koch (New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold, 1987).
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Jan Gehl, Cities for People (Washington, D.C: Island Press, 2010), 64. It is worth noting the
similar structure of “something happens because something happens” to the ‘dogmatic stupidity
of the signifier’: a word means what it means because that is what it means.
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different words. For Gehl’s concern to get people outside doing something, he
envisions a type of semi-private, semi-public space between purely public and
purely private space. Consider a typical Toronto house in relation to the street:
interior of the house, a front porch, a front yard, and then the sidewalk. With this
arrangement, the person in the house can come outside of the purely private
interior of the house and be in a semi-private space of the front porch. The front
yard is also semi-private, but becomes semi-public closer to the purely public
space of the sidewalk. People arrange their front yards to be more private (the
extreme is high bushes along the perimeter) to being more public (open border,
maybe even a bench close to the sidewalk). Rarely, though, are benches in
people’s front yards used. Following Jacobs’ ideas, it might be because they are
‘too’ public and people prefer to sit out front closer to their house, such as on the
front porch. As to why people would put these benches in their front yard and not
use them, it is helpful to recall Lacan’s distinction between imaginary and
symbolic identification discussed in chapter 2. It is not so much that they want to
identify themselves as people who enjoy urban life (imaginary identification), but
rather that they want to been seen as people who enjoy urban life (symbolic
identification). For, if they really did enjoy the public nature of urban life and like
to engage with strangers, then they would sit on their benches.
!

Gehl’s reasoning for flexible borders is so that a person may go outside to

do something (like tend to a garden or fix something up) and be exposed to the
possibility that someone else will be outside doing something similar. Or, if only
one person goes out, then others might see this person and go out themselves.
Again, “something happens because something happens.” However, if the house
has no relation to the front street and the outside area is a fenced-in back yard
(as found in a typical suburb), then there is a sharp border between public and
private space, or between two private spaces. In these arrangements, people will
not see anyone else outside and, if they do, socializing is difficult. Or, if there’s no
semi-private or semi-public space in front of the house, then a person will not
have this middle space to be outdoors without being in purely public space; going
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outside will be a ‘full commitment,’ not just a ‘step outside’ to see what is going
on. Typically, in suburban environments, the ‘nosey neighbour’ is the person who
shows up when someone is enjoying their yard. This is likely a problem in the
suburbs for a number of reasons: that it is probably the same person or people
who do this, or there is little hope of ‘escape’ from these encounters (they will not
‘take a hint’). This relates to the types of contact urban dwellers have and the
mutual respect of privacy and private space.
!

Though Jacobs says there needs to be a “clear demarcation” between

public and private space I think she is essentially in agreement with Gehl. By
“clear demarcation,” she does not necessarily mean a tall fence or bushes or a
“no trespassing” sign. Rather, this demarcation between public and private space
is made in clear but subtle ways. The most obvious is the straight line of the edge
of a sidewalk. People walking on a sidewalk know they are in public space and
welcome there. And they know that that edge of sidewalk is the end of this public
space. Some people might raise the edge of their front yard to further this
demarcation, or perhaps erect a low, decorative fence, as is popular with many
Portuguese families in Toronto.65
!

What is it about this distinction between public and private space that

makes a street safe? In short: people can be certain that public space is public
space and that they are welcome there. They are invited to use this public space
without feeling they are infringing on someone’s private space. People on the
street are what make a street safe, so whatever encourages people onto the
streets and sidewalks will make streets and sidewalks safer.
!

The agreement between Gehl and Jacobs becomes clearer when we look

at the second quality for safe streets. This is the famous, if not infamous,
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Many first-generation Italian and Portuguese immigrants in Toronto arrange the front area of
their houses with paving stones instead of grass, and wrought iron fencing and overhang
supports. This aesthetic appears to be influenced partly by wanting to showcase azulejos
(painted glazed tiles) with Christian iconography. For a study of this practice, see: Catharine
Ponte’s website Front Yard Devotions: http://individual.utoronto.ca/kitkat/ftydev3.htm
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argument that “there must be eyes on the street.” But it is not just anyone’s
‘eyes’ – it must be the eyes of those who Jacobs calls the “natural proprietors” of
the street.66 That is, the people who live in the houses and apartments on the
street and the people who work in the shops. This means that houses,
apartments, and shops must face the street. Recall the typical Toronto house
described above. Aside from a porch that faces the street, there are also a
number of windows that face the street as well. On the other hand, a common
trend with some larger, chain stores is to poster over the windows that face the
street or stock product in front of them so one cannot see in or out. However,
having many people watch the street at various times of the day ensures that,
were there to be something nefarious going on, someone would see it and
intervene. More importantly, it means that people on the street and sidewalk feel
comfortable – they know there are people watching.
!

But why would they assume that if something were to happen to them that

someone, the owners of one of these pairs of eyes, would intervene? For
Jacobs, it is called “trust” and this is why it does not work if the “eyes” are hired
security or the police.67 Here we need to recall that, for Jacobs, cities are by
definition full of strangers. This trust among people is developed by “many, many
public sidewalk contacts”68 and is directly opposed to the “togetherness” found in
small towns or suburbs, which Jacobs calls “nauseating.”69 Jacobs argues,
rightly, that there are so many people in cities, with whom a certain degree of
contact is useful and enjoyable, “but you do not want them in your hair. And they
do not want you in theirs either.”70 So people get to know other people in their
neighbourhoods, but they maintain a degree of privacy. Without this level of
social privacy, people would not want to go out for fear they would have to
discuss private parts of their lives. Thus, people trust other people to not meddle
66
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in their affairs but also trust that there is a “general street support when the chips
are down.”71 While Jacobs explains this trust is developed through the many
seemingly trivial sidewalk contacts, an urban dweller can judge this level of trust
in other ways. For example, where I live on Bloor Street, I have seen people stop
to pick up a lost glove and place it on a newspaper box or somewhere else
prominent so the owner might find it. I have seen a person fall off a bike and a
half dozen people rush over to ensure she was all right and wave at cars in case
the drivers did not see her. I have seen someone drop an item and a person pick
it up and rush ahead to return it. While I have never seen someone provoking a
fight, I once witnessed a truck full of young men verbally harass a woman
walking on the sidewalk. Though there is little someone on foot can do to a group
of cowards in a truck, everyone within ear-shot looked at each other in disgust
and with sympathy for the young woman. There is also the treatment of and the
existence of panhandlers. On Bloor they come from all over the city, one a
woman from Jane and Finch, because people give them money and food, and
treat them with respect. Were the area dangerous or unsafe, there would not be
panhandlers – and the danger of Jane and Finch is the primary reason why the
woman comes here. There are many other examples I could mention, but I think
my point is made: I know, for certain, that if anything were to happen to me on
the sidewalk of my street, people will intervene. This communal trust is what
makes the street safe – not necessarily because they will ‘save’ me from some
incident, but that I feel safe. A street that is safe or feels safe amounts to the
same thing.
!

The third quality is tied into the previous two: there must be people on

sidewalks nearly continuously. This is what the “ballet of the sidewalk” refers to: a
diversity of people on the sidewalks continuously throughout the day and well
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into the evening.72 Having a clear demarcation between public and private space
ensures that people know the public space is public and feel welcome. Having
“eyes on the street” includes those who are on the streets, not just those
watching from windows or porches. Essential for this stratagem to work is having
many people on the sidewalks nearly continuously to give the people watching
the street something to watch. And, to ensure that people are on the sidewalks,
there must be places for people to go throughout the day and night: there must
be stores, bars, restaurants, etc. Consider a strictly residential area, not
necessarily a suburb, but an older residential area of any town or city with few if
any stores. There will only be people on the sidewalks during the day and they
will be those walking recreationally or taking a dog out for a walk – or, if there is
one close by, a few people walking to a solitary store when it is open. It is in
these environments that people often do not feel safe when walking alone since
there is nobody around, nobody to help or intervene if something were to
happen. And, while proper studies would be required, it might help to explain why
suburban areas of Toronto and other cities are more dangerous than the more
densely populated central areas.73

72

Jacobs’ concept of the ‘ballet of the sidewalk’ is very similar to the rhythms of a day that
Lefebvre describes in “Seen from a Window,” which he wrote much later (this essay, along with
the others published in Rhythmanalysis were the last of Lefebvre’s writings and published after
his death in 1991): Henri Lefebvre, “Seen from a Window,” in Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and
Everyday Life, trans. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (London: Continuum, 2004), 27–37. Further,
that Jacobs makes this seemingly random or chaotic aspect of urban life an valid object of
analysis fits it within Rancière’s concept of politics outlined in chapter 2.
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However, high levels of residential density is not a guarantee of feeling safe or low crime rates.
Many relatively small suburban areas with many high-rises (i.e. areas with high residential
densities) often have a high rate of crime. As will be shown below, Jacobs (and contemporary
planners) do not find much value in residential or even dwelling density alone since other factors
need to be included, such as employment density, public space, and retail. Further, as is argued
throughout this chapter, the point is the need for a diversity of these land uses. So, rather than
comparing crime rates to density ratios, one would more likely find a correlation between low
diversity (however that may be defined) and high crime rates.
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Diversity: An Economic Argument
While these are ways in which to ensure sidewalk safety, the most overlooked
aspect of Jacobs’ work is the economic aspect. Many suggest that Jacobs is
advocating for some happy, safe, “Sesame Street urbanism,” 74 but the main point
she is making concerns economic prosperity. To demonstrate this, let us look at
the central portion of her book on the “Conditions for City Diversity.”75
!

Jacobs’ argument for city diversity is what makes her so different from

previous urban or town planners. Modernist urban planners insisted on the
separation of uses (‘zoning’) to ensure that various land uses (e.g. residential,
commercial, manufacturing, etc.) were kept separate. Jacobs is insisting that
both cities and city districts must have a diversity of uses for vital urban life, but
primarily to provide the necessary conditions of economic prosperity. Using the
example of a “pretty sidewalk park in Baltimore” that “needs some commerce for
its users’ convenience,”76 Jacobs states:
Anybody who started a retail enterprise here, for example, would be
stupid. He could not make a living. To wish a vital urban life might
somehow spring up here is to play with daydreams. The place is an
economic desert.77
I quote this at length because, while much of her ideas are about making the city
a vibrant place to live, I want to insist that Jacobs’ central argument is about
generating economy. And what generates the economy is diversity – diversity of
users and uses.
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This is Shawn Micallef’s term. See, for example: Shawn Micallef, “Ye Old Merry Christmas,”
Spacing Toronto, Dec 25, 2006. Retrieved from: http://spacingtoronto.ca/2006/12/25/ye-oldmerry-christmas/
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Many have conflated Jacobs’ argument about diversity as the ‘need for

mixed-use,’ but Jacobs argument is the “need for primary mixed-uses.”78 A
‘primary’ use is something like office buildings, factories, dwellings, some places
of entertainment, education, and recreation. To a lesser extent, so are museums,
libraries, galleries.79 Jacobs is arguing that there needs to be a few of these in
one area so that there are people out and about throughout the day. A district
with just one or even two primary uses, such as an office building, will only have
people outside when people are coming to the office and leaving to go home.
The downtown of London, Ontario, is a prime example of this problem: there are
many office buildings but little else so that the area is nearly deserted by 5:15
PM, so the shops close and remains vacant until the bar crowd shows up.
!

While there is a need for a mix of primary uses, “by itself it is relatively

ineffectual as a creator of city diversity.”80 If there are multiple primary uses that
get people on sidewalks and streets at different times (the “sidewalk ballet”),
“then the effect can be economically stimulating: a fertile environment for
secondary diversity.” 81 Secondary diversity refers to “enterprises that grow in
response to the presence of primary uses, to serve the people the primary uses
draw.”82 These are the smaller shops and services such as corner stores, lunch
places, dry cleaners, bicycle shops, bookstores, etc. Jacobs argues that this
secondary diversity will only develop where there is a diversity of primary uses. If
there is only one primary use (such as residential) it is unlikely that a secondary
service will do well. The main reason for this is that a diversity of primary uses
will bring a multitude of diverse people into the district, from which the secondary
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 152. Emphasis added. It is astounding
that this is overlooked; it is the title of Chapter 8.
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services “can sift their clienteles.”83 And, if a secondary service does well
enough, it can become one of a district’s primary services.
!

Below I will further discuss Jacobs’ economic theories, but here I will point

out that few, if any, urban scholars make much use of this economic theory
regarding primary and secondary diversity. Below it will be clear that, whenever
Jacobs is taken up as an economic thinker, it is nearly always in reference to her
other works, not Death and Life. In rare instances when the economic aspect of
Death and Life is acknowledged, it is only in passing.84 What has been adopted
by many city’s official plans and builders is a concept of ‘mixed-use.’ This
concept of ‘mixed-use’ is usually a diversity of uses in a single building, not a
diversity of land uses in an area or district. While apartment or office buildings
were once nearly always built with a lobby on the main floor, these buildings are
now nearly always built with space for retail on the main floor. In Jacobs terms,
the apartments or offices are ‘primary use’ while the retail space is ‘secondary
use.’ While Jacobs argues that a district needs to have a diversity of primary
uses (residents, work space, etc.) so that secondary uses would be supported,
we see that current building practices seek to ‘short-circuit’ this process by
providing both primary and secondary uses in a single building. While this
practice does help to enliven the streetscape, it is not without problems. If an
apartment or condominium tower is built in an area without other primary uses,
the retail store at street level will not have enough people around throughout the
day to support the business. Condominium buildings are largely financed by
those who buy the residential units, whereas the retail space is leased. There is
less financial risk to the builder if they lease that retail space to one, larger
business. Better would be a diversity of smaller stores, though this means
multiple leases the developer (or whatever management company is hired) to
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Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 162.

For example, see: Pierre Desrochers and Samuli Leppälä, “Rethinking ‘Jacobs Spillovers,’ or
How Diverse Cities Actually Make Individuals More Creative and Economically Successful,” in
What We See: Advancing the Observations of Jane Jacobs, ed. Stephen A. Goldsmith and Lynne
Elizabeth (Oakland, CA: New Village Press, 2010): 287–296.
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negotiate and smaller, independent stores are more likely to run into trouble and
not be able to pay their rent. But much of this increased risk comes from this
attempt at short-circuiting the development of secondary uses.
!

Were city’s official plans and developers to follow Jacobs’ arguments more

closely, they would see there is nothing wrong with building an apartment,
condominium, or office building that serves only one use – so long as there are a
variety of these primary uses in the area. With this diversity of primary uses in an
area, entrepreneurs will move into the area based on their own estimations of the
viability of whatever business, and will be much more likely to succeed. In terms
of policy, cities really only need to do one thing: get rid of any ‘single use’ zoning
bylaws that are in place. There are many areas where two or more primary uses
exist (such as residential and educational), which make it an excellent location
for secondary uses (a café, restaurant, variety store), but the zoning bylaws
prohibit such a thing. Of course, I am simplifying here. The obvious problem
would be the availability of retail space, which is partly why there is this
insistence on retail space on the ground floor of residential towers. Perhaps,
though, there are things cities can do to ensure these spaces are built, but have
policies in place so that developers are not so inclined to rent these out to larger,
chain stores. Dictating that these spaces be multiple and smaller is probably not
the best route, but there are practices a city can (and do) take to relieve the
financial burden of the retail spaces on developers (such as lower developmental
fees, tax breaks on vacant stores, or subsidizing the rent) so that these
secondary uses develop on their own accord.
!

The need for a mixture of primary uses to generate secondary uses is the

first condition to generate diversity. The second condition is the need for small
blocks. Again, many have taken up this argument in favour of small blocks to
support walkable, ‘Sesame Street’ urbanism.85 But, again, Jacobs’ argument for
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both in print and online. As well, a few writers involved with Spacing have created an advocacy
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small blocks has to do with economy: small blocks generate the economy. Now, a
series of small blocks does make it interesting for a person living on a street and
needing to walk to various destinations.86 He or she is able to choose from a
variety of routes. More importantly, it ensures that this person is more aware of
what happens on the other streets and is assured that “these people have
[some]thing to do with him” or her.87 And by “having anything to do with him” or
her, Jacobs is referring to an “economic effect.”88
!

The economic effect is explained in two ways. With long blocks, people

must go to the end of their block to a perpendicular, usually larger, street.
Jacobs’ example is in New York City, where 88th Street crosses Columbus
Avenue. Here, people from all the long blocks (88th, 87th, 86th, etc.) “stream”
together into one place (Columbus Avenue). And, Jacobs argues, because of all
these long blocks leading to one place, Columbus Avenue “has its own kind of
monotony”: there are only shops and commercial standardization.89 It might be
surprising to some to read Jacobs referring to Columbus Avenue as part of the
“Great Blight of Dullness,” but Columbus Avenue along these blocks is, in fact,
rather dull: liquor stores, dry cleaners, and not much else. 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. are
all ‘beautiful’ streets with large trees and lovely apartments and houses. It is
clearly an expensive place to rent or own a house or apartment. But Jacobs’
point remains: there a deadening economic effect. While upper-class people may
live here, their money is not going to anything else besides mortgages or rents,
at least in this area. The long blocks sort people “into paths that meet too
infrequently, so that different uses very near to each other geographically are, in
practical effect, literally blocked off from one another.”90
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Jan Gehl, for example, argues that urban dwellers ought to walk or bicycle for its enjoyable
features, but he rarely connects it to these economic aspects. See: Jan Gehl, Cities for People
(Washington, D.C: Island Press, 2010).
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Now, if 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. were to be bisected with another street that ran

parallel to Columbus, the blocks along 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. would be shorter.
While this would give people choice in their routes, the economic effect would
mean that rather than a single “stream” of people, there would be multiple “pools”
of intersecting pathways. And these multiple intersections are the place for stores
to serve the residents of these streets: a corner store, ice-cream shop, bicycle
shop, fresh produce, etc. Short blocks allow people to “pool their [economic]
support nearby.” 91
!

While Jacobs’ example are streets in New York City, there are similar

situations in Toronto that verify her arguments. The streets between Avenue
Road and Bedford Avenue, south of Davenport Road and north of Bloor Street
have a similar problem as 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. These streets are Bernard Avenue,
Tranby Avenue, Boswell Avenue, Elgin Avenue, Lowther Avenue, and Prince
Arthur Avenue. Though these Toronto blocks are slightly shorter at 270 metres
(the blocks Jacobs describes on 88th, 87th, 86th, etc. are each 320 metres), there
is a similar problem: with the exception of Prince Arthur, none of these streets
have anything but houses and Avenue Road, with a few retail spaces, has, as
Jacobs says, “its own kind of monotony.”92
!

I will discuss the third and fourth conditions for diversity momentarily, but I

would like to first discuss Jacobs’ arguments about automobiles in cities. Since
Jacobs spends much of Death and Life discussing sidewalks and that she is
most famous for successfully opposing the Lower Manhattan Freeway in New
York City,93 then again helping to stop the Spadina Expressway in Toronto,94 it is
perhaps not surprising that many assume that Jacobs was fully opposed to cars
91
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This fight is well-documented in Flint, Wrestling with Moses. It is interesting to note that Jacobs
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writing while involved in this battle: Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 360.
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For a detailed account of Toronto’s plans for major expressways throughout the city, including
Spadina, see: John Sewell, The Shape of the Suburbs: Understanding Toronto’s Sprawl (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2009).
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and supported pedestrian-only areas.95 But this is not the case. In fact, Jacobs is
quite clear that it is wrong to blame automobiles for the destruction of cities or
making them hostile: “automobiles are hardly inherent destroyers of cities.”96
Further, Jacobs goes to lengths to show that earlier forms of ‘horse and buggy’
streets were worse than paved streets for automobiles and that “the internal
combustion engine … was potentially an excellent instrument for abetting city
intensity.”97 As for those finding it “fashionable to suppose that the solution lies in
designating certain places for pedestrians,” they will not find much support from
Jacobs.98 She suggests they might work if there is a reduction of cars in the city
as a whole; otherwise the area surrounding the pedestrian areas will become
deadened parking lots. So, Jacobs insists that, rather than trying to make an area
or two car-free, the “problem is how to cut down drastically the absolute numbers
of vehicles using a city” and so she devotes a chapter to the “attrition of
automobiles.”99
!

Jacobs’ arguments against ‘car-free’ zones helps elucidate my discussions

of Kensington Market’s Pedestrian Sundays in chapter 2 and above in this
chapter. A main problem with pedestrian-only areas is the need of vehicles for
services, supplies, and products. Jacobs suggests one of two alternatives must
be accepted. The first is that the area would not have any services or shops,
which writes “is automatically an absurdity.”100 This is because there would be
little reason for pedestrians to show up. The second alternative is to develop
some novel method for delivering products to shops, such as “underground
tunnels for trucks,” a “post officing” method which claims to rationalize delivery of
products so there would be fewer trucks and could make their deliveries at night.
95

Even Jan Gehl thinks Jacobs would be proud of his ‘car-free’ projects: Jan Gehl, “For You
Jane” in What We See: Advancing the Observations of Jane Jacobs, ed. Stephen A. Goldsmith
and Lynne Elizabeth (Oakland, CA: New Village Press, 2010): 234–241.
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Thus, this is separating automobiles from pedestrians over time, not of space.
And it “involves considerable expense.”101 Jacobs ultimate suggestion, in keeping
with her argument on the need to reduce overall automobile use, is to ensure that
pedestrians are not “overwhelmed and dominated by floods of cars.”102 Again, we
encounter this problem of limits. While Le Corbusier wanted no pedestrians to
ever meet an automobile, and many contemporary urbanists want to ban cars,
Jacobs is proposing a balance. She is pointing to a limit of the number of cars,
but not defining this number. We will see this type of limit in Jacobs’ thinking
below with her arguments about dwelling densities.

Density is Not a Number!
The third condition for diversity is the “need for aged buildings,”103 because only
large corporations and companies can afford to build new buildings or pay the
high rents associated with brand new buildings. Older, plain buildings are where
“new ideas” can flourish.104 This is probably the most unconvincing argument that
Jacobs makes in the entire book, which I will return to presently after covering
the fourth condition for diversity: densities.
!

The fourth condition for diversity is a “sufficiently dense concentration of

people.”105 While ‘density’ is a well-used measurement of a city or district, there is
much to learn from what Jacobs argues here. First, her conception of density is
not strictly residential: a district “must have a sufficiently dense concentration of
people, for whatever purpose they may be there. This includes people there
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Thus, Jacobs understands density completely

differently than the term is normally used in urban planning (as only residential
density). Jacobs recognizes the importance of residential density, as it will be
mostly these people on a district’s streets and sidewalks. But the “dwellings of a
district … need to be supplemented by other primary uses,” so that there will be
people on the streets and sidewalks throughout each day “for the economic
reasons explained” in the central chapter on the need for diversity of primary
uses.107 That is, a district with high residential density must also have other
primary uses, which ensures there will be people outside throughout the day, to
provide the conditions for economic development and the generation of
secondary diversity.
!

However, because dwelling densities are so important to a district’s

success or failure, Jacobs devotes much of this chapter to dwelling densities.
The densities of the examples Jacobs gives for areas with high and low densities
range from 255 dwellings per acre to 21, with “row-house neighbourhoods in
trouble” at 30–45 per acre.108 This ratio is quite strange, as the generally agreedon density for an area to be considered ‘urban’ is 400 persons per square
kilometre, which is 1.6 persons per acre.109 Even though this is persons not
dwellings per square kilometre, the difference is astounding: 1.6 persons per
acre is much, much lower than a population density occupying 30–45 dwellings
in an acre of land. ‘Overcrowding’ is normally understood to exist when there are
more than 1.5 persons per room, so 30–45 dwellings (with multiple rooms) would
easily accommodate about 100 people per acre. So, Jacobs’ examples of low
density are about 5000 dwelling units per square kilometre. Toronto, for example,
has a density of 2700 people per square kilometre (or 10 per acre).
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While Jacobs provides much evidence that districts with “a low density of

dwellings” are dull and unsuccessful, she is adamant that high densities do not
necessarily equal successful urban areas: “the relationship between
concentrations of people and production of diversity is [not] a simple, straight
mathematical affair.”110 Thus, there is no ‘desired density’ without accounting for
the diversity of the area. Dense concentrations of people are one of the
necessary conditions for diversity, but not a sufficient condition.
!

Jacobs also makes the all-too-obvious distinction between high densities

and overcrowding. It is astounding that she needed to insist on this definition,
that it is often overlooked, and that the metrics of urban densities are still
understood by the simple formula of residents per unit of area. Jacobs is clear,
and remains consistent through the book with her definitions: “High densities
mean large numbers of dwellings per acre of land. Overcrowding means too
many people in a dwelling for the number of rooms it contains.”111 That is,
‘density’ ought to refer to number of dwellings per unit of area and ‘overcrowding’
to refer to an insufficient number of dwelling units. This way, an area with many
people and plenty of dwellings would not be considered ‘overcrowded,’ whereas
an area with even a low rate of people would be considered ‘overcrowded’ if
there were an insufficient number dwellings.
!

This distinction between numbers of people and numbers of dwellings is

important, especially when we recall Nothing Gained by Overcrowding! because
Unwin conflated the number of people and dwellings and, in doing so, proposed
extremely low population densities that would not generate diversity. Howard’s
‘Garden City’ and his followers also conflated the two, resulting in plans for low
population densities as a solution to low dwelling densities: two distinct things.112
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Consider Ward 20 in central Toronto, which has 51,210 people, 25,185

occupied dwellings, and is 8 square kilometres.113 This means that in traditional
population/residential ‘density,’ Ward 20 has 6,400 people per square kilometre
which is more than 10 times the minimum for an area to be considered ‘urban.’
Following Jacobs’ insistence that ‘density’ must refer to number of dwellings per
unit of land, Ward 20’s ‘Jacobsian’ density is 3,150 dwellings per square
kilometre, assuming 2 persons per dwelling. Though this appears to be above
Jacobs’ figure of than 1.5 persons per room as ‘overcrowded,’114 it must be noted
that dwellings refers to houses and apartments, nearly all of which contain
multiple rooms. Thus, it can be inferred that Ward 20 has a somewhat high
population density and is decidedly not overcrowded.115
!

It would, then, be wise for anyone discussing density to distinguish

between an area’s overall population (including working), the number of
residents, and the number of dwellings per area of land. Keeping these
measurements separate would ensure that an area is not diagnosed as a ‘slum’
or ‘overcrowded’ when it merely has a high population or residential density. And
it would ensure that an area with low population or residential density can still be
understood as ‘overcrowded’ if there are too few dwellings.
!

Despite the fact that some ratios allow us to measure and understand a

district’s residential densities and crowding, Jacobs insists that there are no
“proper” figures for any of these factors. There is no magic number. The only
measure, for Jacobs, is whether these numbers “frustrate city diversity instead of
abetting it.”116

However, after much cautioning, Jacobs suggests that the

common proposal of 100 dwellings per acre (24,711 dwellings per square
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kilometre) “will be found to be too low” to produce diversity.117 Ward 20 in Toronto
has 3,150 dwellings per square kilometre (12.75 per acre) is only 13% of this ‘too
low’ dwelling density. Within Ward 20, the Annex has 5457 dwellings per square
kilometre (22 per acre). For comparison, St. Jamestown in Toronto (Canada’s
densest neighbourhood) has 125 dwellings per acre (30,900 dwellings per
square kilometre).118 For the entire city of Toronto, there are 2.6 million people on
630 square kilometres of land, which gives each person 240 square metres – the
size of two tennis courts.119
!

In terms of ‘too much’ density, Jacobs again measures this in terms of

frustrating diversity. The actual numerical density does not particularly matter: if
diversity is frustrated then density is too high (or too low). However, she does
suggest that 200 dwellings per acre is a “danger mark” of too-high dwelling
density.120 When dwelling densities are very high, the only way to accommodate
this is by standardization of the buildings, which is precisely the opposite of
diversity.121
!

Her discussion of density figures is the closest Jacobs brings us to the

university discourse. But she is adamant that there is no ‘simple calculation’ or a
‘magic number’ to guarantee diversity.
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These density figures that Jacobs discusses, and the current threshold of

what constitutes an ‘urban area,’ are vastly different than one another, and they
are difficult to ‘square’ with Toronto’s neighbourhoods. To be clear, Jacobs argues
that 100 dwellings per acre (with about 125 persons per acre) will likely be too
low to generate diversity. The current threshold for what counts as an ‘urban
area’ is only 400 persons per square kilometre (1.6 per acre). The ‘downtown,’
highly populated neighbourhoods of Toronto have population densities of around
10,000 per square kilometre (40 per acre) and dwelling densities around 5,000
per square kilometre (20 per acre).
!

Recently, Edward Glaeser published The Triumph of the City, which

became noteworthy because he criticizes Jacobs (blasphemy!).122 Glaeser writes
that Jacobs argues “cities need at least a hundred households per acre to
generate enough street traffic to support exciting restaurants and shops.”123 So
far so good. But then he claims that Jacobs “argue[s] that two hundred homes
per acre was a ‘danger mark.’”124 While she does use the phrase “danger
mark”125 at 200 dwellings per acre, her point is lost on Glaeser. Jacobs is arguing
that somewhere around 200 dwellings per acre, standardization of buildings is
required and that nearly all developments with skyscrapers inefficiently use land
as they are surrounded by grass lawns. And, she refers to the North End in
Boston with 275 dwellings per acre throughout Death and Life as an example of
a good, successful urban area. The reason is not the high density, but the
diversity of uses and users in this district.
!

Glaeser argues that a “typical Manhattan apartment … has about 1,300

square feet” and that to “accommodate two hundred households per acre” the
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apartment buildings would need to be “about six stories high.”126 Here, Glaeser is
demonstrating three things which are precisely what Jacobs opposes: the
standardization of buildings, the simple yet flawed easy calculation, and, most
importantly, a lack of diversity. One can imagine that were a district mostly sixstory buildings, with other non-residential buildings mixed in, and room for streets
with short blocks, we would arrive at Jacobs’ preferred 100–150 dwellings per
acre range.
!

However, we must keep in mind Jacobs’ warning if we are to fall into the

university discourse: dwelling densities, and I would include population and
employment densities as well, “cannot be based on abstractions about the
quantities of land.”127 Further, planning experts are extremely wary of comparing
densities of two or more areas.128 To create a diverse and vibrant area, there are
many important factors or variables that must be considered: wide sidewalks,
access to mass transit, streets designed for many different users, nearby
amenities such as large supermarkets, restaurants and cafés, schools, etc.
Generally, high densities will work well if the density is distributed evenly (e.g. not
in one or two apartment towers) so that life at sidewalk level is alive, vibrant, and
diverse.129
!

Thus, and this should not be surprising, the university discourse fails: one

cannot determine or design a desirable area or district with an abstract ratio. That
is, an area with high densities for whatever purpose can be bland and dull, just
as an area with low densities can be bland and dull. Nonetheless, Jacobs’
general observation that districts with at least 100 dwellings per acre (about
25,000 per square kilometre) are usually much more diverse than areas with less
density does help to thwart some preconceptions. Many find the Annex in Toronto
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to be a desirable neighbourhood130 and often point to Jacobs once calling the
area home as proof it being the type of district she advocates. But her density
figures prove otherwise. The Annex only has 22 dwellings per acre (5,457
dwellings per square kilometre), well below her threshold of 100 per acre. With
these numbers in mind, observation of the Annex neighbourhood reveals that,
while Bloor Street at its southern edge does contain vibrant diversity, crowded
sidewalks, etc., the rest of the neighbourhood is, in fact, strictly residential with
only a few buildings higher than three stories. There are no stores 131 between
Bloor and Dupont, Bathurst and Spadina, though there are, of course, stores on
these main streets. While there may be zoning laws prohibiting stores here, to
quote Jacobs slightly out of context, “anybody who started a retail enterprise
here, for example, would be stupid.” 132 The blocks are long, longer than similar
sized areas to the immediate south, east, and west (areas that do have stores).
And, in the Annex, there simply are not the numbers of people coming and going
at different times of the day for different purposes to sustain a retail store.
!

Further, the Annex Residents’ Association, the members of which

absolutely adore Jacobs, consistently oppose any further ‘intensification’ of the
neighbourhood even though the density is well below Jacobs’ minimum
threshold. And it is here that I bring back the argument that Jacobs can be
understood through the analyst’s discourse: planners and residents are claiming
to desire all these things, but Jacobs’ work forces us to answer the question Chè
vuoi? – What do you really want?
!

As well, Jacobs does not seek to wash over the problem of ‘the political’:

she does not reconcile the limit of density with an arbitrary number. Rather, she
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insists it be a judgment based on ‘diversity,’ which is a conception of the ‘good
life.’

Economy and Space
Jacobs’ third condition for diversity is the “need for aged buildings,” not nice old
buildings with ‘historic value,’ but “plain, ordinary, low-value old buildings.”133
Jacobs’ argument is that only large corporations and companies can afford to
build new buildings or pay the high rents associated with brand new buildings.
Older, plain buildings are where “new ideas” can flourish – neighbourhood bars,
good bookstores, restaurants, etc.134

“New ideas must use old buildings”

because they need cheaper rents.135 This is probably the most unconvincing
argument that Jacobs makes in the entire book. Even without Glaeser’s
critique,136 it is simply not the case that that all old buildings in cities have
cheaper rents. There may be a few old, derelict factory buildings in districts that
are not particularly successful that have cheap rents, but any old building in a
desired area will have a high property value and mean that, for a person to afford
the property taxes, they will have to rent it out at a price comparable to the
buildings around it. Old factory buildings in Toronto’s core which contain
apartments, office space, or stores have some of the highest rents and purchase
prices.
!

Glaeser’s critique is based on simple supply and demand theory.

Preserving a short, old building instead of building something taller does not
assure affordability to ‘new ideas.’ Increasing the supply of office or housing units
will, Glaeser argues, keep prices down in a popular area. The new, taller building
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will not be likely to “house any quirky, less profitable firms” but it will help to keep
the rents lower in the district.137
!

Oddly missing from both Jacobs’ and Glaeser’s theories about the relation

of buildings to affordability is location. If a district is popular, then there is little to
be done to ensure the district is affordable except through government subsidies.
Many cities, Toronto included, have policies in place that ensure that new
buildings have some units designated as ‘affordable housing.’ Other cities, such
as Victoria, BC, subsidize the rent of low-income earners so that people can live
in existing neighbourhoods, rather than designated low-income areas or housing
projects.138 Toronto Community Housing owns and rents out properties across
the city, a fact which is usually unnoticed by anyone passing by.139
!

In terms of enterprises with ‘new ideas’ or ‘quirky, less profitable

businesses,’ which require relatively cheaper rents, observation shows they
begin and survive in districts that are affordable. That is, successful and popular
districts do not typically have an old, plain building with low rents. For example, in
Toronto, in Yorkville or the Annex or other popular areas, it is extremely rare to
find a storefront or office space with a low rent. Thus, an enterprise with ‘new
ideas’ that cannot afford the rental prices of these areas will look for a storefront
or office in a different district.140
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The municipal government of Toronto has sought to provide low rents to

various upstarts by providing subsidies or running their own offices and
storefronts. 401 Richmond is an example of this: located in Toronto’s core, it was
once a factory but has been renovated and is now broken up into various art
galleries, offices, and a bookstore to merchants who pay lower rents than the
area demands. There are also grants available to new businesses that help to
offset costs, including rent.
!

Nonetheless, and following Jacobs’ argument that these subsidies should

not be necessary for the economy to grow, the vast majority of ‘new ideas’
enterprises locate themselves in a district that is less popular and charges
cheaper rent. In the 1970s, Queen Street West between Simcoe Street and
Spadina Avenue was a neglected part of Toronto’s downtown. Rents for both
storefronts and apartments above the stores were considerably cheaper than
elsewhere in the city. Many artists, musicians, writers, and other interesting
people with little money began moving into the area. Within a decade or so, the
area became well known for this artistic community, which was flourishing and
supporting many diverse ‘secondary’ services. Pages Bookstore opened at
Queen and John streets, with the Rex (a jazz and blues bar) just east at St.
Patrick Street. Further west, this secondary diversity included Steve’s Music,
which provided instruments to the area’s musicians, other bookstores, clothing
shops, restaurants, and bars (most famously, the Horseshoe). It is worth noting
that this area did not have many primary uses, let alone a diversity of primary
uses, except for some residential spaces above the street’s stores and Ryerson
Press which was located in what is now a CTV building. At this area’s eastern
edge are some office buildings, though few if any of these workers had any
interest in what was going on along Queen Street. To the south of this area were,
and remain, rather desolate one-way arterial ‘streets’ (really, small expressways).
Following Jacobs’ theory of primary and secondary uses, one can only say that
these new, artistic people generated secondary services without there being
much in the way of primary services. And the successful secondary services
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became the area’s primary attractors to people outside the area. That is, people
from different areas of the city and beyond eventually started coming to Queen
West to shop in the interesting stores, see bands play at the bars, or simply
experience and witness this vibrant artistic community.
!

By the 1990s, however, much of this artistic community had been pushed

out.141 Larger corporations, wishing to ‘cash in’ on the area’s cultural capital,
began renting and buying buildings with storefronts. These corporations were
able to pay higher rents, which pushed the prices out of reach of the existing
artistic community or to any enterprise with ‘new ideas.’ Pages Bookstore
eventually closed when their rental lease expired: the building’s owners were
demanding much more rent to renew a lease. Today, the only remaining
businesses are those that own their own building (the Horseshoe Tavern, the
Rex, Steve’s Music) and Queen West is now home to one of Canada’s largest
media companies, CTV, stores owned by Nike, Adidas, a host of other stores one
normally finds in a mall (Bootlegger, Footlocker, Aldo), and, of course, Starbucks.
!

The artistic community did not, of course, simply disappear. Instead, they

have moved further west on Queen Street around and beyond Ossington
Avenue. While there are a multitude of small, storefront galleries in this area,
there does not appear to be much else. Rather than the diversity of services
found in the ‘original’ Queen West, this new ‘Queen West West’ is nearly
exclusively comprised of small art galleries. Thus, there is little reason for larger
corporations to want to locate a store here. Instead, the area is set to become
primarily residential with many new, recently finished, and under-construction
condominium buildings. This new primary use (residential) has yet to produce
much in the way of secondary services. Many artists and writers who appear to
be tired of being chased along Queen Street have moved much farther west – all
141
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the way to Hamilton. This ‘edge city’ of Toronto is much cheaper in terms of rents
and costs of living and with many artists and creative people migrating there, it is
quickly becoming an interesting and diverse area.
!

This ‘migration’ along Queen Street and towards Hamilton can be, in a

strange way, partly explained by Richard Florida’s infamous ‘creative class’
thesis. Before explaining his thesis, it is well-worth pointing out that Florida is
heavily influenced by Jacobs. Many find this surprising, but only because they
have a ‘Jane’s Walk’ understanding of Jacobs.142 That is, they think Jacobs
arguments are about making ‘walkable,’ ‘mixed-use’ communities, full stop. They
have failed to see the intricacies of Jacobs’ ‘mixed-use’ arguments (primary and
secondary diversity) and that, while these principles make for nice places to live,
they are primarily about generating economy. One only needs to look at the titles
of her other books to see that she is primarily an economist.143 David M. Nowland
notes the “interesting story” of how Jacobs’ work on economics fell into obscurity,
then became standard reference.144 Much of her work’s resurrection was caused
by the influence she had on the Nobel Prize winning economist, Robert Lucas.
However, Nowland only discusses The Economy of Cities and Cities and the
Wealth of Nations, with no reference to Death and Life. However, it has been
Richard Florida who is most well-known for taking up Jacobs’ ideas about the
role of ‘creativity’ that develops the economy. Florida, however, does not write
about the impact of urban design on the economic generation. Instead, Jacobs’
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work on street design and the sociability of sidewalk life is taken up by people
arguing for the need of ‘third places’ for people to leisurely socialize.145
!

In Cities and the Wealth of Nations, Jacobs argues, among other things,

“for the necessity of vigorous cities remaining creative.”146 The book’s larger
argument on the centrality of a nation’s wealth depending on cities ‘takes aim’ at
the tradition of thinking of economy in militaristic terms (‘targets,’ ‘long-range
planning,’ etc.) and instead insists that economic life needs to be concerned with
development and creation. Jacobs goes so far as to suggest that necessity is not
the ‘mother of invention’ but rather “aesthetic curiosity.”147 She gives a long series
of examples. Metallurgy began with jewellery, not weapons. Pigments (the first
use of iron ore), porcelain, ceramics, glass, and welding “all started with luxury or
decorative goods.”148 A wide variety of engineering accomplishments (hydraulics,
wheels, lathes, etc.) were all first used for enjoyments and toys before any
‘useful’ purposes. The first working railroad was an amusement ride in London,
plastics were first used to make toys and kitchen gadgets, and computers were
primarily for games before being produced for office use. Jacobs point is that
economy and invention occurs as a result of creativity and play, not “the order of
‘challenge’ and ‘response’” (or ‘solutions,’ as is so common is business-speak
now).149 Thus, economies are better off when evolving, “producing diversely and
amply” for people, than when trying to specialize.150 Cities, Jacobs argues, are
“open-ended types of economies in which our open-ended capacities for
economic creation are not only able to establish ‘new little things’ but also to
inject them into everyday life.”151

Further, when faced with “economic
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deterioration,” cities can remain “afloat by keeping city economies creative.”152
Finally, a poorly performing city economy can be corrected if that “correction
depends on fostering creativity in whatever forms it happens to appear in a given
city at a given time.”153
!

I quote Jacobs at length here to demonstrate that she argued for the

necessity of creativity to sustain city economies well before Richard Florida
presented and popularized his ‘creative class’ thesis in 2002.154 Though Florida
can be a bit too much of an ‘urban cheerleader,’ he does well in presenting the
evidence for why cities, and which cities in particular, are becoming popular
again. Florida’s argument is that this class of creative people is becoming larger
and that these people have different world views and desires than earlier
dominating classes, such as William H. Whyte’s ‘organization men’ that defined
the 1950s.155 This creative class includes those who work in “science and
engineering, architecture and design, education, arts, music and
entertainment.”156 They are people “whose economic function is to create new
ideas, new technology and/or new creative content” and “engage in complex
problem solving that involves a great deal of independent judgment and requires
high levels of education.” 157 This is different than those in the working or services
classes who are “primarily paid to execute according to plan.”158
!

Florida admits that what ‘creative class’ denotes is ambiguous. And, he

has many critics. Jeremy Peck was one of the earliest, accusing Florida of selling
“neo-liberal snake-oil” since Florida does not provide a sufficient critique of the
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‘trickle-down’ economic theory held by much of the creative class.159 Many other
critics dispute Florida’s claim that this creative class spurs economic
generation.160
!

Nonetheless, he does identify a group of people who are growing in

numbers and have continued to do so since he proposed this thesis. Regardless
of the critiques of economic causality, my reason for bringing Florida into this
discussion is that throughout Florida’s work one theme persists: the type of place
that the creative class prefers. They are not interested in the things that cities
have traditionally done to lure businesses and residents such as stadiums,
highways, malls, or theme-park-like entertainment districts.161 Instead, they are
looking for precisely what Jacobs argued makes for a successful city: abundant
amenities and experiences, and diversity of people and things.162 Florida sums
the factors that the creative class uses to judge the “quality of a place”: a
diversity of built environment combined with the natural environment; a diversity
of people that are open to new and different people and ideas; and a vibrancy of
street life, arts and music with people outside.163 This creative class also wants to
participate in their city’s or district’s development: they attend public consultations
for new developments, pay attention to what city or neighbourhood councils are
159
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doing, etc. Florida’s reasoning for this is, at best, rather thin: members of the
creative class come from different backgrounds and are attracted to places that
“offer something for them all.” 164
!

It is worth noting that Florida published this thesis well before the large

economic decline in 2008 involving mortgages, the stock market, etc. In 2010,
Florida published a book which seeks to explain this economic shift as a “reset”
of capitalism and social structures and values.165 Among other things, Florida
argues that this shift in the economy is not simply economic, but is changing how
“we” are building infrastructure, systems of transportation, new housing patterns:
“it ushers in a whole new way of life.”166 While I do not agree with the scale of this
shift, there are patterns that Florida identifies, some of which others agree with,
and a few which challenge conventional wisdom.
!

As regards the latter, Florida argues that it is wrong to make a sharp

distinction between the urban and the suburban. While there has been a
movement towards bringing some of the spatial arrangements and green space
associated with suburbs into urban areas, more interesting is the urbanization of
suburbs and edge cities.167 This means that various suburban communities are
beginning to increase their densities as well as relax strict, single-use zoning
laws. Most important is a shift in transportation: many suburban areas desire and
are developing mass transit. Distant edge cities like Markham and Mississauga,
Ontario, are doing much more in terms of urban-style development, mass transit,
and bike and pedestrian infrastructure than the city of Toronto. And these edge
cities are not doing these things because they are ‘embarrassed’ by their ‘sprawl’
or are adhering to some socially progressive ideology or wish to be more
‘environmentally sustainable.’ Markham mayor Frank Scarpitti, elected on a
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fiscally conservative ‘cut the wasteful spending’ platform, is championing
environmental initiatives, pedestrian-scaled development, and mass transit. He
states that “Markham is a community made up of executives, and any time the
GO line has been improved to downtown Toronto, it is filled, you can’t get a seat”
because it is filled up with highly paid executives.168 The lesson here is that
developing mass transit is not some ‘left wing,’ socially progressive,
environmentally sustainable enterprise but something that attracts highly-paid
business executives. However, Toronto’s TTC Chair believes otherwise, stating
the TTC’s core job is “to make sure that people who don’t have access to a car
have mobility.”169

Meanwhile, Ajax, another suburban edge city outside of

Toronto, is recognizing that people want quality places to live (meaning ‘diverse’
in Jacobs’ terms) and is seeking to provide this for entrepreneurs and other
professionals.170
!

That suburban edge cities are seeking to urbanize themselves speaks to

the rise in popularity of traditional urban centres. Florida cites various polls and
demographic statistics to show that “college grads” desire to live in large urban
areas like New York City, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco.171 Of course,
much of this has to do with the availability of employment, but people are
increasingly choosing to live in dense, fully urban districts rather than a
suburban, residential district and commute by car.
!

While the increasing costs of owning, operating, and maintaining a

personal car is a major reason why younger people are not buying cars as
previous generations did, much of this trend has to do with larger social and
psychoanalytic factors. A number of studies have shown that a personal
automobile is not the status symbol it once was, as it no longer represents
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freedom and autonomy.172 Instead, it represents ‘boring suburbia,’ isolation, and
wasted time: people increasingly want to live in places where owning a car is not
necessary. People are increasingly choosing to travel by subway, train, bus, bike,
and by foot and desire places that accommodate these choices. In Manhattan,
for example, 82% of people go to work on public transit, by bicycle, or on foot.173
New York City is the place where most people use non-car travel, but in
Washington, DC, 57% of people commute by means other than a car.174 Many
major American cities have about half of workers eschewing cars when
commuting.
!

What is perhaps the most significant shift Florida outlines is the shift from

owning one’s residence to renting it. As is well-known, the cornerstone of the
American Dream is to own a house with a yard, fence, and a car or two in the
driveway. But younger people do not, for the most part, share this dream. Much
of this has to do with the financial aspects: the cost of owning a home has gone
up tremendously, while at the same time they are no longer the stable
investments they once were. But less tangible are the factors of mobility and
flexibility. With many young people now working contract positions rather than
one or two jobs their entire lives, being able to move from city to city or to a more
or less expensive apartment or house within a city is necessary. In fact, many
people were burdened by homeownership when the economy collapsed in 2008:
they were unable to move somewhere else for employment because they owned
a house which they could not sell.175 Homeownership in America peaked in 2004
at 69.2% and fell to 67.6% in 2009, and it continues to decline.176 In cities, rental
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rates are, not surprisingly, much higher: 66% of New Yorkers rent; Chicago and
Washington, DC, are both a bit more than 50%.177
!

In The Great Reset, Florida devotes a chapter to Toronto, the city he has

called home since 2007. He argues that, in contrast to American cities, Toronto’s
“downtown core is loaded with middle-class families” with a very high level of
“diversity,” which reflects the city’s ability to “attract top talent from around the
world.”178 He cites reports that consistently put Toronto near the top of ‘most
liveable city’ rankings and notes that Toronto’s murder rate is 1.9 per 100,000
residents, making it “half as deadly” as the safest city in America, Des Moines,
Iowa.179 Toronto, along with the rest of Canada, did not suffer the ‘mortgage
bubble’ that America did because of mortgage lending rules. Thus, between
September 2008 and September 2009 Toronto housing prices rose 10%, with a
28% increase in sales.
!

Florida’s observations about Toronto were accurate. While nearly all

American ‘downtowns’ saw their populations decrease significantly from postWWII to the 1990s, many Canadian cities experienced this as well. Toronto,
however, did not. Toronto continued to invest in infrastructure, transit, parks, and
resisted further expressway developments.180 Currently, Toronto is experiencing
a very large building boom which, I argue, is largely supported by the presence of
big banks and the spin-off financial jobs, not the presence of the ‘creative class.’
Toronto seems to be doing everything it can to keep the ‘creative class’ out and
many new ‘tech’ start-ups are opting to locate themselves in other Canadian
cities. Much of this has to do with the cost of living and housing, which continues
to rise because of wealthy people who are not part of the creative class: those
who work in finance, law, and government. Rather than shift away from
177
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automobile-centric planning, Toronto is now removing bike lanes and reducing
mass transit. Toronto’s current fetish for subways is in fact a desire to make room
for cars by putting all mass transit off the roads. While the city is experiencing a
‘condo boom’ in the core, these are simply profitable ventures for developers,
with little in the way of an overall plan, and a wilful blindness to the impending
demands on basic infrastructure and mass transit. Rather than investing in public
space, Toronto has contracted out the ‘street furniture’ program to the advertising
company Astral Media. Toronto continues to hang onto arcane bylaws that make
it difficult or impossible for ‘secondary diversity’ services (such as bars and
restaurants) to open and operate.181 So, while Toronto continues to rank high on
various ‘quality of life’ indexes, much of its economy comes from the presence of
large banks, financial groups, and corporations. I would suggest the people who
work in these industries hold more conservative values in terms of housing and
transportation. And these values are supported by long-standing residents
associations that fear apartment buildings and rooming houses in favour of
traditional single family dwellings. The Annex neighbourhood, once a prime
location for many authors and eccentrics, is drastically changing. Older houses
that were broken up into apartments are being returned to single family dwellings
with prices reaching 2 million dollars. This results in a lack of diversity as
evidenced by the changing nature of the stores along Bloor. Increasingly,
independent businesses are being priced out by corporate chain stores. For
example, an independent hair-dresser was overtaken by a David’s Tea, an
independent record shop, Sonic Boom, was overtaken by a Dollarama,182 and
the independent and much-loved Dooney’s Café became a Menchies. This is not
necessarily ‘upscale displacement,’ but rather evidence of building owners
increasingly able to find corporate tenants rather than having to rely on more
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risky independent business tenants. This is ultimately a testament to a lack of the
diversity that Jacobs advocates. Other once-middle class neighbourhoods are
also experience such changes. The following chapter will further discuss
changing notions of urban life through the theoretical frameworks of Manuel
Castells.
!

This chapter has argued that Jacobs’ analysis of cities falls within the

analyst’s discourse and results in ‘the city’ coughing up its ‘truth’: that it is a
problem of organized complexity which cannot be understood or ‘solved’ by ratios
or simple calculations. In other words, I argue that Jacobs is correct to insist that
declaring a limit of ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ urbanism cannot be reconciled by a
number, calculation, or ratio. And, that any plans or strategies to do so are only
attempts to make this judgment on a limit in advance and avoid this central
‘problem’ of cities. Through a close reading of her important book, Death and Life
of Great American Cities, I have countered a number of common misreadings
and have argued that this text is not primarily concerned with valourizing humanscaled, walkable urbanism but rather with the economic developments within
cities. Though Jacobs’ analysis of cities was welcomed by many urbanists and
city dwellers, many cities continued to plan and build on ‘modernist’ principles, or
more specifically for suburban homeownership and cars. However, more recently
Florida has diagnosed a generational shift in desires, which finds that increasing
numbers of people want the diverse urban space that Jacobs insisted was
successful.

262

CHAPTER 5: SPACE-TIMES OF THE MOBILE CITY
This chapter continues from the previous chapter by looking at why cities have
become popular again in the last couple decades. Here, though, it is through a
discussion of theories of urban space, contemporary economy, and society. The
final section of this chapter will consider how electronic communication is
affecting and effecting urban space and everyday urban life.
!

Richard Florida is perhaps the most well-known person to argue for the

importance of cities in relation to economy (“prosperity”), and it is somewhat
surprising to see that he does not mention the work of Manuel Castells. The
amount of research Castells has done and published prior to Florida is
astounding.1

Florida’s unwillingness to engage Castells’ work is surprising

because Castells had already presented similar arguments about changing
desires for urban space which are mediated through new forms of work and
technology. While the majority of Castells work is devoted to a critical account of
global capitalism, within this is a theory of urbanism, which relies on three
underlying theories: a theory of space, a theory of time, and a theory of
technology.
!

For the purposes of this chapter, I will not be analyzing his arguments

about global economic exploitation. Instead I will begin my analysis of Castells by
turning to an underlying argument he makes in the “Conclusion” of The Castells
Reader.2 Beyond the simple fact that the number of people living in urban areas
is increasing, there are multiple ways in which these people are experiencing and
altering these urban environments. Mobile connectivity has dispelled the “myth of
futurology” that people will telecommute to work. Instead, people are able to
move physically while remaining connected to work and professional networks,

1
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of his work on cities and urban regions is found in Manuel Castells, The Castells Reader on Cities
and Social Theory, ed. Ida Susser (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002).
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all the while valuing face-to-face communication. People are not living great
distances from their work or professional connections, but are instead living
(close to) where they work in urban centres. The implication for cities is that
people are not choosing to live in ‘electronic cottages’ or suburban residential
areas and communicate solely by electronic means, but instead they are living
where they work, in urban centres, and thus have a stake in these urban centres.
So, urban centres are increasingly becoming (or at least attempting to be) more
liveable, walkable, and diverse, providing the services and shops these residents
need or desire. Crucial here is that people are living in these urban centres and
not visiting them for work. For the remainder of this section I will seek to unpack
these claims and explain the implications and theories which undergird them.
!

Castells’ theories and arguments about the importance of cities is within

the tradition shared by Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre’s theories of the social
production of space inform and influence Castells’ theory of the space of flows
and timeless time. Though both Lefebvre and Castells operate within the Marxist
tradition of urban theory, Lefebvre is the more radically leftist of the two; that said,
both thinkers are concerned with economy.3 However, Lefebvre sees economy
as a much more determining feature of society and politics than does Castells.
Moreover, Castells ‘updates’ the role of economy on cities by looking at
contemporary global capitalism.
!

This dissertation began with a brief account of Lefebvre’s theories of

space as a social production and the historical process of urbanization. This
chapter does repeat some of that introduction but significantly expands on these
theories and history for the purpose of contextualizing Castells’ work.

3

Castells, when pressed, self-identifies as ‘neo-anarchist.’ However, I do not feel that these
ideological labels are necessary to unpack in order to understand Castells’ theory of networks,
space, time, and technology. For an account just how Marxist Castells’ thought is, and in
comparison to Lefebvre’s, see: Andy Merrifield, Metromarxism: A Marxist Tale of the City (New
York, Routledge, 2002), 113–132.
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The Production of Urban Space
In The Production of Space, Lefebvre’s main argument appears quite basic:
“(social) space is a (social) product.” 4 Each society or community creates its own
space, a space as distinct as the society or community. For example, ancient
Greece produced a space particular to it (i.e. the polis), which is different from the
urban forms which would come to supersede it. While the specificity of ‘social
space’ is emphasized, Lefebvre often broadens this to space in general.
However, Lefebvre’s argument is not that all space is a social production, as he
accepts that there is something called ‘natural space’ – some formal conception
of space which is then altered by social production.5 In other words, one will not
find a satisfying critique of Kant’s philosophy of space and time in Lefebvre’s
theory. Kant argues that space and time are concepts which we have by “pure
intuition”: that we must a priori conceptions of “figure and extension” in order to
determine particular spaces and times.6 Similarly, Lefebvre accepts that there is
some a priori notion of space, “natural space.”7 That said, there may be
something in Lefebvre’s work from which we can argue that even Kant’s
philosophy of this a priori time and space (which he calls the ‘transcendental
aesthetic’) is itself a social production (reproduced through its universal
acceptance).8
Lefebvre presents two corresponding triads for thinking the social
production of space. One is composed of “spatial practice,” “representations of
space,” and “representational space.” The second triad is, respectively,
“perceived space,” “conceived space,” and “lived space.”
4

Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell,
1991), 30.
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 66.
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Spatial Practice !
!
à Perceived Space
Representations of Space !à Conceived Space
Representational Space ! à Lived Space

Spatial practice “embraces production and reproduction” and the spatial
locations of each social formation.9 It is spatial practice which ensures there is
some form of cohesion and continuity for the social group, and for this spatial
practice to keep a social group cohesive and give it continuity, the group
(individually and collectively) must have some level of “competence” and ability of
“performance.”10 It is a society’s spatial practice that “secretes that society’s
space.”11 A society’s space is presupposed and propounded by its spatial
practice. A society’s spatial practice reveals how that society perceives space.
Representations of space are “tied to the relations of production” and the
“order” these relations impose.12 Representations of space are concerned with
knowledge, signs, and codes. Representations of space are ‘beyond’ (in
Hegelian dialectical terms) perceived space and concern conceived space. This
is the space for scientists, urban planners, “technocratic subdividers,” and some
artists with “with a scientific bent” (such as those concerned with ancient Number
theory, the Golden Number, etc).13 This is the conception of space that was
verbalized with a series of signs and codes and thus dominates any society.14
Representational spaces embody “complex symbolisms, sometimes
coded, sometimes not.” 15 They link to the “underground side of social life” and to
9
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art which might come to be understood more as a code of representational space
than as a code of space. This is space as it is directly lived through its symbols
and associations and can be understood as the space of the users, the
inhabitants. It is the space of artists, writers, and philosophers who only seek to
describe and aspire to do no more than describe.16 It is the space dominated by
the users/inhabitants and thus only “passively experienced.” It is representational
space that “overlays physical space” and makes symbolic use of its objects. As
with representations of space, representational space tends toward (with some
exceptions) fairly coherent “systems of non-verbal symbols and signs.”17
“Representational space is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or centre:
Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling, house; or: square, church, graveyard.”18
These “representational spaces” can be further our understanding of
Lacan’s arguments about the problem of the desire of the other. As I argued in
chapter 2, people invest the city with its own forms of desire, and they attempt to
satisfy those desires. We can think of “representational spaces” as contributing to
this ‘otherness’ or ‘personification’ of the city: that these spaces with “an affective
kernel” are the nodes by which we create the network of the city’s desire. These
are the spaces which help us identify a particular city as having a ‘feel’ or a
‘texture’; these are the spaces we ‘care’ about or in which we have a personal
stake. It is how a patch of land becomes a ‘beloved park’ that we tend and
protect or how an otherwise inconsequential building comes to have ‘heritage
status’ that, again, needs our protection.
Lefebvre suggests the body as an example of these three moments of
space. Spatial practice presupposes the body as a tool, as the hands, and the
senses in which social space is perceived. The conceived representations of the
body are the body’s own knowledge (mixed with ideology) of itself – anatomy,
physiology, its health. The lived experience of the body is the most complex, as
16

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 39.

17

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 39.

18

Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 42.

!

Chapter 5!

267

society’s “‘culture’ intervenes” so that what appears to ‘immediate’ perception is
inflected by symbolisms, “certain aspects of which are uncovered by
psychoanalysis.”19
In the previous chapter, I mentioned the “three main themes” Jane Jacobs
insists we much keep in mind when thinking about cities: “to think about
processes”; to seek “unaverage” clues (in other words, look for the exceptions);
and to employ induction rather than deduction.20 That we need to think about
processes ties into Lefebvre’s spatial practice (perceived space) insofar it
concerns production and reproduction as well as continuity to a society.21 What
Jacobs calls “unaverage clues” fit within Lefebvre’s representational spaces
since they concern the “underground of social life” and the way that urban space
is directly lived. That is, the way space is used that can go against urban
planners’ abstract representation of space.
Finally, just as Jacobs argues in favour of induction over deduction,
Lefebvre argues this triad of perceived—conceived—lived (spatial practice—
representations of space—representational space) loses its force if it is treated
as “an abstract model.”22 That is, we must not use it as a model for deductive
reasoning. For Lefebvre, it must grasp the (Hegelian) “concrete” as distinct from
mere “immediacy” otherwise it just becomes a mediating ideology.23 The three
‘orders’ of the triad are interconnected, though (obviously) they can be signified
as separate. There are moments when their interconnectedness is more
apparent: one of the examples Lefebvre gives is “the Western town, from the
Italian Renaissance to the nineteenth century” in which a common language,
19
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consensus, and code were shared by the inhabitants.24 During this period, these
towns were dominated by the representation of space and representational
space, of religious origin, which were reduced to symbolic figures of Heaven and
Hell, the Devil and angles, etc.25 The dominance of representation of space might
have been limited to elites and authorities as the sensibilities of the common
people, though perhaps reduced to silence, were still routed in representational
space. Essential for the shift from representational to representations of space
was the “vanishing point” – parallel lines that stretch to infinity, invoking the
primacy of the gaze, and a “logic of visualization.”26 This representation had
become enshrined in architecture and urban planning; the “code” of linear
perspective dominated the production of space.
Lefebvre tells us that representations of space are “shot through” with a
mixture of understanding and ideology which are subject to change in different
times and places. While the representations of space are abstract, they are also
a practice: they inform political and social practice, the relations between objects
and between subjects. While representational spaces require no ordered
consistency, representations of space require logic and order and will thus “break
up” the subject as he/she cannot conform to this rigidity. Lefebvre suggests that
we can understand Frank Lloyd Wright endorsing a communitarian
representational space that derives from Biblical or Protestant traditions, whereas
Le Corbusier worked towards a technical, scientific representation of space.27
Lefebvre contrasts “absolute space” with “abstract space.” Absolute space
concerns the sites of habitation chosen for their natural features, such as caves,
mountains, rivers, and lakes. Since these places were consecrated as ‘spaces’
they quickly lost their natural characteristics.28 Often, an architect of some sort
24
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would pick a site for its natural uniqueness and impose a political or symbolic
structure that produced the space for its purpose or meaning. Adhering to his
Marxist roots, Lefebvre finds that the abstraction of labour led to “abstract
space.”29 This is the process by which the “historical town of the West,” with the
countryside under its control, came to dominate. This arrangement of town and
country changed the relationship to production and reproduction that perpetuated
social life. In other words, this was a shift that divorced the place of human
reproduction from the place of object production. Labour, no longer social or
‘natural’ (self-sustaining, small-scale, etc.), became abstract, and with abstract
labour comes abstract space.
Though ‘historical’ or ‘absolute’ space never fully disappears, it lost its
force and importance to abstract space. Abstract space “functions ‘objectally,’ as
a set of things/signs and their formal relationships.”30 It is formal and quantitative,
creating generalizations at the expense of specifics. Abstract space is a “product
of violence and war, it is political” insofar as it is imposed by the institution of the
state.31 It appears homogeneous, as a tabula rasa, as a clearing of differences
that stand in the way. This is the space of “a plane, a bulldozer, or a tank.”32
Lefebvre tells us there are three aspects (or what he terms “formants”) to
abstract space. One is the ‘geometric,’; often understood as Euclidean, a pure
space of reference; it is homogenous and guarantees its social and political unity.
It is the means by which space becomes a reduction – from its ‘real’ properties
and from three dimensions to two, by way of the lines of perspective (e.g. a plan,
map, or “any kind of graphic representation or projection”).33
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The second “formant” is the optical or visual, which concerns the “logic of
visualization.”34 Visualization begins to take over other senses (smell, taste,
touch, etc.) so that the visual is the part that takes over for the whole. The
culmination of this aberration or reduction is the written word. The eye renders
the object of its gaze passive. Space loses its social significance and becomes
purely visual and results in “a series of substitutions and displacements” usurping
the entirety or the whole.
The third is the “phallic formant” which ‘makes up’ for the remainder lost in
the pure visuality of space. It is the response to the demand for a “truly full object
– an objectal ‘absolute.’”35 It symbolizes force and “male violence” and this
brutality does not remain simply abstract, but is materialized in the brutality of
political and bureaucratic power. Moreover, “phallic erectility bestows a special
status on the perpendicular … as the orientation of space.” 36
Abstract space seeks homogeneity yet is not itself homogenous.
Homogeneity is its end, it lens, its goal, but only rendered homogenous through
itself being “multiform” (its “geometric and visual formants”).37 The outcome of
abstract space is “the reduction of the ‘real’ … to a ‘plan’ existing in a void and
endowed with no other qualities” while at the same time reducing to “the flatness
of a mirror, of an image, of pure spectacle under an absolutely cold gaze.”38 The
phallic function of abstract space works to ensure that “‘something’ occupies this
space, namely a signifier” which signifies not the void it is but plenitude and the
illusion of the space burdened with myth.39 Lefebvre tells us that the “use value”
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of abstract space is “political” insofar as it assumes the role of a subject with
aims and actions – thus “political” being “power as such and the state as such.” 40
Since Lefebvre invokes the concept of the ‘gaze,’ it is worth bringing
Lacan into this discussion. For Lacan (and for Lefebvre), the eye and the gaze
are split: the gaze refers to the object of the scopic drive.41 Further, the ‘primary’
gaze is that of the subject “seeing itself seeing itself” so that the subject “tries to
adapt himself” to the power of the gaze.42 Since the gaze is “not a seen gaze, but
a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other,” we can get a sense of the power
of the ‘cold gaze’ of Lefebvre’s abstract space; it is cruel and attempts to adapt
oneself to it are dehumanizing. Further, since the gaze is also understood as
objet a, the attempts to satisfy its desire is doomed to failure: the gaze does not
know what it wants – if it really wants anything at all – and, if it does, the subject
can and will be eluded by the shifting ‘location’ of objet petit a.
From the historical shift that moved labour outside the domestic realm and
into factories, Lefebvre locates the beginning of “abstract space.”43 Spatial
practice, in opposition to abstract space, defines the places of the local in relation
to the global and the representation of that relationship; it defines the spaces of
the everyday by opposition to “spaces made special” through symbolization that
makes them desirable, benevolent and/ or sanctioned or forbidden. Spatial
practice concerns “the places of a purely political or social kind.”44 It would seem
that spatial practice is political because it counters the “violence intrinsic to
abstraction.”45 By “violence,” Lefebvre is referring to an apparent “absence” in
abstraction (as opposed to the concrete thing immediately present), which
imposes a particular order onto nature.
40
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Lefebvre’s Urban Revolution
Lefebvre’s Urban Revolution precedes The Production of Space and places a
stronger emphasis on urbanism. Thus, Lefebvre’s theory of urban space is best
articulated in The Urban Revolution,46 in which he declares that society has been
completely urbanized. Consistent with his theory of the history of the city,47
Lefebvre insists that the modern form of the urban is not the same as preindustrial or industrial cities because of the social relationships of production.
Lefebvre identifies the modern form of the urban and the “urban field” as
comprising not just the built world of cities, but all manifestations of the
dominance of the city over the country. A country home, for example, is part of
the city; it is there because of the city.48
!

Lefebvre introduces a “space-time axis” as a graphical representation of

the dialectics he seeks to work through. The axis runs from the total absence of
urbanization (“pure nature” or bare “earth”) to total urbanization.49 The commonly
known historical shift from nomadism to agriculturalism is, for Lefebvre, merely “a
gathering” of people. Authoritarian pressure from urban centres began the
development of the modern state and its administrators, establishing the “political
city,” which he locates as the beginnings of urbanization.50

46

Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2003).
47

See Lefebvre, “The City in History” in Writings on Cities, trans. and ed. Eleonore Kofman and
Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
48

For an account of how the rural fits within Lefebvre’s theory, see: Stuart Elden, “From the Rural
to the Urban,” in Understanding Henri Lefebvre (London: Continuum, 2004): 127–168.
49
50

Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 7.

It may be worth noting here that, just as Lefebvre does not accept the “mere gathering” of
people as constituting a politics, Rancière does not accept that politics is a necessity that comes
from the gathering of people. Both locate the political in an order of ruling and being ruled.
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Fig. 11. Lefebvre’s space-time axis Lefebvre’s space-time axis. (Diagram from
Henri Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, trans. Robert Bononno (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 15.

For Lefebvre, the “political city” was an order of ruling and being ruled. It
was populated by priests, princes, nobles, and administrators, and its function is
to administer, protect, and exploit a territory. The outskirts of the political city is
the place of economy, though eventually the market found its place in the centre
of the city, supplanting the “forum” or “agora” as the “place of assembly.”51
Churches and town halls grouped themselves around the market and a new
urban form appeared, succeeding the “political city” into what Lefebvre terms the
“merchant city.”
Lefebvre suggests that industrialization is responsible for “the urban” and
replaces “the city.” The “urban reality” loses the previous period’s sense of
“organic totality, belonging.”52

The “urban” (not the ‘city’) is “stipulative,

repressive, marked by signals, summary codes for circulation (routes), and
signage.”53 This shift from the “merchant city to the industrial urban space marks
what Lefebvre calls a “process of implosion-explosion.”54 The “implosion” refers
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Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 10.
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54

Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 14.

!

Chapter 5!

274

to excessive concentration of people, activity, wealth, goods, and thought while
“explosion” refers to an outward projection towards the peripheries of suburbs,
vacation destinations, and satellite towns (14). This implosion-explosion marks
the beginning of the “critical zone,” which is the main focus of Urban Revolution.
The “critical phase” occurs as the urban encompasses all of society and
there the “blind field … appears” as a result of a particular “fetishizing” of nature.
While nature is determined as prior to thought and human action, the city
appears as a “second nature of stone and metal built on an initial, fundamental
nature made of earth air wind fire.”55 The various attempts to reunite the
spontaneous and the artificial, nature and culture, are exemplified by parks in the
urban, the “between” places of urban and rural that comprise a “visual
elsewhere” (utopia) as an essential reference point for urban reality to be
reality.56 These are the “blank” or “dark” spaces which Lefebvre terms the “blind
field.” The “blind field” is theorized as a blind spot, or as the centre of the eye that
does not see or know it is blind.57 We try to see the urban as a reality unto itself
but with concepts of another field (industrial, rural); “Our eyes were shaped in
villages” and “factories” so that we cannot “see” the urban.58
This “blind field” is much like the Lacanian concept of the stain of the Real.
As with the concept of the ‘gaze’ outlined above, this blind field is a visual order
caught up in the other’s desire. In the distinction between the eye and the gaze,
Lacan invokes the notion of the ‘stain’: “a given-to-be-seen.”59 This ‘stain’ of the
gaze is what “governs the gaze most secretly” and what escapes the conscious
form of vision.60 Lacan also theorizes his concept of the Real as a stain. As Žižek
writes, “the Real is anamorphic stain” which appears in reality, not as part of

55

Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 25.

56

Lefebvre, Urban Revolution, 26.
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reality, but as a rem(a)inder of the precariousness of the structure of the
Symbolic order.61 Thus, following Lefebvre’s arguments, we ‘see’ the urban as a
symbolic whole, but this is only constituted by the ‘eyes’ of another paradigm and
this precariousness is continually under threat of irruption.
Lefebvre argues that the urban needs to be understood as “the freedom to
produce differences (to differ and invent that which differs).”62 There is nothing
“harmonious about the urban form and reality”: it “incorporates conflict” and
“presents itself as a place of conflict and confrontation.”63 The urban can thus be
defined “as a place where conflicts are expressed.”64 Thus, depending on the
content of the “conflicts expressed” in the urban, and if it concerns the
recognition of an as yet ‘speaking being,’ this may be a Rancièrian political
space.
!

Urbanism cannot be conceived without “self-management,” which “implies

the withering away of the state and the end of politics as such.” 65 Though
Lefebvre argues that politics and the state can only “retard” the development of
the urban, the book ends with the statement, “the space it [the urban] creates is
political.”66 So, for Lefebvre, ‘politics’ and the ‘political’ are two different terms.
Jacques Rancière can be employed here to reconcile these two different uses of
“politics” coming to an end through the urban and “political space” that the urban
creates.67 As outlined in chapter 1, Rancière argues that much of what we
normally understand as politics is in fact the ‘police order.’ The latter concerns
61
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Verso, 2008), lxxxix.
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power and the arrangement of things (a ‘distribution of the sensible’) whereas
politics is whatever ruptures that police order. Thus, if the urban rejects “state
politics,” which is part of Rancière’s ‘police order,’ then the “political space” the
urban creates could be taken as the Rancièrian political space since it appears to
rupture the police order of the state.

Castells’ Theory of Urbanism
Castells’ theory agrees with much of Lefebvre’s, and his history of urban
sociology expands on what Lefebvre calls the ‘critical phase.’ Castells argues
that, though a founding field of sociology, urban sociology has gone through only
a couple phases and is now largely ignored. The Chicago School of the 1920s
and 1930s that included Robert Park, Louis Wirth, and others was “ideologically
biased” with a notion of a unified urban culture that would “characterize city
dwellers regardless of their class, gender, or ethnicity.”68 Their main concern was
integration: how to integrate these diverse members of society into one collective
group. The 1960s and 1970s saw this integration approach sharply decline in
favour of analyses based on conflict. Lefebvre and others posed questions about
who had the ‘right to the city,’69 by highlighting the problems with industrial
capitalism and gender and ethic inequality. These concerns made the concern for
social integration seem quaint if not blatantly ideological. In this milieu, cities
became defined by points of contradiction between “capital accumulation and
social redistribution, between state control and people’s autonomy.”70
!

The third phase of urban sociology Castells describes as “a deep

silence.”71 In spite of the pursuit of various academic careers and the publication
68

Manuel Castells, “Conclusion” in The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory, ed. Ida
Susser (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 391.
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of scholarly books and articles, urban sociology was only restating and redefining
the issues of the first two phases of urban sociology: integration and conflict.
There is a clear link between this ‘deep silence’ and the ‘blind field’ that Lefebvre
outlines as part of the ‘critical phase,’ partly in that the urban became so
pervasive that it could not be seen or, closer to Lefebvre’s theory, sociologists of
the ‘deep silence’ period had their ‘eyes shaped’ by previous, less-applicable
theories and not ‘see’ the changes to urban life. And, again, we see the
applicability of Lacan’s theory of the gaze: the urban as the primary site of
sociology is so central that it was hardly seen.
!

In any case, Castells argues that a new phase of urban sociology is now

upon us, a phase he terms the Information Age, which is based on new
understandings and experiences of space and time which are not determined but
expressed by technology.

Networks
Before giving a detailed account of Castells’ theory of space and time, it is
necessary to explain his main concepts of the ‘network society’ and the
‘informational society.’ Castells favours the term ‘informational society’ over
‘information society’ because it emphasizes the centrality of the role of
information in our society. Information, “the communication of knowledge,” has
been a critical aspect of every society, but contemporary society is centrally
organized around information, just as ‘industrial society’ was organized around
the industrial means of production.72
!

Castells defines ‘network’ as a set of interconnected nodes in which a

node is “the point at which a curve intersects itself.”73 A node is dependent on the
network of which it is a part: a stock exchange, governmental organizations,
72

Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010), 21.
73
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street gangs, money launderers, television systems, mobile devices, etc.
Important is the “architecture of relationships between networks” which determine
the inclusion or exclusion of nodes and networks and the dominant processes
and functions in society.74 Echoing Marshall McLuhan, Castells argues that the
“power of flows takes precedence over the flows of power”: that the way in which
power moves is more important than any power that moves.75 Similarly, more
important for social domination or change than the substance of the network is
the presence or absence in the network itself.
!

While these networks are comprised of information flows, Castells has

argued that we ought to abandon the term “Information Society” as it is too
vague.76 Instead, we need to consider that informational and communication
technologies are more important to contemporary society than previous
technologies were in earlier societies: more important than the technologies of
the Industrial Revolution. The “shift from computer-centred technologies to
network-diffused technologies” along with the rise of nanotechnologies and a
“biology revolution” coupled with the circularity of communication and exchange
of knowledge and information: all of these changes mean information processing
is at the source of basic life and social action so that our “eco-social system is
thereby transformed.”77 Throughout his work, Castells gives detailed examples
and arguments about the changing networked nature of global economies,
structures of work, entertainment, education, gendered roles, governance,
culture, art – just about everything in the realm of society. However, I will focus on
his theories ‘space of flows’ and ‘timeless time.’
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Space of Flows
In an article published in 2000, Castells defines his concept: “the space of flows
refers to the technological and organizational possibility of organizing the
simultaneity of social practices without geographical contiguity.”78 Castells’ first
published use of this concept is in The Informational City published in 1989.79
Here, Castells begins to formulate this concept in relation to his larger thesis of
the ‘mode of development’ which he contrasts with and relates to Marx’s ‘mode of
production.’ The ‘mode of development’ refers to the “technological arrangements
through which labour acts upon matter to generate the product, ultimately
determining the level of surplus.”80 ‘Technology’ is understood by Castells to be
“the use of scientific knowledge to specify ways of doing things in a reproducible
manner.”81 In The Informational City, Castells defines the space of flows as
something emerging in this new, informational mode of development which
“dominates the historically constructed space of places.”82 That is, dominant
organizations have begun to detach themselves from the “social constraints of
cultural identities and local societies” through communicative technologies.83 We
can also understand the space of flows as Lefebvre’s ‘total urbanization.’
!

While ‘space of flows’ is used in The Informational City as a way to explain

emerging patterns in global capitalism and labour, we see an early version of the
argument I began with: technological determinists are wrong to forecast the
demise of cities because of the rise of communicative technologies.84 Castells is
outlining a dialectical relationship between the space of flows in which dominant
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organizations are detaching themselves from localities (decentralizing) and new
centralizing forms of informational and technological industries. The mountain of
empirical data Castells presents concludes that “There is no direct effect of
communication technologies on the location of offices and services.”85 Instead,
corporate and industry offices and producer services are increasingly
concentrated in “nodal large metropolitan areas” and “central business
districts.”86 However, many secondary offices and some head offices, finding the
real estate too expensive in urban areas, are locating in suburban areas. As well,
consumer, public, and social services are following the suburbanization of the
middle class.87

The conclusion Castells draws is that centralization or

decentralization depends on the specific industry, corporation, or service. Based
on a series of studies, Castells finds that “information-intensive industries are
disproportionately concentrated in metropolitan areas.”88 The reason for this,
Castells argues, is because of the infrastructure needed to support these
‘information-intensive’ industries. Large metropolitan regions are where
telecommunications companies are able to install new communication
infrastructure. Thus, we see the rise of the ‘wired city’ rather than the ‘electronic
home’ of telecommuters.89

Quoting Mitchell Moss: “Although new

communications technologies permit geographical dispersal, the economics of
the new infrastructure are oriented towards those urban regions that are major
information centres.”90 While this reason for the concentration of ‘informationintensive’ industries and corporations was likely true at the time, this needed
infrastructure is now spread geographically wide. However, even though this
reason is no longer valid, cities remain and have not withered away.

85

Castells, The Informational City, 142.

86

Castells, The Informational City, 143.

87

Castells, The Informational City, 143.

88

Castells, The Informational City, 146.

89

Castells, The Informational City, 149.

90

Castells, The Informational City, 149. Mitchell Moss, “Telecommunications and the Future of
Cities,” in Land Development Studies, 3 (1986): 33–44.

!

!

Chapter 5!

281

Castells second reason for the continuance of cities and urban areas in

spite of communicative technologies does a better job standing the test of time:
the “importance of trusted person-to-person contacts.” 91 This argument remains
throughout Castells’ work, and I will return to it below in my discussion of mobile
communicative technologies.92
!

Castells returned to this concept of the ‘space of flows’ in the first of his

major, three-volume work. In The Rise of the Network Society, published in 1996
and updated in 2000, Castells sought to give a more theoretically informed
explanation of this concept along with his theory of time. Here he argues that
“space organizes time in the network society.”93 This, of course, is opposed to
classical social theory that assumes space is dominated by time. Here, Castells
repeats the points outlined above from The Informational City: that
communication technology has not dispersed offices out of urban areas and that
telecommunications infrastructure was one of the reasons for keeping corporate
locations within urban centres. Further, evidence since The Informational City
finds that only between one and two per cent of workers worked online from
home. And, importantly, though some groups of professionals are increasingly
working part-time from home, this shift is not determined by the technology, but
rather “out of the rise of the network enterprise and of the flexible work
process.”94
!

Though Castells claims that he understands the space of flows in a

dialectic with the space of places, his ultimate argument is, as I show below, that
the space of flows has dominated the space of places. Space, for Castells, “is the
expression of society”;95 it “does not reflect society, it expresses it”;96 it is not a
91
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“photocopy of society, it is society.”97 Since society is undergoing a “structural
transformation” (towards the networked, informational society), “new spatial
forms and processes are currently emerging” under a new “logic.”98 Since space
cannot be defined outside of social practices, and social actors do things with
previously established (urban) infrastructure, space is “crystallized time.”99
Castells borrows heavily from David Harvey’s materialist conception of space:
that it cannot be understood independently from social action.100
!

At the most general level, space is the “material support of time-sharing

social practices” that always-already bears a “symbolic meaning.”101

Since

Castells argues that contemporary society is constructed around flows (of capital,
information, technology, images, sounds, symbols, etc.), and these flows are the
processes dominating our economic, political, and symbolic life, then the space
of flows is the dominant spatial form. And by ‘flows,’ Castells means the
“purposeful, repetitive, programmable sequences of exchange and interaction
between physically disjointed positions held by social actors.”102
!

Castells argues that there are “three layers of material supports that,

together, constitute the space of flows.”103 The first is the “material support” of
these flows which are “constituted by a circuit of electronic exchanges”:
telecommunications, computer processing, etc.104 Taken together, these are the
“spatial form” of the network society so that no place exists in isolation but rather
in positions related to the exchange of flows within the network.105 While the logic
of spatial arrangement changes within the space of flows, places do not vanish
97
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but are rather articulated and understood in relation to the network. This is much
like how railroads defined economic regions in industrial society, or how the rules
of citizenship defined early spatially bound cities in mercantilism and early
capitalism.
!

The second layer of the space of flows is “constituted by its nodes and

hubs.”106 Again, the space of flows is not placeless but the logic of the network
largely determines its arrangement. Various places come to have specific
functions within the network, based on “social, cultural, [and] physical”
characteristics.107 Nodes within the network are those places which are “the
location of strategically important functions” that develop a host of “locality-based
activities and organizations around a key function in the network.”108 Nodes have
a hierarchy and an example of an important node in the network is Castells
definition of the “global city,” which is not a title of distinction that cities bestow
upon themselves but rather a specific node that plays a large role in global
capitalism. Thus, New York City or London, with their stock exchanges and
offices of global businesses, are obviously global cities. However, depending on
the function within specific networks, various locales can become privileged
nodes. For example, Cannes, France, has become a node in global film industry,
and Chapare or Alto Beni in the global cocaine industry. An essential element to
keep in mind is that these places are only important in relation to the larger,
global networks and their own local developments are dependent on the global
networks. However, Castells clearly states that these nodes’ hierarchies are not
based solely on the flow of capital, but on “wealth generation, information
processing, and power making.”109
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The third layer of the space of flows is the “spatial organization of the

dominant, managerial elites (rather than classes).”110 That is, these elites play a
dominant role in the spatial organization their locales (cities). While the space of
flows is largely structural it is not solely determined by this structure. It is
reproduced by the actions, conceptions, decisions of social actors. As a kind of
shorthand, Castells writes that “elites are cosmopolitan, people are local,”
meaning that though elites are a minority their interests dominate the majority of
people living in locales.111 Elites establish themselves in spaces and cultural
networks apart from their local society (gated communities, private clubs, etc.)
and enact decisions that have global consequences. One can identify these elite
spaces by their uniformity (they look the same regardless of local culture): hotels,
golf clubs, exclusive restaurants, airports, VIP lounges, etc. These are designed
to maintain a social distance between society at large and the elite spaces of
flows.
!

One effect of this space of flows for the managerial elite is the uniformity of

architecture, interior design, and lifestyle, from the beige walls of hotels and
offices to the “mandatory diet of grilled salmon and green salad” along with
regular jogging.112 Architecture of the spaces of flows seeks an escape from local
history and culture and instead becomes homogenous in reference to a “new
imaginary, wonderland world of unlimited possibilities.”113 Castells terms this the
“architecture of nudity”: forms so neutral that they pretend to say nothing; a
message of silence.114
!

Though Castells insists on a dialectic between the space of flows and the

space of places, they do come across in his work as opposites. Pointing out the
obvious, that the vast majority of people live in places, he then assumes that they
110
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“perceive their space as place-based.”115 He defines ‘place’ as “a locale whose
form, function, and meaning are self-contained with the boundaries of physical
contiguity.”116

Unfortunately, Castells does not give much more detail, and

instead turns to a rather long description of the Parisian quartier of Belleville,
where he lived when he was younger and returned to many times. Nonetheless,
Castells point is that Belleville is a clearly identifiable place with a host of physical
features that distinguish it.
!

Spaces of places are not synonymous with ‘communities’ and not all are

“socially interactive and spatially rich,” just that they are distinctive, different,
recognizable, and unrepeated.117 Oddly missing from Castells’ theory of the
space of places are the (sub)urban forms that lack this distinctive character, such
as residential developments that are nearly identical in, say, Toronto, Calgary, or
Edmonton. One can be at the intersection of two arterial roads in suburban
Edmonton and easily mistake it for suburban Toronto. Earlier residential districts,
even urban forms built pre-WWII, can be near identical in different cities and
different areas within the same municipal boundary. However, perhaps we can
use Castells’ ‘space of flows’ to understand why urban developments have
increasingly become similar, whether it is suburban road networks and housing,
retail areas (malls and ‘power centres’), or density-intensifying condominium
buildings. Since “function and power in our societies are organized in the space
of flows, the structural domination of its logic essentially alters the meaning and
dynamic of places.”118 This dominating space of flows is a networked “ahistorical
space” that imposes “its logic over scattered, segmented places.”119

The

suburban sameness is of the ‘architecture of nudity’: ahistorical, with no
reference to local culture.

115

Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 453.

116

Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 454.

117

Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 456–457.

118

Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 458.

119

Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 459.

!

Chapter 5!

286

Timeless Time
Since Castells understands the implications of the space of flows as an
ahistorical, abstract space, it is not surprising that time is closely linked to this
concept. Castells’ philosophy of time is largely influenced by Leibniz, who
understands time as the “succession of ‘things’ so that without ‘things’ there
would be no time.” 120 While Castells appears familiar with various sociological
theories of time, he relies mainly on Harold Innis’ argument that “the fashionable
mind is the time-denying mind.”121 Castells offers a history of various conceptions
of time, but points to the predominance of the critical factor of industrial
capitalism: clock time.122

However, this “linear, irreversible, measurable,

predictable time is being shattered in the network society.” 123 This is not a return
to earlier cyclical, rhythmic notions of time, nor a relativization of time based on
local customs. Rather, it is a “mixing of tenses to create a forever universe.”124
This “timeless time” mainly refers to two things: the acceleration of “just about
everything” and the disappearance of sequence.125
!

In terms of acceleration and the compression of time, Castells cites David

Harvey’s notion of post-modern time: “time-space compression,” which accounts
for near-instant global financial transactions,126 new forms of production, and
labour (‘just-in-time’ production),127 and the resulting obsession with ‘managing
time.’ To explain the disappearance of the ‘proper’ sequencing of time, Castells
relies heavily on our “biological clocks” as the benchmark.128 He argues that
120
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these biological rhythms (of the individual, species, or cosmic) are “essential to
human life” and we “ignore them at [our] peril.”129 Thus, Castells understands
nature in the traditional ‘perfect balance’ ideology and advances in industrial
production, medicine, and the imposition of reason over fate are altering the lifecycle. The network society is “undermining this orderly life-cycle … by breaking
down the rhythms, either biological or social, associated with the notion of a lifecycle.”130 Strangely, Castells’ main concern is with the ability to control human
reproduction and human longevity, thus the loss of the ‘natural life-cycle,’ and his
concerns border on social conservatism. But, since Castells does not pursue this
much further, and does not argue anything offensive, let us turn instead to the
“culture of real virtuality” and changing notions of time.131
!

This ‘real virtuality’ shares the features of timeless time explained above:

“simultaneity and timelessness”: near-instant worldwide communication, such as
journalistic reporting, to ‘witness’ history along with more personal
communication across vast distances.132 More interesting is the blurring of
tenses or the “mixing of times” such that what would be considered a beginning,
middle, or end is lost. What Castells calls “non-sequential time” can be
understood as the loss of narrative. Information is now organized based on “the
impulses of the consumer” so that culture becomes eternal and ephemeral:
eternal since it draws on all historical cultural expressions and ephemeral as
each arrangement or organization is based on a specific context and purpose.133
!

While his contention similar to Harvey’s “‘postmodern condition’ induced

by space-time compression,” Castells does not agree with Harvey’s insistence on
129
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capitalism being the sole cause because “culture does not simply reproduce in all
its manifestations the logic of the economic system.” 134 This “eternal/ephemeral”
time fits within contemporary capitalism but adds new layers: the “ideological and
technical freedom to scan the planet and the whole history of humankind.”135
!

Thus, ‘timeless time’ belongs to the ‘space of flows,’ whereas disciplined

time and biological time belong to the ‘space of places’: “space shapes time in
our society, thus reversing a historical trend: flows induce timeless time, places
are time-bounded.”136 Castells argues that our age is one in which space is
enacting some kind of “historical revenge” in that space is “structuring
temporality” in different and contradictory logics.137

The space of flows is

dissolving time by disordering the sequence of events, suggesting instead a
simultaneity between and among them. The resistance to this timeless time is
what Castells terms “glacial time.”138

Glacial time suggests the proper

sequencing of events based on history along with the slowing down of this
sequencing.

Space, Time, and Cities
In the preface to the 2010 edition of The Rise of the Network Society, Castells
tries to clarify his theories of space and time. Rather than backing down from his
argument about the essential nature of space regarding society, he states that
space is not a tangible reality but a “concept constructed on the basis of
experience.”139 Thus, echoing Lefebvre, space is a social form and a social
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practice and “defines the time frame of social practices.” 140 While cities are
located where they are because of relations of communication, exchange, and
economy, cities are now “characterized by the formation of a new spatial
architecture made up of global networks connecting major metropolitan regions
and their areas of influence.”141 This means that cities can no longer be
understood simply by their urbanized centres and suburbanized fringes because
these “metropolitan regions” have a multitude of centres, each different in size
and function. Each metropolitan region has a multicentred, hierarchical structure,
with decentralized activities, residences, and services and a diversity of land
uses. It is a “nameless” territory that extends “wherever its networks go.”142
!

Castells argues that “suburban sprawl” is no longer a predominant urban

form.143 Instead we are seeing these multifunctional, decentralized metropolitan
regions and Castells gives a series of reasons for this transformation of cities.
The main one, of course, is the “networked connection between the local and the
global.”144 However, Castells insists on the hierarchy in which certain locales are
more important because of their relative value to the networks: certain regions
become important nodes. Within this global architecture of networks, these
important nodes are the places that “attract wealth, power, culture, innovation,
and people.”145 Most important for a place to be an important node is their
physical and electronic connectivity: transit and telecommunication networks.
While these are the crucial features to attract “highly skilled personnel,” there
also needs to be a host of services (hotels, entertainment, etc.) that require
service workers.146 This is precisely the premise of Richard Florida’s work: the
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need to attract “talent” who will earn relatively high wages along with service
workers who will earn relatively low wages.147
!

Unchanged in this updated “Preface” are Castells’ reasons for why cities

have not disappeared in spite of the fairly easy possibility for telecommuting: the
need for face-to-face meetings and the required communication infrastructure.
However, as this “Preface” was written in 2010, Castells recognizes that while the
communication infrastructure was once a cause for these important nodes, it is
no longer as important as it was. This infrastructure (Internet access, cellular
coverage) is available well beyond large metropolitan regions. Instead, “the
value-making locales offer greater opportunities and services, and this offer
attracts talented and innovative professionals.”148 (Had Castells written ‘creative
professionals,’ we would be forgiven for thinking this remark was made by
Richard Florida.) Because these places attract wealthy professionals, there
develops a “thriving market” with better cultural, educational, and health
amenities. All of this requires workers so these areas become “the hubs for
immigration.”149 And here we ought to remember Florida’s argument that people
in the technology and creative class like multi-ethnic urban areas since these
areas are usually more open new and different ideas and people.150
!

Unfortunately, Castells does not tie these ‘metropolitan regions’ with his

theory of the ‘space of places.’ Earlier in the preface he defines “the space of
places the space of contiguity,” and later argues that “there is an increasing
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I

understand this as meaning that, while these new metropolitan regions are
developing through networks and the space of flows, these spaces still have a
foot in the space of places. That is, while people participate globally through work
and culture, there has developed a renewed insistence on quality of their local
‘space of place.’
!

This insight can be paired with Castells’ theory of time: while people

participate globally in the space of flows, within ‘timeless time,’ they are not,
despite Castells’ pleas, countering this with anything approaching ‘glacial time.’
While there might be a few examples of people wishing to ‘reconnect’ to
biological, slower time (yoga, urban gardening, fighting light pollution at night,
etc.), people’s everyday lives, which are immersed in their locales, are wilfully
embracing (but are not ‘dominated by’) the space of flows. A clear example:
travel arrangements to and from work that are interspersed by other errands and
arrangements. While Castells paints this as the “frantic race of everyday life,”152 I
would argue this reflects an entirely new way of experiencing everyday life and,
just because everyday life is ‘quicker,’ more compressed, and out of sequence
does not mean it is a bad thing. People are no longer required to make
arrangements ahead of time but can communicate with others to, for example,
decide what to buy at the supermarket, who will pick children up, what
entertainment will be enjoyed in the evening, etc. All these seemingly banal
errands and outings are decided ‘on the fly’ because of mobile communication
technologies.
!

I will discuss the implications (most of which I argue are positive) of this

mobile connectivity below, but I should be clear that I largely disagree with
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He assumes that timeless time is a dominating force that is

destroying ‘proper’ biological, sequenced time. Moreover, he sees properly
sequenced time as a “counterpower” to this timeless time, and continues to see
“glacial time” as a form of resistance.154 Castells becomes near religious in his
nostalgia for slower paced, sequential time: “It is sequential time … that seems to
us eternal. And in fact it is, because we can only follow the planetary sequence
when we rejoin nature in eternity.” 155 So, far from favouring the space of flows,
networks, or timeless time, Castells becomes increasingly conservative, using
these concepts and theories to warn our society that we are getting ahead of
ourselves and need to return to slower, sequential time.
!

While I am strongly critical of Castells nostalgia and moral hand-

wringing,156 I nonetheless find he has much to offer regarding contemporary
mobile communication technologies. I argue that the recent developments of this
technology are much more profound than normally understood: it is radically
reshaping both the spatial makeup of urban spaces and our experiences and
behaviours in urban spaces.

Connectivity, Mobility, and Cities
Common criticisms of technology’s effect on everyday life are usually based on
conservative and nostalgic ideals. The introduction of early telecommunication
into homes was also met with similar annoyances. Walter Benjamin was rare in
his more nuanced insight into the telephone. He remembers the telephone’s
“regal entry” into his childhood home, how it annoyed his parents and its effect on
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the “younger generation.”157 For those who were lonely, the telephone was a
consolation; for those “forsaken, it shared its bed.”158 In other words, for young
people unable to connect with friends and ‘stuck’ at their parents’ house, the
telephone gave them the possibility of sociability. But for those who had few, if
any friends, the telephone only brought their social isolation into relief. Similarly,
contemporary mobile phones do not create sociability but only allow social
people to be social in new and different ways. And unsociable people will not find
their answers in a mobile phone. Currently, the strangest complaint from older
generations is that they cannot talk to people of younger generations because
they are absorbed in their cell phones or smartphones.159 It is as though they are
hysterically complaining, “They are not social because they are constantly being
social.” While there are some problematics with mobile communication
technologies, which I will discuss below, we ought to be cautious of any criticisms
that come from a nostalgic or conservative position.
!

In 2007 Castells co-authored a book in which its authors articulate the

relationship between the space of flows and timeless time and mobile
communication.160 One chapter, “The Space of Flows, Timeless Time, and Mobile
Networks,” repeats much of what he wrote earlier in The Rise of the Network
Society and The Informational City, but here adds that “the diffusion of mobile
communication technology greatly contributes to the spread of the space of flows
and timeless time as structures of our everyday life.” 161 While social interactions
are increasingly within the space of flows, there remain concrete spaces. People
use mobile technology to meet one another while on the move, a practice
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While this technology allows people the

freedom to contact whomever without being tied to a specific place (as it is with a
‘land line’), most interesting is that mobile communications “build a new space” in
which people selectively communicate (i.e. not with people in their immediate
vicinity) and may do so at any given time.163
!

This connectivity does not eliminate place, but rather redefines the

meaning of places: “anywhere from which the individual chooses or needs to
communicate.164 In other words, “everybody transports their world with them.”165
The implications of this portability, for Castells, is threefold and he refers to these
as ‘rhythms.’ The “rhythms of device use” make “relationships durable and
continuing, rather than ‘fragmented.’”166 The “rhythms of institutional change”
refer to the ways in which people use mobile devices to be productive or
entertained during what was once ‘dead time’: waiting in line, riding transit, etc.
!

The “rhythms of everyday” are of particular interest as these refer to the

“local temporalities associated with social and cultural relationships.”167 One way
in which mobile phones have altered social relations is that they keep alive a
“full-time intimate community.”168 It connects multiple ‘heres’ and ‘theres’ and
does not demand one’s full engagement. SMS (short message service), or
‘texting,’ allows people to keep in touch but does not require immediate attention
and allows a person to respond when they want or can, rather than when the
other demands. And, more than being about a new capability of motion, these
mobile communications allow family and friend networks to both communicate
and physically connect more frequently. Research shows this is much different
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than those who primarily communicate through desktop-based Internet: they are
shown to spend less time physically with friends and family, while those with
mobile Internet are more socially active.169 Thus, “mobile users are more sociable
than non-users.”170
!

Another interesting implication of mobile communication has been given

the unfortunate name “m-etiquette.”171

This refers to the tension between

established cultural norms or rules and the new practices enabled by mobile
communication. There have emerged established rules for using a mobile phone
in a variety of social settings: libraries, theatres, restaurants, classrooms, public
transit, etc. There is a “social learning process” that has occurred to adapt
manners and respect customs. Newer mobile phones have been designed to
assist this by allowing users to easily turn ringers off or set the phone to vibrate.
In places with high-levels of mobile phone users, it is no longer surprising or
bothersome to most to hear a ringtone or overhear a conversation. These
manners and rules of etiquette are, of course, specific to various social groups
and age groups. Older people will often feel that social manners have degraded
and that younger people are less social (even though these devices are
connecting people). About ten years ago, a bill in Illinois was proposed that would
force restaurants to have separate sections for those who had cell phones.
Studies have found that in the US, most mobile phone users will switch off (or
turn to silent) their devices in some public spaces such as churches or concert
halls, but not while interacting with friends and family.172 Japan has stricter codes
and has been quicker to regulate mobile phone usage: for example, people are
not permitted to use their phones on public transit. Many of these social codes
concern voice communication, whereas SMS texting is less intrusive to others
and thus rules are less strict.
169
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Personal safety and security is an important aspect of mobile phones

since many users purchase their first device for safety (in case they get lost, their
car breaks down, etc.) but then begin to use their phones for other, social
reasons. A large number of studies have been done on the role of mobile phones
and the “9/11” attacks on the World Trade Center and the aftermath of hurricane
Katrina.173
!

Mobile phones are not simply communication devices. Certain phones are

marketed to be associated with particular groups or lifestyles. The most heavily
marketed is the iPhone by Apple, who have successfully associated its brand
with a young, ‘cool,’ and, notably, urban demographic. No matter which brand of
phone, they have all “become closely involved in the process of personal identity
construction” so that a person’s phone makes a statement about them. And,
beyond the brand of phone, a wide variety of personalizations are available, from
ringtones and wallpapers to cases and straps with beads or figurines of popular
characters.
!

I agree with theorists such as Castells, Leopoldina Fortunati, J.E. Katz,

and others that mobile communication has not changed social conceptions of
time and space but rather that this technology is of a space and time already
present in society. As Castells outlined his theory of the space of flows well
before the ubiquity of mobile phones, Fortunati argues that “the mobile” is
interacting with a “space that was already transformed.”174 She also argues that
space has become increasingly complex so that one’s understanding of their
place in the world is fraught with anxiety which mobile connectivity helps to
alleviate. It allows people the choice of engaging their immediate physical space
or connecting to another space, usually a space of friends and family. Though

173

It is worth noting that Foucault’s arguments about ‘security,’ discussed in chapter 1, refer to
problem of series: a “series of mobile elements” that circulate: Michel Foucault, Security, Territory,
Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham
Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009), 20.
174

Leopoldina Fortunati, “The Mobile Phone: Towards New Categories and Social Relations,”
Information, Communication & Society 5, no 4 (2002): 514.

!

Chapter 5!

297

Fortunati argues that these mobile connections mean that people are less
connected to their immediate environment and the conversations held are within
a closed circle of people that repeats the same structures of exchange, I suggest
there is a much different aspect at play. The connections that people make with
mobile technologies are not always of their choosing nor are they always
similarly structured conversations with the same group of people.
!

Two Tel Aviv University researchers, Tali Hatuka (Department of

Geography) and Eran Toch (Department of Industrial Engineering) began a study
in 2012 on the different uses and perceptions of public by cell phone and
smartphone owners.175 Thus far, their research indicates markedly different
behaviours in and understandings of public space. Cell Phone users are far more
likely to hold private conversations on their devices in private spaces, whereas
smartphone users will most likely engage in private phone conversations in
public spaces. Smartphone users believe they have much more privacy than they
do in public space (they believe that people cannot hear their conversation), are
much likely to reveal private information in public space, and are much less
concerned about their phone conversations bothering other people in public
spaces. Hatuka believes that smartphone users are under the illusion of being in
a “private bubble.” Interestingly, their conclusions are similar to the much earlier
proposed Illinois bill: to create separate sections of public space, like smoking
and non-smoking sections. Another conclusion, which should not be surprising is
that smartphone users felt “lost” without their phones since they were no longer
able to make the multiple connections with people and information that they are
used to making.
!

While mobile communication devices like smartphones and tablets allow

urban dwellers to find one’s way in a city, there are recent developments that
help users get lost in their cities. The Broken City Lab in Windsor, Ontario, has
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developed an application (“app”) called “Drift” that helps users “unfamiliarize”
themselves with their cities and neighbourhoods.176 The app’s developer, Justin
Langlois, claims this was not meant to be a wry comment on smartphones, but
wanted “to recreate serendipity in the world when modern technology has largely
extinguished it.” 177 The app works by giving the user a set of directions and then
asking the user to take photos, such as head east two blocks, turn at a crack in
the sidewalk and take a photo of “something warm.” Langlois hopes that users
will begin to experience their seemingly-known environments in new ways; they
will discover things they pass by and ignore on their routine routes. One cannot
help but wonder if Langlois was inspired by Benjamin: “Not to find one’s way
around a city does not mean much. But to lose one’s way in a city, as one loses
one’s way in a forest, requires some schooling.”178
!

In 2007, Microsoft filed a patent that would help pedestrians avoid areas of

cities that are dangerous or high in crime as well as environmentally harsh areas.
When the patent was approved in January of 2012, it was immediately dubbed
the “Avoid Ghetto App” and, obviously, was subject to much criticism. While many
critics make sarcastic suggestions for apps, many would in fact be quite useful.
Sarah E. Chinn, author of Technology and Racism suggested, “a more useful app
would be for young black men to be able to map blocks with the highest risks of
their being pulled over or stopped on the street by police.”179 Many in Toronto are
currently criticizing the police’s practice of stopping black youths on the street
and asking for identification, making them ‘known to the police.’180 Were this app
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available in Toronto, I am sure many would find it useful. Gathering statistics and
other information can help people experience cities in a variety of different ways.
There are apps that help people take public transit, find a safe or comfortable
bicycle route, avoid traffic jams, find restaurants, etc.181
!

There are many other apps that affect urban everyday life. In many larger

cities, there are apps that let smartphone users know how to reach a destination
on mass transit and when the next bus, streetcar, or subway is arriving. In San
Francisco, people can find parking spaces through a smartphone as parking
meters send signals when spots are vacant or empty. The system, SFpark, is
able to use “demand response” pricing to make it more expensive to park when
there is high demand, thus reducing demand and freeing up spots.182
!

Nearly all of these types of apps rely on what is being called the ‘Internet

of Things’ (IoT). This term refers to objects, rather than people, that transmit data
to the Internet.183 Early adopters of the IoT were public transportation systems
that used the system’s GPS locators to predict bus or train arrival times and then
made this information public. The “[murmur]” project is an early form of IoT in
Toronto. It began in 2003 in Kensington Market and quickly grew across Toronto
and then to Vancouver and Montreal. It consists of recorded stories of an area’s
history. A sign is placed at the relevant location with a phone number which
people can call to hear the story. A recent new IoT is a product made by the
Spanish company Via Inteligente called “iPavement,” which are paving stones
that contain microprocessors and a variety of built-in apps.184 The data and
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information is ‘cloud’ based, so whoever owns the pavers (municipal
governments, companies, citizens) can update or change what the pavers do.
While they are most likely to be used as way-finding devices (directing tourists to
hotels, banks, transit, etc.), they are also able to accept uploaded documents and
books which would then be available to the public. There is also a program which
would allow residents to post events or information that would then be available
all – a bit like a digital ‘community board.’ Though only released in June 2012,
Madrid, Spain, is already testing the product and Dubai will soon install some as
well.
!

These apps and predictive systems require the data of patterns, which is

now being referred to as “Big Data.” 185 With the surge of data from Internet users
and various sensors (such as shipping containers, private vehicles, and public
transportation), algorithmic computations are able to extract trends and make
predictions. While seemingly innocuous, the trends and predictions have wideranging implications. In earlier times, companies had to decide what type of data
they wanted, then collect it. For example, a car company might want to know the
age or gender of their customers and so they would then go about gathering this
information. Now, much of this data is already collected and available – and the
moment a person, group, or company defines the schema through which to
analyze available data, they determine what that data concerns.186 For example,
data concerning your music preferences is how iTunes’ ‘Genius’ feature is able to
predict other music you like, but that same data can be used to guess at a
person’s racial background and deny them a bank loan. A device called
“FootPath,” using GPS data from smartphones, tracks the movements of
pedestrians on a very small scale to predict pedestrian behaviour. This data can
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be used to, for example, reduce pedestrian bottlenecks or map pedestrian routes
– however, it is largely targeted at retailers to assist them maximizing revenue.187
Related is a somewhat infamous practice of American Express which is clearly
stated in a letter to cardholder: “Other customers who have used their card at
establishments where you recently shopped have a poor repayment history with
American Express.”188 In an excellent discussion between Helen Nissenbaum
and Kazys Varnelis on privacy in the age of Big Data, it is pointed out that if you
buy premium bird-seed, banks and other lenders determine you are good creditrisk.189 Again, these implications derive from the availability of data prior to
hypothesizing a correlation. No one working for a bank or lending institution
thought to compare the purchase of premium bird-seed with credit risk, but
because purchases are quantified and plugged into various formulas, these
correlations become apparent. There is a striking similarity between the
predictive ‘information’ of Big Data and Foucault’s theory of security discussed in
chapter one: that punishment and the partitioning grid was aimed at decreasing
the probability of, respectively, crime and disease.190
!

What interests me most, however, is how mobile communication and

connectivity, along with the rise of IoT and Big Data, will affect everyday urban
experiences and behaviours. Again, I reject the notion that people who are
‘staring at their phones’ are perforce being anti-social. Very few people in public
using smartphones are doing anything but being social, whether it is sending
SMS texts or emails to people, reading what their Facebook ‘friends’ are up to,
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what people are posting on Twitter, or – and this is most likely – making plans to
meet in person with someone. Further, as Castells points out, the networks that
people are developing online and increasingly with mobile devices are both local
and specialized.191
!

The proliferation of various ‘social media’ (which should be called ‘mobile

media’) networks connect people who do not know one another. Facebook is
perhaps the exception since it allows users strong controls over who they interact
with. But Facebook is based on an earlier model without mobility. Though it is
trying to catch up, it cannot.192 Twitter and other newer platforms, however,
connect strangers to one another through either shared networks or by the lack
of commitment required to ‘follow’ someone. Rarely are one’s Facebook ‘friends’
unknown to the user, whereas a Twitter user usually does not know the people
he or she ‘follows.’ While many scoff at Twitter as being a time-waster with little
value, it revealed its value and importance during the G20 protests in the urban
core of Toronto in June 2010. Traditional media outlets were either unable or
unwilling to send reporters to the locations where the police response to protests
had become violent. Television coverage eventually became ‘reporters’ in studios
reading messages and showing photos and videos posted to Twitter. Since then,
many complaints against the police’s actions have been substantiated by these
photos and videos, and many who were charged were able to prove their
innocence by these photos and videos.
!

While Facebook controls what content its users see (which items appear

in the ‘newsfeed’) and are now charging ‘fan pages’ to have their posts seen by
more than 10% of their ‘fans,’ Twitter, in contrast, shows its users everything. This
means that it is up to each user to see what he or she wants: they will need to
follow accounts that interest them, unfollow those that do not, use search boxes
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or click on ‘hash tags.’ William Gibson, the well-known science fiction author
once quipped, “Facebook is the mall; Twitter is the street.”193 The point is that
Facebook is controlled and familiar, whereas Twitter (and most other newer
platforms) provides encounters with people who are more or less strangers and
their connections are engendered by events, interests, and proximities of time
and space. So, networks on Twitter and other newer platforms become
specialized and often based on locale; specialized interests are usually global,
while the local interests are of a material urban nature.
!

That is, many of the people a mobile device user connects with are in the

same city or region; these connections, whether on a local or global scale, are
increasingly specialized. If a person is interested in, for example, local politics
and governance, these networks allow one to learn from and discuss with others
who share a similar interest. So long as a person’s hobby or interest does not
require physical meetings or gatherings (such as organized, team sports), he or
she can pursue just about anything through these communication devices. If a
person is interested in movies that came out in 1941, or poets that lived on
islands, or the details of the history Italian bicycle production, there will likely be
others that share the interest and have created a ‘space’ online (a ‘place’ in the
‘space of flows’) where members can ‘meet,’ discuss, learn, teach, and share
information. In the past, prior to Internet, a young person who took an interest in
some alternative or non-popular form of culture would likely be alone in their
interest (especially if they did not live in a large city) and would need to physically
travel to a larger city in the hopes of finding more artefacts of this alternative
culture. Today, this young person can find people with similar interests, the
information, and possibly the artefacts themselves with a simple Google search.
!

So, what does this do to urban space and to urban dwellers’ experience

and behaviour of this space? Regarding specialization of interests, it means that
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a person can most likely pursue and enjoy this interest without having to
physically travel. The tendency for mobile communication to take place between
people (or things) in the same city or region, helps to explain why so many of
Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ choose to live in cities. Castells repeatedly
argues that technology never determines social practices, but reflects social
practices and relations already in place. Internet and mobile communication is
most likely not the single cause of the surge in interest in urbanism or people
wanting to live in vibrant urban areas, but mobile technology and its use reflect
and sustain this desire to live in urban areas. Many of the ‘things’ online are
urban, be they websites, organized data in an app platform, or the people with
which one connects.
!

In fact, recent studies have shown that the majority of young people would

prefer to have a high-end smartphone than a car.194 This trend, along with the
shifting conceptions of home ownership are radically changing what types of
urban space is desired. No longer desired is the lifestyle associated with
suburban enclaves and the expressways that serve them. This was a previous
generation’s desire. Now, younger people desire ‘good’ urban spaces: diverse,
well-served by mass transit, with a strong cultural sector, entertainment, unique
restaurants, etc. And it is mobile connectivity that is encouraging (not
determining) this.
!

The way in which mobile devices interact with the internet helps to explain

this. Comments on news media sites are one of the worst things about the
internet. But the vast majority of these are left by those accessing the internet in
a stationary way (desktop or laptop computer). The ‘mobile versions’ of these
sites rarely support the comment platform. If they do, it is difficult for the user to
navigate. It is much more likely that a mobile user will share a link to the article
with their networks and attach their comment. So, rather than leave a comment in
a group of unknown, and usually hostile, people, the mobile user will share the
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article and comment with a pre-established network (friends, family, those with a
similar interest, etc.) and will be much more likely to have a productive
discussion.
!

The ‘Walkman’ of the 1980s, the portable CD player of the 1990s, and

then the iPod were all intensely isolating technologies. These were mobile
technologies that were not communicative, but rather allowed users to shut out
everything of the world around them. The smartphone is drastically different.
While some use their smartphones to listen to music on headphones, these
devices are connecting users to organizations, media, and other people which
are all social practices. However, these social connections are not immediate or
physical, but are within the space of flows. So, though being social, studies show
that smartphone users are more likely to be unaware of their immediate
surroundings.195
!

We are all familiar with pedestrians who are looking at the screen of their

smartphones and not watching where they are going.! Perhaps there is a need to
redesign urban infrastructure to accommodate smartphone users. And, since this
is about mobility, perhaps there are things to be learned from recent redesigns of
urban infrastructure to accommodate people with ‘mobility issues.’ The
difference, of course, is that smartphone users can change their behaviour. But
consider that the ubiquitous ‘walk’ and ‘don’t walk’ pedestrian signals were only
made common place in the mid-twentieth century. There have been recent
developments for people with vision or hearing impairments: they make sounds
and have tactile or vibrating buttons. For the actuated or semi-actuated signals,
pedestrians used to push a physical button. Now, they are electrostatic so there
is no need to use any force. For smartphone users, perhaps the ‘walk’ and ‘don’t
walk’ signals should be on the ground at the curb. Or users can make use of
current textured sidewalks that let those with vision or hearing impairments know
they are at an intersection. Or perhaps the electrostatic switches for pedestrians
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can emit an RFID (radio frequency identification) or NFC (near field
communication) signal to nearby phones to send a pop up message that they are
at an intersection – the smartphone users could tap the message to tell the light
to change.
!

But these are all speculative and I do not wish to commit the errors of

previous ‘futurologists.’ Instead, let us turn to Georg Simmel’s social theory to
help us understand the implications of technology and mobility on urban life.
Simmel is one of the earliest theorists of urban social life, whose observations
are still extremely relevant and, as I will show, are extremely applicable to
understand the social relations revolving around contemporary mobile
communication. Further, Simmel’s arguments regarding technology reveal the
tensions between subjective experience and objective technology as well as
elaborate Castells’ observation that communication technology has not led to the
demise, but rather the revival, of socially rich urban areas.

Simmel on Technology and Mobility
In what is Simmel’s most well-known essay, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” we
find the famous phrase “blasé attitude.”196 Many read this essay as arguing that
people in cities have a blasé attitude toward one another: that people do not care
for each other and ignore what is going on around them. This is a misreading.
Simmel’s argument is not that the metropolis results in a loss of interaction, a
disconnected society, or even that the blasé attitude is necessarily bad. He is not
suggesting that the metropolis is an unnatural site for human community,
implying that we ought to return to the rural. Unlike many of the other urban
planners discussed in this dissertation and nearly all Marxist urban theorists not
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discussed here, Simmel likes cities.197 While recognizing that city life has its own
issues, he does not assume they are problems in need of a drastic solution.
!

The blasé attitude is (for some) the initial result of living in an urban space

in which there is an excessive demand on the senses, so that it becomes near
impossible to give one’s attention to all these demands. The blasé attitude is not
a problem, but is rather a type of intellectual accomplishment that leads to a type
of freedom. In fact, “metropolitan life is unimaginable without ... the enhancement
of the metropolitan intellectuality.”198 Simmel is clear that the blasé attitude is an
intellectual ability: “stupid people who are not intellectually alive in the first place
usually are not exactly blasé.”199 The blasé attitude is just the initial mental
response which then develops into what we can call the “attitude of reserve”:
“this mental attitude of metropolitans toward one another we many designate,
from a formal point of view, as reserve.”200 If it were not for this attitude of
reserve, and the subject were to engage in every social exchange such as is
done “in a small town … one would be completely atomized internally and come
to an unimaginable psychic state.”201 Simmel recognizes that it is this reserve
which makes people from rural areas regard metropolitan people as “cold and
heartless,” and that it can lead to complete indifference, hatred, and violence.
But, this attitude of reserve, or “antipathy,” is what protects from both dangers of
the metropolis: complete “indifference and indiscriminate suggestibility.”202 In
other words, the attitude of reserve protects the urban dweller from the blasé
attitude (indifference). Thus, most urban dwellers have this “metropolitan
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intellectuality” that allows them to respond to some things, but not all things.
Were they to have the blasé attitude, they would not respond to anything.
!

This attitude of reserve should be familiar to anyone who lives in a city and

enjoys urban life. It is how we are able to walk down a busy street and not say
“hello” to everyone, attempt to take everything in, or respond to every car horn –
all the while aware of what is around us. It is how dozens of strangers can sit in
close quarters on mass transit and give each other privacy. It relates to Jane
Jacobs’ theory of trust and privacy in cities full of strangers: the attitude of
reserve ‘protects’ us from “nauseating togetherness”203 and from isolation. And it
is this attitude of reserve that can help us understand changing behaviours and
responses to cell phone and smartphone usage in urban public spaces. When
cell phones were still novel, or in areas where there is little usage, a person
talking on their phone in public would demand our attention. But urban dwellers
have, for the most part, developed the “metropolitan intellectuality” and ignore
these one-sided conversations. Mobile phone usage behaviour can be
understood in Simmel’s terms. Were one to respond to every notification, they
might come to the “unimaginable psychic state” in similar way as the person who
attempts in a city to respond to all of the demands on the senses. Like those who
develop an “attitude of reserve,” experienced smartphone users have the ability
to ignore their phone’s alerts when talking face-to-face with someone.
!

Simmel also provides ways in which we can understand the relationship

between individuals and technology, especially mobile technology. In “Bridge and
Door,” Simmel begins with the argument that in positing two objects as ‘separate’
they are in fact bound together in our consciousness and in emphasizing the two
‘things,’ we look over what rests between them.204 For example, the banks of a
river are simply apart in nature, but for us they are separated in our minds, and
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this is reflected in the aesthetic of the bridge. So on the one hand, the bridge
plays a unique part in making things separate, while on the other the bridge’s
practical aspect works to make unity between the two sides. We can think of
communication technology similarly. It addresses this tension between ‘apart’ and
‘separate’ insofar as we, as subjects, are ‘separate’ and communication
technologies represent an attempt to be simply ‘apart’ from one another and
emulate the connectedness of nature.
!

The door, however, provides a stronger example of “how separating and

connecting are only two sides of precisely the same act.”205 The door represents
the linkage between the realm of the subject and what is outside of this realm.
The door, itself a technology, functions to separate space so that ‘man may stand
in certainty,’ in finitude rather than the ‘natural’ infinite world of possibility.
Communication technology, like the door, moulds the plasticity of the world, gives
permanence to dynamism, and yet allows for the ‘opening up’ into the fluctuating
character of life. Both, too, represent “the enclosure of his or her domestic being”
yet they provide the essential and constant possibility of “stepping out of this
limitation into freedom.” 206 Just as the research presented above shows the
personalization and individualization of smartphones alongside their inherent
communicative capacities, these smartphones represent this tension between
individual ‘enclosure’ and the ability to engage with the other.
!

The aesthetic of the handle, Simmel argues, has a similar social function

as bridges and doors.207 And here we can see how constantly present mobile
communication technologies (“handheld” devices) function like the handle.
Simmel is not suggesting that the handle provides a link between the realms of
the aesthetic and the practical, but rather that the harmonization of these two
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spheres is “our unconscious criterion for the aesthetic effect.”208 Simmel argues
that the handle is a way of approaching the problem of relationship between the
“soul” (psyche) and the world that appears ‘outside’ the subject. Rather than
considering these things to be separate, Simmel is arguing that the soul (psyche)
“has its home in two worlds,”209 which is similar to the function of a smartphone: it
allows the user to live in two worlds, perhaps even multiple worlds.
!

Prior to these essays, Simmel wrote and published The Philosophy of

Money (1903), which argues (among many other things) that technology has
advanced far more than individual culture. That is, tools and machinery are more
“refined” than art and intellectuality: “Machinery has become so much more
sophisticated than the worker.”210 This is clearly the case with contemporary
technology and users, but it is no longer simply the technologies of work but also
that of entertainment and communication. Thus, we literally do not understand
the technology and processes involved when we communicate with each other.
So, while Simmel argues that this objective technology leads to an objectification
of the external world, which begins to influence the internal world of the subject
(such as the rise of ‘objectivity’ in thought), we can infer that communication
technologies give rise to ‘objective’ interpersonal (subjective) communication. In
other words, communication between two subjects is mediated by objective
technology which they do not understand.
!

The Philosophy of Money also provides a discussion of some problems for

subjectivity in relation to technology. Interestingly, contemporary communication
technology resolves much of his critique:
Cultural objects increasingly evolve into an interconnected
enclosed world that has increasingly fewer points at which the
subjective soul can interpose its will and feelings. And this trend is
supported by a certain autonomous mobility on the part of the
208
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objects. It has been pointed out that the merchant, the craftsman
and the scholar are today much less mobile than they were at the
time of the Reformation. Both material and intellectual objects today
move independently, without personal representatives or transport.
Objects and people have become separated from one another.
Thought, work effort and skill, through their growing embodiment in
objective forms, books and commodities, are able to move
independently; recent progress in the means of transportation is
only the realization or expression of this. By their independent,
impersonal mobility, objects complete the final stage of their
separation from people.211
Conversely, mobile communication technologies give users increasingly more
“points at which the subjective soul can interpose” since they are able to engage
and interact with the information, objects, and other subjects. Simmel’s concern
about “intellectual objects” moving independently without their “personal
representatives” is, however, increased with communication technologies. The
circulation of scholarly work without the scholar present may not, though, be such
a bad thing, as it enables larger audience, influence, and circulation of exchange.
However, recalling Castells’ argument that cities remain important despite
predictions of ‘electronic cottages,’ the desire for face-to-face interaction can be
considered a response to this impersonal exchange of ideas. But our increasing
ability to manipulate, interact, and actively engage with the ideas, information,
and ‘data’ in many ways returns these technological objects back to the people. It
should also be noted that Simmel argues that “money symbolizes acceleration in
the pace of life,” not that money is the cause.212 Similarly, Castells argues that
technology expresses life, not determines life. However, though I would argue
that mobile communication technologies are not the cause of changes to
contemporary society, these technologies do have a hand in teaching us what to
desire. And Simmel seems to agree:
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People’s ecstasy concerning the triumphs of the telegraph and
telephone often makes them overlook the fact that what really
matters is the value of what one has to say, and that, compared
with this, the speed or slowness of the means of communication is
often a concern that could attain its present status only by
usurpation.213
This “ecstasy,” Simmel suggests, is what distracts people from their true desire
(what one has to say) in favour of the desire taught by the technologies (how
quickly it transmits what one has to say).
!

While I see interesting and positive developments by communication

technologies, we ought to remember Lacan’s advice: “the only thing of which one
can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire.”214 We need to
‘maintain a fidelity’ to our desires and ensure that what excites or interests us on
an everyday urban level are our own desires and enjoyments, not those taught to
us by technology. Mobile technology can help us enjoy, explore and experience
urban spaces in different ways but we ought to be on guard for mistaking the
enjoyment of the technology with our own enjoyment. In many contemporary
discourses, especially the ‘business discourse,’ there is an overriding fantasy of
technology: that it will solve all problems hitherto unsolved. In Lacanian terms,
this discourse holds the belief that technology will finally cover over the Real. We
need to remember that the Real is always with us (always in its place) and judge
the value of communication technologies by, as Simmel says, their ability to let us
say what we want to say and not by a parameter it sets (usually speed). Further,
we need to be cautious about any communication technology that reduces our
ability to communicate and understand.
!

Thus, we need to consider what desires are seeking fulfillment with mobile

communication technology. Are they our desires, or the desires of the technology
itself? Apps like Drift can assist us in exploring our immediate urban
213
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environments in novel ways. But we should be wary of allowing our movements
and desires to be dominated by the technology itself, such as going to a
particular place solely because it has free WiFi or gazing at our devices and
missing the urban around us.
!

This chapter has continued the line of thought of the previous chapter –

that Jane Jacobs’ primary concern was the economies of cities, and many of her
arguments have been taken up by Richard Florida who has documented the
recent trend that more people are choosing to live in urban areas, and has
sought to explain why. This chapter has continued to investigate this trend
through the arguments of Manuel Castells, whose research finds that, despite the
rise of communication technologies and predictions that people would
increasingly chose not to live in urban areas and instead ‘telecommute’ to work,
more and more people are choosing to live in urban areas. This new interest in
urban areas is understood through his theories of the ‘space of flows’ and
‘timeless time.’ While Castells ultimately laments the loss of ‘space of places’ and
‘traditional time,’ I argue that, though people are situating themselves within the
‘space of flows,’ the desire to live in urban areas suggests a continued affection
for ‘space of places.’ However, there appears to be little interest in returning to
‘traditional’ or ‘glacial time.’ Much of the reconfiguration of urban areas and
people’s desire for these urban areas is meditated through communication
technologies, particularly those which are mobile. I argue that mobile
communication technologies are significantly altering the experiences of
everyday urban life, particularly how people relate to their immediate urban
environments. Rather than assume these changes are negative, I seek to show
how they altering and even increasing urban sociability. A handful of Georg
Simmel’s theoretical observations of urban life and technology are then
introduced because he seeks to find a balance between, or help us understand
‘when’ we declare a limit to, our responses to the demands of urban life and our
own sense of freedom as well as objective technologies and our internal world of
subjectivity.

314

CONCLUSION: The City as Symptom
This dissertation has taken cities and urban space as arrangements of space
across time, and as arrangements of time across space, and so many urbanists
and urban planners address time and space as a problem of circulation. As
Foucault argues, this problem of circulation made urbanizing and policing
identical practices, which explains the predominance of the grid. The rise of
mobile communication technology and a network society suggests a shift from
gridded circulation to a more complex arrangement within the space of flows.
While mobile technology allows users to interact across space instantaneously
and appears to ‘defeat’ the constraints of time and space, contemporary society
nonetheless insists on the importance of traditional circulation and arrangements
of space (the space of places), however: we seem content with the compression
and desequencing of traditional ‘clock’ time (timeless time). Contrary to
predictions that communication technologies would result in the ‘electronic
cottage’ and the decline of cities, we are instead witnessing a re-found desire for
the intensities and contingencies of urban life. Just as previous generations
reached their limit to urban life and retreated to the suburbs, current generations
have reached their limit with the suburban lifestyle. While this shift means that
cities have higher populations and densities, there are also signs of a trend in
which the fringes of cities are becoming ‘edge cities’ rather than strictly
residential enclaves.
!

So what are the contemporary practices in urban planning and

development, and how do these practices confront the city as a problem of
desire? The main contemporary practices, or at least those to which urbanists
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express adherence,1

are Smart Growth,2
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Complete Streets,3

and New

Urbanism.4 ‘Smart Growth’ is largely an empty signifier – the central principles of
it lack anything close to a clear definition – but it seeks to make urban spaces
more ‘sustainable’ and ‘respect the natural environment.’5 The Complete Streets
movement also suffers from a dependence on master signifiers, but is brilliant in
its simplicity. The movement is based on the argument that urban streets in North
America are built primarily for private vehicle use and these streets need to be
‘completed’ by redesigning them for all users (including children, the elderly, and
those with mobility issues) and making room for all uses (such as walking,
cycling, and public transit). New Urbanists, briefly mentioned in this dissertation,
claim an affinity to Jane Jacobs, but their projects do not demonstrate a fidelity to
her work.
!

New Urbanists seek to develop new towns and suburban spaces that are

more walkable and focus on the aesthetics of rooflines and the architectural
rhythms of streets. While their suburban developments contain a ‘neighbourhood
centre’ with a few basic shops and services, they completely ignore Jacobs’
insistence on the need for a diversity of primary land uses that spur secondary
uses. New Urbanist projects usually only have one primary use – a residential
one – and impose a few secondary uses in the form of a few shops and services.

1

Of course, what urbanists plan or propose is not necessarily what is built.

2

For an overview of Smart Growth, see: Andres Duany, Jeff Speck and Mike Lydon, The Smart
Growth Manual (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010).
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It might be argued, since many New Urbanist projects also contain a town hall or
community centre, along with a public green space, that these should count as
primary land uses. Perhaps, but missing is a significant number of places of
employment. Because there are so few places to work within these
neighbourhoods, people still travel for work and treat those work destinations as
only work destinations. They still reside in suburbs and work ‘downtown,’ using
the downtown. Further, while New Urbanism’s insistence on garages at the rear
of houses accessed by laneways does make the streetscape ‘prettier,’ it also
takes life off the street. The houses might have porches and balconies and be
closer to the street than typical suburban homes, but there is not much to look at
from these porches and balconies. And, though New Urbanists assist in shifting
away from single-use ‘zoning bylaws,’ they are replacing these with ‘codes’ which
re-enforces the university discourse.
!

Further, many New Urbanism projects come across as ‘pre-gentrified.’

Their first project was Seaside, Florida, which was the set for the film, The
Truman Show. One of the film’s producers, Edward Feldman, found the town to
be “a set” (thus, there was no need for a set to be built for the film) and refers to it
as a “candy floss town,” while the lead actor, Jim Carrey, calls it as a “Norman
Rockwell scene.”6

This façadism is also apparent in the New Urbanist

development outside of Calgary – McKenzie Towne, Alberta. This suburban
development features a central area with a town hall along with what resembles
a main street (McKenzie Towne Gate) of a small town, with amenities like a post
office, drugstore, restaurants, and a pub. Though this main street features
buildings of at least two stories, so that the upper floors could be apartments, all
of these upper floors are, in fact, empty.7 Similarly, the districts of Cornell and
Greensborough in Markham, Ontario, also New Urbanist projects, were planned
with a central areas containing shops and services, but these shops and services
6

Peter Weir, et. al. “How’s It Going to End? The Making of The Truman Show,” Special Features
ofThe Truman Show, DVD, directed by Peter Weir (Hollywood: Paramount, 1992).
7

Chris Turner, “Diagnosis: This is Nowhere,” Azure, May 2008. Retrieved from: http://
www.azuremagazine.com/magazine/backissues/features.php?id=1775
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are hardly enough to sustain communities or neighbourhoods as there is not
much more than a dry cleaner and a bakery.
!

In chapter 4, I argued that many have sought to ‘short-circuit’ primary and

secondary diversity by advocating or building towers with retail on the main floor
and calling it ‘mixed-use.’ This ‘short-circuit’ also occurs, but in a different form in
these New Urbanist developments: they impose a few secondary uses with little
diversity. Put another way, from the outset, these New Urbanist projects seek a
limit on secondary uses, which does not allow for sufficient diversity. Or, put yet
another way, these New Urbanist projects seek to calm down the urban. We see
a similar thing with Smart Growth: an attempt to calm down the urban, to control
a series of disparate events, practices, and externalities. The Complete Streets
movement also dreams of accounting for everything and make streets a realm of
pure functionality. Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier provided their own
solutions to the problems of urban life, and now we are facing more ‘solutions.’
These contemporary movements – perhaps, ideologies – are in many ways
repeating history by determining in advance the problems and thus arriving at the
‘solutions.’8
!

We see this type of thinking dominating discussions at street level, too:

automobile drivers calling for synchronized traffic lights to solve their
frustrations,9 transit riders calling for an unimpeded right-of-way, cyclists calling
for bike lanes segregated from other forms of traffic to, again, allow for
unimpeded travel, and pedestrians calling for fewer patios, signs, or street
furniture, which encroaches on sidewalk space. City dwellers with environmental
concerns want more and more ‘green space,’ trees, and gardens until, it seems,
the entire city becomes a woodlot. Those who worry about safety demand stopsigns, speed-bumps, and crossing-guards in florescent vests. Resident
8

For example, nearly all contemporary urban planning movements insist on the importance of
‘walkability,’ which is a good thing, but it avoids the problem of the continued use of automobiles.
9

Synchronized traffic lights do not relieve congestion. It is extremely difficult to synchronize traffic
lights and, if successful, only invites more traffic – more congestion. See: Tom Vanderbilt, Traffic:
Why We Drive the Way We Do (and What It Says About Us) (New York: Vintage, 2009), 111–114.
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associations make futile attempts to ensure fellow residents are ‘respectable’ and
well-to-do and have presentable houses and yards. All the while, municipal
governments impose bylaws on extremely minor issues such as the minimum
height of overhanging awnings on storefronts, or the width of curb cut-outs, as
though the difference of a few centimetres is the difference between a vibrant
street and skid-row.
!

At the beginning of the short documentary film City Limits, Jane Jacobs

makes a relevant point: “We shouldn’t be frightened because problems show up
in our cities,” and toward the end of the film iterates her point: “We shouldn’t be
dismayed at the fact that our cities have problems.”10 Jacobs’ contention is that
cities are complex and do, indeed, have their share of problems from mass
transit to public health to parks, but governments and bureaucrats are not doing
a very good job of solving them. Her suggestion is to listen to the people who
actually live in so-called ‘problem’ areas, those who are affected by poor mass
transit, or those who regularly use neighbourhood parks. While Jacobs is largely
correct, I would like to discuss what underlies her argument: how precisely do we
determine what is a problem? That is, mass transit, for example, is not inherently
a problem but becomes one when, perhaps, it is not doing what we expect.
Similarly, the issues I raised above (automobile traffic, pedestrian space, safe
infrastructure, the environment, housing maintenance, etc.) are all things that are
not problems in themselves but can become problems when we judge them to be
such. I argue that there is no prescription for this judgment. There is no formula
to determine when, for example, automobile use becomes ‘too much,’ nor can
there be a predetermined ratio of trees per acre to ensure there are ‘enough.’
There is no code. These are all things that – perhaps unfortunately – require us
to make a determination, either individually or collectively. Or, as Jacobs says, we
must “depend on our wits.”11

10

City Limits, DVD, directed by Laurence Hyde (Toronto: National Film Board, 1971).

11

City Limits.
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This dissertation has discussed a number of failed attempts to avoid

making this judgment: the imposition of the grid, establishing urban parks,
Howard’s “Master-Key” and mathematical diagrams, Le Corbusier’s grandiose
plans, predetermined density ratios, and predictions from Big Data are a few
examples. But attempts to avoid this judgment go as far back as Plato: in the
Laws he argues that a polis should have “five thousand forty landholders,”12
whereas Aristotle determines that the maximum population should be the “largest
number that can be taken in at a single view.” 13 All of these plans, codes, and
other attempts at avoiding making a judgment share a means by which to ‘calm
down’ the urban, if not eradicate it. They are in the realm of Lacan’s Imaginary,
which are used in attempts to cover the gaps in the Symbolic – and they fail
because the Real returns, or, rather, it is “always in its place.”14 They fail because
of the stubborn ‘remainders’ or ‘surpluses’ of these plans, codes, and calculated
‘solutions.’
!

We have already seen a number of remainders and surpluses of the city.

The ‘voice’ in the graph of desire discussed in chapter 2 (not the ‘voice’ of the city
as a product of transference) is the remainder of the signifying operation, which I
linked to the surplus sounds of the city: buzzing of fans, honking of cars, din of
the crowd, etc. These are all, I argued, the ‘sounds of the city.’ Also from chapter
2, my discussion of Lacan’s theory of imaginary identification argued that we
identify with the flaws of the city, and that these flaws are what make a city a city.
Related is the argument that the terms ‘urban’ and ‘city’ are caught up in fantasy
and so these terms fail to live up to the attempts to define these terms. It is the
surplus (here as objet petit a) that remains in the name ‘city’ or ‘urban’ that resists
precise definitions. Urban planners who situate themselves within the university
12

Plato, The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988), 124 (Stephanus pagination: 737e). Plato chooses this number because it makes it simpler
to divide parcels of land.
13

Aristotle, “Book VII, Chapter 4” in The Politics, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. by Jonathan Barnes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 162.
14

Jacques Lacan, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter,’” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in
English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 17.
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discourse find that the ‘truth’ of the discourse is the city itself – the messiness
and apparent disorder of the city that eludes their plans for orderly distribution. Le
Corbusier thought that technology and machines would ‘liberate’ humanity from
the contingencies of life, though that would, in fact, ‘liberate’ us from life itself.
Similarly, Le Corbusier could not accept the complexities of street life, and so
proposed its eradication. Recall Lacan’s argument that “Enjoy!” is the imperative
of the superego. Žižek takes this up to suggest that in contemporary society we
are to enjoy the object, but one deprived of its dangerous element. This perhaps
best explains the sensation that New Urbanist projects are ‘candy floss towns.’
They are lacking the dangerous element; the surplus, the object of desire – the
urban, in other words – is absent. And their failure, coming across as ‘unreal,’ is
because the symptom persists as a surplus and “returns through all attempts to
domesticate it, to gentrify it.”15
!

Much, if not all, of these stubborn surpluses and remainders relate to

enjoyment. The things we love about the city are the very things that can turn into
problems. People who live in or visit the city enjoy what only the urban can offer:
its arts, music, shopping, public space, restaurants, bars, etc. But eventually
nearly all of us reach our limit, cry “too much!,” declare it a problem and seek
some form of solution or reprieve.
!

I would like to propose that this shift from enjoyment to problem can be

theorized with Lacan’s concept of the symptom or sinthome.16

I am not

suggesting a psychologization of individual city dwellers, but rather a
psychoanalysis of the city itself – putting the city on the ‘couch.’ I propose that
these ‘surpluses’ or ‘remainders’ that citizens, urban planners, governments, and
bureaucrats seek to solve or ‘calm down’ are the symptoms of the city itself. And,

15
16

Slavoj Žižek,The Sublime Object of Ideology, (London: Verso Press, 2008), 74.

This is an analytical framework which I am developing from my argument that the political is the
judgment and declaration of a limit. This theory of the city as symptom is something I will continue
to pursue in future work.

!

Conclusion!

321

following Lacan, the symptom is part of the subject’s (the city’s) jouissance; it is
the kernel of enjoyment.
!

Lacan understands symptoms much differently from traditional medicine,

which takes symptoms as manifestation of illness. In Lacan’s early work, he
theorized the symptom as a signifier that could be used to read the unconscious
“structured like a language,”17 but then later as part of the subject’s jouissance,
“as the way in which each subject enjoys the unconscious.”18 Further, Lacan
defines the symptom as a metaphor for the subject. The subject presents his or
her symptoms instead of him or her self – they are “messages about the subject
that are designed for the Other.”19 In the analyst’s discourse, as discussed in
previous chapters, symptoms arise from the analysand ($) in a whole host of
forms, even as a master signifier (¨), and “more and more aspects of a person’s
life are taken as symptoms.”20 Because the subject presents symptoms instead
of him or her self, because these symptoms are part of jouissance and the kernel
of enjoyment, and since the purpose of analysis is not necessarily to remove or
have the subject stop displaying symptoms, we end up with Žižek’s wry
comment, “Enjoy your symptom!”21
!

If we take some liberties with Lacan’s theory of the symptom (part of the

subject’s jouissance, a metaphor for the subject, describing much of subject’s
life) and take the city itself as the subject, we can rephrase Žižek: “Enjoy your
city’s symptoms!” I am suggesting that the complexities of the city, all the things

17

Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 20.
18

Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge,
2005), 189. This shift in his understanding of the symptom is represented in his use of the term
‘sinthome’ rather than ‘symptom.’ Here, however, I will only use ‘symptom.’
19

Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1995), 73.
20

Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2004), 135.
21

Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan In Hollywood and Out (New York:
Routledge, 1992).
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that citizens, planners, governments, and bureaucrats seek to ‘calm down,’ are
the symptoms of the city. And, if we treat these symptoms as symptoms, we can,
instead of seeking to eradicate or ‘calm’ them down, enjoy the city in a more
honest way than the superego’s cruel injunction to “Enjoy!” Put another way,
Simmel’s attitude of reserve is both a symptom of city life and what allows us to
enjoy the city.22
!

To take the city as symptom would mean that, instead of trying to ‘calm

down’ or eradicate the complexities of urban life, we would enjoy its complex
nature. Instead of trying to tidy up the inherent messiness of urban life, we can
experience this messiness (not necessarily disorder) as a symptom of the city, a
part of the jouissance of the city we can take part in. In fact, I would argue we
need to enjoy these symptoms of the city because they are precisely what
defines it; moreover, they are not going away. If I can put it another way, we need
to “traverse the fantasy” of the city.23 That is, we should endorse an engagement
with the city’s symptoms as symptoms and seek to neither calm them down nor
eradicate them. This would mean that we would break with the dream of a new
master in the form of a perfect urban plan or in the form of one of a series of
master signifiers that, if realized, would “solve all.”24
!

However, the problem of limit arises again. At what point does a symptom

of the city, such as a crowded street, become too much, too crowded? When
does a well-used public transit system become overused? At what point does a
city’s symptom become unbearable? Again, there is no schema to determine this
– there is no code. Foucault, as discussed in chapter 1, suggested as much: a
“good street” has miasmas and disease circulating, along with beggars, thieves,

22

Georg Simmel, “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” in Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, ed.
David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), 174–185.
23
24

Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2008), 41 and 59.

Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1992
[1961]), 433.
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and riots.25 It is worth recalling the question “Chè vuoi?” – What do you want? –
since this question is meant to have us take responsibility for our own desire. It is
up to our judgment, either individually or collectively, but I propose that thinking of
these ‘problems’ of the city as symptoms of the city changes the way we respond
and judge. We can accept these symptoms – enjoy them, even – and recognize
that eradication or radical proposals are not the ‘solution’ but only an invitation to
different (perhaps the same) problems. It might be worth recalling Foucault’s
discussion of governmentality as “the right disposition of things,” insofar as this
suggests neither full acceptance nor prohibition.26
!

Typical, if not stereotypical, suburban developments have few if any of the

symptoms noted above – and it is for this lack that they are derided and mocked.
Similarly, the towns and suburban developments based on New Urbanist
principles plan in advance to avoid any of the symptoms of urban life, since they
are based on a ‘code’ to ensure similarity while appearing to contain difference –
a “candy floss town.” It is a distribution of things, but not to a particularly
‘convenient’ end.
!

Allow me to point to Kensington Market once again. It is a wonderful

example of ‘messy urbanism,’ appearing chaotic and unorganized, but it is
actually an organized complexity. It is difficult to walk through, and even more
difficult to navigate by bike, or worse, by car. And this is because it is teeming
with people. Clearly it is doing something right since it consistently attracts so
many people. Perhaps this manifested desire and enjoyment is a way to help us
judge the limit of a symptom of the city. And yet, organizations attempt to
pedestrianize it, to control it and calm it down. It is worth remembering that very
little of what makes up Kensington today was ever planned, yet it exhibits the
very best (symptoms) of urban life. Ultimately, we need to relinquish control. We
cannot contain a city’s desire – we cannot, and should not, plan it away.
25

Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978,
ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2009), 19.
26

Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 96.
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